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ABSTRACT
UNITED NATIONS AND UNILATERAL MILITARY INTERVENTIONS: 
ADMISSIBLE JUSTMCATIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS’ RESPONSES
KINACIOGLU, Müge
Ph. D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Professor Dr. Ali Karaosmanoglu
September 2003
This study on the United Nations’ approach to unilateral military 
interventions is an analysis of the concept of military intervention in the domestic 
affairs of states and its normative development in international politics. In this 
context, the main purpose of the study is to discover the normative trends of 
legitimization in the organs of the United Nations (Security Council and General 
Assembly) and to assess the permissible state justifications of military intervention as 
endorsed by the United Nations. More specifically, it aims to expose the principle of 
non-intervention to inspection and exception, and inquire the extent of United 
Nations’ contribution to the development of international norms and trends with 
respect to military intervention in domestic affairs. For this purpose, the primary 
focus of the study is in general on the stance, and in particular on the decisions and 
actions taken by the main United Nations organs concerning the legality and 
legitimacy of military interventions undertaken by a state or group of states in the 
domestic affairs of another state with reference to individual cases.
Examining the United Nations’ responses to individual cases of military 
intervention, the study finds that the United Nations has consistently declined the
111
permissibility of unilateral military interventions in circumstances other than those 
stipulated by the Charter. Thus, the study concludes that the United Nations practice 
indicates substantial adherence to the Charter scheme regarding the prohibition of the 
use of force and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs.
Keywords: United Nations, Military Intervention, Collective Legitimization
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ÖZET
BmLEŞMÎŞ MİLLETLER VE TEK TARAFLI ASKERÎ MÜDAHALELER: 
BİRLEŞMİŞ MÎLLETLER’ÎN TEPKİLERİNDE KABUL EDİLEBİLİR 
HAKLI KILMA GEREKÇELERİ
KINACIOĞLU, Müge
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Professor Dr. Ali bCaraosmanoğlu
Eylül 2003
Birleşmiş Milletler’in tek taraflı askeri müdahalelere yaklaşımı konusundaki 
bu çahşma, devletlerin içişlerine askeri müdahale kavramı ile bunun uluslararası 
politikadaki normatif gelişiminin bir analizidir. Bu çerçevede çalışmanm temel 
amacı, Birleşmiş Milletler organlarmda (Güvenlik Konseyi ve Genel Kurul), 
normatif meşrulaştırma eğilimlerini ve askeri müdahalelerin. Birleşmiş Milletler 
tarafından onaylanmak suretiyle, izin verilebilir haklı kılma gerekçelerini ortaya 
çıkarmaktır. Daha somut olarak, bu çalışma, müdahalede bulunmama ilkesinin 
istisnalarım araştumakta ve Birleşmiş Milletler’in, içişlerine askeri müdahaleye dair 
uluslararası norm ve eğilimlerin gelişimine katkısmı değerlendirmektir. Bu amaçla, 
çalışma, genel olarak Birleşmiş Milletler’in tavrı, özel olarak ise bir üUce veya 
ülkeler grubunca diğer bir ülkenin içişlerine askeri müdahalede bulunmanın yasallığı 
ve meşruluğuna dair başlıca Birleşmiş Milletler organları tarafından alman kararlar 
ve atılan adımlar üzerine odaklanmıştır.
Çalışmada Birleşmiş MiUetler’in askeri müdahalelere ilişkin tepkileri tek tek 
iacelenerek. Birleşmiş Milletler organlarmda, BM Şartı’nda öngörülenlerin dışmdaki
tek taraflı askeri müdahaleler için öne sürülen diğer haklı kılma go'ekçelerinin 
benimsenmediği görülmüş; dolayısıyla Birleşmiş Milletler uygulamalarmm, 
içişlerine karışmama ilkesini öngören ve kuvvet kullanımım yasaklayan Şart’a bağh 
kaldığı sonucuna vanlmıştu*.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşmiş Milletler, Askeri Müdahale, Kolektif 
Meşrulaştmna
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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of non-intervention in domestic affairs is the logical corollary of the 
principle of state sovereignty. In international relations, it has been considered as the 
most significant means to cope with the “logic of anarchy” that lies at the heart of 
international politics, and thus become the main governing rule of state relations. Its 
main function therefore has come to be the primary safeguard regarding the 
preservation of order and the peaceful coexistence among states. As a principle, non­
intervention first evolved through the writings of scholars beginning from the 
eighteenth century, and was eventually codified in several treaties and other 
documents in the twentieth century.
In this context, the United Nations Charter stands as the universal framework that 
proscribes intervention in the domestic affairs of states. Being the product of the 
desire to prevent recurrence of the conflicts that had given rise to the Second World 
War, the UN Charter reflects the concern with the prohibition of the use of force in 
the relations between states. Accordingly, it aimed to establish a system for 
maintaining international peace and security through the control of use of force in 
international relations. Regarding intervention, the Charter enshrines the principle of 
non-intervention primarily in Article 2, paragraph 7, according to which the United 
Nations should refrain from intervention “in matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state.” In addition, there are other provisions in the Charter, 
particularly concerning the duties of the states and the organization, that suggest the 
primacy attached to the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. For example. 
Article 2(1) stipulates that “the Organization is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members.” For that matter. Article 2(4) requires states 
“to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”
Notwithstanding the prevailing norm of non-intervention, the issue of intervention 
has never ceased to be a recurring phenomenon that international community has had 
to confront. In the modem history of world politics, the role, character, frequency 
and methods of intervention varied depending partly on the nature of international 
system i.e. the stracture of power, and partly on the moral foundations of the 
international society. The prevalence of intervention in world politics led one leading 
scholar to refer to intervention in the late 1960s as “a central problem of world 
politics.”  ^ Similarly, another prominent international relations scholar maintained 
that intervention was “a ubiquitous feature of modem international relations, perhaps 
even an inherent feature of it.”  ^One other scholar even goes further and equates the 
subject of intervention with “international politics in general from the beginning of 
time to the present.” Thus, the concept of intervention remains to be “both important
and very topical. *yA
‘ James N. Rosenau, “Intervention as a Scientific Concept,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution 13:2 
(1969), 160.
 ^ Hedley Bull, “Introduction” in Hedley Bull (ed.). Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), 2.
 ^ Stanley Hoffinann, “The Problem of Intevention” in Hedley Bull (ed.). Intervention in World 
Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 7.
*Ibid
Generally speaking, the distinctive element of intervention is considered to be its 
coercive nature. In this sense, intervention includes both forcible and non-forcible 
interference. It comprises a spectrum of political and economic policies as well as 
military action. Among these, acts of interference involving the actual use of force 
stands out as the most controversial form of interference with regards to the norm 
proscribing intervention in the internal affairs, since legitimation of the use of force 
to affect or change the course of internal affairs is much more problematic.
This study on the UN approach to unilateral military interventions is an analysis of 
the concept of military intervention in the domestic affairs of states and its normative 
development in international politics. The problem is not necessarily the law-making 
process in the UN. Rather, it is the normative trends of legitimization of specific 
justifications of military interventions in the organs of the UN. Thus, the main 
purpose of this study is to extrapolate these normative trends of legitimization and to 
assess the permissible state justifications of military intervention as endorsed by the 
UN. More specifically, it aims to expose the principle of non-intervention to 
inspection and exception, and inquire the extent of UN’s contribution to the 
development of international norms and trends with respect to military intervention 
in domestic affairs. For this purpose, the primary focus will be in general on the 
stance, and in particular on the decisions and actions taken by the main United 
Nations organs, namely the General Assembly and the Security Council, concerning 
the legality and legitimacy of military interventions undertaken by a state or group of 
states in the domestic affairs of another state with reference to individual cases. As
such, the study investigates the approach adopted by the UN in relation to specific 
justifications invoked by states undertaking the act of interference.
Given the purpose of the study, it is appropriate to make a few preliminary 
observations about ‘legitimacy’ as well as the role played by the UN in 
legitimization. The notion of legitimacy in this study largely draws on Inis Claude’s 
seminal work on the collective legitimization function of the United Nations. As Inis 
Claude observes, politics is not only “a struggle for power but also a contest over 
legitimacy.”  ^ That is not to imply that power and legitimacy have an antithetical 
relationship. In fact, legitimacy supplements power, as the “obverse of the legitimacy 
of power is the power of legitimacy.”® Thus, actors seek legitimization to bolster 
their policies. Inis Claude identifies two aspects of the discussions of political 
legitimacy, namely law and morality. Lawyers are inclined to define legitimacy as a 
mere translation of ‘legality.’ Moralists, in a similar way, tend to approach the issue 
of political legitimacy as a question of moral justification. Claude argues that 
although both law and morality stand as powerful grounds for legitimization, in the 
final analysis legitimization is a political process, which is not entirely governed by 
legal rules and moral principles: “Judges and priests and philosophers usually make 
themselves heard, but they do not necessarily have the last word.”  ^ Moreover, he 
contents that as much as law and morality may reinforce each other in some cases, 
they may also come into conflict in other cases. Hence, what is significant from this 
perspective is the agency of legitimization, i.e. who is accepted as “the authoritative
 ^ M s L. Claude, Jr., ‘Xbllective Legitimization as a Political Fimction of the United Nations,” 
International Organization, 20:3 (1966), reprinted in M s L. Claude, States and the Global System: 
Politics, Law and Organization (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), 146.
^Ibid.
interpreter of the principle” and how the process of legitimization takes place rather 
than the principles of legitimacy themselves.® In other words, principles of 
legitimacy may change or their application may be unchain and ambiguous, but 
what gains greater significance is the nature of the process itself.
In the light of the above presuppositions, the United Nations appear as the most 
prominent international organization undertaking a function of collective 
legitimization i.e. setting a hallmark of approval. Although it can be argued that the 
UN hardly represents the world society, it would be reasonable to assert that it 
embodies a critical mass of actors. In addition, it is recognized by states as the most 
respected forum for the representation of global general will. As Claude observes, 
“its [the United Nations] status as an institution approximating universality give it 
obvious advantages for playing the role of custodian of the seals of international 
approval or disapproval.”^
A few remarks should also be made concerning norms in order to underline the 
significance of the subject. Norms of legitimacy comprising legal, political and moral 
elements constitute one of the main determining factors in international politics. 
They set a “standard of appropriate behavior for actors within a given identity”*® and 
they function as constraining and enabling frameworks for state behavior. In this 
respect, one can question the power of norms in international politics by pointing out 
the discrepancy between the acceptance of norms in principle and the instances of
 ^Ibid., 147.
^Ibid., 148.
 ^Ibid., 150.
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,”
International Organization 52:4 (1998), 891.
their breach in practice. However, whether the actor is genuine or not is beyond the 
point, for what matters is the need felt by the actor to legitimate its behavior and to 
take actions compatible with the declared principles. Within the context of military 
interventions, this assumption would lead one to examine the justifications rather 
than mix of various motivations for intervention. Despite the conventional approach 
in the International Relations discipline that would argue that justifications are mere 
fig leaves for the disguise of self-interests, from the perspective of this study, 
consistent endorsement of certain justifications is essential in the evolution of 
standards of behavior of state conduct.
Having established the importance of the study in the context of collective 
legitimization and norm development, it is also necessary to look at the state of 
existing literature. As mentioned above, the concept and practice of intervention is a 
burning issue in international relations, and thus there exist several studies regarding 
the subject. The studies on the definition of the concept aside, the literature on 
intervention mainly focuses on normative and empirical implications of intervention 
and non-intervention in the international relations. On the empirical side, many of the 
important cases of intervention have been studied at length. Indeed, most of the 
literature on intervention is limited to historical case studies and/or a great power’s 
interventionary behavior. Among these, there are studies that have looked at the 
relationship between the pattern of intervention and the structure of the international 
system. Raymond and Kegley, for example, analyze intervention in relation to cycles 
of power concentration and déconcentration in the international system.“  They
" G. A. Raymond and C. W. Kegley, “Long Cycles and Internationalized Civil War,” Journal o f 
Politics 49 (1987), 481-499.
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examine interventions in civil wars in the period between 1816 and 1980. Most of the 
post-Cold War studies of interventions focus on specific cases of intervention such as 
Liberia, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and Kosovo, or great power policies. In that 
respect, Richard N. Haas in Intervention, The Use o f American Military Force in the 
Post-Cold War World, scrutinizes the debate on the use of military forces within the 
United States and looks at the recent cases of US intervention.
In addition to the body of empirical research, there are also sizeable number of 
normative studies of questions relating to intervention and non-intervention. In this 
respect, the most celebrated account of the development of non-intervention as a 
principle, doctrine and practice is R. J. Vincent’s Nonintervention and International 
Order (1974), which examines the doctrines of non-intervention held by individual 
states and groups of states, and analyzes the function that the principle fulfills in the 
international system and its contribution to international order. One other notable 
normative work that traces the doctrines of intervention and non-intervention is 
Thomas and Thomas’s Non-Intervention, the Law and Its Import in the Americas 
(1956). On the other hand, some studies focus on the tension between the non­
intervention principle and the growing concern about the violation of human rights. 
In his book. Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (1987), 
Tesón argues that the conception of international law should be reformulated with a 
view to take into consideration the major dilemma between absolute adherence to the 
principle of non-intervention and promotion of human rights. Addressing the same 
question, Walzer, in Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical 
Illustrations (1977), contends that unless there are extreme cases where massacre,
genocide or enslavement is involved, intervention cannot be justified. Other recent
7
studies in the concept and practice of humanitarian interventions, and normative 
dilemmas involved, include, among others, Francis Kofi Abiew’s The Evolution o f 
the Doctrine and Practice o f Humanitarian Intervention (1998); Stephan A. Garrett’s 
Doing Good and Doing Well, An Examination o f Humanitarian Intervention (1999) 
and Nicholas Wheeler’s Saving Strangers, Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society (2000).
As to the inquiries of the United Nations and intervention, the studies generally
center on the operational functions of the organization such as its programs in
various areas or individual/general peacekeeping missions. With respect to the UN
and military interventions, studies are also mostly limited to individual cases or to
interventions with specific purposes. Most prominent recent work in that respect is
Sean Murphy’s Humanitarian Intervention, the United Nations in an Evolving World
Order (1996). On the other hand, there are also studies, which scrutinize the issues
arising out of UN’s involvement in internal conflicts. One significant work that
investigates the question of international organizations’competence in the resolution
of internal conflicts within the context of principle of non-intervention in domestic
affairs is Ali Klaraosmanoglu’s book, îç Çatışmaların Çözümü ve Uluslararası
Örgütler (Resolution of Internal Conflicts and International Organizations) (1981).
Among more recent studies regarding the UN’s participation in specific
interventions, are Enforcing Restraint, Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts
edited by LxJii Fişler Damrosch (1993); The UN Security Council and Human Rights
by Sydney D. Bailey (1994); Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping edited by Donald C.
F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (1995); The United Nations and Civil Wars edited by
Thomas G. Weiss (1995); The New Interventionism, I99I-I994, United Nations
8
Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia edited by James Mayall 
(1996); The UN, Peace and Force edited by Michael Pugh (1997). Finally, there are 
general international law studies concerning the use of force and the United Nations, 
such as International Law and the Use o f Force, Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm 
(1993) by Anthony Clark and Robert J. Beck, and Uluslararası Hukukta Kuvvet 
Kullanma: Savaş, Karışma ve Birleşmiş Milletler (The Use of Force in International 
Law: War, Intervention and the United Nations) (1998) by Funda Keskin.
From this brief survey of literature, it appears that the legitimization function of the 
United Nations and its consequent role in the development of the normative fabric of 
international society are often overlooked in the political analyses of the United 
Nations and intervention. Since examination of the UN participation in isolated cases 
of military intervention would not display the trends in the normative development, 
in order to discern the cumulative impact of repeated endorsement of a specific 
position, the challenging task remains to be the conduct of a comprehensive and 
systematic study of the UN reactions to military intervention in domestic affairs as 
manifested in the General Assembly and the Security Council since its inception. By 
filling this gap with such research, this study intends to contribute significantly to the 
international relations literature on the subject of intervention.
The scope of the study is limited to unilateral military interventions. Given the main
purpose of this study as the determination of the normative trends in the
legitimization of the justifications of military interventions by the United Nations,
the UN reactions to all military actions fulfilling the working definition of
intervention in the study are considered. The term ‘unilateral’ in this study is similar
9
to its use by international lawyers as opposed to its use by most social scientists. 
Whereas the latter employ the term to denote a decision or action by a single state, 
the former use the term to refer to ‘non-authorized’ action and thus of uncertain 
legality regardless of the number of states that have undertaken that action. Since the 
center of attention in this study is the rationalization and acceptability of the military 
intervention rather than the mix of the various motivations behind it, unilateral 
interventions will be examined on the basis of justifications of the intervening state 
and the subsequent reaction of the UN. In order to discern the general tendencies of 
the UN and their subsequent contribution to the evolution of normative fabric 
regarding intervention, the time frame it covers comprises both the Cold War period 
and the post-Cold War era. The study, however, does not make a distinction between 
Cold War and post-Cold War periods, as it is concerned with investigation of 
continuity/discontinuity in the UN reaction towards particular justifications 
regardless of the systemic changes.
As such, the study starts its research from 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary. The 
reason for this is the assumption that any evaluation of the normative tendencies in 
the UN reaction could be revealing after mid-1950s, since it is then onwards that the 
UN membership had attained an adequate level of universality.^^ This study, 
however, does not extend the analysis to the military interventions undertaken after 
September 11 incident, though they have revitalized the debate on military 
intervention in domestic affairs. Although the subsequent interventions, most notably 
the US military action against Iraq in March 2003, appears to have brought about
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new political and moral justifications for military intervention, such as the regime 
change and the prohibition of the WMD proliferation, it would be too premature to 
conclude that it has substantially changed the normative framework regarding 
intervention. In other words, it is too early to decide whether the US justifications 
raised for military intervention in the aftermath of September 11 will be employed by 
other states as legal grounds for defending their future interventions or they will 
remain representing an exceptional case. In this sense, the analysis of UN reaction to 
these cases will not yet demonstrate a certain UN trend regarding those particular 
justifications, and will be limited to ‘describing’ only the UN reaction to September 
11 related instances of intervention. Thus, for the purposes of the study, these 
interventions are not considered in the present research.
A final note should be made with regards to the limitation of the subject matter. The 
study concerns military interventions in the ‘domestic affairs’ of a recognized 
sovereign state. Hence, interstate aggression and the subsequent responses are out of 
the confines of this study. For example, the case of Iraq is considered in terms of the 
collective measures taken as a response to its repressive policies to its own ethnic 
and religious groups, namely Kurds and Shi’ites, rather than with respect to the US- 
led military campaign in response to its invasion of Kuwait.
Within the context of the purpose and the scope of the present study, three general 
hypotheses arise:
The United Nations had 60 members between 1950-1954. In 1955, the membership reached 76, and 
in 1956, it increased to 81.
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By consistently endorsing the justifications other than those provided in the 
Charter, the United Nations reactions to individual cases of unilateral military 
intervention have made the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of 
non-intervention in internal affairs laid down in the UN Charter futile. Thus, 
the UN practice represents a complete break with the Charter framework 
regarding these rules.
By consistently approving certain justifications other than those provided in 
the Charter, the United Nations reactions to individual cases of unilateral 
military intervention have introduced exceptions to the ban on the use of 
force and principle of non-intervention in internal affairs other than those 
provided in the UN Charter. As a result, the UN practice suggests the 
adaptation of the Charter framework regarding these rules.
By consistently declining the permissibility of unilateral military 
interventions in circumstances other than those stipulated by the Charter, the 
United Nations reactions to individual cases of unilateral military intervention 
have abided by the exceptions explicitly laid down in the UN Charter. 
Therefore, the UN practice indicates complete adherence to the Charter 
scheme regarding the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non­
intervention in internal affairs.
In order to test these hypotheses, the study is divided into three parts. The first part 
examines the conceptual and legal framework of the study. It first discusses the
concept of intervention with an emphasis on its specific aspects and provides a
12
historical overview of state interventions. It then analyzes the rule of non­
intervention at the United Nations by looking at the relevant provisions of the 
Charter, the exceptions stipulated by the Charter, and the General Assembly 
resolutions. Within this ftamework, the study moves on to the analysis of UN 
reactions to the specific justifications invoked by states. In this context, the second 
part scrutinizes the exceptions contained in the rule of non-intervention, namely self- 
defense and consent of the target state, as justifications of military interventions. The 
third part, on the other hand, focuses on other justifications that have been raised, 
which are not explicitly laid down by the Charter, and discusses the UN reactions to 
such interventions. These justifications comprise self-determination, protection of 
nationals abroad and intervention for humanitarian ends. The military interventions 
defended on humanitarian grounds are distinguished from the first two by their 
association with “general interest.” Because this aspect raises additional questions of 
UN involvement within the context of its main purposes -maintenance of peace and 
security and promotion of human rights-, and its interference in domestic affairs, 
humanitarian intervention is examined under a separate chapter. For assessing UN’s 
application of the norm of non-intervention in the context of specific justifications 
for military intervention, the chapters under Part II and Part n i first analyze the 
position of the justification in question within general international law and the UN 
Charter with special attention to interpretative legal contentions, if any, then provides 
the state views and the UN responses regarding the justification in question. Finally, 
in the light of the findings of Part II and Part HI, the conclusion provides an overall 
assessment of the UN’s interpretation and application of the principle of non­
intervention in domestic affairs in general and of the permissible grounds of
intervention in particular within the framework provided by Part I of the study.
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PARTI
THEORETICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
CHAPTER I:
INTERVENTION: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
One of the common observations of scholars about intervention is that there is no 
precise and generally acknowledged definition of the term. Rather, the concept is 
used in a vague way and considered to include a diverse range of activities. This is 
partly due to the ambiguous nature of intervention, that is, the difficulty in 
distinguishing it from everyday interactions between states. One of the most quoted 
observations in this regard is the nineteenth century French statesman Talleyrand’s 
claim that there is practically no difference between intervention and non­
intervention. Furthermore, the complexity of the concept also stems from the
interplay of the main constitutive elements of international relations, namely power,
14
self-interest, international law and morality, in the act of intervention. Thus, it can be 
argued that intervention is a gray area where different forces and elements of 
international politics meet in varying degrees. Indeed, the literature on the concept is 
so unclear that James Rosenau has observed that writing on intervention seems to be 
taken by some as “a licence for undisciplined thought.”^
On the other hand, the concept of intervention usually defined as the breach of 
sovereignty and encroachment of independence in international law has remained the 
accepted formula of intervention since the eighteenth-century. The prevailing norm is 
the rule of non-intervention as implied by the state system based on the principle of 
sovereignty and equality.^ In other words, the norm proscribing intervention in the 
internal affairs of states has come to represent the flip side of the norm upholding 
sovereignty.^ Hence, traditional legal understanding conceives intervention in 
normative terms and regards it as a deviation from the recognized norm of non­
intervention. Nevertheless, an overview of state relations in the nineteenth century 
shows that intervention was a common feature of international affairs and an 
instrument of statecraft.
This chapter aims to give a general presentation of the concept of intervention, sketch 
out the historical antecedents of the principle of non-intervention, and review the 
practice of intervention prior to the United Nations Charter. Given the ambivalent and 
complex nature of intervention, the discussion of this concept focuses on its various *
* James Rosenau, “The Concept o f Intervention,” Journal o f International Affairs 22:2 (1968), 173.
 ^ Seha L. Meray, Devletler Hukukuna Giriş, İkinci Cilt (Introduction to International Law, Vol. II) 
(Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1965), 394.
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components in order to avoid confusion and provide a basis for developing a working 
definition of intervention in this study. A historical appraisal of the idea of non­
intervention will illuminate how it was articulated as a principle and doctrine, and 
inquire why it was deemed to be a requirement of international conduct in the 
writings of major classical legal scholars and political thinkers. Finally, the 
examination of the particular representative cases of state practice in the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century intends to shed light on how the idea of non­
intervention was reflected in interstate relations, and more precisely, the extent to 
which it guided state behavior as a rule.
1.1. DEFINITION AND CONCEPT OF INTERVENTION 
1. 1.1. Intervention Defined
Since the end of the nineteenth century, primarily international law scholars have 
taken up the task of crafting definitions of interventions. Within the literature of 
international relations, on the other hand, intervention is analyzed and classified with 
respect to its types and forms, rather than conceptualized and specifically defined. 
For the purpose of distinguishing intervention from the interplay of different forms of 
power in international politics, it is necessary to delimit the concept and examine its 
major components.
 ^ Aime-Marie Slaughter Burley and Carl Kaysen, “Introductory Note: Emerging Norms of Justified 
Intervention” in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen (eds,). Emerging Norms o f Justified Intervention
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1 .1 .1 .1 . Intervention as a Type of Activity
One way of drawing the boundaries of intervention is by reference to the type of 
activity it involves. Literally speaking, intervention is any act of “interference in any 
affair” with the aim of affecting its direction or outcome."  ^Within the context of state 
relations, in his article “Intervention as a Scientific Concept,” Rosenau concludes that 
many observers define intervention as “any action whereby one state has an impact 
upon the atiiairs of another.”  ^ This definition suggests that “every act of a state 
constitutes intervention.”  ^ In this respect, several scholars have contended that 
intervention is always present and inevitable in international politics, and more 
specifically, constitutes an inherent feature of international relations. For example, 
Weiss equates intervention with the practice of international relations, “which by 
definition consists of efforts by governments to influence the behavior of other 
states.”  ^In its widest interpretation then, intervention becomes a catch-all phrase, and 
may refer to any foreign policy conduct.® From this perspective, even an official 
communication concerning an action of one state might count as intervention.^
(Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993), 13.
 ^ R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1974), 7.
 ^ James N. Rosenau, “Intervention as a Scientific Concept,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution 13:2 
(1969), 153.
® Stanley Hoffinann, ‘The Problem of Intervention” in Hedley Bull (ed.). Intervention in World 
Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 7-8.
 ^Thomas G. Weiss, “Humanitarian Interventions in a New Era,” World Policy Journal 11:1 (1994), 
59.
® Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, “Introduction: International Intervention, State 
Sovereignty, and the Future of International Society” in Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno 
(eds.). Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Relations (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University ^ ess, 1995), 10.
 ^ Ann Van Wyen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, The Law and Its Import in the 
Americas (Dallas: SouthOTi Methodist University Press, 1956), 68.
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Notwithstanding these broad interpretations, in scholarly discourse as well as in state 
conduct, the term intervention generally came to label the foreign attempts to 
influence domestic or external affairs of states. Early in the twentieth century, the 
well-known jurist Oppenheim qualified the act of interference by underlining its 
dictatorial nature. According to this view, intervention comprises those acts which 
constitute “dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another state for the 
purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of things.”’® This 
understanding of intervention goes beyond endeavors seeking to influence others’ 
actions. In other words, it excludes regular power relationships in world politics. 
Instead, the emphasis on the dictatorial nature of intervention presumes a notion of 
coercion. As BelofP observes, intervention is an attempt by one state aiming to “affect 
the internal structure and external behavior of other states through various degrees of 
coercion.””  In this sense, intervention involves the activities that impair a state’s 
external independence or territorial authority by imposing a certain order of things on 
a state without its consent.
Within this context, scholars differ on whether coercion implies merely the use of 
force or also the threat of such force. On the one hand, some argue that differences in 
power may always involve an implicit threat of force in any relationship between a 
great and a small power. For example, Vincent maintains that identifying acts as 
intervention on the basis of coercion may be too inclusive, since a lesser power may 
claim any act of interference by a great power as coercive because of the “implicit
Hersch Lauterpacht (ed.), L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, VoL I -  Peace (London; 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), 305. For a similar definition, see Meray, Devletler Hukukuna Giriş, 
395.
" Max Beloff, “Reflections on Intervention,” Journal o f International Affairs 22:2 (1968), 198.
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threat of force which a powerful state can hold over a weak state.”'^ On the other 
hand, some writers claim that coercion need not entail the utilization of force. For 
example, Castel holds that “it is the coercive nature of an act of interference which 
makes that act intervention, whether the act in question involves the use of force or 
merely economic and political pressure.” The key aspect, he notes, is the intention of 
the intervening state “to coerce the sovereign will of the other state.” Similarly, 
Thomas and Thomas contend that the implication of force in definitions of 
intervention narrows the subject too much, and leaves out acts of interference of 
political and economic nature. In addition, they argue that such a restricted approach 
is not only inaccurate, but also dangerous, for “it excuses various types of 
interference that have often occurred.”*^  Similarly, Vincent notes that confining 
‘intervention’ to those activities that utilize or threaten force may also become too 
exclusive, since it might “fail to capture the reality of dictatorial behavior in spheres 
like that of international economic relations.” In a comparable fashion, Hoffmann 
also maintains that coercive activities that count as intervention need not involve 
force and may not entail a clear dictatorial interference; yet, may still constitute 
intervention to the extent that they aim to force an actor to do something which it 
would not do otherwise.'^ Hence, according to him too, delimiting the definition of 
intervention in terms of acts of dictatorial interference involving force would be 
reductive and misleading.
Vincent, Nonintervention, 8. For a similar idea, see Ernst B. Haas, Beware the Slippery Slope: Notes 
Toward the Definition o f Justifiable Intervention, Policy PapCTs in International Affairs No. 42 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1993), 6-7.
J. G. Castel, International Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1976), 55.
Thomas and Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, 68.
Ibid., 69.
16 Vincent, Nonintervention, 8.
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In line with the conceptions of intervention just reviewed, Hedley Bull deBnes
intervention as “dictatorial or coercive interference in the sphere of jurisdiction of a
sovereign state, or more broadly of an independent political community.” Aigtiing
that intervention is not a single course of action, he states that:
“Intervention in this sense may be forcible or non-forcible (as 
when it takes the form of economic coercion). It may be 
direct or indirect (as when a major power uses a minor power 
as its agent or proxy). It may be open or clandestine (as when 
the instruments being employed are under the control of 
secret intelligence agencies).”’“
Bull emphasizes that a “basic condition” for any action to be called interventionary is 
that the intervening actor be superior in power to the target of intervention. In his 
view, the question of “dictatorial or coercive” interference stems from the relative 
superior strength of the intervenor vis-à-vis the target.
One other significant discussion of intervention in the literature is Rosenau’s attempt 
to operationalize the concept of intervention. During the 1960s’ behavioral approach 
to international relations, Rosenau argued that intervention was distinguished from 
other types of state activity by two characteristics. First, it represents a clear break 
with the prevailing pattern of relations between the intervening and target states; and 
second, it is essentially directed to either change or preserve the structure of political 
authority in the target state.^ Thus, as expressed by Rosenau, the two defining 
attributes of intervention are its characteristics of being “convention-breaking” and
’’ Stanley Hofhnann, ‘The Problem of Intervention,” 9-10.
Hedley Bull, “Introduction” in Bull (ed.). Intervention in World Politics, 1.
19 Ibid.
“  Rosenau, ‘The Concept of IntCTvention,”167; Rosenau, “Intervention as a Scientific Concept,” 161.
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“authority-oriented.” Consequently, despite the fact that it is a recurrent feature of 
international politics, each intervention is a distinct action.^^
As such, with respect to the type of activity, common to the traditional conceptions of 
intervention in the literature is the idea that intervention covers a wide range of acts 
intended to change or maintain state behavior in a particular issue area. However, the 
most important aspect in qualifying an act of interference as intervention seems to be 
the existence of compulsion or threat, “whether by armed force or by diplomacy, 
whether concealed or open, whether direct or indirect.”^^
1. 1 .1 .2 . Intervention Defined by Reference to the Type of Actor
hiterventions are also distinguished by reference to the nature and number of actors 
that carry them out. The intervening party may be one single state or a group of states. 
In addition, regional or universal international organizations may also be possible 
intervening actors.^^ hi some views, the actor may also be a business corporation or a 
political party, to the extent that they are supported by a state or act on behalf of a
state.24
An alternative classification of interventions with respect to the type of actor is the 
distinction between unilateral and multilateral interventions. In this respect, the key 
difference is often considered to be the legitimacy factor. Generally speaking, 
unilateral intervention is believed to serve the self-interest of the power that
Vincent, Nonintervention, 8.
^  Thomas and Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, 69.
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undertakes the intervening. In addition, intervention by one state is also assumed to 
upset the existing balance of power among states. For these reasons, unilateral 
intervention is generally “an activity that is not socially approved within the modem 
international community.”^  By contrast, collective intervention is usually authorized 
by an international organization, and thus enjoys a wider basis for legitimacy. It also 
differs from unilateral intervention with respect to its aims. As opposed to advancing 
one individual state’s own interests, collective intervention is undertaken for 
collective purposes, such as restoring peace, preserving the status quo, the prevention 
of power rivalries among states or reinstating humanitarian values.^ In this sense, 
collective intervention is generally regarded as having a positive function in 
promoting the common good. As a result, it often possesses a certain degree of 
legitimacy, which is hardly ever attributed to unilateral intervention.
1 .1 .1 .3 . Intervention Defined in Relation to the Target
It is conventionally accepted that the target of intervention, i.e. the one against whom 
intervention is directed, is a sovereign state. However, the question in this respect 
remains to be the domain targeted by the intervention. In this respect, scholars usually 
identify two broad categories, namely the internal affairs of a state and its external 
activities. By external activities, it is referred to the foreign relations of a sovereign 
state, while the internal affairs imply the domestic arrangements and internal 
developments of a state.
^ Vincent, Nonintervention, 4-5.
^  Hofftnann, “The Problem of Intervention,” 10.
22
Some writers contend that intervention may target either or both. For example. Bull 
argues that the target of intervention is the jurisdiction of a sovereign state, whereby 
“the jurisdiction that is being interfered with can be a state’s jurisdiction over its 
territory, its citizens, its right to determine its internal affairs or to conduct its external 
relations.”^  Likewise, Brierly confines intervention to those “acts of interference 
either in the domestic or the foreign affairs of another state, which violate that state’s 
independence.” ®^ Vincent echoes the view that the separation between ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ is useful in depicting the boundaries of intervention, although he notes that 
the distinction may sometimes be blurred due to the changing nature of the
conception of “domestic affairs”.29
On the other hand, some scholars maintain that there exists no valid distinction 
between internal and external affairs. Since intervention targets a sovereign state, it is 
essentially directed at the independence of a state, which is made up of both external 
and internal independence. In other words, internal and external independence are 
part of the same crucial rule of ‘independence.’ Thus, the key reference with regards 
to the destination of intervention is a state’s independence.^ ®
Yet, there are other writers who argue that the concept of intervention should be 
restricted to those acts of interference only in the internal affairs of states. For 
example, Hoffmann proposes to confine intervention to “acts aimed at affecting the
“  Evan Luard, “Collective Intervention” in Bull (ed.). Intervention in World Politics, 157. 
^  Ibid., 158-159.
2 7,
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Bull, “Introduction,” 1.
J. L. Brierly, The Law o f Nations, An Introduction to the International Law o f Peace (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1942), 247.
® Vincent, Nonintervention, 5-6.
^  Thomas and Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, 70.
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domestic affairs of the state.”^^  The rationale of this limitation, he explains, is two­
fold: Because intervention either aspires to control the state itself, or because 
impinging on domestic affairs is considered to be “the best way of influencing the
external behavior of a state.
1. 1 .1 .4 . Types of Intervention
Interventions may take different forms, and are usually classified by the type of acts 
involved in the interference. In this context, scholars first underline that intervention 
should be distinguished from war. Thomas and Thomas, for example, point out that 
intervention should not be classified as war in cases where force is employed. They 
argue that the difference between intervention by force and war depends on the intent 
of the intervening state and the consent of the state intervened.^^ It is intervention, not 
war, they explain,
“If the intervening state, despite its hostile conduct, intends 
the continuance of uninterrupted peaceful relations, and 
further if the state intervened acquiesces in that attitude by 
failing to declare war.” '^^
On the other hand, in most analyses, intervention is generally located along a range of
activities, with violation of international frontiers at the one end, and sheer diplomatic
pressure at the other. At one extreme lies the military intervention, i.e. intervention by
force. Pearson defines foreign military intervention as follows:
“Foreign military intervention is defined as the movement of 
troops or military forces by one independent country, or a 
group of countries in concert, across the border of another
Hoffmann, “The Problem of IntCTvention,” 10. 
^  Ibid., 10-11.
Thomas and Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, 73. 
^Ibid.
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independent country (or colony of an independent country), 
or actions by troops already stationed in the target country.”^^
Vincent extends the definition of military intervention to include military aid as well,
and qualifies it with certain purposes. He maintains that military intervention takes
place “when troops are dispatched to keep order or to support a revolution in a
foreign state, or when military aid is given to a government whose internal position is
insecure or which is in conflict with a neighboring state.» 3 6
Within the broad spectrum of instruments of intervention, the other types of 
intervention most often referred to are economic and political interventions, although 
these types of interventions do not always satisfy Rosenau’s definitional formula of 
“authority-breaking,” i.e. directly aiming to change the authority structure. While 
economic intervention includes economic pressure such as trade and credit sanctions, 
boycotts, embargoes; political intervention encompasses measures like subsidies and 
aid to revolutionary groups, to opponents of a regime, or to shaky governments and
implicit activities such as bribery and propaganda campaign 37
Alternatively, distinctions in the types of intervention are also made with respect to 
the purpose of intervention. The aim of intervention connotes the desired end. In the 
history of interventions, it is possible to distinguish various patterns according to the 
purposes envisioned as resulting from the interventions.^* Nevertheless, a general
Frederic S. Pearson, “Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes,” International Studies 
Quarterly 18:3 (1974), 261.
Vincent, Nonintervention^ 9.
Hoffmann, ‘The Problem of Intervention,’’ 9-10. For acts under economic and political 
interventions, see also, Haas, Beware the Slippery Slope^ 7-8.
Martin Ortega, for example, distinguished ten patterns of military intervention: imperialistic, 
colonial, balance of power, ideological, self-determination, self-defense. Cold War pattern of 
intervention, humanitarian intervention, collective intervention, punitive intervention. Martin Ortega,
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classification is often made between interventions for the purpose of maintaining 
balance of power, interventions carried out for ideological reasons, and interventions 
for humanitarian interests.^’ It might seem that the classiftcation of interventions on 
the basis of purposes in fact introduces little input for defining intervention. However, 
from international law perspective, the distinction is considered to be pertinent in the 
assessment of the legality of interventions. Grouping interventions with respect to 
purposes does, however, involve certain difficulties. To begin with, an intervention 
may have a combination of different purposes, which makes the task of fitting the 
intervention into one category problematic. Another difficulty involved in such a 
classification emanates from the possible discrepancy between the declared purpose 
and the real motives of the intervening state. In other words, the official justification 
of an intervention may often be challenged as being a cover for the real intentions of 
the intervener.
From the above analysis of definitions of intervention with reference to its various 
aspects, one may deduce that intervention occurs when a state or group of states - 
whether acting as a coalition or under the authority of an international or regional 
organization- interferes in the external or internal affairs of another state against its 
will, to compel that state to do an act which it would not do in the absence of such 
coercion, with the aim of maintaining or altering particular conditions or behavior of 
the target state.
Military Intervention and the European Union, Chaillot Paper 45 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 
2001), 5-7.
”  See for example, Vincent, Nonintervention, 11.
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Most notably, four conditions appear to characterize an act as intervention. First, the 
target state must be widely acknowledged as sovereign. Unless the object of the 
intervention is recognized as a sovereign state enjoying the right to non-interference, 
the act would not constitute an intervention violating state independence. Second, 
intervention comprises acts intended to influence the internal affairs of a state, rather 
than designed to annex or conquest that state. There are degrees of pressure in the act 
of interference. However, it differs from military confrontation, whose aim is to take 
over a state indefinitely. An intervention is for a defined and transitional period. Thus, 
although intervention embraces the risk of escalation, it is a “temporary and finite 
phenomenon.”^  Third, an act is considered intervention when the target state resists 
it. In other words, if the act is invited or agreed upon, it becomes the provision of 
support to a willing state, and thus will not qualify as a case of intervention. Fourth, 
not all types of influence qualify as intervention. In this respect, the influence of 
economic, foreign and other policies of some or one state on the lives of the citizens 
of other state(s) will not classify as interference, for the reason that intervention 
implies an anticipated and direct influence rather than involuntary and minor
impact.'41
1 .1 .2 . Working Definition of Intervention in this Study
Taking into account the above survey of the conventional definitions of intervention, 
it is necessary to select the characteristics that will define intervention to enable the
Rosenau, ‘The Concept o f Intervention,”167.
For a detailed elaboration o f the conditions to be satisfied for an act to be counted as an 
intervention, see Bhikhu Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” International Political 
Science Review 8:1 (1997), 53-54.
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systematic examination and interpretation of the questions under scrutiny in this 
study.
For the purposes of the present research, drawing mainly upon the definitions of 
Rosenau and Bull, this study defines intervention as the coercive interference of an 
external agency, whether a state, a group of states or an international body, in the 
internal affairs of another state in a manner that disturbs the conventional pattern of 
their relations, with the aim of rearranging its domestic political order, including its 
authority structure and domestic policies, in a particular fashion. Although 
intervention defined in terms of these aspects need not involve the use of armed force, 
this study limits its research to interventions undertaken as unsolicited acts of military 
interference in a sovereign state’s conduct of internal affairs. Following Pearson’s 
definition, military intervention is taken to be the organized physical transgression of 
the borders of a recognized state. Therefore, in this study the key guides to the 
incidence of intervention are the use of force and the conception of intrusion in 
domestic affairs.
Notwithstanding the prevalence of the incidents of intervention, under international 
law, it is firmly established that interference in the domestic affairs of other states is 
an illegal act. Consequently, whether defined broadly or narrowly, the debate on 
intervention in the scholarly literature has sought to discern exceptions to the rule of 
non-intervention. Thus, in order to grasp the phenomenon of intervention, it is 
necessary to examine the idea of non-intervention as it evolved through the most 
rewarding writings of legal scholars as well as political thinkers.
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1. 2. LEGAL AND POLITICAL PRECURSORS OF NON-INTERVENTION 
AS A DOCTRINE AND PRINCIPLE
Having defined intervention, non-intervention can be said to be the condition in 
which intervention does not take place.'^ ^ At the outset, it should be underlined that 
non-intervention as a concept is intrinsically related to the theory of sovereignty, and 
thus, as a rule emanates from the norm of sovereignty. It provides a standard in state 
behavior, an obligation of refraining from interference in each other’s affairs."^  ^
Hence, before contemplating the development of the rule of non-intervention in the 
writings of legal scholars and political philosophers, a few remarks should be made 
concerning the linkage between the norm of sovereignty and the principle of non­
intervention.
1 .2 .1 . Non-mtervention as a Derivative Principle of the Norm of Sovereignty
Sovereignty is the idea that “there is a final and absolute political authority in the 
political community” and that “no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere.”^  
Translated to the international context, sovereignty is “a political entity’s external 
recognized right to exercise final authority over its affairs.”^^  In this sense, 
sovereignty represents the “institutional expression of the freedom of groups
Vincent, Nonintervention, 13.
One should note that beyond its description as a rule, non-intervention itself can be a policy, in 
situations where a state chooses not to intervene when it could do otherwise. However, this study is 
concerned with non-intervention as a rule, a principle to which all states are obliged to observe in their 
relations with one another.
F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (New York: Basic Books, 1966), 26.
Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.). State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.
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politically organized as states.”^  Hence, as opposed to the implied hierarchical 
system of domestic rule, in international relations sovereignty signifies equality and 
independence in terms of both domestic affairs and international activity. In other 
words, in the international arena, sovereignty entails the antithesis of the very concept 
applied to a single community. While in one particular community sovereignty refers 
to absolute power, in the context of more than one political community, it is based on 
the presumption that there exists no supreme authority over and above the 
communities. One prominent scholar states that this is the logical outcome of the 
nature of sovereignty:
“...a  state which claims to be free of limit and control within 
its community bound in logic to concede the same freedom to 
other states in theirs.”^^
Thus, sovereign status not only ensures freedom from external interference but also, 
by logical implication, imposes on the state the obligation of non-intervention in the 
boundaries of another sovereign state, hi this sense, non-intervention is the twin 
concept of sovereignty. As Axtmann and Grant observe, “sovereignty within is thus 
premised on non-interference from without.” *^ As a result, it can be said that the 
essential function of non-intervention is to sustain state sovereignty. More precisely, 
the principle of non-intervention stands as the fundamental principle that 
accommodates plurality and diversity of political organization in the international 
society, and thereby plays the key role in ensuring co-existence of sovereign states.
Robert Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance At the Conceptual and Historical 
Landscape,” Political Studies 47:3 (1999), 455.
Hinsley, Sovereignty, 158.
Roland Axtmann and Robert Grant, “Living in a Global World: Globalization and the Future of 
Politics” in Trevor C. Salmon (ed.). Issues in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2000), 32.
30
1 .2 .2 . Intellectual Roots of Non-Intervention
The origin of the doctrine of non-intervention in general international law may be 
traced to the writings of classical publicists of the modem law of nations. Among the 
major legal scholars articulating the relations between states was Hugo Grotius 
(1583-1645), who is generally considered to be the founding father of modem 
international law. In his writings, there is no direct reference to the principle of non­
intervention. IBs point of reference was war as opposed to intervention. According to 
Grotius, there was either war or peace -with no other intermediate condition-, and 
thus all acts of violence against another state constituted war.'^  ^ As a result, he 
questioned whether war was justified when waged for the defense of the oppressed 
subjects of another power.^ ® In his major work. On the Law o f War and Peace, 
Grotius noted that according to natural law, resort to war for a just cause was lawful. 
To him, just causes included defense against an injury, restoration of legality and 
punishment of a misbehaving state.^ * Furthermore, he argued that sovereigns had the 
right to punish other sovereigns in cases where a mler had treated his subjects 
wrongly. Because he believed the subjects of international law were not only states 
but also individuals, he postulated that a sovereign was responsible for the welfare of 
both of its own subjects as well as of others.^^ Thus, although he maintained a strong 
emphasis on the subjects’ obedience to sovereign authority and denied people the 
right to punish their own mlers, for Grotius, resorting to war on behalf of the
Thomas and Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, 5.
“  Hugo Grotius, Seha L. M m y (trans.). Savaş ve Barış Hukuku (De lure Belli Ac Pacis /  On the Law 
o f War and Peace) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1967), bk. 2, chp. 25, para. 8 ,171.
Ibid., 52.
Hedley Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society” in Herbert Butterfield and Martin 
Wright (eds.). Diplomatic Investigations (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), 64.
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mistreated subjects under an oppressive ruler was “a right vested in human society”^^ . 
However, Grotius also warned that this type of military intervention “may often be 
used as the cover of ambitious designs.”^  Grotian conception of intervention or the 
use of force presupposed the existence of an international society between sovereign 
states with strong solidarity,^^ a notion which later served as the key assumption for 
scholars who later developed the principle of non-intervention.
The principle of non-intervention was first clearly stated in the writings of Wolff and 
Vattel. Building on the theories of natural law with respect to the independence and 
equality of states, they both renounced intervention in mutual relations between 
states. Wolff argued that:
‘To interfere in the government of another, in whatever way 
indeed that may be done is opposed to the natural liberty of 
nations, by virtue of which one nation is altogether 
independent of the will of other nations in its actions.” ®^
He further underscored that no such right of interference existed, even though the less
powerful may at times be forced to “yield at length to the more powerful.”^^
According to him, intervention breaches the right of the state intervened.^ ® Thus, he
contended that “a state has an absolute right not to allow any other nation to interfere
in any way in its own govemment.”^^  W olffs conception of international law was
Grotius, Savaş ve Barış Hukuku, 171.
^Ibid.
Bull, “The Grotian Conception of International Society,” 52.
Christian Wolff, Joseph H. Drake (trans.). Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum  (New 
York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1964), chp. I, para. 256,131.
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founded on his understanding of obligations under natural law, which furnished states 
with the rights to liberty, equality, sovereignty and independence.^®
Emmerich de Vattel also articulated the principle of non-intervention as a duty of 
equally sovereign states. Writing in the eighteenth-century, Vattel argued against 
interventionary acts, for they would violate states’ right to independence and 
sovereignty that are bestowed upon them by nature. His formulation of international 
law was based on an international society comprised of independent states. He 
conceived international law as a legal framework governing relations between states, 
and by definition, therefore, states’ domestic affairs were left out of international 
law’s area of application. For matters of domestic concern, Vattel wrote no foreign 
power had a right to interfere unless it was called upon to do so. In this respect, he 
stated that to interfere “in the domestic affairs of another nation or to undertake to 
constrain its councils is to do an injury.”®' He also argued that liberty and 
independence of nations implied that each nation had the right to govern itself as it 
deemed proper and consequently no nation had the right to interfere in the 
government of another.®  ^Thus, Vattel was an ardent supporter of the respect for the 
principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. Nonetheless, Vattel also established 
exceptions to the rule of non-intervention. For example, he recognized a state’s 
assistance to an oppressed people upon request as lawful.®  ^ In cases where the 
opposition to tyranny amounted to a civil war, Vattel stated that “foreign Nations may *
Ibid., 15-16.60
** Emmerich de Vattel, The Law o f Nations or the Principles o f Natural Law Applied to the Conduct 
and to the Affairs o f Nations and o f Sovereigns, bk. 1, ch. 3, para. 37, quoted in Thomas and Thomas, 
Jr., Non-intervention, 5.
Vattel, The Law o f Nations, bk. 2, ch. 4, para. 54, quoted in Vincent, Nonintervention, 30.
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assist that one of the parties which seems to have justice on its side,”^  In addition, he 
also anticipated permissibility of intervention in certain cases for balance of power 
purposes. Although less clear on this exception, Vattel affirmed that nations might 
use “all upright means” to prevent the nation, which upsets the balance of power from 
achieving a significant degree of power.^ Hence, Vattel denounced intervention, but 
at the same time provided a certain leeway for instances of lawful intervention.
Subsequent political thinkers joined these pioneer legal scholars in arguing against 
intervention. Among them, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in his major essay. Perpetual 
Peace, vigorously condemned a right of intervention into another state’s domestic 
affairs. One of Kant’s preliminary articles on perpetual peace states: “No state shall 
interfere by force in the constitution or government of another state.”^^  He considered 
this principle to be crucial for the attainment of peace among nations. However, Kant 
seems to quali^ his prohibition of intervention and his insistence on internal 
sovereignty by stating in his first definitive article on perpetual peace that “the civil 
constitution in each state should be republican.”®^ Thus, Kant is of the opinion that 
world peace could only be achieved when the republican form of government had 
become universal.®* Consequently, some scholars argue that his emphasis on the
® Vattel, The Law o f Nations, bk. 2, ch. 4, para. 54, quoted in Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian 
Intervention, The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 46.
^  Vattel, The Law o f Nations, bk. 2, ch. 4, para. 56, quoted in Thomas and Thomas, Jr., Non­
intervention, 6.
Vattel, The Law o f Nations, bk. 3, ch. 3, para. 49, quoted in Thomas and Thomas, Jr., Non­
intervention, 6.
“  Hans Reiss (ed.), H. B. Nisbet (trans.), Kant, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 96.
Ibid., 99.
^ Kant’s idea that a world of republican governments would secure endurable peace later gave way to 
the assumption that common liberal and democratic values play a considerable role in moderating 
power politics and significantly reduce resort to force. Elaborated by President Wilson in early 
twentiedi century, the liberal proposition o f democratic peace is revitalized at length particularly in the
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republican form of government in the attainment of durable peace gives precedence to 
republicanism over the rule of non-intervention, which opens a space for intervention 
in support of movements fighting against non-republican forms of govemment.^^ In 
this respect, Vincent suggests Kant required “the establishment of republican 
government within states before a rule of non-intervention could operate between 
them.” °^ Thomas and Thomas claim that rather than advocating the principle of non­
intervention per se, Kant “stands for the theory that no state shall intermeddle by 
force with the constitution or government of a republican state.” As a result, it can 
be said that Kant envisaged adherence to the principle of non-intervention on the 
basis of a revision of the international order based on the republican lines.
Among other important political thinkers who opposed intervention was John Stuart 
Mill (1806-1873). Interventions, according to him, undermined the national freedoms 
by disturbing the balance of forces.^^ In addition. Mill also objected to intervention 
for assisting people in their fight against repression, for he believed people should 
resist and struggle on their own to obtain liberty.^^ In his conception, any effort to 
grant freedom to a political community other than the people’s own is bound to fail, 
since people themselves should develop “the virtues needful for maintaining
aftermath of the Cold War. For the link between Kant and the democratic peace theory, see Michael 
Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, part 1,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12:3 
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
See for example, Fernando R. Tesón, A Philosophy o f International Law (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1998), 6.
Vincent, Nonintervention, 62.
Thomas and Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, 8.
^  John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention (1859), reprinted in G. Himmelfarb (ed.). 
Essays on Politics and Culture, (1962), 368, quoted in Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 46.
69
70
73 Ibid.
35
freedom.” '^^  The principle of non-intervention, Mill insisted, was the guarantee 
against intrusive foreign interventions, which would hinder the success of efforts 
towards self-determination. Yet, he recognized certain situations wherein 
interventions might be acceptable among ‘civilized’ nations,^^ such as assisting 
people fighting against foreign oppression or native tyranny sustained by foreign 
arms. Mill argued that intervention in this case would not “disturb the balance of 
forces on which the permanent maintenance of freedom in a country depends, but to 
redress that balance when it is already unfairly and violently disturbed.”’® To him, 
counter-intervention to restore the order interrupted by foreign intervention is 
“intervention to enforce non-intervention” which is “always rightful, always moral, if 
not always prudent.””  One other exception to the rule of non-intervention in his 
writings might be said to be the permissibility of intervention in a protracted civil 
war. While there is no unequivocal reference to intervention for humanitarian 
purposes in his writings, he nevertheless noted that it became a maxim of 
international law that neighboring nations may intervene to a protracted civil war 
given that “the contending parties are so equally balanced that there is no probability 
of a speedy issue.”’* Although Mill considered this as an exceptional case, some 
scholars today regard his articulation of intervention in protracted civil wars as a
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc.,1977), 87.
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version that justifies the admissibility of interventions for humanitarian purposes in
Mill’s writing.79
In sum, the principle of non-intervention has its intellectual origins in both legal and 
political writings of the eighteenth century. All these scholarly works were based on 
an analogy between individuals and states. Just as in the domestic political system, 
individuals have a right to freedom and independence, so states have similar rights in 
the international arena.*® Consequently, the rule of non-intervention that followed 
from the right to independence and sovereignty, was viewed as the major devise to 
ensure an environment in which states could achieve freedom. Nevertheless, the 
above analysis also shows that certain exceptional situations whereby a right to 
intervene might arise, are also recognized in the writings of philosophers by the 
arguments of international order, stability and republican legitimacy.
1. 3. AN OVERVIEW OF INTERVENTIONS PRIOR TO THE UNITED 
NATIONS
Notwithstanding the prominence attached to the non-intervention rule in legal and 
political treatises, a close examination of practices of states in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries reveals that there are quite a number of examples of
See for example, Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 56.79
Brierly, The Law o f Nations, 29-30; Richard Little, “Recent Literature on Intervention and Non- 
Intervention,” in Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman (eds.). Political Theory, International Relations, and 
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interference in internal affairs in history and that intervention was a common 
instrument of foreign policy goals.
The Concert system established in the aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat was an attempt 
to rationalize the uncertainties of the temporary alliances of the classical balance of 
power system of the eighteenth century through more assertive leadership by the great 
powers. Intervention during this period was an instrument at the hands of European 
conservative powers to check deviant movements from the general great power 
consensus. In addition, a right of intervention was often invoked by virtue of the 
treaties signed with non-European and non-Westem powers.
During the same period, European powers also carried out several interventions in the 
Americas. Although President Moiu*oe’s message of 1823 sent a warning to European 
powers that the United States would not be indifferent to European interventions in 
the Western Hemisphere, it was not until late nineteenth century that the US assumed 
an assertive role with regards to European adventures in the American Hemisphere, 
forcing the European powers to observe the principle of non-intervention in the 
Americas. The interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine and the corollaries 
incorporated in it expanded with the growth of American power. As a result, over 
time. United States’ warning to European powers not to intervene in the Americas 
became a license for its own interventionary policies towards its southern neighbors. 
Consequently, the United States undertook a number of interventions in Central and 
Latin America in order to prevent European interventions.
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With the establishment of the League of Nations, a mechanism for restricting the 
recourse to force through a detailed set of procedures for the peaceful settlement of 
conflicts. The League of Nations was created with a view to avoid a recurrence of the 
brutal horrors of the Great War. The League represented the first concerted effort to 
institutionalize collective security under international law and it was predicated upon 
the idealist assumption that conflict could be avoided by proper application of 
diplomacy and international law. The trend in this period reflected the predominant 
concern of avoiding armed conflict. Thus, the League assigned a definitive emphasis 
on non-military measures in securing world peace. Accordingly, military intervention 
for any reason was neither foreseen nor proscribed under any circumstances.
1 .3 .1 . Intervention During the Era o f the Concert of Europe
The Concert system was set up in 1815 at the Vienna peace conferences following the 
Napoleonic Wars. Although initially devised against the newly defeated French 
Empire, the aim of the new political order was first and foremost to hinder the 
domination of Europe by one single power, and thereby to contain as well as prevent 
international crises. Above all, the Vienna settlement was built on the common 
iiiterests of the major European powers, Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia and later 
France, to resist any revolutionary movement as well as hegemonic aspirations by any 
one of them. One prominent scholar described the Concert of Europe as “an exclusive 
club for great powers whose members were self-appointed guardians of the European 
community and executive directors of its affairs.”*^  It was essentially a consultation 
and cooperation mechanism based on ad hoc conferences between the great powers in
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times of perceived challenge to their internal monarchic systems and to the existing 
equilibrium. In this sense, the Concert of Europe, as it became known, was a system 
of “voluntary collusion among an oligarchy of great powers.”*^  In this respect, the 
Concert of Europe was built upon realist assumptions to manage the security of 
Europe. The classical period of the Concert system survived up until the Crimean 
War (1856). In fact, the 1848 revolutions had already shaken the basis of the Concert. 
The rise of nationalism and later the unification of Italy and Germany profoundly 
changed the distribution of power and the European equilibrium. Thus, the general 
consensus among the great powers gradually eroded and was replaced first by a 
period of international anarchy, and later by permanent alliances.*^
As such, military intervention during the Concert of Europe was recognized as a 
legitimate instrument of the great powers in order to achieve political ends. Its 
effective function was based on monarchical solidarity and consensus for the 
suppression of revolutionary movements. To interfere in the internal affairs of any 
country departing fiom dynastic rule was considered a legitimate right of the great 
powers in maintaining the established social and political order, since the equilibrium 
in the European balance of power was not only seen in physical terms, but also in *
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Andrew M. Dorman and Thomas G. Otte (eds.). M ilitary Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to 
Humanitarian Intervention (Hants, England: Dartmouth, 1995), 19.
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terms of shared moral values.* *^ Consequently, despite the generally accepted rule of
non-intervention, the Holy Alliance asserted “a right of self-preservation by
legitimate governments” against revolutions aiming to overthrow them.*^ The idea
that the internal type of government of one state other than monarchy was detrimental
to the security of other nations and thus justified intervention in the internal affairs of
that state in the interests of European solidarity and the maintenance of the status quo,
was the basis of the Protocol signed between Austria, Russia and Prussia at the
Conference of Troppau in 1820. It stated that:
States which have undergone a change of government due to 
revolution, the results of which threaten other states, ipso 
facto cease to be members of the European Alliance, remain 
excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for 
legal order and stability. If, owing to such alterations, 
immediate danger threaten other states, the parties bind 
themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to 
bring back the guilty state into the bosom of the Great 
Alliance.*®
At this conference, Austria was mandated by the Holy Alliance to carry out a 
unilateral intervention in Naples and Piedmont to halt liberal revolutions there. This 
resulted directly in the restoration of autocratic monarchies.*^ Another example of this 
type of intervention was the French intervention in Spain in 1823. Similarly, Bourbon 
France was authorized by the Holy Alliance (Austria, Prussia and Russia) to intervene 
militarily in Spain in order to suppress the Spanish revolution and reinstate King 
Ferdinand VII’s power.** However, it should be noted that Britain raised objections to 
the policy of intervention in the internal affairs of another nation to maintain dynastic 
regimes, and protested the Troppau Protocol, asserting that intervention was
^  Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 79.
“  Thomas and Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, 9.
** Otte, “Of Congresses and Gunboats: Military Intervention in the Nineteenth Century,” 25-26.
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damaging to the idea of internal sovereignty. In 1820, regarding the Spanish 
revolution, the British Foreign Minister, Castlereagh, argued that it was entirely an 
internal matter and that establishing a system of automatic and collective intervention 
by other states in the internal affairs of any state going through revolutionary change 
was ‘impracticable’ and ‘objectionable.N onetheless, in 1826 and 1827, Britain 
intervened in Portugal upon the revolt of the Portuguese army in order to preserve the
type of constitutional government.90
Within the context of great power relations, the leading participants of the Concert 
effectively refrained from intervening into each other’s affairs,^ * for the underlying 
aim of the Concert of Europe mechanism was to prevent war among great powers 
themselves. As a result, one can argue that within the Concert system, the source of 
legitimacy of military intervention lied in the Great Power consensus over the 
predominant aim of sustaining the established order and stability in Europe. Military 
intervention was undertaken for securing compatibility between domestic orders, and 
thus a right of intervention in the internal affairs of others was invoked when it had 
the defensive pmpose of promoting dynastic legitimacy
Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy: 1814-1914 (New York; McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992), 36. For 
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1. 3 .2 . European Interventions Outside Europe
Outside Europe, the legitimacy of intervention was governed by references to rights 
by virtue of treaties and/or the notion of assisting the oppressed. European powers 
carried out several interventions for example, to Ottoman Empire, by arguing a right 
of intervention to protect the mistreated Christians. Although their rationalizations 
based on hmnanitarian goals should be approached with some skepticism, there is 
some merit to the opinion that the conservative views of the Holy Alliance was 
gradually replaced by a more liberal thinking within the Concert. As a result of the 
development of progressive ideas as exemplified in the writings of liberal 
philosophers like John Stuart Mill, intervention for the purpose of liberating the
oppressed and ending their suffering was increasingly advocated 93
During 1827-1830, Britain, France and Russia militarily intervened in Greece to 
support the Greek upheaval to Ottoman rule, which ultimately forced the Ottoman 
Empire to accept Greek independence in 1830 and the terms of the Treaty of London, 
signed between the three powers in 1827.^ The argument that this intervention had 
humanitarian considerations arouse from the terms of the London Treaty. In the 
preamble of the Treaty, it was agreed that action was required “no less by sentiments 
of humanity, than by interests for the tranquility of Europe.”^  However, scholars
^  Otte, “Of Congresses and Gunboats: Military Intervention in the Nineteenth Century,” 36-38; also, 
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differ on the question of whether this intervention had a humanitarian character. For 
example, Oppenheim points out that the main concern was the brutality that the 
Christian population was facing.^ Franck and Rodley note that one of the main 
motivations of the intervening states was the protection of their commercial 
interests. Alternatively, Finnemore argues that geostrategic factors, rather than 
humanitarian considerations, were decisive in this intervention. She emphasizes, for 
example, that Britain and France had a power political motive in that they intended to 
balance Russia by taking part in the intervention.^ ® In this respect, she underlines that 
the nineteenth century multilateralism was strategic, rather than political and 
normative. More precisely, it was not inspired by “shared notions about when the use
of force is legitimate and appropriate.«99
Another important case in which humanitarian concerns were advanced was the 
French intervention in Syria to prevent the suppression of Maronite Christians during 
1860-1861. The intervention was launched upon authorization from Austria, Britain, 
Prussia, Russia and Ottoman Empire convening at the Conference of Paris. Following 
the adoption of a new constitution for the region that required a Christian governor 
directly responsible to the Sublime Porte, French troops were withdrawn in 1861.^ °® 
Given Ottoman consent, albeit a reluctant one, some writers argue that this 
intervention should be considered as a case demonstrating the evolution of the
^  Hersch Lautopacht (ed.), L. Oppenheim, International Law, 313.
^  Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley, “After Bangladesh; The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by 
Military Force,” American Journal o f International Law 67:2 (1973), 280.
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doctrine of non-consensual humanitarian intervention. Yet, others describe this 
intervention positively as an example of humanitarian intervention.*®^
Similarly, Russia declared war on Turkey in 1877, alleging the mistreatment of 
Christians in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria. The war ended with the conclusion 
of the Treaty of San-Stefano, which finally led to the adoption of Berlin Treaty of 
1878 that established a system of Christian autonomy in Bulgaria and Montenegro. 
Also, by this treaty, Serbia and Rumania gained independence, and Austria annexed 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.*®  ^Although humanitarian concerns were put forward as the 
rationale of the intervention, writers agree that this case is one that displays the 
difficulty in assessing the motivations behind intervention and demonstrates the 
interplay of humanitarianism and political interests of the intervening state. In that 
respect, Britain for example, considered this intervention as a reflection of Russian 
aspirations to control the Straits and Constantinople.*®^ In addition, there was no 
Concert authorization given for Russian intervention. Although in the London 
Protocol of 1877, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Britain, Italy and Russia 
reserved the right to take all necessary measures in the event of inadequate reforms in 
the region by the Sultan, they remained neutral in the Russo-Turkish War.
One other example of intervention in the Ottoman Empire occurred following the 
rebellion in Macedonia in 1903. Austria-Hungary and Russia acting under the 
auspices of the European powers demanded that the Ottoman Empire embark on
Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 54.101
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certain reforms in Macedonia in order to prevent atrocities against the Christian 
Macedonian population. Although Ottoman Empire accepted the demands, the 
subsequent revolution in Macedonia resulted in further atrocities, which led to a 
declaration of war by Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria on the Ottoman Empire in 1912. 
The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of London in 1913, through which 
Macedonia was ceded to the Balkan states for partition. The fact that the 
intervention ended with actual loss of territoiy to the intervening states is considered 
to be indicative of the existence of motives other than humanitarian ones,*®  ^although 
it was carried out on the grounds of assisting Christians in Macedonia. In siun, 
regardless of the underlying motivations, the significance of these interventions in the 
Ottoman Empire lies in their justification on the grounds of humanitarian 
considerations prompted by atrocities perpetuated upon the Christian populations.
From the above discussion, it follows that during the Concert of Europe, intervention 
outside the Concert system was mainly guided by a right of interference to assist the 
oppressed as articulated in the writings of prominent scholars. While one can argue 
that the motives of intervention were varied and could not be classified in one single 
category, the justifications raised during these interventions place them, in the sphere 
of intervention for humanitarian purposes. In that respect, Franck and Rodley note 
that humanitarian motives behind the Concert of Europe’s “recurrent interventions in 
Ottoman affairs [should] probably not...be dismissed as bogus.”'®* Nevertheless, 
there are writers arguing that the humanitarian claims provided a convenient pretext
For the history of the period, see Anderson, The Eastern Question, 261-309.
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for politically motivated interventions. For example, examining the instances of 
intervention during this period, Brownlie concludes that “no genuine case of 
humanitarian intervention has occurred, with the possible exception of the occupation 
of Syria in 1860 and 1861.
1 .3 .3 . Intervention in the Americas
Across the Atlantic, the adoption of the doctrine of non-intervention can be traced to 
the United States’ early policy of neutrality, which kept it out of the struggles 
between Spain and its Latin American colonies from 1811 to the recognition of some 
of the new states bom in the Americas in 1822, and its ultimate formulation as a 
principle in the Monroe Doctrine, which was proclaimed by President Monroe in
1823.110
The Monroe Doctrine, though varying in interpretations, shaped American foreign
policy throughout the nineteenth century. The doctrine, formulated by President
Monroe, included three principles. First, it articulated a principle of non-colonization.
Alarmed by Russian territorial advances in the northwest part of the American
Continent,"* the Doctrine stated that the United States would not condone further
colonization in the Western Hemisphere by any European power:
“The American continents, by the free and independent 
condition which they have assumed and maintained, are
Brownlie, International Law, 340.
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henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future 
colonization by any European power.”“ ^
Secondly, the Doctrine included a restatement of American neutrality concerning
European affairs, and established the principle of non-intervention:
“In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to 
themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport 
with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are 
invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make 
preparation for our defence... Our policy in regard to Europe, 
which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have 
so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless 
remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal 
concerns of any of its powers...”“ ^
Finally, the promise of abstention from interference was followed by a warning that
European powers must keep away from the independent nations of the Western
Hemisphere and must not intervene in American affairs.
“With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European 
power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with 
the Governments who have declared their independence and 
maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great 
consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could 
not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing 
them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any 
European power, in any other light than as the manifestation 
of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States...”” ^
Provoked by a concern about European intervention in Latin America to restore to 
Spain its revolted colonies,"^ the doctrine further declared that any attempt to extend 
the European system to any part of the Western Hemisphere would be dangerous to 
the United States’ peace and security, and therefore that such interpositions would not
The Monroe Doctrine, 2 December 1823, reprinted in Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson 
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Company, 2000), 170.
Ibid., 171.
Dexter Perkins, “Defense of Conunerce and Ideals” in Merrill and Paterson (eds.). M ajor Problems 
in American Foreign Relations, 398.
48
be viewed with indifference/^® In this sense, the Doctrine represents the expression of 
the definition of an American sphere of security interests. As a result, it can be said 
that the Monroe Doctrine idealistically aimed to protect republican liberty in the 
Americas against European absolutism ,^w hile realistically attempting to impede 
“the ability of another great power to threaten the United States from a close
proximity. U18
On the other hand, although the Monroe Doctrine set forth a doctrine of non­
intervention in European affairs and an authoritative expectation of a reciprocal 
attitude by the European powers towards the Americas, it remained silent on the 
principles, which would guide the United States in its relations with Latin America. 
While denying European powers the right to acquire additional colonies on the 
American continent, it neither ruled out further expansion of the United States in the 
continent nor precluded the United States from interfering in the internal affairs of the 
Latin American states. Nevertheless, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
principle of non-intervention directed the policy of the United States toward new
states in Latin America. 119
Despite the assertiveness of this warning, European intervention in the Americas 
continued in the years following the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine. For 
example, Britain occupied the Falkland Islands in 1833, and it extended its territories 
in Central America, occupying San Juan, Nicaragua between 1830 and 1841. France
The Monroe Doctrine, reprinted in Merrill and Paterson (eds.). Major Problems in American 
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Dexter Perkins, The American Approach to Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1962), 79.
Combs, The History o f American Foreign Policy, 73.
49
also got involved, intervening in Mexico in 1838 to collect claims for injuries 
suffered by French nationals, occupying the Mexican port of Vera Cruz for a short 
period of time. Another instance of European intervention was the joint blockade of 
Rio de la Plata by Britain and France in 1845. In each of these cases, the United 
States failed to respond to these European interventions in Latin America and did not 
consider such actions as “manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the 
United States” as deemed by President Monroe. For example, in reply to an 
Argentinean request of aid against the joint British and French blockade, the United 
States expressed that the Monroe Doctrine pledged no obligation with regards to the 
Latin American states.^ *^^
Nevertheless, with the rise of its power and strength towards the end of the century, 
the United States began to take action to determinately prevent European 
interventions in the Americas. The most significant enforcement of the Monroe 
Doctrine was against the French intervention in Mexico in the 1860s. In 1861, upon 
suspension of payments of foreign loans by the Juarez government, Spain, Britain and 
France agreed to undertake a joint action against Mexico. The three powers then 
proceeded to occupy the Mexican port of Vera Cruz in December 1861 and January 
1862. After the withdrawal of the British and Spanish forces in early 1862, Napoleon 
in  was left with a free hand to take advantage of the political chaos in Mexico and 
eventually create a puppet regime there. Early in the crisis, the United States 
repeatedly expressed its disapproval of the events in Mexico and protested against the
Vincent, Nonintervention, 118.
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installation of a monarchy against the will of the Mexican people and the United 
States.^ ^  ^ However, civil war in the United States, precluded any action beyond 
diplomatic warnings against France. After the Civil War ended, American warnings 
to the French were turned into outright threats, which eventually led to the withdrawal 
of French forces and the fall of the Mexican monarchy in 1867.^^
Another instance of the effective enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine occurred when 
President Cleveland intervened in the boundary dispute between Britain and 
Venezuela regarding British Guiana. Upon a Venezuelan appeal to the United States 
for aid. Secretary of State Olney invoked the Monroe Doctrine in 1895 with the aim 
of forcing Britain into arbitration of the question. Further, Secretary of State Olney’s 
remarks on the boundary dispute between Venezuela and Britain asserted that the 
United States is “practically sovereign” on the American continent. After continued 
pressure from the United States, British government finally agreed to arbitrate with 
Venezuela in November 1896. The Venezuelan crisis is significant because it marked 
Britain’s recognition of American supremacy in the Western Hemisphere and 
increased prestige of the Monroe Doctrine in Europe. Moreover, it also signified 
that the United States no longer intended to carry out the non-interventionary spirit of 
the Monroe Doctrine with regards to its relations with its southern neighbors. The 
change in American policy in this respect is illustrated in the US’s subsequent
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interventions in Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Haiti and 
Mexico.
1 .3 .4 . US Interventions and the New American Hegemony
In 1898, the United States intervened in the civil war between Cuba and Spain on the 
part of Cuban independence movement, which ultimately led to a war with Spain that 
resulted in American victory.*^ In his war message. President McKinley advanced 
elaborate justifications for intervention in Cuba. He explained the grounds for 
intervention as follows:
“First, hi the cause of humanity and to put an end to the 
barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now 
existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either 
unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say 
this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and 
is therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for 
it is right at our door.
Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that 
protection and indemnity for life and property which no 
government there can or will afford, and to that end to 
terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.
Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very 
serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our 
people and by the wanton destruction of property and 
devastation of the island.
Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present 
condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace 
and entails upon this Government an enormous expense.
With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us 
and with which our people have such trade and business 
relations; when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in 
constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves 
ruined; where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are 
seized at our very door by war ships of a foreign nation; the 
expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent
For details o f the Spanish-American War, see Combs, The History o f American Foreign Policy, 
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altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements 
thus arising -all these and others that I need not mention, 
with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to 
our peace and compel us to keep on a semi war footing with a 
nation with which we are at peace.”^^
As such, although humanitarian concerns were emphasized overwhelmingly, the fact 
that the US intervention in Cuba considerably reduced the Spanish influence in the 
Western Hemisphere and paved the way towards US dominance in the region 
suggests that intervention was motivated just as much by national interests.*^
In 1903, the United States also intervened in the affairs of Colombia by assisting in 
Panama’s independence from Colombia. The United States prevented the repression 
of Panamanian revolutionaries by obstructing the landing of Colombian forces in the 
area aimed at suppressing the rebellion. It landed its forces to protect the United 
States citizens and immediately recognized Panama as a state. President Roosevelt 
justified this action in terms of the national interests and safety of the United States as 
well as the interests of the civilized world. The Panama Canal Treaty of November
18, 1903, also granted the United States canal rights and a zone of occupation. 
Furthermore, the United States acquired a right to intervene in Panama to maintain 
order, which was embodied in the text of the new republic adopted on February 13,
1904.131
The Panama Canal intervention was followed by a new incident of intervention in the 
Dominican Republic upon the failure of Dominican Republic to pay its debts to the
President McKinley’s war message, 11 April 1898, reprinted in Merrill and Paterson (eds.). Major 
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United States and certain European nations. The intervention resulted in an agreement 
with the Dominican Republic in 1905, by which the United States set up a customs 
receivership and the Dominican Republic became a financial protectorate 
administered by the United States. President Roosevelt in his annual message to 
Congress on December 6, 1904, declared that the United States would assume a right 
to intervene in cases of “chronic wrongdoing, or impotence” among Western 
Hemisphere nations, and “however reluctantly” would have to exercise “an 
international police power.”*^  ^ As explained by Roosevelt, this intervention was 
carried out for two reasons: to protect US claims and to preclude European nations 
from the forcible collection of debts, which might result in occupations in the 
Americas.’^  This principle of preventive diplomacy became known as the Roosevelt 
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.
A similar intervention also occurred in Haiti in 1915 after a long period of civil strife 
and disorder. To protect the citizens of the United States as well as other foreigners, 
especially French and British, and thus prevent possible interventions by those 
powers that would have extended their domination over this strategic island. 
President Wilson ordered the navy to invade Haiti in July 1915. This intervention 
resulted in the establishment of an American military regime that ruled the country 
until 1934.^ ^  ^The United States likewise intervened in Nicaragua upon the execution 
of two American citizens for assisting rebels in Nicaragua in 1909, to protect
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American lives and property. The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty signed in 1914 granted to 
the United States rights to construct and operate a canal in Nicaragua in exchange for 
$3 million.*^® A final example of American intervention was America’s armed 
intervention in Mexico in 1914 to force the Huerta regime out of office, and later in 
1916, as a result of continuing disorder and raids carried out on American territories 
by the revolutionary forces in Mexico. The events in Europe brought an end to 
intervention, and led to the withdrawal of American forces from Mexico in 1917.’ ’^
Thus, from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, the United States carried out 
extensive military, financial and strategic interventions in Latin America, known also 
as “big stick” or ‘dollar’ diplomacy. Nevertheless, it can be aigued that these 
interventions were primarily undertaken with the aim of protecting the security 
interests of the United States. In spite of the humanitarian concerns that were 
occasionally provoked, the preoccupation with self-preservation was manifested in 
the Monroe Doctrine’s anxiety of the future European colonization and intervention 
in the Americas. This was perceived as a menace to US security, as outlined in the 
Roosevelt corollary of preventive intervention. Hence, although subsequent US 
interventions in the region eventually led to American hegemony in the Western 
Hemisphere, the primary consideration of interventionary policies of the United 
States was argued to be the protection of the continental United States.*^’
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1 .3 .5 . The Inter-War Period
In contrast to the realist approach of the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations 
was founded upon idealist presumptions without the realistic instruments to safeguard 
its workability. The League of Nations reflected the desire to prevent the recurrence 
of war. It was based on the belief that war was not an inevitable condition of the inter­
state relations. The essential means of achieving an endurable peace was imagined 
possible through the realization of democratic ideals through self-determination. 
Thus, the League did not attempt to radically alter the multi-state system. Rather, it 
was an effort to provide the effective institutional machinery for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, as well as an effort to improve the operation of the existing 
international system. In this sense, the League represented a reform movement rather 
than a revolutionary one, based on the principle of sovereignty and self-
govemment. 140
As stated in the preamble of the Covenant, the League of Nations relied on “the 
acceptance of obligations not to resort to war” and “the maintenance of justice...in 
the dealings of organized peoples with one another” to preserve peace. Thus, it did 
not actually prohibit the use of force. Rather, it rationalized it by requiring its 
members to resolve their disputes peacefully through the judicial settlement or the 
League organs before they actually resorted to force (Covenant, arts. 12, 13, 15).^ "^ * 
By this logic, unless the steps foreseen for peaceful dispute resolution were
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exhausted, recourse to war would constitute a war against all members and 
theoretically result in collective response.
With regards to intervention, the League was precluded from interfering in matters 
under the domestic jurisdiction of the member states. Although the League 
emphasized and elaborated a system for safeguarding the religious and linguistic 
rights of minorities in a series of treaties, the failure to comply with it by no means 
provided a basis for intervention. Since the obligations to preserve the international 
peace and security were so loosely defined, eventually the League proved to be
powerless to guarantee their enforcement. 143
The Kellogg-Biiand Pact subsequently signed in 1928, provided for more explicit 
commitments. Its significance lied in the codification of the prohibition of war as an 
instrument of national foreign policy within international law.*"  ^Notwithstanding, the 
pact did not impose constraints on the uses of force short of war, leaving permissible 
uses of force unclear. Although the pact would not be strong enough to impede yet 
another World War, it reversed the legal positivist idea of states’ unrestricted right to 
war. The changed rhetoric about resort to war later found expression in postwar
efforts aimed at rebuilding international peace and security.146
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Hence, the approach to the use of force in general during the pre-Second World War 
period mirrored the sentiment of preventing war at whatever cost. Consequently, the 
sovereignty of states and the rule of non-intervention prevailed over other values such 
as the freedoms and rights of individuals. One should note, however, that the inter­
war aggressors, i.e. Japan, Italy and Germany, actually appealed to humanitarian 
reasons for their interventions.^^^ Although their interventions reveal the potential 
abuse of the humanitarian justifications, they are nevertheless significant in terms of 
reflecting the importance of this notion during the inter-war period.
In sum, it can be concluded that the phenomenon of intervention in internal affairs 
has coexisted with the principle of non-intervention since the foundation of the state 
system. The discussion of the era of Concert of Europe suggests that the exercise of 
sovereign rights was conditional on the observance of certain standards of internal 
affairs. The practice of armed intervention for humanitarian reasons during this period 
also implies that the right to intervene in situations of severe deprivation of the most 
basic human rights as articulated in the doctrines of non-intervention was 
acknowledged. In the Americas, the doctrine of non-intervention as envisaged in the 
Monroe Doctrine, functioned as an instrument through which the United States 
persuaded and coerced the states on the other side of the Atlantic regarding their 
polices toward the nations of Western Hemisphere. Eventually, the League of Nations 
established the rule of non-intervention as an imperative of international law. Thus, 
despite the frequency of the incidents of intervention, the doctrine of non-intervention
For example, in rationalizing the German occupation o f Bohemia and Moravia in 1939, Hitler 
argued that there were “assaults on the life and lib ^ e s  o f minorities” and stated that the purpose of 
intervention was to disarm “Czech groups and terrorist bands threatening the lives o f minorities.” 
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served as a legal restraint and provided the states a reference position for standards 
governing acceptable and unacceptable behavior in international relations as well as 
for situations where resort to intervention was considered tolerable.
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CHAPTER II;
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION AT THE UNITED
NATIONS
As a rule, non-intervention is advanced to guide the interstate relations with the aim 
of maintaining the international system based on the sovereign equality of states. 
Presently and at the universal level, it is principally the United Nations documents 
(the Charter and declaratory resolutions of the Assembly) that affirm and govern this 
preferred pattern of conduct in international relations. Although the emphasis in the 
United Nations Charter and in various related UN documents can be taken to indicate 
that there exists a consensus about the significance of the principle, there are 
controversies with respect to its interpretation and disagreements regarding the scope 
of behavior that is proscribed by implication.
This chapter will provide an overview of the legal framework governing the UN
Charter for more substantive discussion of the contribution of the United Nations to
the development of norms concerning military intervention in the domestic affairs.
Thus, this chapter will examine the United Nations’ doctrine of non-intervention by
introducing the key provisions of the Charter and the contentions regarding their
interpretation. For this purpose, it will first scrutinize the relevant provisions of the
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United Nations Charter in order to discern the place of the principle of non­
intervention in the Charter. It will also attempt to clarify the main notions that these 
provisions contain with an emphasis on their different interpretations. In this context, 
it will then look at the exceptions to the rule of non-intervention that the UN Charter 
provides for and the sources for authorizing such interventions. From this analysis, it 
will move on to explore the extent to which the principle of non-intervention has 
been embraced and emphasized in various General Assembly declarations over the 
years. In this regard, an attempt will be made to distinguish any patterns in the views 
expressed by the General Assembly, as it represents a forum of the society of states. 
The primary focus will be on the legal status and political prominence of the 
Assembly’s support of the principle.
2.1. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE UN CHARTER
The United Nations Charter does not explicitly spell out the principle of non­
intervention as a mle governing relations between member states.^ It is rather implied 
in the statement of Principles of the United Nations (Article 2). For example. Article 
2(1) roots the Organization on the “principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members,” and Article 2(3) calls for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. 
For the purposes of the study, however, the two most relevant provisions are Article 
2(4) and Article 2(7). While the former lays down the general prohibition of the use 
of force -and in this respect can be said to govern the proscription of intervention by
61
states-, the latter establishes the United Nations’ jurisdiction in relation to the area of 
the discretion of sovereign states, and thus draws the boundaries for United Nations 
intervention itself.
2. 1.1. Article 2(4)
Article 2(4) requires that states refrain in their international relations, from the threat
or use of force. In this sense, it represents the most explicit Charter provision against
intervention with the use of force. In this respect, Kelsen maintains that by
establishing the obligation of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their
relations. Article 2(4) implies the obligation of states to refrain from intervention in
the domestic matters of other states.^ Consequently, its interpretation constitutes the
basis for discussion of unilateral military interventions. Article 2(4) reads as follows:
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
As such. Article 2(4) stipulates a general prohibition of the use of force. More
precisely, it applies to any kind of force “regardless of whether or not it constitutes a
technical state of war.
The prohibition of the use of force was a rule of pre-Charter customary international 
law. However, permissible forms of self-help had relatively a wider base in the pre-
 ^ The International Court of Justice explanation for this was that “it was never intended that the 
Charter should embody written confirmation of every essential principle of international law in force.” 
ICJ Reports (1986), Nicaragua Case (Merits), para. 202.
 ^Hans Kelsen, The Law o f the United Nations (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1951), 770.
 ^Michael Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law, (London: George Allen and Unwin,
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Charter period."  ^Under contemporary customary international law, the UN Charter 
extends the prohibition of force beyond war to include other types of unilateral use 
and threat of force. It therefore endows the prohibition of force as a general and 
authoritative principle.^ In this respect, the substantial majority of legal scholars 
attribute the norm contained in Article 2(4) to a jus cogens character.^ To begin with, 
by providing for a collective security system, the Charter limits the permissible basis 
for acts of self-help. Secondly, the Charter also stipulates in Article 2(6) that the 
Organization will ensure the observation of its principles by non-Members ‘‘so far as 
may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security,”  ^implying 
that the UN may take measures against non-Members as well in response to their
 ^Self-help may generally be defined as forcible measures to redress violations of the law. For detailed 
exploration o f the concept, see Hans Kelsen, Principles o f International Law (New York: Rinehart & 
Company, 1952), 8-9. One such permissible form of self-help, for example, is the doctrine of self- 
preservation. According to the doctrine o f self-preservation, a state may violate any norm of 
international law or infiinge any right o f another state, if the elimination of violation of its vital 
interests and its preservation requires such action. In other words, under the doctrine of self- 
preservation, any action taken by a state to remove the potential impairment to its interests, regardless 
of the immediacy of the threat, is considered legal. Scholars who are of the opinion that there is a right 
to self-preservation, assert that this right has priority among all the fundamental rights of states. For 
example, the English jurist Hall states that “in the last resort almost the whole of the duties o f states 
are subordinated to the right of self-preservation.” Indeed, several interventions were justified on the 
grounds o f self-preservation. The interventions by European powers to maintain balance o f power are 
often included under the wider doctrine o f self-preservation. The Monroe Doctrine and the United 
States interventions in Latin America to prevent European interventions provide alternate examples of 
the exercise of the right to self-preservation. See A. Pearce Higgins (ed.), W. E. Hall, A Treatise on 
International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 322, quoted in R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and 
International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 288. For the doctrine of self- 
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1982), 410. In this respect, Brownlie also states that the customary norm regarding the use of force is 
“restated and reinforced” by Article 2(4). See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force 
by States (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 112.
 ^Among the noteworthy examples of authoritative statements against non-Members are for example, 
SC Res. 82 (1950) of 25 June 1950 and SC Res. 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950 in relation to the Korean 
conflict, in which the Council determined a breach of the peace and called upon North Korea to 
withdraw forthwith its force to the 38**^  parallel; and GA Res. 498 (V) of 1 February 1951, which 
condemned the intervention of People’s Republic of China in Korea as aggressive and called “upon all 
States and authorities to refrain from giving assistance to the aggressors in Korea.”
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threat or use of force. In other words, the prohibition of the threat or use of force 
binds all states, members and non-members alike.® Thirdly, in Article 35(2), non- 
Members are allowed to “bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the 
General Assembly any dispute” to which they are parties. Finally, Article 103 
establishes the precedence of members’ obligations under the UN Charter in the 
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members under the Charter and 
under other international agreements. Thus, it follows that the Charter is instrumental 
in providing a framework for prohibiting force and elevating it to a jm  cogens 
status.®
The7M5 cogens status of Article 2(4) is also confirmed in the Nicaragua judgment of 
the bitemational Court of Justice (ICJ), where it referred to statements by 
government representatives who considered the prohibition of force in Article 2(4) as 
not only a principle of customary international law but also “a fundamental and 
cardinal principle of such law.” ®^ The Court also inferred the opinio juris of states 
from the consent given to numerous General Assembly resolutions that reiterated the 
norm of the prohibition of force,^^ in particular the 1970 Declaration on Principles o f 
International Law}^ which was adopted by consensus, bi addition, the Court referred *
* Hüseyin Pazarcı, Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri, IV. Kitap (Lectures in International Law, Book IV) 
(Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2000), 113; Çelik, M illetlerarası Hukuk, 409.
® Belatchew Asrat, Prohibition o f Force Under The UN Charter: A Study o f Article 2(4) (Uppsala, 
Sweden: lustus Förlag, 1991), 51-52. 
l a  Reports (1986), para. 190.
“ See for example, GA Resols. 290 (IV), Essentials fo r Peace, 1 December 1949; 378 (V) A, Duties 
o f States in the Event o f the Outbreak o f Hostilities, 17 November 1950; 380 (V), Peace Through 
Deeds, 17 November 1950; 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles o f International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in accordance with the Charter o f the United 
Nations, 24 October 1970; 3314 (XX3X) Definition o f Aggression, 14 December 1974; 42/22, 
Declaration on the Enhancement o f the Effectiveness o f the Principle o f Refiaining From the Threaf 
or Use o f Force in International Relations, 18 November 1987.
Declaration on Principles o f International Law asserts that “Every State has the 
its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial'
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to the views of the Intemational Law Commission on the jus cogens character of the 
provisions of Article 2(4)/^ Within this context, one question relevant for the 
purposes of this study, arising out of the attribution of an intemational peremptory 
norm to Article 2(4), is the question of validity of the treaties of guarantee in 
intemational law, since the use of force that such treaties provide for could be argued 
to be against Article 2(4).*'^  Such a position, for instance, was taken by the Cypriot 
govermnent in the Security Council in 1964, when Turkey invoked its guarantorship 
rights under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee signed in 1960. The UN reaction to 
Greek objections to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee will be examined in Chapter II of 
Part n , within the context of interventions pursuant to a prior treaty.
Notwithstanding the consensus on the prominence of the norm of the prohibition of 
the use of force and its customary intemational law status. Article 2(4) raises 
questions of interpretation due to an absence of definition for the various notions 
stipulated in the article.
2. 1 .1 .1 . The Notion of ‘Force’
The prohibition of force in Article 2(4) comprises both the threat and the use of 
force. However, the language of Article 2(4) neither defines nor qualifies the term 
‘force.’ The prevailing view is that the notion of ‘force’ in Article 2(4) does not 
extend to all kind of force, such as political and economic coercion, but signifies
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes o f the United 
Nations. Such a threat or use o f force constitutes a violation of intemational law and the Charter of the 
United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling intemational issues.” GA Res. 
2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
ICJ Reports (1986), para. 190.
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solely anned force. The General Assembly Declaration on the Principles o f 
International Law, which is considered to be the key interpretation of the main 
principles of the UN Charter, confirms this reading of force. In its interpretation of 
the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations, 
the Declaration only refers to military force. It deals with other types of coercion in 
the context of the general principle of non-intervention in matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a state.*® Thus, it follows that what General Assembly was 
implying by its use of the term ‘force’ in Article 2(4) was specifically limited to 
armed force. In addition, the ICJ supports this narrow conception of force in the 
Nicaragua case, as it refers to this resolution for determining the scope of the
prohibition of force in customary international law.17
Nevertheless, even when confined to the definition of armed force, the term provokes 
questions with respect to the uses of ‘indirect’ force. Included in the notion of 
“indirect force,” are one state’s allowing its territory to be used by troops of another 
country for fighting a third state and/or providing arms to insurgents in another 
country.*® Although legal scholarship generally tends to consider this problem within 
the framework of defining ‘intervention,’ it is also relevant within the scope of 
Article 2(4). In this respect, the Declaration on the Principles o f International Law
See for example, Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, 141.
Asrat, Prohibition o f Force Under The UN Charter, 40; Bruno Simma (ed.). The Charter o f the 
United Nations, A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 112; Oscar Schächter, 
International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1991), 111; Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, 137; Pazarcı, Uluslararası Hukuk 
Dersleri, 114.
GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 Octob«· 1970.
ICJ Reports (1986), para. 191.
** Simma (ed.), The Charter o f the United Nations, 113; Pazarcı, Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri, 114.
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provided specifícatíons regarding the prohibition of the use of indirect force in its
section dealing with the prohibition of force more generally:
“Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing or 
encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed 
bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory 
of another state. EvCTy state has the duty to refrain from 
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of 
civil strife or tororist acts in another state or acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the 
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.”
On the other hand, the ICJ in its Nicaragua judgment of 1986, reiterates the
Declaration on Principles o f International Law, reaffirming that the above
formulation of indirect force is within the scope of Article 2(4). As a result, it
appears that the notion of “indirect force” is also included in the prohibition of the
use or threat of force.
2 .1 .1 .2 . Threat of Force
The prohibition of force in Article 2(4) also includes the prohibition of the threat of 
force. In this respect, Schächter points out that Article 2(4) forbids “a threat to use 
military action to coerce a State to make concessions.” ®^ However, legal opinions 
have given far less consideration to what is meant by the “threat of force” than to the 
use of actual force. Brownlie describes “threat of force” as “an express or implied 
promise by a Government of a resort to force conditional on non-acceptance of
While describing the arming and training o f the Contras by the United States as acts amounting to 
the threat or use o f force, the Court did not characterize the mere supply o f funds to them as a use of 
force. It should be noted, however, that the Court stated that supplying funds constituted an act of 
intervention in the internal affairs. ICJ Reports (1986), para. 228.
^  Schächter, International Law, 111.
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certain demands of that Govemment.”^^  Another author notes that “[t]he relevant 
feature of threat as a form of coercion is not so much the kind of force applied, but 
rather the purpose and outcome or the threat: a genuine reduction in the range of
choices otherwise available to states.9^22
The Declaration on Principles o f International Law acknowledges ‘threat’ as an 
instrument of coercion, by declaring that “[t]he territory of a State shall not be the 
object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force.” 
Therefore, it can be stated that Article 2(4) includes the threat of force, which may 
possibly result in violation of a particular state’s territorial integrity and political 
independence.^ Nevertheless, since most threats of force have generally been 
justified on the basis of the right of self-defense, there seems to be a higher degree of 
tolerance towards the threat than the actual use of force in state practice.^^ This 
tolerance can also be said to result from the general recognition of the difficulty to 
prove coercive intent in an international system characterized by power disparities 
and the consequent dominant and subordinate relationships between states. 
Notwithstanding this, scholars agree that an open and direct threat of force to compel 
another state to give up territory or yield considerable political concessions is to be 
considered unlawful under Article 2(4).^
Brownlie, International Law, 364.
^  Romano Sadurska, ‘Threats of Force,” American Journal o f International Law 82:2 (1988), 242. 
^ Asrat, Prohibition o f Force Under The UN Charter, 138-139.
^  Simma (ed.). The Charter o f the United Nations, 118.
^  Schächter, International Law, 111; Sadurska, ‘Threats of Force,” 239.
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2. 1 .1 .3 . The Frame of ‘Tntemational Relations”
Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force in international relations between 
states. Hence, the proscription does not include the domestic use of force.^ ® In other 
words, the provisions of Article 2(4) do not deprive states of their right to take 
measures to maintain order within their own jurisdictions. Accordingly, states may 
resort to force in suppressing riots and insurrections, and may use it to punish 
dissenters without breaching Article 2(4).^^ More specifically, the very framework of 
international relations implies that the provision does not apply to civil wars.^ ® This 
reflects the general agreement that internal conflicts are beyond the realm of 
international law, since the latter is meant to govern the relations between states. 
Nevertheless, the case ceases to be exclusively a matter of internal affairs, if the 
internal use of force is condemned and declared to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security by the UN.^  ^ In this respect, practice shows that the UN has 
increasingly come to accept internal disorders as potential “threats to international 
peace and security,” and thus matters of international concern. However, such 
characterization by the UN and its resultant involvement in internal conflicts is a 
subject that should be assessed in the context of Article 2(7) which pertains to the 
Organization’s intervention in matters within domestic jurisdiction, and thus is 
beyond the confines of Article 2(4). What is relevant in regard to Article 2(4) is the 
question of whether a state’s use of force and its intervention in a civil conflict in 
another state violate the general prohibition on the use of force or not. According to 
traditional doctrine in international law, the stance of outside powers with respect to
“  Shaw, International Law, 720.
Ibid., 688; Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, 137.
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a civil conflict must depend on the scale of the conflict. If the conflict is 
characterized as having a status of ‘rebellion,’ then the government in power is still 
considered to be legal and it can suppress the rebellion according to its domestic 
regulations. Therefore external assistance to the government upon request is 
permitted, but aid to the rebels is prohibited. In this sense, intervention in favor and 
at the request of the government does not contravene Article 2(4).^° If, on the other 
hand, the rebel forces have taken control of a sufficient area of the territory and have 
obtained formal recognition of a status of ‘belligerency,’ external states must 
observe a position of ‘neutrality,’ as they would in any other international conflict. 
Thus, traditional legal doctrine appears to permit third party interventions in a civil 
war only to assist the legitimate government, but prohibits giving support to the 
rebels.^^ As one scholar puts it, this shows “a priori presumption of legitimacy to the 
rights of existing governments, and of illegitimacy to all rebel forces.”^^  The 
difficulty arises, however, from the lack of objective criteria regarding how outside 
governments recognize internal disturbances. In general, international law proves to 
be limited in determining the status of an internal strife.^^ Consequently, the fact that 
external states have a considerable amount of discretion has resulted in the portrayal 
of the civil conflicts largely according to political convenience.
“  Simma (ed.). The Charter o f the United Nations, 116.
^  Âsrat, Prohibition o f Force Under The UN Charter, 70-71.
Kelsen, The Law o f the United Nations, 934.
Hersch Lauterpacbt (ed.), L. Oppenheim, International Law, 305. For a detailed analysis o f 
international law of internal war and concise elaboration of the regulation o f the duties o f states with 
respect to internal conflict depending on the status accorded to the factions in conflict, see Richard A. 
FaÛc, Legal Order in a Violent World (Princeton: Princeton Univeristy Press, 1968), 117-127. See 
also, Rosalyn Higgins, “International Law and Civil Conflict” in Evan Luard (ed.). The International 
Regulation o f Civil War (New York: New York University Press, 1972), 170-171; Ann Van Wyen 
Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, The Law and Its Import in the Americas (Dallas: 
Southern Methodist University Press, 1956), 215-221; and Ali L. Kaıaosmanoğlu, îç  Çatışmaların 
Çözümü ve Uluslararası ö r f l e r  (The Resolution o f Internal Conflicts and the International 
Organizations) (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1981), 15-20.
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Within the UN framework, there have been various attempts to lay down a set of
rules concerning the rights and duties of states with respect to internal conflict.^'^  In
1949, the Essentials o f Peace Resolution called on all nations to “refrain from any
threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or
integrity of any state, and fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people
in any state.”^^  In 1950, a further resolution condemned intervention or assistance in
civil conflict aimed at ‘changing’ the legitimate government by the threat or use of
force.^ ^ Similarly, another resolution, in 1965, declared that no state should “interfere
in the civil strife of another state.”^^  More authoritatively and in a more detailed
fashion than any of these, the Declaration on Principles o f International Law affirms
in the context of the use of “indirect force,” that:
“Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, 
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or 
terrorist activities in another State...the acts referred to in the 
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.” ®^
The resolution contains a similar provision in the subsequent principle concerning
the duty of non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction, reiterating
that no state may “interfere in civil strife” in another state.^ ^
^^Evan Luard, “Civil Conflicts in Modem International Relations” in Lnard (ed.). The International 
Regulation o f Civil Wars, 22.
Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World, 119.
In this regard, it should be noted that some pre-Charter attempts were made as well. For example, in 
1900, the Institute of International Law formulated rules regarding the duties of states in relation to 
insurgency, and in 1928, a number o f Latin American states signed the Convention on the Duties of 
Rights and States in the Event of Civil Strife, which restricted the right of intervention extensively. 
See Luard, “Civil Conflicts in Modem International Relations,” 21.
GA Res. 290 (IV)* 1 December 1949.
GA Res. 380 (V), 17 November 1950.
GA Res. 2131 (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility o f Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of 
States and the Protection o f Their Independence and Sovereignty, 21 December 1965.
GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
39 Ibid
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When civil strife involves the right to self-determination -particularly in states under 
colonial rule- the use of force by the colonial power to suppress rebels is generally 
defined not as a matter of internal affairs, but rather in the context of the principle of 
prohibition of the use of force in international relations.^ It thus raises the question 
of whether intervention in this kind of civil conflict by third party states is 
compatible with the spirit of Article 2(4) and the, principle of non-intervention. In 
this respect, both the Declaration on Principles o f International Law and the UN’s 
Definition o f Aggression assert that every state has the duty to “refrain from any 
forcible action” which would impede the exercise of self-determination and that such 
peoples are entitled to “receive support” for their struggle to that end.^ * Hence, civil 
conflicts entailing self-determination appear to provide the states with a possible 
justification of using force on behalf of the peoples seeking that end.
2. 1 .1 .4 . Territorial Integrity and Political Independence
The terms “territorial integrity” and “political independence” is commonly taken to 
refer to “the total of legal rights which a state has.”^^  A good definition, for example, 
describes these terms as:
“embracing in summary reference the most important bases 
of state power, the values or interests whose impairment and 
destruction are so u ^ t to be prohibited and, correlatively.
whose necessary protection by coercion is permitted.„43
^  Pazarcı, Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri, 112-113.
GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970 and GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 Decembra· 1974. Third party 
involvement in such cases whereby right of self-determination is in question shall be explored in 
detail in the Chapter I of Part HI.
Brownlie, International Law, 268. See also the sixth principle of GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 
1970, which states that “[e]ach State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty.”
M.S. McDougal and F.P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum Public Order (1961), 177, quoted in Asrat, 
Prohibition o f Force Under The UN Charter, 146.
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In practice, these terms are generally emphasized with the addition of notions such as 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘inviolability.’ For example. Definition o f Aggression, adopted by 
consensus in 1974, refers specifically to “sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence.” The resolution puts forward a broad conception of prohibition of 
armed intervention and aggression, which includes not only invasions, but also 
attacks or military occupations; sending armed bands or mercenaries to carry out 
violent acts; shelling another state’s territory; blocking its ports; and attacking the 
forces of another state.'*  ^ Thus, it can be inferred that the prohibition of force in 
Article 2(4) does not only refer to the use of force aimed at termination of a state’s 
territorial existence or the status of its political independence. Rather, it extends 
protection to the fundamental rights of states. In this sense, the prohibited force in 
Article 2(4) covers any kind of trans-border use of armed force, regardless of the 
intention of depriving that state of part of its territory. Hence, in terms of its legal 
effect, scholars argue that the term ‘integrity’ in the provision signifies 
‘inviolability,’ prohibiting any kind of forcible cross-frontier activ ityParagraph 7 
of the Charter’s preamble further reinforces this conclusion. It articulates the goal of 
ensuring that “armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.” On the 
other hand, the judgment of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case, which denied the 
British line of reasoning according to which British minesweeping operation in 
Albanian territorial waters did not violate Albanian sovereignty as it neither 
threatened its territorial integrity nor its political independence (nor caused territorial 
loss or harmed the political independence of Albania), suggest that the prohibition of
44 GA Res. 3314 (XXDQ, 14 December 1974.
Simma (ed.). The Charter o f the United Nations, 117.
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force laid down in Article 2(4) is all-embracing. It is therefore not restricted to the 
protection of territorial integrity or political independence in its strictest sense.“^
In sum, Article 2(4) can be said to presume the illegality of any unilateral use of 
force not authorized by the UN. In this sense, it is the corner-stone of the rule of non­
intervention between states. The norm it establishes has universal and imperative 
applicability in that it is consistently reaffirmed in a number of international 
documents as well as in General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. 
Although the content of the article remains debated, it is generally interpreted as 
pertaining to threat or use of armed force, employed directly or indirectly against 
another state.
2 .1 .2 . Article 2(7)
With respect to the interference of the United Nations, as an organization, within the 
internal affairs of the member states. Article 2, paragraph 7 directs the organs of the 
UN to respect domestic affairs of states and lays down a principle of non­
intervention. It reads:
“Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”
The Court did not specifically refer to this particular British claim in its judgment. However, the 
rejection of the British plea can be inferred from the unanimous decision of the Court that the British 
action constituted a violation o f Albanian sovereignty. See ICJ Reports (1949), Corfu Channel Case, 
(Merits), 35.
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The principle of non-intervention stipulated by Article 2(7), is not the same principle 
as the duty of non-intervention of states established by general international law.'^  ^
Article 2(7) refers specifically to the Organization’s intervention, rather than the 
intervention of one state in another’s affairs.“^* In other words, it does not refer to a 
general prohibition of intervention, but rather declares “a delimitation of competence 
between the state and the organs of the In this sense, the terms “[njothing
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene” point to an “organizational rule of 
conduct for the organs of the UN.” °^ Thus, it represents “an interpretative guideline” 
for UN organs in “dealing with matters that are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a state.”^^  It is argued that Article 2(7) can be considered a “life-saver” 
clause for member states, which provides them with a sort of a veto right that they 
can employ for restricting the jurisdiction of UN organs. Consequently, unilateral 
interventions are not subject to Article 2(7), and their legality is to be established
through reference to general international law.53
Article 2(7) is the next generation to Article 15(8) of the League Covenant, '^^  which 
set out limitations on the functioning of the League of Nations with respect to the 
domestic jurisdiction of member states. However, it is distinguished from its
Kelsen, Principles o f International Law, 63; Ian Brownlie, Principles o f Public International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 553.
^  Kelsen, The Law o f the United Nations, 770.
Sinima (ed.). The Charter o f the United Nations, 150.
Ibid, 150.
Ibid, 143.
Seha L. Meray, Devletler Hukukanda Birleşmiş Milletler Antlaşması ve Tatbikatına Göre M illi 
Yetki Meselesi (The Issue o f Domestic Jurisdiction According to the United Nations Charter and 
Practice in International Law) (Ankara: İstiklal Matbaacılık ve Gazetecilik Koli. OrL, 1952), 45.
Simma (ed.), The Charter o f the United Nations^ 150.
^  Article 15(8) of the Covenant reads as follows: “If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one 
of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out o f a matter which by international law is solely 
within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no 
recommendation as to its settlement.”
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predecessor by substituting the word ‘essentially’ for ‘solely,’ by omitting the 
reference to “international law” as a criterion for determining matters of domestic 
jurisdiction, and by not specifying any particular UN organ as the competent 
authority for establishing jurisdictional issues.
There are three rules embodied in Article 2(7). The first provision, as noted above, is 
addressed to the organs of the UN. It directs them to respect “domestic affairs.” The 
second rule is addressed to the members of the UN. It maintains that they should not 
submit matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction to the UN for a 
peaceful dispute settlement. Thus, the UN organs are guided to claim competence to 
consider disputes only on matters under international law, as opposed to questions 
that are regarded to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state. The final 
component of the article specifies for the only exception to the rule of non­
intervention by the United Nations in the domestic affairs of a state. It thus 
establishes a limitation of domestic jurisdiction in relation to the enforcement 
measures contained in Chapter VII of the Charter.^^
Among other things, the difficulties arising out of the terms of Article 2(7), surround
the definition of the terms “not to intervene” and “matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction.” As Goodrich, Hambro and Simons assert:
“Ambiguity results from the fact that a permissive view with 
respect to what the Organization may do can be the result of 
either of a restrictive definition of intervention or restrictive 
interpretation of ‘essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction.’?»56
Simma (ed.). The Charter o f the United Nations, 149.
Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro, and Anne Patricia Simons, Charter o f the United Nations: 
Commentary and Documents^ Third Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 67.
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The fact that Article 2(7) offers no specific criteria for determining what is to be 
regarded as essentially domestic or what amounts to intervention has consequently 
provided United Nations organs with a good deal of leeway in applying these terms 
to particular cases.^  ^ Thus, it is necessary to consider the implied criteria for 
permissible United Nations’ intervention within the sphere of domestic affairs, with 
reference to the practices of the UN.
2. 1. 2. 1. The Scope of the United Nations’ Jurisdiction: Ways and Means 
Utilized for Overcoming the Prohibition of Intervention in Domestic 
Jurisdiction
Article 2(7) proscribes intervention, but does not prohibit all actions and decisions of 
the United Nations relating to domestic affairs.^* Therefore, confining the meaning of 
‘intervention’ to describe instances of coercive interference by the United Nations 
would be misleading. As a result, the analysis of the concept of intervention and the 
meaning of “to intervene” as set out in Article 2(7) should be extended to those acts 
of the United Nations, which fall short of enforcement action. In this respect, 
notwithstanding disagreements on various issues, there are some well-established 
principles which set the parameters of the degree of UN involvement in domestic 
matters. Thus, the question arises concerning which activities lying outside the scope 
of Chapter VII may be claimed as falling within UN jurisdiction, and in what ways
Oscar Schächter, ‘The United Nations and Internal Conflict” in John Norton Moore (ed.). Law and 
Civil War in the Modem World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 402. For 
detailed elaboration of the latitude assumed by the United Nations organs, see Rosalyn Higgins, The 
Development o f International Law Through The Political Organs o f the United Nations (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1963), 64-130.
Schächter, ‘The United Nations and Internal Conflict,” 421.
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can the UN bypass the prohibition of intervention in domestic affairs as stipulated in 
Article 2(7).
The history of the UN’s practices demonstrates that the Organization may undertake 
either indirect or direct intervention in the domestic affairs of a state. It may intafere 
in the domestic affairs of a state without carrying out an action on the territory of the 
state in question. Included in this kind of interventions are activities like putting the 
issue on the agenda of any UN body, discussing the issue in that forum, and making 
recommendations. With respect to such indirect interventions, the Organization’s 
practice has been consistent. Despite the occasional objection from the concerned 
states, UN organs have considered and discussed the issues in question
automatically.59
In making recommendations and adopting resolutions expressing a certain position 
on an internal matter, UN bodies have considered themselves competent to the extent 
that an “international concern” has been expressed on a given matter. In other words, 
while the matter at hand may not be deemed as one constituting a threat to or breach 
of peace (meriting enforcement action under Chapter VII), the existence of 
international ramifications “may none the less serve as a basis for jurisdiction.” “^ 
Thus, any matter that is regarded as a potential threat to the peace can be proclaimed
^  Meray, Devletler Hukukunda Birleşmiş M illetler Antlaşması, 181; Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, 
“Birleşmiş Milletler Andlaşmasmm 2 inci Madde 7 inci Fıkrasınm îç Savaşlar Bakunmdan Yorumu” 
(The Interpretation o f Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter With Respect to Civil Wars), Siyasal 
BilgUer Fakültesi Dergisi (Journal of Faculty o f Political Science) 3 (1972), 193.
Higgins, Hie Development o f International Law, 77.
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to be of “intonational concern,” which in turn removes it from the operation of
Article 2(7), and more specifically, from the scope of “domestic jurisdiction.»61
It was in relation to the Spanish question that, in 1946, the concept of “international 
concern” was first elaborated. While it was recognized in the Security Council that 
the nature of a regime was unquestionably a matter of domestic jurisdiction, a 
resolution was adopted to set up a sub-committee to determine whether the situation 
in Spain “has led to international friction and does endanger international peace and 
security.”®^ This resolution was significant, for it established that investigations to 
determine facts, even on a matter generally recognized to be within domestic 
jurisdiction, did not in itself constitute an intervention, and as such, did not fall 
within the perview of Article 2(7). The sub-committee found that although the 
situation in Spain was not “an existing threat within the meaning of Article 39,” it 
constituted “a potential menace to international peace,” the continuance of which 
was “likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security within the meaning of 
Article 34.”^^  Accordingly, the sub-committee determined that the Security Council 
had no jurisdiction to “direct or authorize enforcement measures under Article 40 or 
42»64 Rather, the report was of the opinion that the matter should be dealt with by the 
Security Council within the context of Chapter VI of the Charter, which lays out 
measures for peaceful settlement and adjustment.®  ^Despite the failure of subsequent 
resolutions, the Spanish question initiated the idea that “matters prima facie of
All L. Karaosmanoğlıı, “UNFICYP and The Problem of Consenlf’ in Reşat Anm (ed.), Cyprus and 
International Law (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2002), 98; Higgins, The Development o f 
International Law, 77.
SC Res. 7, 29 April 1946. The resolution was adopted by 10 votes to none, with one abstention 
(USSR).
® UN Yearbook 1946-1947,348.
64 Ibid.
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domestic jurisdiction may be of international concern in certain circumstances.”“  
Henceforth, the idea of “international concern” was to become a major element in 
giving the Security Council the authority to transcend the only exception to Article 
2(7), namely the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII, opening 
before “the Organization a wide field of possibilities in situations that had been 
hitherto deemed to fall within the domestic jurisdiction.” ’^ More precisely, the 
concept of “international concern,” which is broader than that of breach of, or threat 
to, international peace, seems to indicate that threats for less severe than those 
requiring enforcement measures may pave the way for action despite the limiting 
provisions of Article 2(7).
The element of “international concern” as the basis of jurisdiction can be observed in 
various General Assembly resolutions, for example, in those dealing with apartheid 
in South Africa. In a series of resolutions related to the issue, the General Assembly 
maintained that apartheid constituted “a grave threat to the peaceful relations 
between ethnic groups in the world;”“  was “prejudicial to international harmony;”“  
and had “led to international friction.”’® Likewise, with respect to the Angolan 
situation, the General Assembly stated that it was “likely to endanger international 
peace and security,”’* backed up by the Security Council, which found that the 
continuation of Angolan situation constituted “an actual and potential cause of
^  Ibid., 34S.
^  Higgins, The Development o f International Law, 79.
Karaosmanoglu, “UNFICYP and The Problem o f Consent,” 98. 
“  GA Res. 820 (K ), 14 December 1954.
® GA Res. 1375 (XIV), 17 November 1959.
™ GARes. 1598 (XV), 13 April 1961.
GA Res. 1603 (XV), 20 April 1961.
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international friction.”^^  Thus, it can be said that the Organization has shown a 
tendency to link domestic situations with international peace on the grounds of 
“international concem.”^^
Despite the reference made to this concept in various resolutions and decisions for 
declaring UN jurisdiction, the criterion of “international concern” remains highly 
vague, largely because of the political nature of such a claim. The decisions of UN 
organs are political, in the conventional meaning of the term, simply by virtue of the 
composition of its members, which are governments. Such decisions are most often 
the outcome of a coalition of national interests, mirroring considerations of benefits 
and costs of the proposed measures.^^ Nonetheless, governments usually refer to the 
UN Charter to justify their positions and selected course of actions. In this respect, 
the broader goal of the UN, particularly the aim of maintaining international peace 
and security, arms UN organs with considerable latitude to deal with issues falling 
imder domestic jurisdiction. In other words, any matter can find its justification in 
one or another of the United Nations aims. Thus, such criteria are the “product of
political processes and reflect a particular combination of circumstances.«75
This said, from its inception, the UN has intervened in domestic affairs of states 
more directly as well. In this respect, the Organization has either embarked on 
actions within the territory of a state or attempted to influence the military, political 
and economic affairs of a state. Study, investigation and inquiry of any subsidiary
^ s c  Res. 163,9 June 1961.
”  Karaosmanoglu, “UNFICYP and The Problem o f Consent,” 98.
Schächter, “The United Nations and Internal Conflict,” 402.
”  Ibid. For a similar view, see also, Karaosmanoglu, “UNFICYP and The Problem o f Consent,” 98.
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body or conunission carried out in accordance with Article 34 of the UN Charter^^ 
are among the types of non-military intervention practiced by the United Nations.^ 
This UN practice reveals that activities outside the territory of the state are not 
considered to be prohibited by Article 2(7), to the extent that there is an 
“international concern” as explained above. The proscription against UN intervention 
in domestic affairs seems to crystallize when a fact-finding mission is to be 
undertaken on the spot, for states are not obliged to admit the Organization’s 
investigative and observational activities on their territories. It is an accepted rule of 
international law that all the activities assumed on the territory of a given state by an 
international organization constitute a violation of its sovereignty.^ ® In such cases, 
the decisive element in overcoming the prohibition of intervention other than the 
exception provided in Article 2(7) (i.e. enforcement actions under Chapter VII), 
appears to be the ‘consent’ of the legitimate government to the inquiry on its 
territory.
For the purposes of the study, the most important issue within the terms of Article 
2(7) concerns the deployment of foreign military units in a sovereign state and taking 
military action within the territory of that state. In this respect, one can make a 
distinction between the non-coercive and coercive military actions of the UN.^’ Since 
coercive intervention may be interpreted as an enforcement action, (which is
Article 34 reads: “The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might 
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of 
the dispute or situation is likely to endang^ the maintenance of international peace and security.”
It has to be noted that non-military interventions can be coercive too. In this respect, the economic 
measures as foreseen by Article 41, which stipulates measures short of use o f armed force, represent 
an example.
Karaosmanoğlu, “UNFICYP and The Problem o f Consent,” 99.
^  Karaosmanoğlu, “Birleşmiş Milletler Andlaşmasmın 2 inci Madde 7 inci Fıkrasmm İç Savaşlar 
Balonundan Yorumu,” 192.
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excepted from the prohibition of domestic jurisdiction), the question arises as to what 
qualifies as non-coercive military action and the conditions under which they would 
not be considered in contravention of Article 2(7). The United Nations’ actions are 
not considered coercive as long as the aim is not to compel the parties to a conflict to 
agree on a certain solution or to change the political and militaiy balance in favor of 
one party at the expense of the other.®° In this sense, peacekeeping operations may 
be regarded as actions involving no forcible measures, since they require the 
“consent of the protagonists, impartiality on the part of the United Nations Forces,
Q 1
and resort to arms only in self-defense.” Thus, it can be said that the ‘consent’ of a 
state or of the parties to a dispute within a state, in cases of domestic conflict is not 
only an important political factor ensuring the cooperation of the parties with the 
peacekeepers, but also an essential legal requirement to sidestep the prohibition of
intervention outlined in Article 2(7).82
It follows from the above, that the essential steps the UN must assume in overcoming 
the prohibition of interference in domestic jurisdiction in Article 2(7) are a 
declaration of “international concern” on a given matter and ‘consent’ of the state at 
issue. While “international concern” is sufficient for the placement of a case or 
situation on the agenda of any UN organ, discussion, adoption of recommendatory 
resolutions on a matter considered as domestic as well as institution of missions of 
inquiry outside the territory of the state in concern; it is not an adequate basis for 
legalizing on-spot inquiries and peacekeeping operations. In the latter instances, the 
consent of the state appears to be a critical element in determining the Organization’s
^Ibid.
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competence. The requirement of consent for such involvement follows from the 
political nature of the concept of “international concern,” which can undermine the 
legal relevance of Article 2(7), since it is fairly easy for UN bodies to allege 
“international concern” regarding any variety of domestic disorder.
2. 1 .2 .2 . Scope and Content of Domestic Jurisdiction
The issue of intervention is raised only in matters regarded as domestic. If it lies
outside this perview, then the prohibition laid down in Article 2(7) does not apply.
Thus, another difficulty with respect to the interpretation of Article 2(7) is related to
the issue of the scope and content of “domestic jurisdiction,” for its definition is by
no means self-evident. In the twenty-six years of League practice, only one case shed
light on the limits defining this term. In its advisory opinion to the League Council
on the matter of the Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco, the Permanent
Court of International Justice stated:
“The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely 
within the jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative 
question; it depends upon the development of international 
relations.”*^
The Court also asserted that even in the case of a matter which was not principally 
governed by international law,
“the right of a state to use its discretion is nevertheless 
restricted by obligations which it may have undertaken 
towards other states. In such a case, jurisdiction which, in 
principle, belongs solely to the state, is limited by rules of 
international law.”
The Blue Helmets: A Review o f United Nations Peace-Keeping (New York: The United Nations,
1996), 4.
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^Ibid.
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Two specific rules were derived out of this formulation. Firstly, the content of 
domestic jurisdiction does not comprise a neat and rigid list of issues that exclusively 
belongs to the domain of a state. Its precise scope is to be determined rather on the 
basis of the facts of each case, along with the prevailing state of international 
relations. Secondly, the domestic jurisdiction of a state is restricted by the 
commitments and obligations that it might have deliberately assumed towards other 
states under a specific treaty or agreement.^ Thus, international law, created through 
multilateral conventions and bilateral treaties, “removes the subjects regulated in 
these conventions” from domestic jurisdiction.®^
The UN Charter itself does not contain a definition of the term “domestic 
jurisdiction.” Indeed, at the San Francisco Conference (1945), the issue of the 
definition of the term was not raised.®  ^This omission did not stem from an implied 
consensus on its definition. On the contrary, according to one view. Article 2(7) “was 
deliberately made ambiguous in recognition of the fact that it dealt with an issue so 
difficult of solution as to be better left unsolved.”®® Arguing against making Article 
2(7) more precise legally, the US representative, John Foster Dulles argued in favor 
of “making the provision more a political principle than a legal formula”®^ and
“  M. S. Rajan, “Defining ‘Domestic Jurisdiction’: Is It Necessary? Is It Feasible? Is it Useful?,’’ The 
Indian Journal O f International Law (New Delhi), 1:1 (July 1960), reprinted in M. S. Rajan, United 
Nations and World Politics (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1995), 147-148.
Simma (ed.). The Charter o f the United Nations, 152.
Except for Uruguay delegation, no other delegation made any specific proposals regarding 
definition o f the jurisdictional limits of the proposed organization. For the arguments of various 
delegations at San Francisco Conference with respect to Article 2(7), see Meray, Devletler Hukukunda 
Birleşmiş M illetler Antlaşması, 40-42.
Francis O. Wilcox and Cari M. Marcy, Proposals For Changes in the United Nations (Washington 
D.C., 1955), 263, quoted in Rajan, United Nations and WorW Politics, 164.
Rajan, United Nations and World Politics, 148.
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contended that it would evolve in parallel to “the state of the world, the public 
opinion of the world and the factual interdependence of the world.” °^
Consequently, it can be said that domestic jurisdiction is a relative concept: its extent
may be limited or expanded in parallel to the changing principles of international
l a w F o r  example, in its judgment on the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ
determined that respect for human rights was a legal obligation erga omnes.^^
Similarly, the document which came out of the Moscow meeting of the Conference
on Human Dimensions of the CSCE of 4 October 1991, stated that:
“The participating States emphasize that issues relating to 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule 
of law are of international concern, as respect for these rights 
and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the 
international order. They categorically and irrevocably 
declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the 
human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and 
legitimate concern to all participating States and do not 
belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State 
concerned.’>93
One other problem related to the interpretation of the “domestic jurisdiction” clause 
in the text of Article 2(7) is the importance attached to the phrase “matters essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction.” While the Covenant provision referred to “a matter 
which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction,” the Charter 
provision substituted ‘essentially’ for ‘solely’ and left out the “international law” *
** Quoted in Rajan, United Nations and World Politics, 148-149.
Shaw, International Im w , 395.
^  ICJ Reports (1970), Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case, paras. 33-34. The Latin 
expression “erga omnes” means “towards all.” Within the context of the concept o f obligations erga 
omnes, the debated question is “whether the international community can be bound by obligations 
erga omnes and be the bearer of the corresponding rights.” For a detailed study of international 
obligations erga omnes, see Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept o f International Obligations Erga Omnes 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
CSCE, Document o f the Moscow Meeting o f the Conference On the Human Dimension o f the 
CSCE, 10 September-15 October, 1991, http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990- 
1999/hd/mosc91e.htm.
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criterion to establish whether a matter falls within domestic or international 
jurisdiction. Scholars content that the substitution was meant to restrict the 
jurisdiction of the Organization vis a vis the member states. In this respect, Vincent 
argues that, the principle of non-intervention as laid down in Article 2(7), aims to 
“preserve the state against the emergence of a superstate.”^  Another scholar 
observes that Article 2(7) is “the quintessence of the tendency of the sovereignty 
dogma to resist progress.”^^  Yet, another commentator notes that there are no matters 
that can be classified by nature neither as solely nor essentially domestic. It is only 
when there is no customary or contractual international law regulating an issue then 
that matter can be said to be solely, but not essentially, within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a state. This implies that the question can only be resolved by 
reference to “international law.” However, even if a state is bound by a legal 
obligation under international law, that is to say, even if the matter is not considered 
to be solely an issue of domestic jurisdiction, a state may still claim that this matter is 
‘essentially’ within its domestic jurisdiction. In consequence, it may be presumed 
that the state concerned has an obligation only under general international law or 
with respect to a specific treaty (if it refers to the matter in question), but not under 
the law of the Charter.^^ Thus, the term ‘essentially’ ended up broadening the scope 
of domestic jurisdiction.’  ^ In other words, the replacement of the term ‘solely’ with 
the term ‘essentially’ has made the content of “domestic jurisdiction” substantially 
more flexible and vague.
Vincent, Nonintervention, 235.
^  A lf Ross, Constitution o f the United Nations (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1950), 129, quoted 
in Vincent, Nonintervention, 236.
Kelsen, The Law o f the United Nations, 776-779.
^  Meray, Devletler Hukukunda Birleşmiş M illetler Antlaşması 53.
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Still, another view argues that Article 2(7) is a reflection of the principles of states’ 
right to choose their own political, economic, social and cultural systems without 
external interference within the community of politically equal states. In this respect, 
it is argued that questions relating to a state’s governmental system appear to be the 
only matters that lie solidly within the domestic sphere in their essence. Even then, 
this holds on the condition that the state can “claim legitimacy in terms of the right to 
self-determination of the people living in that territory, i.e. by virtue of a
representative government, and by respect for human rights.»98
Unlike the corresponding provision of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
(Article 15(8)), Article 2(7) did not designate international law as reference for 
defining the parameters of domestic jurisdiction. At the San Francisco Conference, 
Mr. Dulles explained the reason for the omission by pointing out that international 
law was subject to constant change and thus evaded definition.^^ On the other hand, 
the Australian delegate. Dr. Evatt argued for the omission on the opposite ground, 
stating that mention of international law in the provision would be redundant, since 
there was no other possible standard for determining the nature of a jurisdiction.^ ®* 
One commentator asserts that Article 2(7) was intended to preserve “international 
law at its present stage” and resist “ a further development of it through the efforts of 
the United Nations to regulate those things which are now abandoned, in anarchistic 
fashion, to the struggle for political power.”*®* Nonetheless, other scholars argue that 
the significance of the criterion of international law should not be exaggerated. First,
Simma (ed.). The Charter o f the United Nations, 152. Simma argues that these criteria can be 
inferred from The Declaration on Friendly Relations.
Quoted in D. J. Harris, Cases and M aterials on International Law, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1998), 973.
Meray, Devletler Hukukunda Birleşmiş M illetler Antlaşması, 49.
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because, international law has not offered a precise definition of the term domestic 
jurisdiction; and second, no specific rules exist in general international law for 
determining the nature of jurisdictions.*®^ Another view for not overstating the 
absence of the international law criterion holds that the omission was simply a matter 
of style. However, one might infer that the decisive factor in the determination of 
matters within domestic jurisdiction was intended to be “political and circumstantial, 
rather than exclusively or constantly be of a legal character.”*®^
In the practice of the United Nations, the issue of whether a matter falls within a 
state’s jurisdiction arose in a number of different cases. Although one can point to 
certain generalizations from the practice, its interpretation remains uncertain due to 
the influence of political factors.
2. 1 .2 .3 . Authority Determining Competence
Yet another problem with the interpretation of Article 2(7) is the question of 
authority, that is, deciding who is competent to determine whether a matter is 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state or within that of an organ of the 
UN in specific instances. Article 2(7) does not contain any provision to delegate this 
power to any organ of the UN. The non-inclusion of a competent authority has given
Ross, quoted in Vincent, Nonintervention^ 235.101
See for example, Rajan, United Nations and World Politics, 147. For an opposite view that in fact 
domestic jurisdiction has a clear meaning in international law, in that it refers to those matters where a 
state’s discretion is not limited by obligations imposed by international law, see Akehurst, A Modem  
Introduction to International Law, 169.
Meray, Devletler Hukukunda Birleşmiş M illetler Antlaşması^ 49.
M. S. Rajan, ‘TJnited States Attitude Towards Domestic Jurisdiction in the United Nations,” 
International Organization (Boston) 13:1 (1954), reprinted in M. S. Rajan, United Nations and World 
Politics (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1995), 215.
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way to two contrary views: one arguing that each member decides whether the matter 
in question is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction/®^ and the other, that the 
organs of the UN, in the exercise of their individual functions, are the competent 
authorities for such determinations. For example, in 1954 Greece requested that 
the item “Application under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the 
island of Cyprus” be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly’s ninth 
session. The British representative argued that the matter fell essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, since Cyprus was a British possession. 
In support of the British claim, the Turkish representative maintained that Article 
2(7) of the Charter precluded discussion of the Cyprus question in the General 
Assembly because a question of domestic jurisdiction was i n v o l v e d . B y  
Resolution 814 (IX), the Assembly decided not to consider the item.'®® The 
following year, the Assembly declined a similar Greek request to include the item on 
its agenda."® Finally, however, in 1956, the UK requested that the Greek complaint 
should be discussed together with a compliant of its own charging Greece for giving 
support for terrorism in Cyprus.'" With respect to jurisprudence regarding the issue, 
the ICJ confronted with pleas to “domestic jurisdiction” on number of occasions. For 
example, in the Interhandel case, the United States invoked the “domestic 
jurisdiction” reservation, which excluded from its acceptance of the compulsory
Kelsen, The Law o f the United Nations, 783-784.
A lf Ross, Constitution o f the United Nations (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1950), 130, quoted 
in Rajan, United Nations and World Politics, 217. See also Meray, Devletler Hukukunda Birleşmiş 
M illetler Antlaşması, 50.
Letter o f 16 August 1954 from President o f the Council of Ministers o f Greece to Secretary- 
General, UN Doc. A/2703 (1954).
UN Yearbook (1954), 94-95.
GA Res. 814 (IX), 17 December 1954.
UN Yearbook (1955), 77-78.
UN Yearbook 11956), 121-122.
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jurisdiction of the Court, “disputes with regard to matter which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the 
United States of America.”  ^ In its decision, although the Court ruled that it lacked 
jurisdiction on the case, the decision was based on the grounds that Switzerland had 
not exhausted local remedies. The Court did not comment on the validity of the 
reservation. As such, the question of authority determining competence remains 
far from settled.
2. 1.3. Exceptions to Article 2(4) and Article 2(7)
The United Nations system, while prohibiting the threat and use of force by states, 
designates the United Nations as the sole authority able to use force legitimately as a 
means of maintaining international peace and security. In other words, the Charter 
places the right of resort to force under the monopoly of the United Nations. With 
respect to the rule of non-intervention in domestic affairs, the enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII represent the only exception provided by the Charter. On the other 
hand, the prohibition of force by states is not absolute. The UN Charter provides for 
an exception to this rule in relation to measures of collective and individual self-
defense. 114
See Herbert W. Briggs, “The United States and the International Court of Justice: A Re- 
Examination,” American Journal o f International Law 53:2 (1959), 301.
Harris, Cases and Materials, 1013.
In addition to these, there are two other exceptions to Article 2(4). One of these is explained in 
Article 106, which enables the five permanent members o f the Security Council to take joint military 
action if  the Member States have not yet made special agreements with the Security Council to 
provide military contingents to take part in an enforcement action. On the other hand. Articles 107 and 
53 contain another exception. They allow for the use of force against the ‘enemy’ states o f the Second 
World War. The changed circumstances however, since then, have rendered the above exceptions 
practically void. Hence, for the purposes o f the study, force used in self-defense and force authorized 
by the Security Council are presumed to be the two exceptions pertinent under current international 
standards. For an elaboration of other exceptions, see for example, Brownlie, International Law, 336-
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2. 1 .3 .1 . Enforcement Measures
The maintenance of peace and security, as indicated in Article 1(1) of the UN 
Charter, is the essential aim of the United Nations. In this respect, the primary 
jurisdiction is assigned to the Security Council (Article 24). Accordingly, Chapter 
Vn focuses on the preservation and restoration of peace. It constitutes the core of the 
collective security machinery of the United Nations. The Security Council is 
empowered to make decisions binding on UN member states, concerning economic 
and military measures for maintaining or restoring international peace and
security. 115
2. 1 .3 .1 .1 . Security Council
Under Chapter VII, the Security Council is first required to determine whether a
“threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” exists before it can take
measures pursuant to Chapter VII. Article 39 reads:
‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression 
and shall make recommendations, or decided what measures 
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”
Chapter VII does not, however, furnish explicit definitions as to what constitutes a
threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. It leaves this
337; Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use o f Force, Beyond the 
UN Charter Paradigm (London. Routledge, 1993), 32-33; Simma (ed.). The Charter o f the United 
Nations, 119; Pazarcı, Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri, 121.
Chapter V n also includes non-enforcement measures by the Security Council such as 
recommendations. See Article 39 of the UN Charter.
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completely to the judgment of the Security Council. Thus, as one scholar notes, “a 
threat to the peace is whatever the Security Council says is a threat to the peace.”^^ ^
Nor does Article 39 qualify that the threat to, or the breach of ‘international’ peace. 
In spite of the stated aim of maintaining or restoring ‘international’ peace, it refers to 
‘any’ threat to peace. Hence, according to the wording of the article, the Security 
Council’s definition of a threat to peace does not need to derive from instances that 
are specified in Article 2(4). To put it in other words, a threat to peace does not 
necessarily have to be a conflict between two states.”  ^ Moreover, read in 
conjunction with Article 2(7), the Organization is authorized to intervene in matters 
of domestic jurisdiction in cases where there is judged to be a threat to, or breach of, 
the peace as determined by the Security Council in accordance with Article 39. 
Therefore, a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression may well be 
extended to include domestic affairs, such as civil war, violations of human rights, or 
the existence of a repressive regime. In this context. Article 39 leaves it to the 
exclusive discretion of the Security Council to decide what factors constitute a threat 
to, or breach of international peace and against whom the enforcement action for the 
maintenance or restoration of the international peace is to be carried out. In practice, 
on many occasions, the Security Council has found a number of such situations as 
constituting a threat to or breach of peace. Thus, ‘essentially’ domestic nature of the 
situation does not impede the Council from assuming jurisdiction, once it determines 
that a threat to international peace and security in fact exists. In this sense. Article 39, 
combined with Articles 41 and 42, implies the “forcible interference in the sphere of
Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law, 181. 
Kelsen, The Law o f the United Nations, 731.
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a state.”’** As a result, it can be said that the notions “threat to peace, breach of the 
peace” permit a highly subjective interpretation, compared to, for example, the 
“threat or use of force” under Article 2(4), which is a more “objectively determinable
conduct’.119
The Security Council’s determination of the existence of a threat to, or breach of the 
peace, or an act of aggression, is a precondition for undertaking further measures 
under Chapter VII. In this respect. Article 41 contains provisions for non-military 
sanctions against a wrongdoing state. If the sanctions undertaken in accordance with 
Article 41 fail, or are judged to be insufficient, the Council may proceed to take 
measures involving air, sea or land forces in accordance with Article 42. In this 
respect, the decision of the Security Council is binding over the member states 
(Article 25).’^  In practice, the absence of agreements for providing the Organization 
with the “armed forces, assistance and facilities” between the Organization and 
member states upon Security Council’s call for the military measures (Article 43), 
and the non-functioning of a Military Staff Committee (Article 47) have led to the 
evolution and innovation in the implementation of enforcement measures. One such 
innovation is the Security Council’s extension of its jurisdiction over the years, to 
authorize the use of force by states in some instances, or to recommend this type of 
action in others.
Kelsen, The Law o f the United Nations, 735. 
Ibid., 737.
It should be noted that, as the ICJ indicated in the Certain Expenses advisory opinion (1962), 
measures under Article 42 represent “enforcement measures” against a state. Thus, they are 
distinguished from the deployment of peace-keeping forces, where there is a prior agreement with the 
state that they are station^, by the fact that enforcement actions are carried out against the will o f the 
state. For Certain Expenses case, see Harris, Cases and Materials, 975-984.
94
2 .1 .3 .1 .2 . Role of tiie Regional Organizations
One potential source of authorizations for interventions is regional organizations. 
Chapter VIII of the Charter designates a possible role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security to “regional arrangements or agencies,” on the 
condition that such actions are consistent with the UN’s purposes and principles 
(Article 52). Article 52(2) imposes on the members of the UN that are party to such 
arrangements to seek “pacific settlement of local disputes” within the framework of 
such arrangements “before referring them to the Security Council.” Hence, peace­
keeping operations through regional organizations are not proscribed, since forces 
under peace-keeping are not within the scope of Article 2(4)}^^ Examples of this 
include the 1961 Arab League Force deployed in Kuwait, the 1965 Inter-American 
Peace Force deployed in the Dominican Republic and established by the 
Organization of American States, the 1976 Inter-Arab Deterrence Force in Lebanon 
sponsored by the Arab League, the 1981-1982 Organization of African Union Force 
in Chad, and 1995 IFOR (from 1996 on, SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina established 
by NATO.
In terms of enforcement actions. Article 53(1) empowers the Security Council to 
“utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its 
authority.” The next clause of the article makes it clear that regional organizations do 
not have an independent authority regarding enforcement actions. It declares that “no 
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
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agencies without the authorizations of the Security Council.” Article 54 requires that 
the Security Council “be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in 
contemplation under regional arrangements” with respect to “the maintenance of 
peace and security.” Thus, the Charter expresses in clear language that regional 
organizations are only allowed to take up action towards peacekeeping. It stipulates 
that such organizations are prohibited from exercising Chapter VII powers, unless 
they have obtained prior Security Council authorization.
2. 1. 3. 1. 3. Role of the General Assembly Regarding International Peace and 
Security
The UN Charter has assigned a secondary role to the General Assembly in matters of 
peace and security. Article 11 provides that the General Assembly may consider and 
make recommendations regarding matters related to the maintenance of international 
peace and security. However, under Article 12, it is constrained from making such 
recommendations “while the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute 
or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter ... unless the Security 
Council so requests.”
Despite these limitations, the 1950 Uniting fo r Peace Resolution expressly authorizes 
the Assembly to make recommendations on enforcement measures, including
military action, when the Security Council is unable to act.^ ^  ^ Thus, the General
Funda Keskin, Uluslararası Hukukta Kuvvet Kullanma: Savaş, Karışma ve Birleşmiş Milletler 
(The Use o f Force in International Law: War, Intervention and the United Nations) (Ankara: 
Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfi Yayınlan, 1998), 156.
GA Res. 377 (V), 3 November 1950, adopted at the 302“* plenary meeting, by 52 votes to 5, with 2 
abstentions.
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Assembly is a potential source of authorization when the Security Council fails to act 
decisively. The Uniting fo r Peace resolution also provides the mechanism of being 
able to call an “Emergency Special Session” within 24 hours. It empowers the 
General Assembly to assume these powers only after an occurrence of the breach of 
peace or an act of aggression, but leaves the condition of threat to peace out of its 
scope. The resolution is significant in that it substantially broadens the Assembly’s 
area of jurisdiction, and gives the General Assembly the right to decide whether a 
breach of peace or an act of aggression has taken place -a right exclusively reserved 
for the Security Council by the C h a r t e r . I n  this sense, some have argued that the 
Resolution has fundamentally rearranged the collective security mechanism of the 
United Nations.*^ Nevertheless, the fact that in practice. General Assembly has 
effectively employed the rights conferred by the Resolution only once in the Korean 
case (1951), suggests the lessening relevance of the resolution, in spite of its 
technical existence. The practice of the General Assembly with respect to matters 
of peace and security, thus, has been confined to examination, discussion, and 
occasionally, condemnation. Nonetheless, it is important to note that an intervention 
having the necessary two thirds backing or more of the General Assembly, usually 
has a strong moral and political legitimacy, even in the absence of Security Council 
endorsement.
Çelik, M illetlerarası Hukuk, 420.
Keskin, Uluslararası Hukukta Ktcwet Kullanma, 147-148.
The General Assembly has acted under Uniting fo r Peace resolution on several occasions, 
including the Suez question (1956), the Hungarian question (1956), Lebanon and Jordan (1958), the 
Congo question (1960), the Middle East (1967), the Pakistan Civil War (1972), Afghanistan (1980), 
the Palestine situation (1980, 1982), Namibia (1981) and the Question of Occupied Arab Territories 
(1982). In almost all of these cases, an emergency special session was held, but no enforcement action 
was undertaken. The resolution was raised in 1956 as the basis for the formation o f a multinational 
force (UNEF), which operated on Egyptian territory with Egyptian consent after the Suez crisis. 
However, since UNEF was established with Egypt’s consent, the ICJ decided in the Certain Expenses 
case that UNEF was not an enforcement action “within the compass o f the Chapter VII o f the 
Charter.” For Certain Expenses case, see Harris, Cases and Materials, 975-984.
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2. 1 .3 .2 . Self-defense as an Exception to Article 2(4)
As elaborated above. Article 2(4) strictly proscribes states from using force in
resolving their differences. Nonetheless, Article 51, which contains the right to
individual and collective self-defense, provides for the only exception to the
proscription of the unilateral use of force, specif^ng the conditions under which
individual states may resort to force. It states:
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members 
in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in 
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council und^ the present Charter to take any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”
There is considerable controversy regarding Article 51, as the scope of self-defense 
and the circumstances under which the right of self-defense may be exercised are ill- 
defined. This also applies to the nature of what is meant by “armed attack.” In this 
respect, the most contentious issue pertains to whether the use of right of self-defense 
is confined to the circumstances whereby an armed attack has already occurred or 
whether this right can be invoked in anticipation of such an attack. On the one hand, 
there are those who argue that Article 51, read in conjunction with general 
prohibition of the use of force set out in Article 2(4), limits the invocation of such a 
right to cases where an actual armed attack has occurred. This view accepts no 
other circumstances under which the right to self-defense may be invoked. In this
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connection, the tenn “inherent right” is taken to imply the undeniable nature of this 
right to members and non-members alike, and to indicate that the UN may provide 
assistance to a non-member in their defense against an armed attack. Thus, it is 
argued that the term ‘inherent’ was intended to underline that defense against an 
armed attack is a right of every sovereign state.
On the other hand, there are legal scholars who argue that Article 51 should not be 
interpreted as excluding the right to anticipatory self-defense in the case of an 
imminent danger of attack. This view rejects the restrictive interpretation of the word 
‘i f , as it is employed in Article 51, as meaning “if and only if.” To that effect, these 
scholars point out that by qualifying the right of self-defense as ‘inherent,’ the article 
indicates the existence of a right of self-defense in pre-Charter customary 
international law, according to which preventive measures are permitted. Hence, it is 
argued that the word ‘inherent’ shows that the article did not intent to restrict the pre­
existing customary right. In this sense, the argument goes, by the term “armed 
attack,” Article 51 refers merely to one situation, whereby a state could invoke the 
right of self-defense.*^ Supporters of this view refer to the legal criteria for 
permissible self-defense as formulated in the case of Steamer Caroline}^ as
Brownlie, International Law, 265; Kelsen, The Law o f the United Nations, 797-798; Hersch 
Lauterpacht (ed.), L. Oppenheim, International Law, 299; Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law 
and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 140-143.
Kelsen, The Law o f the United Nations, 792.
D. W. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), 185. 
Also, Higgins, The Development o f International Law, 201.
For summary of this case, see Hersch Lauterpacht (ed.), L. Oppenheim, International Law, 300- 
301. Also for the historical details, see Walter LaFeber, The American Age, US Foreign Policy At 
Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), 109-110; and 
Julius W. Pratt, Vincent P. De Santis and Joseph M. Siracusa, A History o f United States Foreign 
Policy, (USA: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), 78-80.
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reflecting the authoritative customary law/^® According to the formulation in the 
aftermath of this case, the anticipatory self-defense is admissible, when “the 
necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of 
means and no moment for deliberation.” *^*
There has been no authoritative decision in international litigation on the question of
anticipatory self-defense. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice
left the question open, by stating that:
“...the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent 
threat of an armed attack has not been raised. Accordingly the 
Court expresses no view on that issue”*^ ^
The Court’s position on this issue is unclear, given that Judge Schwebel in his 
dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case, argued that Article 51 does not
circumscribe self-defense to a situation “if, and only if armed attack occurs.’,133
As a result, it can be said that the legal controversy with regards to preventive 
interventions on the basis of right of anticipatory self-defense is a far from settled 
one. Despite the fact that a number of states have argued for the permissibility of 
such preventive measures on several occasions, the view that the UN Charter
Jennings refCTS to this case as the “locus classicus" o f the customary law of self-defense. R. Y. 
Jennings, ‘The Caroline and McLeod Cases,” American Journal o f International Law 32 (1938), 92. 
For the view that the customary law regarding self-defense is best expressed in the Caroline incident, 
see also Timothy L. H. McCormack, Self-D^ense in International Law, The Israeli Raid on the Iraqi 
Nuclear Reactor (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 247; Schächter, International Law, 151; 
Arend and Beck, International Law and the Use o f Force, 72.
Upon the incident of invasion of Ammcan t^ itorial waters, the American Secretary of State, 
Daniel Webster, set out the elements of self-defense that provided the philosophical basis for the right 
to use force in self-defense and the limits to the exercise of that right See note o f Webster to British 
authorities, 27 July 1842, quoted in McCormack, Self-Defense in International Law, 183.
ICJ Reports (1986), para. 194.
ICJ Reports (1986), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel.
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prohibits the use of force for the purpose of ending unlawful interference unless it 
consists of an armed attack, seems to prevail in the literature.
One other problem related to the exercise of the right of self-defense arises out of the 
subjective character of the decision to resort to force in self-defense. Because of the 
nature of the international system, each state is, by this right, entitled to judge on its 
own whether to resort to force to defend itself.'^  However, a legal question remains 
whether circumstances merit the legitimate exercise of self-defense.^ ^® Under Article 
51, the exercise of right of self-defense is permissible “until the Security Council has 
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” As such. 
Article 51 recognizes that there may be pressing situations, which requires an 
immediate defensive response. Thus, the language of the article allows states to 
temporarily judge the urgency of the situation and decide to act in defense, but at the 
same time by stipulating “measures taken in the exercise of self-defense shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council,” it also subjects the state’s reasoning 
to international review.'®^ In this respect, international precedent demonstrates that 
an action of defensive nature is not necessarily considered legitimate based solely on 
the judgment of the state taking that action. For example, Japan maintained that its 
action in Manchuria in 1931 was defensive. But the Assembly of the League of 
Nations concluded that the Japanese action could not be considered as a legitimate 
exercise of the right of self-defense.*®^ In the same vein, the judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1946 rejected the German Nazi
134
135
Shaw, International Law, 694.
J. L. Briefly, The Law o f Nations, An Introduction to the International Law o f Peace, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1942), 257; McCormack, Self-Drfense in International Law, 259.
Higgins, The Development o f International Law, 205,207.
Hersch Lauteipacht (ed.), L. Oppenheim, International Law, 302-303.
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leaders’ argument that Germany acted in self-defense and that every state must be the 
judge of whether a given situation yields to the exercise of the right of self-defense, 
by asserting that “whether action taken under the claim of self-defense was in fact 
aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation or adjudication if 
international law is ever to be enforced.” As a result, due to the lack of an 
objective criteria for assessing the alleged imminence of an attack and the 
consequent potential for abuse, the dominant view among legal scholars -who make 
reference to the UN’s aspiration to restrict the use of force by the individual state 
inasmuch as it is possible- reads Article 51 as ruling out the use of force for self- 
defense, other than that in response to an armed attack.
In concluding this part on the related provisions, it can be said that although the UN 
Charter does not explicitly lay down a principle of non-intervention applying to the 
relations between states, the principle is implicit in the general prohibition of the use 
of force in international relations. By allowing for only one condition as an exception 
to the prohibition of the use of force, the Charter has considerably confined the scope 
of what are considered legitimate self-help measures. Nevertheless, while the UN 
Charter is restrictive with respect to the use of force by states, it is fairly open-ended 
when it comes to the use of force and intervention by the UN itself. By assigning 
broad powers, particularly to the Security Council, in matters of international peace 
and security, it leaves a great deal of room for political considerations and 
deliberations.
Judgment o f the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 1946, Trial o f German Major War Criminals 
Before the International M ilitary Tribunal, quoted in Schächter, International Law, 137.
Simma (ed.). The Charter o f the United Nations, 666-667; Brownlie, International Law, 227-275; 
Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law, 222-223; Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave, 
141-145.
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2. 2. NON-INTERVENTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTIONS
There are a number of UN General Assembly Resolutions that enshrine non­
intervention norm in interstate relations. One prominent scholar asserts that it was 
through these resolutions that “the implicit noninterventionism of the Charter began 
to be made explicit in the practice of the United Nations.”'"^
From the very inception of the United Nations, the General Assembly has 
repetitively underlined the non-intervention principle as the principle duty of states. 
For example. Article 3 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties o f States of 
6 December 1949, stated that:
“Every state has the duty to refrain from intervention in the 
internal and external affairs of the any other state.”'"^*
The duty of non-intervention in internal affairs was strongly emphasized in
subsequent resolutions. In Peace Through Deeds Resolution for example, the
General Assembly condemns “the intervention of a State in the internal affairs of
another state for the purpose of changing its legally established government by the
threat or use of force.” '^^  ^ The 1957 Resolution of Peaceful and Neighbourly
Relations among States reiterates the duty of non-intervention as one of the main
principles the Charter was based on 143
*'*® Vincent, Nonintervention, 237.
GA Res. 375 (IV), Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties o f States, 6 December 1949. 
GA Res. 380 (V), 17 November 1950.
GA Res. 1236 (XII), Peaceful and Neighbourly Relations among States, 14 December 1957.
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Notwithstanding the subsequent emphasis on the rule of non-intervention. Resolution
2131, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility o f Intervention in the Domestic Affairs
o f States and the Protection o f Their Independence and Sovereignty adopted in 1965,
provides the first detailed formulation of the principle;
“No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for 
any reason whatever, in the internal and external affairs of 
any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all 
other forms of interference or attempted threats against the 
personality of the State or against its political, economic and 
cultural elements are condemned.”*"*^
The following paragraphs further condemn the use of “economic, political or any
other type of measures to coerce another State,” subversion, and all other forms of
indirect intervention. Specifically, the second operative paragraph declares that:
“No State shall oiganize, assist, foment, finance, incite, or 
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed 
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, 
or interfere in civil strife in another State.”
The Declaration further acknowledges that full observance of the principle of non­
intervention was “essential to the fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations.” On the other hand, the preamble underlines the importance of the 
principle and provides the doctrinal foundation with references to the principle as it 
is asserted in the charters of the Organization of American States, the League of Arab 
States, and the Organization of African Unity. Ostensibly, this declaration depicts a 
comprehensive doctrine of non-intervention and goes beyond obligations outlined in 
the Charter by insisting on other principles like self-determination, human rights, 
elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism.
144
145
GARes. 2131 (XX). 21 December 1965. 
Vincent, Nonintervention, 237.
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The question of definition of the duty of non-intervention was once again taken up in 
the drafting of the Resolution 2625, which aimed to outline the fundamental 
principles of international law. The subsequent Declaration o f Principles o f 
International Law of 1970 adopts essentially the same definition of non-intervention 
as that provided in Resolution 2131. It links “the obligation not to intervene in the 
affairs of any other State” with the international peace and security. Restating the 
principle concerning “the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State,” it additionally proclaims that acts of “armed intervention 
and all other forms of interference” constitute violation of international law.*^ The 
following Resolution 2734 on the Strengthening o f International Security once again 
call upon all States “not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of
any State.«147
The principle of non-intervention was further developed in a more detailed way in 
the 1981 Declaration on the Inadmissibility o f Intervention and Interference in the 
Internal Affairs o f the States. Regarding the “full observance of the principle of non­
intervention and non-interference in the internal and external affairs of States” as 
having the utmost significance for the “maintenance of international peace and 
security,” and violation of it as a “threat to the freedom of peoples, the sovereignty, 
political independence and territorial integrity of States” as well as to “their political, 
economic, social and cultural development,” the Resolution embarks on a detailed 
elaboration of the scope of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference in
146
147
GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970. 
GA Res. 2734 (XXV), Declaration on t, 
1970.
Strengthening o f International Security. 16 December 
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the internal and external affairs of States, and prescribes a series of specific duties. 
According to it, states are:
“ ...to refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force in any form whatsoever...to dismpt the political, 
social or economic order of another State, to overthrow or 
change the political system of another State or its 
Government..., to refrain from armed intervention, 
subversion, military occupation or any other form of 
intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at 
another State or group of States, or any act of military, 
political or economic interference in the internal affairs of 
another State.” '^^ * 
In addition, the Resolution articulates other duties, which extends beyond the
traditional boundaries of the non-intervention principle. For example, it asserts:
“The duty of States to refrain from any measure which would 
lead to the strengthening of existing military blocs or the 
creation or strengthening of new military alliances, 
interlocking arrangements, the deployment of interventionist 
forces or military bases and other military installations 
conceived in the context o f great-Power confrontation.”
and.
“...the duty of a State not to use its external economic 
assistance programme or adopt any multilateral or unilateral 
economic reprisal or blockade and to prevent the use of 
transnational and multilateral corporations under its 
jurisdiction and control as instmments of political pressure or 
coercion against another State, in violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations. .149
As such, the practice of interference in the internal affairs is condemned in a number 
of General Assembly resolutions.^^® Although General Assembly resolutions are not 
binding over states, there is a general agreement on the authoritative character of the
GA Res. 36/103, Declaration on the Inadmissibility o f Intervention and Interference in the Internal 
Affairs o f the States, 9 December 1981.
* ® It should be noted that this Resolution was opposed by most developed states, namely Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Among other resolutions that emphasized the principle of non-intervention are GA Res. 34/103, 
Inadmissibility o f the Policy ofH egem onism  in International Relations, 14 December 1979 and GA
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resolutions on notions like intervention, self-determination and human rights. In this 
respect, they are argued to represent concrete interpretations of the Charter and 
assertions of general international law.^ ^  ^ For example, Oscar Schächter points out 
that:
“Legal uncertainty has, however, been created when the 
Assembly adopted resolutions which purported to assert legal 
norms without recourse to the treaty process. Such 
resolutions “declared the law” either in general terms or as 
applied to a particular case. Neither in form nor in intent were 
they recommendatory.”
Judgments of International Court of Justice also support this view. For example, in 
the Nicaragua case, the Court referred to Resolution 2131 and Resolution 2625 as 
reflecting customary law.'^ ^ Thus, evaluating the resolutions as mere 
recommendations would to underestimate of the authoritative character of 
declaratory resolutions and to disregard their significance in the development of 
norms. Moreover, the repetition or re-citation of a principle in successive resolutions 
demonstrates continuity, which may be said in turn to represent a consensus or 
tendency as well as a general degree of support of states concerning this matter. In 
this context, it can be pointed out that the main principles in General Assembly 
declarations have been invoked and referred to in several Security Council 
resolutions concerning specific instances of intervention. Thus, it can be said that the 
Assembly has been influential in making non-intervention a political principle, 
through the subsequent detailed elaboration of its content and importance. 
Furthermore, by listing the rule of non-intervention among the principles of
Res. 37/10, Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement o f International Disputes, 15 November 
1982.
Blaine Sloan, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions In Our Changing World (New York: 
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1991), 45.
Schächter, International Law, 85.
153 ICJ Reports (1986), para. 203.
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international law in Resolution 2625, the General Assembly has put its imprint on the 
rule of non-intervention as a legal principle as well. As a result, the above-mentioned 
resolutions are not only significant for customary international law, but also mirror 
the clear inclination of the society of states to consider interference as unlawful.
Having established the place of the principle of non-intervention in the UN by 
looking at the legal framework provided in the Charter and the political significance 
attached to it in various General Assembly resolutions, it is now necessary to turn the 
attention to the discussion of actual cases of military intervention, with a special 
emphasis on the justifications raised for such interventions, and the application of 
principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in UN reactions with respect to 
their legitimacy.
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PART II
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF NON-INTERVENTION 
AS THE MAIN JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MILITARY
INTERVENTION
In breaching the rule of non-intervention in internal affairs, states have often 
defended their conduct by evoking exceptions or justifications contained within the 
rule itself. Consequently, the two most common justifications of military 
interventions found in state practice are the right of self-defense and the consent of 
the target state. Together they constitute the most important legal grounds for foreign 
armed intervention, since self-defense, as embodied in Article 51, is the main 
exception to the general prohibition of the use of force in international relations, and 
‘consent’ in international law is a circumstance which precludes wrongfulness of 
unlawful acts.
Almost in all cases of military interventions studied in the present research, states 
have claimed a defensive character. The problem however, arises from the fact that
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the intervening states have attempted to justify their acts on the basis of Article 51 of 
the Charter in cases where it is highly controversial, indeed impossible, to justify 
them as acts of self-defense per se. The question is to what extent the UN organs 
(Security Council and General Assembly) condone such arguments based on Article 
51 and accept those acts as self-defense. Similarly, ‘consent’ of the state where die 
intervention takes place has often been claimed by the intervening states. Usually 
coupled with other justifications, such consent typically finds expression in an ad hoc 
invitation or in a prior agreement between the two states. The main point of 
contention regarding ‘consent’ as a justification for military intervention appears to 
be the legitimacy of the entity permitting the intervention as well as the applicability 
of the treaty in concern.
As such, this part focuses on the primary justifications of military intervention in the 
internal affairs. By exploring the United Nations’ responses to specific situations in 
which the principle of self-defense and consent of the target state for armed 
interventions have been invoked, this part aims to determine whether the UN 
reactions reveal permissibility of military intervention defended on the basis of those 
principles in question and whether there existed some kind of coherent pattern in the 
United Nations’ application of the principle of self-defense and of the element of 
‘consent’ to the military interventions during the Cold War, in view of the opinions 
expressed and the decisions taken in the course of the consideration of the cases.
n o
CHAPTER I;
INDIVroUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENSE
It is generally agreed that self-defense is a special form of self-help.^ In particular, it 
is a kind of self-help “against a specific violation of the law, against the illegal use of 
force, not against other violations of the law.”  ^ In this sense, self-defense can be 
defined as “forcible self-help in reply to a forceful wrong.”  ^ There exists a general 
agreement in the legal scholarship on the permissibility of the use of force in self- 
defense. As a result, the appeal to self-defense constitutes the most firequently heard 
justification for armed intervention.
It has been noted that within the framework of the UN Charter, the right of self- 
defense is stipulated in Article 51, and that it constitutes the main exception to the 
general ban on the use of force embodied in Article 2(4) of the Charter. Given that 
one qualification for the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) is 
“international relations,” the application of self-defense for military intervention in *
* For elaboration o f the distinction between self-help and self-defense, see Dwek W. Bowett, Self- 
Defense in International Law (New York: Frederick A . Praeger, Inc., Publishers, 1958), 11.
 ^Kelsen, Principles o f International Law, 60. For a similar view, see also, Ann Van Wyen Thomas 
and A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, The Law and Its Import in the Americas (Dallas: Southern 
Methodist University Press, 1956), 79.
 ^ Rosalyn Higgins, The Development o f International Law Through The Political Organs o f the 
United Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 199.
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the internal affairs becomes relevant only when the internal situation within a state 
obtains an international aspect.'^  The ‘internationalization’ of an internal situation on 
the other hand, can be said to occur when an internal disturbance within a state 
crosses to a bordering state, when a state intervenes on the side of one of the flghting 
groups within a state, or when there is a combination of these two situations.® For the 
purposes of this study, it is these set of circumstances that raise problems relating to 
the application of the concept with regards to its exact content and scope.
The following analysis includes cases of military interventions justified as individual 
self-defense in situations where an internal matter of a state is claimed to constitute 
an external threat to the security of another state, and as collective self-defense 
including the so-called right of counter-intervention, in situations where the 
intervened state is claimed to be in need of assistance against an alleged threat or 
aggression.
1.1. INDIVroUAL SELF-DEFENSE
As noted before, the main point of contention regarding the exercise of self-defense 
within the terms of Article 51 pertains to the condition of “armed attack.” Where 
there is an actual armed attack, there is little controversy on the right of states to self- *
* Accordingly, it should be recalled that the prohibition does not extend to the use o f force within the 
domestic jurisdiction, or ‘Vithin the state’s metropolitan area, in its colonies and protectorates.” In 
this respect, Bowett points out that this qualification complements “the general limitation on the scope 
of the authority of the organization contained in Article 2(7), which preserves to the members matters 
‘essentially within the domestic jurisdiction.’” Bowett, Self-Drfense in International Law, 149.
* Antonio Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1993), 52.
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defense. However, practice illustrates that the circumstances under which states have 
raised the claim of individual self-defense do not necessarily involve an armed attack 
as such. The instances where the right of individual self-defense were appealed, 
involve responses to the alleged external threat posed to the intervening state by the 
internal situation within the target state as well as responses to prior aggression. Such 
cases comprise the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 (which later became 
Bangladesh), the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea in 1978, the Tanzanian 
intervention in Uganda in 1978 and the Israeli intervention in Lebanon in 1982.
When hidia launched a full-scale attack against Pakistan on 3 December 1971,^ the 
Indian justification was based on two arguments, one of which is self-defense against 
an earlier Pakistani attack and against the threat posed to Indian economy and 
security by the massive inflow of refugees^ caused by the repressive Pakistani 
policies in East Pakistan.*  During the first round of the Security Council debates 
between 4 and 6 December 1971, the Indian representative portrayed the inflow of 
refugees as aggression, which had inflicted intolerable social, financial and 
administrative pressures on India.^ Given that the inflow of refugees, although might 
be considered as an immediate outcome of the policies of the Pakistani government.
° For the background of the conflict between Pakistan and India and the events leading to Indian 
attack to Pakistan, see Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers, Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 55-59. See also, “Clashes on East 
Pakistan Border, September-November,” Keesing*s Record o f World Events 17 (December 1971), 
http://www.keesings.com.
 ^ For detailed information regarding the refugee flow, see ‘The Refugee Situation,” Keesing's 17 
(December 1971).
* The other Indian justification was assistance to the people of Bangladesh in their struggle for self- 
determination. This Indian justification will be taken up in the Chapter I of Part IQ within the context 
of the question of whether self-determination can justify armed intervention. For Indian justifications, 
see statements by the Permanent Representative of India at the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. 
A/PV.2003 (1971) and by the Indian Foreign Minister at the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.1611 
(1971).
® UN Yearbook (1971), 147.
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was not a deliberate strategy to threaten the territorial integrity or political 
independence of India, and thus does not fall within the terms of Article 2(4), the 
question in this case is related to whether the inflow of refugees would render an 
armed intervention in self-defense admissible. Insofar as the inflow of refugees does 
not constitute an “armed attack” or an immediate and overwhelming threat, the 
exercise of self-defense does not seem to be permissible not only under the 
provisions of Article 51 of the Charter, but also in its more ‘traditional’ sense.^° 
Nevertheless, the UN reaction was rather mixed. Despite some countries’ open 
condemnation, in particular China," the debates focused on the immediate threat 
posed by the situation to international peace and security, and on the repeated calls 
for cessation of hostilities and withdrawal, rather than deploring the Indian 
intervention on the grounds of inadmissibility of its justifications. Additionally, a 
number of states also noted the inadmissibility of Pakistani policies in East 
Pakistan." Several draft resolutions were proposed." However, failing to agree on a 
particular position, the Security Council referred the matter to the General
For the ‘traditional’ requirements of self-defense in customary international law, see Chapter II o f 
Parti.
“ UN Yearbook (1971), 147. In fact, among all the draft resolutions, it was only the one introduced by 
China that openly condemned the Indian aggression against Pakistan. See draft resolution by China, 
UN Doc. 8/10421(1971). It should be noted that the initial US reaction was considerably critical of 
the Indian action, accusing India “o f major responsibility” for the war. However, as a result of 
Congressional criticism, the US administration softened its negative reaction and subsequently 
avoided the use of the word ‘aggression’ to describe India’s actions. For the details o f the 
congressional criticism and the administration’s response, see “US Support for Pakistan - Suspension 
of Military and Economic Aid to India,” Keesing’s 18 (February 1972).
See UN Yearbook (1971), 146-150.
See draft resolution by the United States, UN Doc. S/10416 (1971); draft resolution by Belgium, 
Italy, Japan, UN Doc. S/10417 (1971); draft resolution by the USSR, UN Doc. S/10418 (1971); draft 
resolution by Argentina, Burundi, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, UN Doc. S/10419 (1971); draft 
resolution by China, UN Doc. S/10421 (1971); draft resolution by Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, 
Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, UN Doc. S/10423 (1971); draft resolution by Belgium, 
Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, S/10425 (1971); draft resolution by the USSR, UN Doc. 
S/10428 (1971); draft resolution by Argentina, Burundi, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia 
(adopted as SC Res. 303), UN Doc. S/10429 (1971).
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Assembly. The General Assembly debates paralleled the Council discussion, with 
China and Pakistan condemning the intervention, and others mainly demanding the 
end of the hostilities as well as a political settlement in East Pakistan.*^ The 
subsequent Assembly resolution characterized the hostilities between India and 
Pakistan as constituting “an immediate threat to international peace and security,” 
and recalling Article 2(4), called for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of all 
troops.*^ Finally, during the second series of meetings on the situation in the 
subcontinent between 12 and 21 December 1971, the Security Council was able to 
adopt a compromise resolution along the same lines with the Assembly resolution, 
which stated that the situation remained to be a threat to international peace and 
security and demanded a cease-fire as well as withdrawal of all armed forces to their 
respective territories.*^ Thus, neither the Council nor the Assembly condemned the 
hidian intervention, and Bangladesh was recognized by many states by the end of 
February 1972.*®
In December 1978, an estimated 100,000 Viemarnese troops entered Kampuchea, 
joined by some 20,000 United Front troops —a resistance organization, which was 
founded in the “liberated area of Kampuchea.” After two weeks of fighting, the 
capital Phnom Penh fell, and a provisional government was created by the Front with *
s c  Res. 303, 6 December 1971, adopted by 11 votes to 0, with 4 abstentions (France, Poland, 
USSR, United Kingdom).
UN Yearbook (1971), 150-152. Some countries, whilst not openly supporting the Indian 
intervention, held that any solution must take into consideration the will o f die Eastem-Pakistani 
people. See for example, Argentinean and Turkish statements at the General Assembly, UN Doc. 
A/PV.2002 (1971), 22,36-37.
GA Res. 2793 (XXVI), 7 December 1971.
SC Res. 307,21 December 1971, adopted by 13 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions (USSR and Poland).
** Among the states which recognized Bangladesh by then were mostly communist countries but also 
WestCTn Germany, France, the UK, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Italy, 
Japan, Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. See “Recognition of Bangladesh by Soviet Union,
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the assistance of Vietnam. The Vietnamese foreign minister stated that 
Kampuchean people’s struggle to oust the Pol Pot regime was an internal matter.^ ® 
Similarly, during the Security Council’s consideration of the matter, the Vietnamese 
representative asserted that the revolutionary war of Kampuchean people should be 
distinguished from the Kampuchean-Vietnamese border war. Vietnamese action, he 
affirmed, was a reaction to the persisting aggression of Pol Pot’s regime against 
Vietnam, which had the right to defend its independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.^* The Soviet Union and its allies openly welcomed the overthrow of the 
Pol Pot regime, and expressed the view that Viernam was victim of aggressive Pol 
Pot regime,^ ^ They also objected to the Security Council’s consideration of the issue, 
arguing that the situation in Kampuchea was an internal matter.^ All other 
countries, '^^  including some communist countries,^ condemned the Vietnamese 
intervention, and stressed the need to observe the Charter’s principle of non­
interference in the internal affairs of states, respect for their independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the settlement of disputes by peaceful 
means; and called for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Kampuchea. A number of states, among which were France, the United Kingdom,
Britain and Other States. - Withdrawal of Pakistan From the Commonwealth,” Keesing’s 18 (February 
1972).
For the course of events, see “Vietnamese Invasion o f Cambodia -  Uprising led by United Front -  
Fall o f Phnom-Penh,” Keesing's 25 (May 1979).
“  Letter of 8 January to the Security Council from Vietnam (transmitting statement o f 6 January 1979 
by Ministry of Foreign Affairs), UN Doc. S /13011 (1979).
UN Doc. S/PV.2108 (1979), 11-14; UN Yearbook (1979), 274.
“  The countries not criticizing the intervention included Angola, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, 
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Laos PDR, Mongolia, Poland, Vietnam, USSR, 
Zambia. For the statements of the respective countries see, UN Documents S/PV.2108-2112 (1979); 
S/PV.2114-2118 (1979); S/PV.2129 (1979). For the supportive statements appeared in the press of 
these coimtries, see “Reactions in Communist Countries,” Keesing’s 25 (May 1979).
^  UN Doc. S/PV.2108 (1979), 1-3; UN Yearbook (1979), 273.
^  For reactions o f the members of ASEAN, see “Reactions in ASEAN Countries,” Keesing’s  25 (May 
1979).
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Norway and Portugal, argued that the violations of human rights by the Pol Pot 
government could not justify intervention by another state.^ ^ The United States, on 
the other hand, asserted that Viemam’s dispute with Kampuchea could not give 
Viemam a right to take over that country.^ A draft resolution, which would call upon 
all foreign forces to withdraw from Kampuchea, and would demand strict adherence 
to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, failed due to the 
veto of the Soviet Union?* Another draft resolution to the same effect sponsored by 
the five countries of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) also failed to 
be adopted for the same reason. Notwithstanding the Council’s failure to take a 
position, the General Assembly adopted a resolution, by which the Assembly deeply 
regretted the armed intervention by outside forces in the internal affairs of 
Kampuchea, called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Kampuchea, and called on all states to refrain from all acts or threats of aggression 
and all forms of interference in the internal affairs of states in South-East Asia. The 
resolution further appealed to all states to refrain from any interference in the internal 
affairs of Kampuchea in order to enable its people to decide their own future and 
destiny, and to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of 
Kampuchea. In the following considerations of the situation in Kampuchea, the
^ Among the communist countries that condemned the Vietnamese intervention were China, 
Romania, Yugoslavia and North Korea. For reactions of these countries, see ‘^ Reactions in Communist 
Countries,” Keesing*s 25 (May 1979).
^  For the views of all countries that participated in the Council discussion on the matter, see UN 
Documents S/PV.2108-2112 (1979); S/PV.2114-2118 (1979); S/PV.2129 (1979); UN Yearbook 
(1979), 274.
^  UN Doc. S/PV.2114 (1979), 3; UN Yearbook (1979), 281.
^  Draft resolution introduced by Bangladesh, Bolivia, Gabon, Jamaica, Kuwait, Nigeria and Zambia. 
The vote was 13 in favor and 2 against (Czechoslovakia and the USSR). For the text of the proposed 
resolution, see UN Doc. S/13027 (1979).
Draft resolution sponsored by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand. The vote 
was 13 in favor and 2 against (Czechoslovakia and the USSR). For the text of the proposed resolution, 
see UN Doc. S/13162 (1979).
GA Res. 34/22,14 November 1979. Adopted by 91 to 21, with 29 abstentions.
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Assembly stressed the need for all states to the principles of respect for the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-intervention and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of states, non-recourse to the threat or use of 
force, and peaceful settlement of disputes, and deplored the continuation of the 
armed intervention.^^ Judging from the debates and draft resolutions that were put to 
vote in the Council as well as the Assembly resolutions, it can be maintained that 
majority of the member states of the United Nations did not perceive the Vietnamese 
intervention in Kampuchea as an act of self-defense, despite the general recognition 
in the draft resolutions and the decisions of the Assembly of the conflict between 
Viemam and Kampuchea.
In stark contrast to Vietnam’s intervention in Kampuchea, Tanzania’s intervention in 
Uganda in the same year,^^ justified with similar terms, was met with general 
indifference. lik e  in the case of Vietnamese intervention, Tanzanian intervention 
also led to the overthrow of the existing Idi Amin regime and a change of 
government in Uganda. However, unlike Vietnam, Tanzania did not explicitly invoke 
the right of self-defense, although President Nyerere of Tanzania presented the 
Tanzanian military action as a defensive one in response to Uganda’s earlier invasion 
of the Tanzanian territory and occupation of Kagera Salient.^^ With respect to the 
struggle of Ugandan exile forces struggling to overthrow Amin, paralleling the two- 
wars argument of Vietnam -the need to make distinction between revolutionary war
See GA Resolutions 35/6, 22 October 1980; 36/5, 21 October 1981; 37/6, 28 Octoba· 1982; 38/3, 
27 October 1983; 39/5, 30 October 1984; 40/7, 5 November 1985; 41/6 21 October 1986; 42/3, 14 
October 1987; 43/19,3 November 1988,44/22,16 November 1989.
For the background of the Tanzanian-Ugandan conflict, see Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 112-116. 
For the events leading to Tanzanian intervention see, “October 1978 Invasion o f Tanzanian Territory 
by Uganda -Intmnational Reactions” and “Tanzanian Military Action Against Uganda,” Keesing’s 
(June 1979).
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of Kampuchean people and the border war between Vietnam and Kampuchea-, 
Nyerere also stated that while overthrowing Amin was the responsibility of the 
Ugandans, it was Tanzania’s task to chase him from Tanzanian soil. He also 
maintained that the Ugandans decision to fight with Amin’s regime coincided with 
the Tanzanian decision to punish Amin.^ Secondly, Nyerere also argued that their 
action had set a good precedent to the effect that “when African nations find 
themselves collectively incapable of punishing a single country, then each country 
has to look after itself.”^^  Thus, the intervention was somewhat ambiguously 
defended as punishment of Amin after the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
failed to do so. Finally, when the Tanzanian involvement reached to 20,000 troops 
while there were 3,000 to 5,000 Ugandan exiles, the two-wars argument became 
harder to sustain, thus, consequently Tanzania also defended its action as support to 
the exile forces.^ ® The Tanzanian intervention never came before the Security 
Council, nor was it debated by the General Assembly. Although by a letter of 28 
March 1979, Uganda requested an urgent meeting in connection with the Tanzanian 
aggression against Uganda, it withdrew its request upon the appeal of a group of 
African states at the UN not to involve the Security Council to the conflict.^^ The 
new government of Uganda was soon recognized both by the regional countries and 
many other states.^* With regards to the reactions of the African countries, the OAU 
did not issue a statement on the change of the government in Uganda, although 
Tanzanian action was a clear violation of OAU’s principle of non-intervention.
“Continued Mediation Efforts,” Keesing’s 25 (June 1979).
^  Ibid.; “Recognition of Lule Government by Other Countries,” Keesing’s  25 (June 1979).
‘Recognition o f Lule GovCTnment by Other Countries,” Keesing’s 25 (June 1979).
^  Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 121-122.
Letters of 28 March and 5 April from Uganda (request to convene Council and withdrawal o f 
request respectively), UN Documents S/13204 (1979) and S/13228 (1979).
“  ‘Recognition o f Lule Government by Other Countries,” Keesing’s 25 (June 1979).
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Among the few regional countries that criticized Tanzanian action as an illegal 
intervention were Sudan, Nigeria and Morocco. For example, the Government of 
Nigeria issued a warning on 9 April 1979 that interfering in another country's affairs 
to the extent of invasion -as Tanzania had done in Uganda- might lead to a chain 
reaction in Africa in which "a few militarily powerful countries would be able to 
determine the leadership of other states." On the other hand, in Morocco, the pro- 
government daily El Maghrib on 12 April 1979 deplored "the silence of the OAU" 
and indicated that for the first time in the history of Africa a country had "invaded its 
neighbor and taken its capital with impunity."^^ Finally, during the OAU meeting in 
Monrovia between 17 and 21 July, 1979, Sudan described Tanzanian action as “a sad 
precedent in Africa” and a clear violation of OAU’s Charter, which “prohibits 
interference in other people’s internal affairs and invasion of their territory by armed 
force.”^  Nonetheless, the general lack of interest in the Tanzanian intervention may 
be contrasted with the Vietnamese one, which was justified on similar grounds and 
resulted in a similar outcome, i.e. the overthrow of the existing regime. In this 
respect, the extensive consideration of the Vietnamese intervention both at the 
Council and the Assembly,^’ contrasts sharply with the lack of discussion of the 
Tanzanian intervention in any of the organs of the UN. A second point of difference 
is that the Assembly gave recognition to the overthrown Pol Pot’s government in the 
following ten years as the representative of Kampuchea,'*^ whereas the new 
government of Uganda installed with the assistance of Tanzania was recognized by 
over sixty states at the end of 1980. The difference in reactions can be explained by
Ibid
Quoted in Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 126.
For its part, the Assembly considered and condemned the intervention in Kampuchea from session 
34 to session 44 (1979-1989).
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the relative insulation of Tanzania from superpower geopolitics, by the considerable 
agreement among states with Tanzania’s claim that Uganda had attacked first as well 
as by the general contentment with regards to the removal of Amin regime, known 
with its widespread human tights abuses."^ ^
Finally, when Israel launched a military operation to Lebanon in June 1982, it also 
justified its action on the basis of individual self-defense against the attacks across its 
northern border from PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) bases in southern 
Lebanon.'*  ^ The reactions to Israeli intervention were overwhelmingly negative. At 
various Security Council meetings held during 1982, all countries, but the United 
States, regarded the Israeli action as an act of aggression and condemned it"^  ^
However, the United States veto prevented the Council to adopt a resolution to that 
effect“*^  The United States repeatedly stressed that cessation of hostilities by all 
parties and the Israeli withdrawal had to be implemented simultaneously.“^  ^
Nevertheless, the resolutions of 5 and 6 July, adopted unanimously, expressed 
concern for the violation of the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of 
Lebanon, and called for a cessation of all military activities and unconditional Israeli 
withdrawal from Lebanon.“*® The following Security Council resolutions in the same 
year confirmed the Council’s demand for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of
The General Assembly denied recognition to the new government in Kampuchea in Resolution 
34/22. GA Res. 34/22,14 November 1979.
For elaboration of these points regarding the international reactions, see Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 
122-132.
^  Israeli statement before the Security Council on 6 June 1982, UN Yearbook (1982), 435.
UN Yearbook (1982), 433-440,452-457,466-470.
^  The draft resolution introduced by Spain, condemning Israel, was not adopted due to the US veto on 
8 June 1982. For the text of the draft resolution, see UN Doc. S/15185 (1982).
See UN Yearbook (1982), 435-436,440,449.
^  SC Resols. 508,5 June 1982; 509 ,6  June 1982.
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all Israeli forces.'^  ^It was only in its 17 September resolution that the Council openly 
condemned subsequent Israeli incursions into Beirut in violation of the cease-fire 
agreements and of Security Council resolutions.^® The general disapproval of Israeli 
action was most notably reflected in the General Assembly resolutions. In its seventh 
emergency special session, the General Assembly calling for withdrawal of Israeli 
troops, condemned Israel for its non-compliance with the Council resolutions of 5 
and 6 June, and demanded that it comply.^ * During the consideration of the matter, 
Israel’s claim to have acted in self-defense was rejected by a number of states. 
Virtually all states pointed out that Israeli allegations were unconvincing, and that its 
action was one of aggression and invasion.^^ By a resolution adopted on 19 August, 
the Assembly once again condemned Israel for its non-compliance with the 
Council’s resolutions.^“^ In the subsequent resolutions on the matter, the Assembly 
expressed full support for the Council’s demands for an inunediate cease-fire and 
unconditional Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and called for strict respect of the 
territorial integrity, sovereignty, unity and political independence of Lebanon.^^ On 
the other hand, in a resolution on the self-determination of peoples, the Assembly 
condemned Israel’s aggression against Lebanon in addition to reiterating the
SC Res. 515, which demanded that Israel lift immediately the blockade o f Beirut in order to permit 
the dispatch of supplies, passed by 14 to none, the US did not participate in the vote, 29 July 1982; SC 
Res. 516, which confirmed Council’s previous resolutions, passed unanimously, 1 August 1982; SC 
Res. 517, which expressed deep shock and alarm at the deplorable consequences o f the Israeli 
invasion of Beirut on 3 August 1982, was adopted by 14 to none, with 1 abstention (United States), 4 
August 1982; SC Res. 518, which called for the immediate cessation of all military activities within 
Lebanon, was adopted unanimously, 12 August 1982.
The resolution also called for strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and 
political independence of Lebanon. SC Res. 520,17 September 1982, adopted unanimously.
GA Res. ES-7/5,26 Jime 1982, adopted by 127 votes to 2 (Israel and the United States).
The coimtries, which pointed out that the Israeli claim of self-defense was a pretext for its 
aggression included Iraq, Pakistan, Poland, Belgium on behalf o f the EC members, Indonesia and 
Zaire. UN Yearbook (1982), 442. Among other states rejected the Israeli claim to have acted in self- 
defense were Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda. UN Yearbook (1982), 460.
“  UN Yearbook (1982), 440-447,458-466,470-474.
^  GA Res. ES-7^, 19 August 1982, adopted by 120 votes to 2 (Israel and the United States), with 20 
abstentions.
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Council’s demands for Israeli withdrawal and respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.^^ As such, the Israeli action raised extensive negative reactions 
from the international society.^^ The fact that it had been subject to encroachment of 
its territorial integrity was not considered to legitimize its operation against Lebanon 
on the grounds of self-defense.
With regards to military intervention on the basis of individual self-defense, the UN 
reaction to individual cases can be interpreted as in conformity both with the 
restrictive interpretation of Article 51 and the customary requirements of the exercise 
of the right of self-defense. In the Indian case, although not expressly condemning 
the intervention, the UN nevertheless considered it as an immediate threat to 
international peace and security. The absence of condemnation in the related 
resolutions can be interpreted as the admission of the Indian claim that the situation 
in concern constituted a threat to its vital security interests, whereby the target state is 
unable or unwilling to act. However, it can also be inferred from the reference to 
Article 2(4) and repeated calls for withdrawal of troops and cease-fire in the 
resolutions that the claim is not admitted as one providing basis for self-defense. 
Given the magnitude of action, it may be argued that although the Indian intervention 
might be considered to fulfill the conditions of necessity and immediacy, the UN did 
not qualify it as an act of self-defense due its disproportionate scale and consequence
GAResols. ES-7/9,24 September 1982; 37/123 E, 16 December 1982.
GA Res. 37/43, para. 22 ,3  December 1982.
For example, at the end of the 23^  ^European Council meeting in Brussels, which was held on 28-29 
June 1982, the European states agreed that they had maintained “their vigorous condemnation o f the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon.” Also, Yugoslavia asserted that military activities o f Israel against the 
Palestinian forces in Lebanon was an act o f aggression which ran “counter to the princmles of the 
United Nations ChartCT and the wishes o f the entire international community.” See “23™ European 
Council Meeting in Brussels,” and “12* Congress o f League o f Communists,” Keesing’s 28 (August 
1982).
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in relation to the aims allegedly pursued. On the other hand, the Israeli intervention 
may be said to be condemned largely in the absence of an actual armed attack by the 
state intervened and due to the extensive character of the operation, which led to 
military occupation of half of Lebanon, including Beirut. In addition to the absence 
of the conditions of self-defense, the express condemnation of the Israeli action may 
possibly be linked to the fact that Israeli action suppressed the struggle of Palestinian 
people for self-determination. This factor can be contrasted to the Indian action, in 
which one of the purposes was to ensure the Bengali people to achieve self- 
determination. Nonetheless, the application of this principle as justification of 
military intervention shall be discussed in Chapter I of Part HI.
The UN reaction to Vietnam can also be viewed along the same lines. Despite the 
repeated Vietnamese complaints of Kampuchean aggression, the absence of an actual 
armed attack did not render its action as one of self-defense. Additionally, the UN’s 
considerable negative reaction to Vietnamese action in contrast to the Tanzanian 
intervention may be said to be due to the fact that the Vietnamese action did not stop 
as soon as its alleged aim was realized and it retained an army of occupation in
Kampuchea.58
1.2. COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
In addition to individual self-defense. Article 51 also refers to collective self-defense. 
Indeed, the term “collective self-defense” is introduced to international law by the
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Charter system, for under customary international law there exists no right of self- 
defense in response to an armed attack upon another state, unless the states in 
question are simultaneously attacked by the same aggressor.^ ® With regards to the 
term “collective self-defense,” Higgins argues that it is actually inaccurate, since 
“defense of the self cannot be collective.” ®^ Similarly, Kelsen maintains that self- 
defense is by definition unilateral in character, thus to speak of ‘collective’ unilateral 
right is to give way to self-contradiction. For him, the right of self-defense is “a right 
of the attacked or threatened individual or state, and of no other individual or 
state.”®' Bowett, on the other hand, asserts that the right of collective self-defense 
applies when each state, acting in concert for self-defense, has been attacked.®  ^ In 
this sense, collective self-defense refers to common, coordinated exercise of the right 
of individual self-defense by a number of states that were individually attacked. 
However, then, one may question the function of the term ‘collective,’ since such a 
usage assumes each state is exercising its individual self-defense -a right, which is 
already admitted under customary international law and the Charter. In this respect, 
Brownlie notes that the express recognition of a right of collective self-defense in. 
Article 51 refers to action beyond the sum of individual self-defense, and in fact 
serves to give a legal status to the use of force by a third state, which is not itself 
attacked or threatened, to assist a state exercising its individual right of self- 
defense. For scholars supporting this view, the restrictive understanding of the right 
of collective self-defense undermines the effectiveness of the prohibition of the use
Vietnam did not withdraw its forces from Kampuchea until late 1980s.
Thomas and Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention^ 169. Also Quincy Wright, “United States Intervention 
in the Lebanon,” American Journal o f International Law 53:1 (January 1959), 118.
62
Higgins, The Development o f International Law, 208.
Hans Kelsen, The Law o f the United Nations (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1951), 792. 
Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law, 216.
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of force, since it leaves the weaker states vulnerable to the militarily stronger states, 
in cases where the Security Council fails to respond an armed aggression against a 
member state.*^
Along with the controversy on the implications of the term, there seems to be 
differences of opinion on the circumstances and conditions that would allow states to 
intervene (or counter-intervene) in internal affairs under the principle of collective 
self-defense.^^ As to the circumstances, Higgins notes that the right of collective self- 
defense arises only when the interests of the attacked state is fundamentally linked 
with the territorial integrity and political independence of another state, “that the 
defense by the latter state of the former is truly ‘self-defense’”*^  According to 
Goodrich and Hambro, the existence of a common threat is sufficient for collective 
response.®  ^On the other hand, in the merits of the Nicaragua case, the International 
Court of Justice indicated that using force by a state against another which has 
undertaken a wrongful act against a third state, is regarded as lawful as long as “the 
wrongful act provoking the response was an armed attack.” ®^ Thus, the Court limited 
applicability of collective self-defense by asserting that the illegal acts involving 
force short of an armed attack do not raise such a right. The Court held as follows:
^  Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States (London: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 329.
See for example, Bruno Sinima (ed.). The Charter o f the United Nations, A Commentary (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), 675; and Leland M.Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, İlhan Lûtem 
(trans.). Birleşmiş Milletler Antlaşması: Şerh ve Vesikalar (Charter o f the United Nations: 
Commentary and Documents) (Istanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1954), 327.
See for example, John Norton Moore, “Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of 
Intervention,” and Derek W. Bowett, “The Interrelation o f Theories o f IntCTvention and Self- 
Defense,” in John Norton Moore (ed.). Law and Civil War in the Modem World (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).
“  Higgins, The Development o f International Law, 209.
M.Goodrich and Hambro, İlhan Lûtem (trans.). Birleşmiş Milletler Antlaşması, 327.
68 ICJ Reports (1986), para. 211.
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“Li the view of the Court, under international law in force 
today —^whether customary international law or that of the 
United Nations system— States do not have a right of 
‘collective’ armed response to acts which do not constitute an 
‘armed attack’
With regards to the conditions, it is generally interpreted that the plea to collective 
self-defense by a third state must be based on previous consent, such as a prior treaty 
between the states acting in self-defense, or an express request by the attacked 
state.™ This view by and large corresponds to the International Court of Justice’s 
interpretation of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. In its Nicaragua 
case judgment, the Court maintained that the exercise of the right of collective self- 
defense is permissible only if the victim of the alleged attack declares itself to have 
been attacked and requests aid from a third state,’  ^ Hence, according to the Court’s 
judgment, the express request regardless of the existence of a prior legal bond, such 
as a treaty, is the necessary condition for invoking the right of collective self-defense.
A survey of the state practice largely conforms to the Court’s judgment, and 
demonstrates that states intervened on the grounds of collective self-defense 
invariably relied on the existence of a request by the victim state. The aspect of 
‘request’ or ‘invitation’ will be examined within the context of ‘consent’ in the next 
chapter. The following investigation of the cases will rather focus on the 
circumstances under which the right of collective self-defense has been raised, and 
examine whether the kind of threat against the target state is taken to warrant a right 
of collective self-defense in the UN responses.
^  l U  Reports (1986), para. 211.
™ Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 236; Hüseyin Pazarcı, Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri, IV. Kitap (Lectures in International Law, 
Book IV) (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 20(K)), 121.
ICJ Reports (1986), para. 199.
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1. 2 .1 . Military Interventions in Collective Self-Defense to Assist a State in Its 
Response to a Prior Foreign Aggression
These kinds of interventions include cases where there is an internal conflict and the 
concerned government invokes its right to self-defense against the intervention of a 
third state in support of insurgents. From the outset, it can be said that such 
interventions appear to be against both the prohibition of the use of force as set in 
Article 2(4) of the Charter and the general non-intervention principle in the domestic 
affairs. Nonetheless, it is clear that since it involves a prior military intervention by 
another state, it raises the right to self-defense under Article 51 on the part of the 
state to which such intervention was carried out. In practice, cases, which fall neatly 
in this type of interventions, are in fact very infrequent. In the post-Charter period, 
only the Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975, and the French and Zairean 
intervention in Chad in 1983 seem to belong to this category.
Cuba intervened in Angola when three factions were fighting for the independence of 
Angola against the Portuguese colonial rule in November 1975.^  ^Cuba asserted that 
the Cuban intervention was a response to an earlier South African intervention upon 
the request from the MPLA administration (People’s Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola) —the independence movement Cuba supported.^^ South Africa admitted its 
previous intervention and claimed that it had acted on the need to safeguard the 
installations at the Calueque Dam site due to the complete breakdown of law and
^  For the details o f the internal situation in Angola, see “Hostilities between MPLA, FNLA and 
UNTTA” “Control of Luanda gained by MPLA, Participation o f UNTTA Forces in Fighting,” 
“Achievement of Independence - State of Virtual Civil War - International Involvement - 
Establishment o f Sq>arate Governments by MPLA and FNLA, UNTTA - Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by Cabinda,” kecsw g’s 21 (December 1975).
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order, and that its forces remained there at the request of the Portuguese 
administration, which at the time was still in ruleJ"  ^The representative of Portugal, 
however, in a letter dated 23 March 1976 to the UN Secretary General, denied the 
South African assertion that Portugal had given an advance authorization for such an 
action. The following Security Council debates centered mainly on the South 
African intervention. While the Western countries, and Zaire and China condemned 
all forms of foreign intervention in Angola, most of the other states condemned only 
the South African intervention.^^ Accordingly, the resultant Security Council 
resolution, making references to the general principles of non-intervention and non­
use of force, condemned the South African aggression against the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of Angola.^ ^ With regards to the Cuban 
intervention, the resolution made no mention. Thus, it will not be wrong to argue that 
the Security Council did not question the lawfulness of the Cuban intervention on the 
basis of collective self-defense.^* The general tacit endorsement of Cuban 
intervention can also be inferred from the fact that the matter was not considered in 
the General Assembly.
One other intervention undertaken with the justification of assisting a state in self- 
defense against an armed aggression is the French and Zairean intervention in Chad
”  UN Yearbook (1976), 174.
Letter of 20 March from South Africa (annexing statement of 21 March 1976 by Prime Minister of 
South Africa, and statements of 12 and 15 March 1976 by Minister o f Defense), UN Doc. S/12019 
(1976).
Letter of 23 March from Portugal, UN Doc. S/12023 (1976).
For the views o f the states expressed at the Security Council, see UN Documents S/PV. 1900-1906 
(1976).
^  SC Res. 387, 31 March 1976. Adopted by 9 votes to 0, with 5 abstentions (France, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States; China did not participate in voting).
™ One should note that the representatives of France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States stated that they abstained because the condemnation in the resolution did not extend to all 
foreign military intervention in Angola. See UN Yearbook (1976), 177-178.
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in 19837® While Zaire defended sending its forces as a response to the request of the 
legal government of Chad,*® France declared that it had sent its troops as provided by 
the 1976 Cooperation Agreement*^ between the two countries and in accordance with 
international law embodied in the Charter, to assist that country in exercising its right 
to self-defense prompted by the Libyan armed aggression.*^ At the Security Council, 
although some states underlined the duty of non-intervention in general,*^ no state 
condenmed the French intervention as such. A number of states supported the view 
that Libya undertook an intervention in the internal affairs of Chad, which fully 
justified Chad’s appeal to its right of self-defense and request for military assistance 
of friendly states.*^ Despite efforts for Council action to call for an end to aggression, 
the withdrawal of armed forces intervening in Chad and the condemnation of Libyan
aggression,*^ the Council did not take a position at the time, nor the matter was
81
For the main facts of Chad’s internal situation and Libya’s support for the rebel forces, see “Civil 
War in North Libyan, French and Zairean Involvement;” for the details of the French intervention in 
Chad, see ‘Tormation of French Defensive Line in ‘Operation Manta’, French Diplomatic Contacts 
With Libya,” Kessing's 29 (December 1983).
UN Yearbook (1983), 185.
In 1976, Chad and France signed civil and military agreements, which superseded those of 1960 
that had been signed at the time of Chad’s independence from France. The new military agreement no 
longer contained an automatic clause for the defense of Chad by France in the event of an attack. See 
“New Co-operation Agreements with France -  Continued Activities by Rebels -  The Clauster Affair,” 
Kessing*s 22 (May 1976).
For French justification, see UN Yearbook (1983), 185; also “French and Zairean Aid to Habré 
Government FANT Counter-offensive,” Keesing*s 29 (December 1983). Libya, however, denied that 
it had intervened in Chad’s affairs and that it had sent troops there. For Libyan argument, see UN 
Yearbook (1983), 185. Also, at the opening o f the 30* session of the Organization to African Unity’s 
(OAU) liberation committee in Tripoli on 13 February 1978, Colonel Kadhafi, the Libyan leader, 
denied his country’s involvement in Chad’s civil war, which he described as “an internal problem 
between Chad people themselves.” See “Suspension and Subsequent Restoration of Relations with 
Libya,” Keesing's 29 (December 1983). And in a letter dated 28 June 1983, to the Ethiopian head of 
state, the then President of the OAU, Kadhafi stated that Libya “remained neutral in the power 
struggle between the Chadian factions.” See, “French and Zairean Aid to Habré Government FANT 
Counter-offensive,” Keesing's 29 (December 1983).
Countries who opposed the French involvement were the USSR, Libya, Iran and Syria. UN 
Yearbook (1983), 185.
Among the supporters were Egypt, the Ivory Coast, France, Guyana, Kenya, Liberia, the 
Netherlands, Somalia, Sudan, the United States and Zaire. For details of the debate on the matter, see 
UN Documents S/PV.2462,2463,2465,2467,2469 (1983); and UN Yearbook (1983), 184-187.
Egypt, Kenya and the United States maintained that the Libyan aggression should be specifically 
condemned, while Benin insisted that the Council should call for the withdrawal o f all non-African 
forces. UN Yearbook (1983), 186.
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considered at the General Assembly. The UN inaction in this case may be said to 
imply that the UN did not challenge the legitimacy of the French argument of 
collective self-defense.
As a result, it can be said that the practice of the states and the UN response to 
military interventions to assist a state against a previous foreign aggression conform 
the general view that an external armed intervention confers a government the right 
of collective self-defense. The fact that the competing arguments in the above cases 
mainly called into question whether or not the internal body invoking the right of 
self-defense was the legitimate government, rather than the exercise of such a right 
when faced with armed aggression,*® further reinforces the conclusion that in the face 
of a foreign armed intervention in support of rebels, a state has a right to request the 
military assistance of other states. Thus, in this sense, the opposing arguments in the 
above cases do not contradict with the UN’s application of the principle of collective 
self-defense under the aforementioned circumstances, for they merely signify the 
differences in political judgment concerning the status of the internal administration 
appealing for help.
1. 2. 2. Military Interventions in Coll^tive Self-Defense to Assist a State in Its 
Response to a Foreign Agression By Irr^ular Forces
In this category, justification of collective self-defense for military intervention is 
raised due to the operations of irregulars, guerrillas, volunteers or mercenaries, which *
** For example, the coimtries that opposed the French intervention in Chad (the USSR, Libya and 
Syria) supported the Cuban intervention in Angola. See, UN Yearbook (1976), 175.
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do not carry an official character, that is to say, no state assumes responsibility for
the actions undertaken by them.*^ Needless to say, under international law, insofar as
such actions involve the use of force, they are banned by the terms of Article 2(4).*®
In addition, it is also established by various UN resolutions that even merely
providing shelter or allowing operations from one’s territory is a violation of Article
2(4). For example, the Declaration on Principles o f International Law states that:
“Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or 
encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed 
bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory 
of another State.”*^
It further maintains that:
“Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, 
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or 
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized 
activities within its territory directed towards the commission 
of such acts when the acts referred to in the present paragraph 
involve a threat or use of force.” °^
Similarly, the 1974 Definition o f Aggression listed “the sending by or on behalf of a 
state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of 
armed force against another State” among prohibited forms of use of force.^ ^ The 
1987 Enhancement o f the Effectiveness Declaration also reiterated the states’ duty to 
refrain fi’om the above-mentioned acts.^ ^
^  Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention, 62.
On the illegality of such operations, see Brownlie, International Law, 370; and Bowett, Self- 
Defense in International Law, 49.
GA Res. 2625 (XXV), para. 8 of the principle (a) on the Non-Use o f Force, 24 October 1970.
”  Lbid., para. 9 of the principle (a) on the Non-Use of Force, 24 October 1970.
GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), Article 3(g), 14 December 1974.
GA Res. 42/22, Declaration on the Enhancement o f the Effectiveness o f the Principle o f o f  
Refraining from the Threat or Use o f Force in International Relations, Part I, no. 6, 18 November 
1987.
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In addition, the bitemational Court of Justice in its Nicaragua judgment confirmed 
that such activities constitute an “armed attack” and thus may give rise to self­
defensive reaction:
“There appears to be now general agreement on the nature of 
the acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks. In 
particular it may be considered to be agreed that an armed 
attack must be understood as including not merely an action 
by regular armed forces across an international border, but 
also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of 
armed force against another State of such gravity as to 
amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by 
regular forces ‘or its substantial involvement therein.’ This 
description, contained in Article 3 para, (g) of the Definition 
of Aggression annexed to the General Assembly Resolution 
3314 (XXDC) may be taken to reflect customary international 
law.”^ ^
The cases of military intervention with the justification of collective defense as a 
response to aggression by irregular troops are not very frequentH ow ever, two 
cases in particular seem to help reach conclusions regarding the matter in question. 
These are the Moroccan and Franco-Belgian interventions in Zaire, in 1977 and 1978 
respectively.^^ In both cases, irregular forces entered Zaire’s southern region of
l a  Reports (1986), para. 195.
It should be admitted that the actual cases of such actions are most probably more than the ones 
considered here. However, given that such subversive actions are difficult to determine due to their 
covert nature and that claims of the existence of foreign subversion by states confronting internal 
disturbance are fairly common, only the cases which involve an external invasion by irregular troops 
on a significant scale and pose a grave danger to the target state, and where the involvement o f a 
foreign power is by and large known, even though this power denies responsibility, are addressed in 
this section.
One can possibly place the American intervention in Vietnam in this category. However, the 
difficulty with the assessment of this intervention stems from the existence o f the conflicting 
interpretations of the facts, i.e. whether the conflict was an internal one belonging to the State of 
Vietnam as a whole, or an international one between the two states of North and South Vietnam, or an 
internal one within the State of South Vietnam. Depending on the interpretation taken, the legal 
analysis o f the US involvement varies from one constituting ‘‘military assistance,"  ^ “intervention,” 
“aggression"’ or “an armed attack.” Thus, due to the controversy on the facts o f the Vietnam conflict, 
this intervention is not considered to be representative of any of the interventions discussed here. For 
different interpretations of the nature o f the conflict, see Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law 
and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 306.
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Shaba from Angola, and took over most of the r e g i o n I n  1978, in addition to the 
invasion, increasing numbers of killings and harassment of the European population 
were reported as well. In both cases, Moroccan and French/Belgian forces 
intervened upon the request of the Zairean govemment.^ ® Among the countries 
expressed negative opinions to Moroccan intervention were the Soviet Union, 
Angola, Cuba, Algeria and Nigeria.^ The 1978 French intervention, on the other 
hand, was condemned notably by Libya and Congo during the 31*‘ meeting of OAU 
Council of Ministers,^““ and by Mozambique, Nigeria and Madagascar in the 
Assembly of OAU.^ °’ Notwithstanding the objections, many took the view that 
foreign aggression entitled Zaire to seek assistance abroad. Neither of the cases 
became subject of discussion in any of the UN organs.
In conclusion, UN’s inaction or indifference to the cases above suggests that use of 
force in collective self-defense to assist a state against the armed operations of 
irregular forces is implicitly considered to be admissible.
“Invasion Launched from Angola by Former Katangese,” “Invasion of Shaba Province,” Keesing’s 
23 (June 1977); “Invasion o f Shaba Province by Rebels - Arrival of French and Belgian Paratroops,” 
Keesing's, 24 (August 1978).
”  As a result, both France and Belgium laid much emphasis on the protection o f nationals. “Invasion 
of Shaba Province by Rebels - Arrival of French and Belgian Paratroops,” Keesing’s 24 (August 
1978).
“Invasion Launched from Angola by Former Katangese,” Keesing’s 23 (June 1977); ‘Invasion o f 
Shaba Province by Rebels - Arrival o f French and Belgian Paratroops,” Keesing’s 24 (August 1978).
“Conflicting Reactions among African Countries - Condemnation o f French Action by Angola, 
Cuba and the Soviet Union,” Keesing’s 23 (June 1977). 
iM «2 1 “ Meeting of Council of Ministers,” Keesing’s 24 (October 1978).
“Assembly of Heads of State and Government,” Keesing’s 24 (October 1978).
For the approval o f the Moroccan operation by most African countries and China, see “Conflicting 
Reactions among African Coimtries,” Keesing’s 23 (June 1977). As to the support voiced for the 
French intervention in 1978 by the EC and the African countries, see “Invasion o f Shaba Province by 
Rebels - Arrival o f French and Belgian Paratroops” and “Franco-Afiican Conference o f Heads o f 
State or Government - Moves towards Formation of African Peace-keeping Force,” Keesing’s 24 
(August 1978).
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1. 2. 3. Military Interventions in Collective Self-Defense to Assist a State in Its 
Response to Subversion and Instigation of a Civil War by a Foreign Power
The forms of subversion which have raised a right of collective self-defense ranges
from cases of actual infiltration by foreign agitators into the target state to incidents
where hardly identified and barely established threat against the state’s security was
alleged/®^ As assessed above, such activities unquestionably constitute illegal
conduct, particularly when they entail the use of force and threaten a state’s
security/®^ Yet, from a legal standpoint, these activities are not tantamount to an
“armed attack” within the terms of Article 51. In the Nicaragua case, the Court
adhered to a rigid concept of “armed attack”:
“The Court does not believe that the concept of “armed 
attack” includes not only acts by armed bands where such 
acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance to rebels 
in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other 
support. Such assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of 
force, or amount to intervention in the internal affairs of other 
States.” ®^^
In addition, because such activities are usually not easy to detect and prove, to raise 
the right of self-defense under customary international law in accordance with the 
Caroline conditions of the threat to be “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice
of means and no moment for deliberation” is also hard to justify.106
Notwithstanding the problematical legal aspects in the exercise of the right of self- 
defense as a response to subversion, several cases were justified on some form of
Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention, 67-68.
GA Res. 2625 (XXV), para. 9 of the principle (a) on the Non-Use of Force, 24 October 1970; ICJ 
Reports (1986), para. 195. 
l U  Reports (1986), para. 195.
Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention, 69.
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infiltration into the state assisted. The cases where such instances were sufficiently 
established comprise the British intervention in Muscat and Oman (1957) and in 
Jordan (1958), the United States intervention in Lebanon (1958), and the United 
States intervention in Central America, which began in 1981.
When Britain intervened in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman in 1957, it argued that 
the British action was prompted by the request of the Sultan of Muscat to help him to 
restore order in the face of a revolt that had been encouraged and supported by 
subversive forces, which had been known to be active for some time.^ *  ^The Arab 
countries requested the Security Council to put the matter on its agenda, claiming 
that the British action constituted an act of armed aggression.^ ®* However, this 
request was rejected by four members (Iraq, USSR, Sweden and the Philippines) 
voting in favor, five against (United Kingdom, France, Australia, Colombia and 
Cuba), and one abstaining (United States). China did not vote.^ ®® Among the 
countries, which voted against, the USSR and Iraq revealed intention of condemning 
the British intervention, while Sweden and Philippines argued that the consideration 
of the matter by the Security Council would give each party a chance to clarify their
positions.no
Similarly, in the case of Lebanon, the United States justified its action on the basis of 
authorization from the Lebanese government as a response to the threat to its
UN Yearbook (1957), 57.
Letter of 13 August 1957 from Permanent Representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen, UN Doc. S/3865 and Add. 1 (1957).
UN Yearbook (1957), 58. 
no UN Yearbook (1957), 57-58.
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territorial integrity by rebellion stimulated and assisted from outside/" Lebanese 
government confirmed the US assertion, and maintained that Lebanon had invoked 
Article 51 to seek the direct assistance of friendly countries in the face of infiltrations 
originating from the United Arab Republic (Syria) aimed at overthrowing the 
existing regime in Lebanon."^ Upon similar Jordanian complaints about the United 
Arab Republic’s interference to its domestic affairs by subversive elements,"^ the 
Security Council decided to consider both matters concurrently. At the Council 
debate, Jordan stated that in accordance with Article 51, Jordan had asked British 
help, and the British representative maintained that the Jordanian request of a 
military assistance as a defensive measure was in full conformity with the United 
Nations Charter and with the established rules of international law.""^ The USSR 
challenged both interventions, stating that allegations of intervention by the United 
Arab Republic were unfounded, and thus both the US intervention in Lebanon and 
the British intervention in Jordan constituted “armed interventions in the domestic 
affairs of the Arab States” and a gross violation of the Charter."^ On the other hand, 
the Swedish representative did not regard the US action in Lebanon was in accord 
with Article 51, since there had not been an armed attack within the terms of that 
article."^ Consequently, failing to agree on a position, the Security Council called for 
an emergency special session of the General Assembly.*" The General Assembly
In addition, as will be discussed in the Chapter I of Part HI, the US also justified its action on the 
basis o f protection o f its nationals. For detailed elaboration of the US justifications, see Wright, 
“United States Intervention in the Lebanon,” 112-125. For detailed information on the Lebanese 
internal situation and the circumstances in which the US intervention was undertaken, see Malcolm 
Kerr, “The Lebanese Civil War” in Evan Luard (ed.). The International Regulation o f Civil Wars 
(New York: New York University Press, 1972), 65-90.
UN Yearbook (1958), 38-39.
Letter from representative o f Jordan, 17 July 1958, UN Doc. S/4053 (1958).
UN Yearbook (1958), 41.
Ibid., 3 7 ,39,42.
Ibid., 40.
117 SC Res. 129,7 August 1958.
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which met between 8 and 21 of August, adopted a resolution with generic emphasis 
on the principles of “mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, of non-aggression, of strict non-interference in each other’s internal 
affairs.” The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary 
steps to “facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two
countries; >118
The United States’ involvement in Central America between 1981 and 1986 
somewhat differ from the above cases in that it was by and large a covert 
operation.^The US action in support of the ‘contras’ fighting against the Sandinista 
government in Nicaragua was claimed to be a response in collective self-defense 
against the assistance provided by the Sandinistas to the insurgents in El Salvador. 
However, serious doubts existed with respect to the main objective of the American 
operation that rather than helping El Salvador to halt the internal rebellion, it aimed 
to overthrow the Sandinista government in N ic a r ag ua .T he  Security Council 
discussed the matter a number of times upon repeated appeals from Nicaragua during 
1982-1986. In the debates, while the USSR, and mostly the Eastern European and 
non-aligned countries held the United States responsible for the situation. Western 
European and Latin American states took a softer position.^^^ In 1983, the Security 
Council unanimously adopted a resolution, which affirmed “the right of Nicaragua *
*** GA Res. 1237 (ES-III), 21 August 1958, adopted unanimously.
For the relevant facts and the extent of the activities that the covert intervention involved, see 
David P. Forsythe, The Politics o f International Law: US Foreign Policy Reconsidered (Boulder: 
L |^ e  Rienner Publishers, 1990), 31-38.
Forsythe, The Politics o f International Law, 38.
Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention, 72.
See the relevant Security Council meetings, UN Yearbook (1982), 364-372; UN Yearbook (1983), 
200-207; UN Yearbook (1984), 203-204, 207-211; UN Yearbook (1985), 212-218; UN Yearbook 
(1986), 183-194.
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and of all the countries of the area to live in peace and security, free from outside 
interference.”*^  ^Nicaragua continued to bring the claim to the Security Council that 
the United States was continuing its subversive activities. After the Council’s failure 
to adopt a resolution in April 1984, calling for immediate cessation of the US 
activities against Nicaragua, because of the US veto,* '^* Nicaragua brought the case 
before the International Court of Justice. The Court first ordered, as provisional 
measures, cessation of the US activities in Nicaraguan territorial waters,*^^ then 
assumed jurisdiction to hear the case.*^ In early 1985, the US administration 
withdrew from the proceedings before the Court and it justified its activities in 
Nicaragua as an “exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self- 
defense enshrined in the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty in defense of the vital 
national security interests of the United States interests and in support of the peace 
and security of the hemisphere.”*^ ’ On 27 June 1986, the Court rejected the 
“justification of collective self-defence maintained by the United States of America,” 
and decided that the United States had acted in breach of its obligations under 
customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State and not to 
use force against another state.*^ ® The General Assembly considered the matter
SC Res. 530,19 May 1983.
Draft resolution submitted by Nicaragua, UN Doc. S/16463 (1984). The vote was 13 to 1 (United 
States), with 1 abstention (United Kingdom). See UN Yearbook (1984), 207. It should be noted that 
the Security Council adopted one other resolution during the course of the conflict, urging the United 
States and Nicaragua to resume dialogue. SC Res. 562,10 May 1985.
For the operative provisions o f the Court’s order o f 10 May 1984, see UN Yearbook (1984), 1084.
For the operative provisions o f the Court’s judgment of 26 November 1984, see UN Yearbook 
(1984), 1085.
For the official statement o f withdrawal, together with the justification o f the action in Central 
America, see Department o f State Bulletin 85 (March 1985), 64-65. In connection with the right of 
self-defense, the United States also argued that a legal claim regarding self-defense could only be 
judged by the state, which raises such a right. However, the US did not act on this argument later, 
since this would have meant that it would be in no position to evaluate the claim of collective self- 
defense, which the Soviet Union raised in its invasion o f Afghanistan in 1979. Forsythe, The Politics 
of International Law, 51.
For the opwative provisions of the Court’s judgment o f 27 June 1986, see UN Yearbook (1986), 
981-983.
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several times after the I d ’s judgment, and adopted resolutions emphasizing the duty 
of states under customary international law not to intervene in the internal affairs of 
other states and calling for “full and immediate compliance with the judgment of the
International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986; ,129
As such, the US activities against Nicaragua were not regarded admissible on the 
basis of collective self-defense. In fact, as the I d  stated in the merits of the 
Nicaragua case, even if the justification of self-defense was to be admitted, then 
there would have remained the question of proportionality -one of the main 
requirements of the exercise of the right of self-defense- between the response 
carried out by the US and the action undertaken by Nicaragua. In this respect, the 
Court stated that:
“Since the Court has found that the condition sine quo non 
required for the exercise of the right of collective self-defence 
by the US is not fulfilled in this case, the appraisal of the 
United States activities in relation to the criteria of necessity 
and proportionality takes on a different significance. As a 
result of this conclusion of the Court, even if the US activities 
in question had been carried on in strict compliance with the 
canons of necessity and proportionality, they would not 
thereby become lawful. If however they were not, this may 
constitute an additional ground of wrongfulness.”^^ °
Moreover, the fact that the US activities were not limited to the territory of El
Salvador to help that country to cope with the alleged infiltrations of subversive
elements from Nicaragua, but instead extended to the Nicaraguan territory raised
serious suspicions about the US claim of assisting El Salvador in connection with the
right of collective self-defense.
See GA Resols. 41/31, 3 November 1986; 42/18, 12 November 1987; 43/11, 25 October 1988; 
44/43,7 December 1989.
130 ICJ Reports (1986), para. 237.
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As a result, the American conduct in Central America appears to be the intervention 
criticized most by the international community. The other cases that are examined in 
this category did not provoke the UN’s condemnation. The general indifference, if 
not substantial approval, of the UN to these cases suggests that foreign infiltration 
was accepted as a circumstance that rendered these interventions permissible, 
regardless of the difficulty in characterizing such subversive activities as tantamount 
to “armed attack.”^^  ^Nonetheless, one should note that in these interventions, there 
also existed the consent of the intervened state. Thus, whether the existence of the 
element of request expressed by the respective governments of the target states, or 
the acceptance of the right of the self-defense under circumstances in question, that 
removed negative reactions, is not so clear-cut.
1. 2. 4. Military Interventions in Collective Self-Defense to Assist a State in Its 
Response to an Alleged External Threat
This category differs from the previous type essentially by the ambiguous, 
unidentified and unproved character of the alleged external threat. These cases 
include the Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and 
Afghanistan (1979-1980) and the United States interventions in the Dominican
For example, in response to El Salvadoran claim that the supply of arms to the opposition forces in 
El Salvador by Nicaragua justifies “invocation o f the right of collective self-defense in customary 
international law” and “would have to be equated with an armed attack by Nicaragua on El Salvador,” 
the Court stated that: “the Court is unable to consider that, in customary international law, the 
provision o f arms to the opposition in another State constitutes an armed attack on that State. Even at 
a time when the arms flow was at its peak, and again assuming the participation of the Nicaraguan 
Government, that would not constitute such armed attack.” ICJ Reports (1986), para. 230. The 
statements to the same effect can also be found in para. 195. See, note 105.
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Republic (1965) and Grenada (1983).*^  ^Common to all these interventions is that the 
intervening countries had a political interest in undermining the status quo in the 
target state, and that in none of the cases, the alleged foreign threat was substantially 
verified.^ ^^ Not surprisingly, with the possible exception of the intervention in the 
Dominican Republic, whereby the US action was condemned by a few countries, the 
reactions of the international community to these interventions were largely negative.
During the Security Council consid^tion of the Hungarian question,^^ the USSR 
representative claimed that in response to an appeal by the Hungarian government 
and in conformity with the Warsaw Treaty, the Soviet military units had gone to the 
help of Hungarian forces to suppress the counter-revolutionary uprising, which was 
assisted by the United States.^ ^^ Despite the general condenmation of the Soviet 
action in the Security Council, the Council failed to adopt a revised US draft 
resolution due to the Soviet veto, whereby the Security Council would call upon the 
USSR not to introduce additional armed forces into Hungary and to withdraw all of 
its forces from that country.*^^ Consequently, the Security Council passed a 
resolution by which the Council decided to call an emergency special session of the 
General Assembly to consider the situation in Hungary. In the inclusion of the 
matter in the Assembly’s agenda on 4 November 1956, it was stated that recent 
events in Hungary had demonstrated that, in contravention of Article 2(4), both the 
threat and use of force had been employed against the political independence of
132 The justification of collective self-defense in the United States’ interventions in the Dominican 
Republic and in Grenada was secondary to the protection of the American and other foreign citizens. 
Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention^ 73.
For the account of events in Hungary leading to Soviet intervention, see Peter Calvocoressi, World 
Politics Since 1945 (New York: Longman, 1996), 294-296.
UN Yearbook (1956), 68.
United States’ draft resolution and revision, UN Doc. S/3730 and Rev. 1 (1956).
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Hungaiy.^ ^® On the same day, the General Assembly adopted a resolution 
“condemning the use of Soviet military forces” in Hungary. The resolution called 
upon the USSR to end “any form of intervention, in particular armed intervention, in 
the internal affairs of Hungary,” and to “withdraw all of its forces” from Hungary.^ ^^ 
During its further consideration of the question, the Assembly adopted several other 
resolutions with large majorities, which considered foreign intervention in Hungary 
as a violation of the political independence of Hungary and of Charter, condemned 
the USSR for its violation of the Charter, and called upon the USSR to desist from its
intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary and to withdraw its forces.140
In the case of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact states’ intervention in Czechoslovakia in 
1968,'“^  ^ once again the right of collective self-defense against the threat to the 
socialist system in Czechoslovakia posed by the counter-revolutionary forces that 
were assisted by foreign forces hostile to socialism, was invoked. The Tass news 
agency published a statement claiming that the Czechoslovak party and government 
leaders requested urgent assistance from the Soviet Union and other allied states to 
meet the threat “which has arisen to the socialist system in Czechoslovakia, a threat 
emanating from the counter-revolutionary forces which have entered into collusion 
with foreign forces hostile to socialism.”*'^  ^Also, in a letter to the President of the 
Security Council, the USSR argued that the sending of military forces by the socialist
s c  Res. 120,4 Novemba· 1956. 
UN Yearbook (1956), 70.
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GA Res. 1004 (ES-П), 4 November 1956. The resolution was adopted by 50 votes to 8, with 15 
abstentions. The countries voted against comprise mainly the socialist coimtries.
See GA Resols. 1005 (ES-П), 9 November 1956; 1127 (XI), 21 November 1956; 1130 (XI), 4 
December 1956; 1131 (XI), 12 December 1956. The contrary votes to these resolutions were those of 
socialist states.
For the accoimt of events concerning the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the USSR and other 
members of the Warsaw Pact, see Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945,296-300.
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countries was in accordance with mutual treaty obligations, at the request of the 
government of Czechoslovakia, and on the basis of the relevant provisions of the 
Charter regarding individual and collective self-defense/'*^ hi a similar vein, during 
the Security Council debates, the representatives of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Poland insisted that there had been attempts to encourage internal counter­
revolution in Czechoslovakia by imperialist states, particularly North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization powers, and that there was an appeal from the lawful authorities in 
Czechoslovakia for assistance under existing treaty obligations/^ Majority of the 
countries speaking before the Security Council found the alleged claims unsupported. 
Moreover, the representative of Czechoslovakia, Jiri Hajek, speaking as a member of 
the Czech government, stated that there was no external threat and danger of counter­
revolution in Czechoslovakia.*^^ Canada, China, Brazil, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, 
Paraguay, Senegal, the United Kingdom, the United States, Yugoslavia condenmed 
the intervention in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia as a gross violation of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent country as well as of the 
principles of the Charter.*^ Notwithstanding the general disapproval of die 
intervention, a draft resolution, which would condemn the armed intervention of the 
USSR and other members of the Warsaw Pact in the internal affairs of 
Czechoslovakia, and call upon them to cease all other forms of intervention in 
Czechoslovakia’s internal affairs, failed to be adopted due to the negative vote of the
For the text o f the Tass statement, see “The Soviet Invasion,” Keesing’s 14 (September 1968). 
Letter o f 21 August 1968 from USSR, UN Doc. S/8759 (1968).
UN Yearbook (1968), 299-300.
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Ibid., 303. 
Ibid., 299-302.
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USSR,^ '^  ^ The question of Czechoslovakia was not considered by the General 
Assembly.
During the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979,^ ^* a right of collective 
self-defense against an external threat was also invoked. The Security Council 
held six meetings on the question between 5 and 9 January 1980. The representative 
of the USSR alleged that the United States and certain other Western powers, 
together with China, had interfered in Afghanistan’s internal affairs through attempts 
to generate counter-revolution. He contended that the Soviet decision to send a 
military contingent to Afghanistan was taken in response to the appeal of the Afghan 
government for support to repel armed intervention from outside, in accordance with 
the provisions of mutual treaty obligations.^^“ In support of the Soviet argument, the 
German Democratic Republic stated that the Soviet military assistance was in 
conformity with the inalienable right of states to individual and collective self- 
defense as confirmed by the C harter,N onetheless, the Soviet invasion was 
overwhelmingly opposed and heavily criticized in the Council. A draft resolution, 
which would deplore the armed intervention in Afghanistan, however, was not 
adopted as a result of the Soviet veto.^ ^  ^ Consequently, the Security Council called
Draft resolution co-sponsored by Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Paraguay, Senegal, United 
Kingdom, United States, UN Doc. S/8761 and Add.l (1968). The resolution failed by 10 votes in 
favor, 2 against (Hungary and USSR), with 3 abstentions (Algeria, India and Pakistan).
For detailed information on the Soviet action, see “Airlift Soviet Troops into Afghanistan -  
Overthrow of President Amin,” Keesing*s 26 (May 1980).
In addition, the Soviet Union also defended its action on the basis of the request of the Afghan 
government and pursuant to the 1978 Friendship Treaty signed between Afghanistan and the Soviet 
Union. For examination of these justifications, see Chapter II of Part n.
UN Yearbook (1980), 297-298.
IbuL, 297.
For the opposing views by most o f the Council members as well as by the majority o f the 32 states 
that participated in the discussion without the right to vote, see UN Yearbook (1980), 298.
E)raft resolution sponsored by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Niger, Philippines, Tunisia, Zambia, UN Doc. 
S/13729 (1980). It received 13 votes in favor to 2 against (German Democratic Republic, USSR).
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for an enotei^ency special session of the General Assembly to examine the situation in 
Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security. At the end of 
the emergency special session, the Assembly adopted a resolution by overwhelming 
majority, which, recalling its resolutions on the inadmissibility of intervention in the 
domestic affairs of states, strongly deplored the armed intervention in Afghanistan 
and appealed to all states “to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of 
that country.”^^  ^During the debates before the vote, the Soviet Union reiterated that 
its action was compatible with the right of individual and collective self-defense 
enshrined in the Charter. However, most opposing views denied the existence of an 
external threat which rendered the claim of self-defense unfounded and the Soviet act 
as interference in a state’s internal affairs in violation of international law as well as 
of the principles of the Charter. Another resolution adopted in the same year, again 
by a notable majority, called for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from 
Afghanistan.^^’ In the following resolutions, the General Assembly reiterated its 
concern with the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan and its call 
for the withdrawal of foreign troops from this country, with emphasis on strict 
observance of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.
The right of collective self-defense was also invoked by the United States for its 
intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965),*^® and by the Caribbean states
SC Res. 462,9  January 1980.
GA Res. ES-6/2, 14 January 1980. The resolution passed with 104 votes in favor and 18 against, 
with 18 abstentions. The negative votes belonged mostly to the socialist countries.
UN Yearbook (1980), 299-301.
GA Res. 35/37,20 November 1980, adopted by 111 to 22, with 12 abstentions.
See GA Resols. 36/34,18 November 1981; 37/37,29 November 1983.
For the details o f the Dominican civil war, see “Outbreak of Civil War. - Fighting between Pro- 
Bosch and Anti-Bosch Factions -  Formation o f Military Junta,” Keesing’s 11 (July 1965). For factual 
information on the US intevention in the Dominican Republic, see “Landing of American Troops. -
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participating to the multinational force led by the United States for the intervention in 
Grenada (1983),*^° but only as a secondary justification. After his initial justification 
of protection of lives and safety of American citizens,*^* President Johnson argued 
that the United States action in the Dominican Republic also aimed to prevent a 
communist take-over in this country. Five days after the American landing in the 
Dominican Republic and the evacuation of some 3000 Americans and other 
foreigners, in a television broadcast on 2 May 1965, President Johnson contended 
that the communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba, had taken increasing 
control of the revolutionary movement, and as a result what began as a “popular 
democratic revolution committed to democracy was taken over ...and placed into the 
hands of a band of Communist conspirators.” He further declared that “the American 
nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another 
Communist government in the Western Hemisphere.” Thus, the US mission, he 
maintained, also included preventing the emergence of another Communist state in 
the hemisphere. Consequently, the President drew on the communist threat as a
Evacuation o f U.S. and Foreign Nationals. - Arrival o f O.A.S. Peace-Mission. -  Temporary Cease- 
Fire,” ATecsmg’s 11 (July 1965).
For the background of the events leading to the intervention, see “Military Coup -  Intervention by 
US and Caribbean Forces,” ‘background to the Coup,” “Removal o f Mr. Bishop -  Establishment of 
Revolutionary Military Council -  Reactions from other Caribbean States,” Keesing’s 30 (January 
1984).
Statement o f President Johnson reprinted in Department o f State Bulletin 52 (1965), 738. See also 
letter o f 29 April 1965 from the United States to the Security Council (enclosing statement by 
President o f United States on Dominican Republic situation, issued at 9 pm, 28 April 1965), UN Doc. 
S/6310 (1965).
Statement by President Johnson reprinted in Department o f State Bulletin 53 (1965), 55-60. For the 
argument that tiie US action is justified as collective self-defense against a communist threat, see C.G. 
Fenwick, “The Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective Self-Defense,” American Journal o f 
International Law 60:1 (1966), 64-67. For an opposite view, see R. T. Bohan, “The Dominican Case: 
Unilateral Intervention,” American Journal o f International Law 60:4 (1966), 809-812.
“President Johnson’s Warning o f Communist Threat in the Dominican Republic -  Reinforcement 
of American Troops,” Keesing’s 11 (July 1965). The same argument was also presented by the United 
States during the Council consideration o f the matter in May 1965. See UN Yearbook (1965), 141. It 
has to be noted however that Johnson’s allegations regarding the communist control o f the rebellion 
was rejected by the ousted President of the Dominican Republic, who declared in a radio interview on 
3 May 1965 that there was absolutely no justification for tiie US military intervention, and maintained
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justification for sending an additional 15,000 troops to the Dominican Republic. 
Condemning the US armed intervention as an act of direct aggression that violated 
the UN Charter and an action for the repression of a national liberation movement, 
the Soviet Union renounced the US argument of “threat of communism in the 
Dominican Republic” as groundless. The representative of Uruguay criticized 
Johnson’s reasoning of considering revolutions as domestic problems, but deeming 
those aimed to establish a communist regime as a basis for hemispheric action. 
This kind of thinking, he argued, was not compatible with the principle of self- 
determination. Participating the Council debates on his request, the Cuban 
representative also pointed out the denial of self-determination. Among the opposing 
states was also Jordan, whose representative at the Council maintained that the 
uprising in the Dominican Republic was an internal matter, and thus the US armed 
intervention was based exclusively on its own assessment of the situation there. 
As such, the opposing views emphasized that the US action constituted intervention 
in the internal affairs and violation of the sovereignty of an independent state. It
that the uprising was entirely democratic, that it was in no way under Communist control. For details 
of his statement, see “Ex-President Bosch Repudiates US Allegations of Communist Direction of 
Rebellion -  Latin American Reactions to US Military Intervention,” Keesing’s 11 (July 1965).
UN Yearbook (1965), 142.
In his statement on 2 May 1965, President Johnson declared that: ‘Revolution in any country is a 
matter for that country to deal with. It becomes a matter calling for hemispheric action only when the 
object is the establishment of a Communist dictatorship.” See “President Johnson’s Warning of 
Communist Threat in the Dominican Republic -  Reinforcement of American Troops,” Keesing’s 11 
(July 1965).
UN Yearbook (1965), 141-143. It has to be noted that France also strongly criticized the US 
intervention, but its opposition was more to do with the justification of protection of nationals. 
Another noteworthy criticism regarding the extent o f the communist threat came fi'om the US Senator 
Fulbright four months after the intervention. He held that the administration’s premise that the 
Dominican revolution was communist-controlled had never been established. See “Senator Fulbright’s 
Criticisms o f US Intervention in Dominican Republic,” Keesing’s 11 (September 1965).
As a general remark, Malaysia also underlined that the principle o f non-interference represented 
the very basis of the UN Charter, and thus no government could claim the right to intervene in the 
affairs of any state outside, the scope of the Charter. UN Yearbook (1965), 143.
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was only the British representative that expressed full support for the US action. 
Other states, notably Malaysia, the Netherlands, Bolivia and China, supported the 
OAS (Organization of American States) action to deal with the situation in the 
Dominican Republic.^ ^^ Two resolutions adopted on 14 May 1965 and 22 May 1965, 
called for strict cease-fire. The Soviet draft resolution, which would condemn the 
intervention as a gross violation of the United Nations Charter as well as call for the 
withdrawal of the US troops, was defeated on 25 May 1965.^ ^^
Similarly, during the intervention in Grenada, after defending the action on the 
grounds of protection of the lives of Americans and restoration of law and order, the 
United States and the participating Caribbean states later also justified the 
intervention in broader terms, as one in accordance with Article 8 of the 
Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) Treaty, which stipulates collective 
defense.^ ^^ Speaking in the Security Council on 27 October 1983, the US
However, the British support was based on the US justification of the urgent need of the protection 
of American citizens and other foreign nationals.
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UN Yearbook (1965), 142-143.
SC Res. 203,14 May 1965, adopted unanimously; SC Res. 205,22 May 1965, adopted by 10 votes 
to 0 with 1 abstention (United States).
For the text of the Soviet draft resolution, see UN Doc. S/6328 (1965). The operative paragraphs of 
the resolution were voted separately. The first paragraph condemning the US intervention, was 
supported only by the USSR itself, while the second paragraph, calling for the withdrawal of the US 
troops, was supported by the Soviet Union and Jordan. Voting against both paragraphs were the 
United States, the United Kingdom, China, the Netherlands, Bolivia and Uruguay, while France, the 
Ivory Coast and Malaysia abstained on both paragraphs. Another draft resolution which would call on 
all countries to avoid helping either of the “contending factions” failed to be adopted by 5 votes in 
favor (Uruguay, France, Jordan, Ivory Coast and Malaysia), 1 against (Soviet Union) and 5 
abstentions (United States, United Kingdom, China, Netherlands and Bolivia. For the text of the draft 
resolution proposed by Uruguay, see UN Doc. S/ 6346/Rev.l (1965). For the details o f the Security 
Council debates, see “Security Council Debates -  British and French Reactions to Dominican 
Situation -  French Criticisms of US Military Intervention in Santo Domingo,” Keesing*s 11 (July 
1965).
Max Hilaire, International Law and the United States Military Intervention in the Western 
Hemisphere (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 81; Scott Davidson, Grenada: A Study in 
Politics and the Limits o f International Law (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1987), 86-88. It has to be 
noted that Article 8 of the OECS Charter limits defensive action to “external aggression.” Moreover, 
this argument was especially put forward by the United States, Barbados and Jamaica, which are not 
members of the OECS. For the text of the OECS Treaty,
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see
representative, Jeane Kirkpatrick argued that as a result of RMC's (Revolutionary 
Military Council) coup,*^  ^the military power which Grenada had accumulated “with 
Cuban and Soviet military backing had fallen into the hands of individuals who could 
reasonably be expected to wield that power against its neighbours.”'^ '^  In the OECS 
statement transmitted to the Council, it was maintained that extensive military build­
up in Grenada had created a threat to OECS and neighboring countries, and thus the 
action was one of collective self-defense pursuant to Article 8 of the OECS treaty. 
The reactions at the Security Council were overwhelmingly negative. Virtually all 
states, except the United States and its Caribbean allies, expressed outright rejection 
of all the legal justifications presented by the intervening states, and pointed out the 
lack of substantial evidence of the claims. For example, the Iranian representative 
rejected all the legal justifications presented, which he considered formulated by the 
invading forces to justify their aggression.Sim ilarly, the Jordanian President of the 
Council observed that the intervention resembled a case of “invade first and then 
look for the justification.” As to the collective self-defense argument, the Polish 
representative, among others, held that there was no military attack, “which would 
justify a defensive military action.”^^  ^In addition, a number of states pointed out that 
Article 8 of the OECS treaty permitted self-defense only in response to external 
aggression, which was not existent in the case concerned, and that collective self-
http://www.oecs.org/assets/OECS_Treaty.pdf. For detailed analysis of the claim that the OECS had 
the authority to engage in military intervention in Grenada on the basis of the OECS Charter, see 
Forsythe, The Politics o f International Law, 74-75.
For the details of the military coup, see “Removal of Mr. Bishop - Establishment of Revolutionary 
Military Council -  Reactions from Odier Caribbean States” Keesing’s 30 (January 1984).
UN Doc. S/PV.2491 (1983), 37.
UN Doc. S/16070 (1983).
Among the countries opposing the action were also the US allies, such as Canada, Italy, Australia, 
France, West Germany and Belgimn. UN Yearbook (1983), 211-214.
UN Doc. S/PV. 2489 (1983), 78-80.
™ UN Doc. S/PV.2491 (1983), 192.
UN Doc. S/PV.2489 (1983), 22.
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defense action could, in any case, can only be carried out upon the request of the 
victim state itself.Furtherm ore, the representative of Grenada, participated in the 
Council debate at its request, stated that its current situation was of an entirely 
internal nature, and that it had not threatened the use of force against any country.**  ^
A resolution of condemnation introduced by Guyana, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe was 
vetoed by the Nevertheless, an almost identical resolution of condemnation,
declaring the US armed intervention as “flagrant violation of international law and of 
the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Grenada, passed easily in 
the General Assembly. Both the defeated Council resolution and the General 
Assembly resolution cited Article 2(4), the Declaration on Principles o f 
International Law, and the Declaration o f the Inadmissibility o f Intervention and 
Interference in the Internal Affairs as the main documents of reference in deploring 
the intervention.
Thus, on the whole, the UN reactions to the above military interventions in collective 
self-defense in response to a purported external threat, with the exception of the 
Czechoslovak case where the UN failed to condemn the intervention due to the 
Soviet veto, were robustly negative.*^ However, one cannot fail to notice that the 
criticism and condemnation largely focused on the very existence of the alleged
Among those countries contending OECS treaty did not allow for the action in question were 
Mexico, Cuba, Ethiopia, Algeria and Mongolia. See UN Doc. S/PV.2491 (1983).
UN Yearbook (1983), 212. It should be noted that the US objected to the credentials o f the Grenada 
representative. UN Yearbook (1983), 214.
UN Doc. S/16077Jlev.l (1983). The resolution was defeated by 11 (China, France, Guyana, 
Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, USSR, Zimbabwe) to 1 (USA) with 3 
abstentions (Togo, United Kingdom, Zaire).
GA Res. 38/7, 2 November 1983. The resolution was adopted by 109 to 9 (the US, the Caribbean 
states together with El Salvador and Israel) with 27 abstentions.
One can possibly leave the US intervention in the Dominican Republic out of the group of the 
disapproved interventions o f this type as well, since the UN response was limited to calls for cease­
fire in two Council resolutions, with no Assembly consideration of the matter at all.
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situation, rather than the validity of the claim of the right of collective self-defense in 
response to an external threat By implication then, one can conclude that the United 
Nations has not endorsed a right of collective self-defense where there was no 
significant evidence provided to substantiate allegations of a foreign threat.
In concluding this section on the interventions justified as collective self-defense, 
certain observations follow. Firstly, it appears from the above survey of the UN 
reactions to the interventions that the United Nations generally tend to affirm the 
right of third states to assist a state facing an aggression. Second, the UN seems to 
apply the principle regardless of the nature of the aggression, which allegedly 
invoked the right of collective self-defense. In this respect, the key issue appears to 
be the perception of the danger or threat posed to the security of the target state by 
the action in question. Insofar as the external involvement was taken to pose a 
serious danger to the target state, which requires an immediate response, the United 
Nations reaction was not one of strong condemnation. Thus, it is not the character of 
the action that provoked the intervention, but rather the degree of the effects of such 
conduct that has been a determining factor in characterizing the attitude taken 
towards the intervention in question. In other words, to the extent that the danger to 
the security of the state is imminent and grave, and cannot be responded by any other 
means short of an immediate forcible reaction is accepted, so is the intervention. 
Thus, in contrast to the exercise of the right of individual self-defense, the UN has 
treated the concept of “armed attack” broadly in collective self-defense cases. In this 
respect, the UN appears to adhere to the customary criteria of self-defense, namely 
necessity, immediacy and lack of no other means in cases of collective self-defense
in response to actions not amounting to an “armed attack.” On the other hand, it is
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notable that in all of the above cases, the plea to collective self-defense is always
accompanied with the element of ‘consent’ In this connection, one should recall the
I d ’s judgment in the Nicaragua case that maintains:
“At all events, the Court finds that in customary international 
law there is no rule permitting the exercise of collective 
self-defense in the absence of a request by the State which 
regards itself as the victim of an armed attack. The Court 
concludes that the requirements of a request by the State 
which is the victim of the alleged attack is additional to the 
requirement that such a State should have declared itself to
have been attacked. U8S
From the Court’s formulation, it follows that, as mentioned elsewhere, the conditions 
of collective self-defense are the request of the attacked state and the declaration of 
having been attacked. In fact, collective self-defense is one among the other 
justifications that are closely linked to the element of ‘consent.’ Hence, it is now 
necessary to turn attention to ‘consent’ as a determinant of the legality of military 
intervention in the UN’s response.
18S ICJ Reports (1986), para. 199.
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CHAPTER II:
CONSENT OF THE TARGET STATE
In international law, the concept of ‘consent’ is admitted to be one of the conditions 
that disqualify the wrongfulness of otherwise wrongful acts carried out by states/ In 
regard to military intervention, the logical implication then is when a state agrees to 
an intervention in its internal affairs by another state, the element of coercion -an 
essential qualification of the concept of intervention- is eliminated, which in turn 
eradicates the wrongfulness of the act of intervention/ In this respect, some authors 
argue that where there is an element of consent, it will not be meaningful to label the 
type of interference in question as ‘intervention,’ insofar as intervention represents 
“an act or threat of compulsion or coercion of the will of a state by another, an 
imposition of the will of the intervenor.”  ^With respect to the prohibition of the use 
of force, the element of ‘consent’ has also the effect of precluding the application of 
the proscription. An armed intervention, which would in general be considered as an
‘ Article 20 under Chapter V (Circumstances precluding wrongfulness) o f the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility o f States fo r Internationally Wrongful Acts reads as follows: “Valid consent by a State 
to die commission o f a given act by another State precludes the wronghilness of that act in relation to 
the former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits o f that consent.” Adopted by the 
Intenational Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2(X)1), Official Records o f the General 
Assembly, fifty-sixth session. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, chp. IV.E.1 (2001).
 ^ Ann Van Wyen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, The Law and Its Import in the 
Americas (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956), 91; Ian Brownlie, International Law 
and the Use o f Force by States (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 317.
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act of aggression, would cease to be typified as such and turn into a lawful act if it 
takes place with the consent of the state.^ For example, in its Nicaragua judgment, 
ICJ implicitly recognized that intervention is allowable “at the request of the 
government of a state.”  ^ On the other hand, there is no doubt that by virtue of the 
principle of sovereignty enshrined in Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter, 
states are entitled to request military assistance in time of emergency even though 
such an aid would impair their exercise of sovereignty.® Having assessed the legal 
function of ‘consent’ and its relevance to military intervention in the internal affairs, 
the central question appears to be not so much that of establishing the admissibility 
of consent as a justification for intervention, but rather one of identifying the 
conditions for its validity.^ Needless to say, the circumstances in which the 
interventions occurred vary from one case to another. Nonetheless, consent of the 
intervened state as a legal ground for intervention seems to take two forms: either 
given as an od hoc invitation or given in advance by a previous treaty.® In this 
respect, the most problematic issue emerges to be the question of the legitimacy of 
the authority giving consent.’
 ^ Thomas and Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, 91. For a similar view, see Rein Mullerson, 
“Intervention by Invitation” in Lori Fişler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer (eds.). Law and Force in 
the New International Order (Boulder: W estview Press, 1991), 127,
 ^Antonio Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1993), 19; Brownlie, International Law, 317,320.
 ^ICJ Reports (1986), para. 246.
 ^(Juincy Wright, “United States Intervention in the Lebanon,” American Journal o f International Law 
53:1 (January 1959), 119. For the same principle in traditional international law, see Antonio Cassese, 
International Law in a Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 239.
 ^Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention, 23.
® Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim*s International Law, Volume I (Harlow, England: 
Longman, 1992), 435.
’ Ruth Wedgewood, “Commentary on Intervention by Invitation” in Damrosch and Scheffer (eds.). 
Law and Force, 138.
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Almost in all cases of military interventions under investigation, the principle of 
consent has been invoked along with other justifications. States are alleged to have 
requested foreign military assistance either in response to external attacks or threats 
of attack, or to tackle internal conflict With respect to the former situation, the 
request for assistance has been raised in connection with the right of collective self- 
defense, which is examined in Chapter I of Part n. Thus, this chapter will mostly 
focus on the latter cases, namely cases whereby the interventions occurred in the 
form of assistance to the inviting authority in an internal conflict situation. In 
addition, the cases of interventions at the request of the target state where the 
external involvement in any form was considered to be the cause of the internal 
disturbance are also scrutinized.
Three general characteristics of the inviting authority in relation to the internal 
situation can be distinguished. First, there are cases where the incumbent government 
with a relatively considerable degree of effectiveness nevertheless confronting an 
internal insurgence expresses request for assistance. Second, there are situations 
where there is an internal disorder with distinct factions fighting, and the consent is 
given by the government representing one of them. Third, there are instances where 
the entity requesting aid, although has formal authority, neither represents a certain 
faction nor enjoys effective power, in which case the intervention is aimed “to 
restore order.”*® Finally, there are those interventions, which fall into none of these 
categories. Those cases will be discussed with emphasis on the specific problems 
they pose.
This classification o f the cases based on the characteristics of the inviting authority vis-à-vis the 
internal situation is borrowed fiom Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention, 25.
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The British intoventions in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman (1957) and Jordan 
(1958), and the French interventions in Gabon (1964) and Chad (1968) represent 
most important cases of military intervention upon the request of the incumbent 
government in the face of an internal rebellion. In both Muscat-Oman and Jordan, 
there was an alleged foreign involvement in the internal disturbance.^* Before the 
Council debate on whether it should place the British action in Muscat and Oman on 
its agenda, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman protested the Arab request for the 
consideration of the matter by the Council, by stating that the matter laid exclusively 
within his internal jurisdiction.*^ Although legitimacy of the request by the Sultan 
was questioned by the Arab states on the basis of the claim that Oman had got its 
independence by the Treaty of Sib in 1920, and thus was not under the Sultan of 
Muscat’s jurisdiction; the British assertion that the Sib Agreement of 1920 had only 
allowed Oman a measure of autonomy but not recognized it independent, found 
support in the Council.*^ As a result, the Council declined the Arab request. In 
contrast to inaction with respect to Muscat and Oman, the United Nations considered 
the British intervention in Jordan both at the Council and the Assembly, During the 
Council debate, the Jordanian representative declared that facing a threat to its 
independence and integrity by subversive elements employed from outside, Jordan 
had asked the United Kingdom for aid. The consideration of the matter in both
2. 1. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AT THE REQUEST OF THE
‘INCUMBENT’ GOVERNMENT
" See Chapter I of Part II for the examination of these cases within the context o f collective self- 
defense against subversive forces instigating domestic trouble.
Cable of 17 August 1957 received by President of Security Council, UN Doc. S/3866 (1957).
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organs mainly focused on whether such an alleged threat existed, rather than the 
validity of the Jordanian consent to the action.*"^
In the two cases of French interventions in Gabon (1964) and Chad (1968), France 
defended its action on the basis of the request issued from the respective 
governments under the provisions of defense agreements signed with these states in 
1960.^  ^Both Gabon and Chad declared that they had requested French aid in the face 
of an internal rebellion. While the French operation in Gabon was approved by 
most of the African French speaking states, such as Madagascar, the Central African 
Republic, Chad, Niger, Upper Volta and the Ivory Coast, some African countries, 
notably Algeria, Mali and Ghana, strongly opposed it.'^ The intervention in Chad on 
the other hand, did not raise much international reaction. None of the interventions 
were considered at the UN. As such in cases where the ‘legitimacy’ of the 
government is not questioned, the United Nations did not challenge the governments’ 
capacity to give ‘consent.’ Thus, its practice in this respect is in conformity with the 
traditional view that it is legal to assist the incumbent government facing internal 
disorders upon its request.
The Philippines and Sweden raised their concern with the complicated legal questions in relation to 
the status of the Treaty of Sib, thus expressed their support for the inclusion the item on the Council’s 
agenda. UN Yearbook (1957), 58.
Yearbook (1958), 41-47.
The treaties, which provided for continued defense collaboration with France, were signed with 
Chad on 12 July 1960 and with Gabon on 15 July 1960 on the occasion of granting independence to 
these countries. See, “Independence Agreements with Chad, Central Afiican Republic, Congo and 
Gabon,” Keesing’s Record ofW oridEvents 6 (August 1960), http://www.keesings.com.
A Gabonese govranment statement issued on 19 February 1964 maintained that the legal 
government of Gabon had requested assistance from France on die basis of the agreements between 
the two countries. “Abortive Military Coup -  Intervention by French Forces,” Keesing’s  10 (April 
1964). In a similar vein, a statement o f Chadian Government in August 1968 declared that the 
territorial integrity of Chad was being threatened and that the President of the Republic of Chad 
appealed for French military assistance in accordance with the Franco-Chadian mutual defense pact o f 
1960. “French Military Assistance against Rebels,” Keesing’s 14 (Decembra· 1968).
Abortive Military Coup -  Intervention by French Forces,” Keesing’s 10 (April 1964).
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2. 2. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AT THE REQUEST OF THE ENTITY
REPRESENTING ONE OF THE PARTIES IN AN INTERNAL CONFLICT
These cases include where the inviting authority is largely associated with one of the 
parties in an internal conflict and lacks effective power over the whole territory in 
question. Among other reasons, the United States justified its intervention in 
Lebanon in 1958 on the ground that it was invited by the established government of 
Lebanon.*® In the Security Council, the US action was largely approved; except the 
Soviet Union, emphasizing the absence of an external threat, strongly condenmed the 
intervention and deemed it as aimed solely to maintain the Chamoun government in 
power. The following General Assembly resolution called for strict observance of 
the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.^ ®
The 1964 rescue operation in Congo by the Belgian paratroopers with the help of the 
United States^* had been requested by the Tshombe government of Congo.^^ 
However, the fact that this government did not enjoy effective control over the area 
of operation became the major focus of criticism by the countries, which condemned 
the operation in the Council. The opposing countries questioned the legality of the *
** Wright, “United States Intervention in the Lebanon,” 112.
UN Yearbook (1958), 39. In this connection, it has to be noted that the US State Secretary Dulles 
stated that the election of General Chehab, who had been supported by the rebels, in Lebanon some 
time after the US intervention, showed that the US action did not aim to help President Chamoun to be 
re-elected. See Wright, “United States Intervention in the Lebanon,” 113.
“  GARes. 1237 (ES-m), 21 August 1958.
For details o f the internal situation o f Congo at the time and the op ^ tion  by the US and Belgium in 
Congo, see Richard Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1968), 324-335.
The Democratic Republic o f the Congo informed the Security Council that it had authorized the 
rescue operation. UN Yearbook (1964), 95.
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Tshombe government and the validity of the invitation extended to Belgium.^ On 
the other hand, supporting arguments stressed the legitimacy of the Leopoldville 
government, and thus underlined its capacity to issue an invitation to Belgium.^ The 
Security Council adopted a m ild resolution requesting states to refrain from 
intervention in the domestic affairs of the Congo.^ Thus, neither the US intervention 
in Lebanon nor the US-Belgian intervention in Congo was condemned by the UN.
A complicated case with respect to ‘request’ is the 1976 Cuban intervention in 
Angola upon the consent of one of the three fighting factions, namely the MPLA 
(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), which controlled only twenty per 
cent of the territory, before Angola had gained its independence.^ During the 
Security Council’s discussion, the MPLA representative maintained that it was 
Angola’s right to appeal to assistance of any friendly country to counter the South 
African aggression and that any concern about this would be an unjustified 
interference in its internal affairs.^^ The problem in this case however arises from the 
fact that the Cuban intervention occurred before the declaration of independence of 
Angola.^ Thus, the MPLA, not being the legitimate government, did not possess the
“  Among the opposing countries were the African countries (Algeria, Burundi, the Congo 
(Brazzaville), Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, M ali, Sudan, the United Arab Republic and the United Republic 
of Tanzania), which regarded the intervention as an act o f aggression and a conspiracy to impose upon 
the people of the Congo the disputed authority of the Tshombe government; and the USSR and 
Czechoslovakia, which endorsed the aforementioned accusations o f the African countries. UN 
Yearbook (1964), 96-97. See also, “Commimist and African Reactions to Stanleyville Operation,” 
Keesing’s 11 (February 1965).
^  The countries supported included France, Brazil, China, Bolivia, Norway and Nigeria. On the other 
hand, while admitting the legality of the Leopoldville government, the Ivory Coast and the Central 
African Republic deplored the Stanleyville operation. UN Yearbook (1964), 98.
“  SC Res. 199,30 December 1964.
^  For the details of the Angolan situation, see note 72 in Chapter I o f Part n .
UN Yearbook (1976), 173.
^ In the Security Coimcil, the Cuban representative stated that Cuba had sent the first military unit to 
Angola on 5 November 1975 at the request o f MPLA. UN Yearbook (1976), 174. Two separate 
republics were proclaimed almost simultaneously by MPLA in Luanda, the capital (on 10 November 
1975), and jointly by FNLA (National Front for the Liberation o f Angola) and UNTTA (National
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legal right to seek assistance of any third state in self-defense against a foreign armed 
attack. Nevertheless, in the Security Council, many countries regarded the MPLA as 
the legitimate government and supported its right to seek help against the previous 
South African attack.^^ In a similar vein, the consequent Security Council resolution 
did not challenge the legal right of MPLA to ask help to counter South African 
intervention regardless of the fact that the Cuban intervention in fact took place 
before the MPLA proclaimed independence. On the contrary, the resolution did 
underline “the inherent and lawful right of every state, in the exercise of its 
sovereignty, to request assistance from any other state or group of states.” ®^
Another complex case concerns the interventions in Chad, namely the 1978 and 1983 
French interventions and 1980 Libyan intervention. The French intervention in 1978 
was undertaken to support the government forces in their counter-offensive against 
the rebels on the basis of the request of the established government of Chad.^  ^
According to an International Herald Tribune article, at the time of the intervention, 
the government controlled barely a quarter of the country.^ ^ France repeatedly 
stressed that the continued French aid to Chad had been in response to that country’s
Union for the Total Independence o f Angola) in Huambo (on 11 NovembCT 1975). “Achievement of 
Independence -  State of Virtual Civil War -  International Involvement -  Establishment o f Separate 
Governments by MPLA and FNLA-UNITA - Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Cabinda,” 
Keesing’s 21 (December 1975). By the end of February 1976, the MPLA government was recognized 
by the OAU and many other states, including the Western states and Asian countries. See, 
“Recognition of MPLA (fevemment by OAU and Other Countries,” Keesing’s 22 (April 1976).
”  For example, the representative of Pakistan held that it was within Angola’s sovereign rights to 
invite and retain foreign military forces that it considered friendly to its cause and whose assistance it 
felt needed. Similar arguments were put forward by the USSR, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Mali. 
UN Yearbook (1976), 175.
SC Res. 387, 31 March 1976.
The 1978 French intervention was also justified as protection of French citizens. This justification 
will be examined in the next part of the study within die context of “protection of nationals abroad.” 
For details o f the French involvement in Chad, see “Allegations o f French Involvement,” Keesing’s 24 
(May 1978).
“Allegations o f French Involvement,” Keesing’s 24 (May 1978).
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“express and urgent request.”^^  When a civil war broke out again in 1980, Libya 
intervened in Chad on the side of the coalition forces supporting President Oueddei.^ 
Declining to expose the extent of Libyan connection. President Kadhafi of Libya 
described its involvement as being merely “technical and humanitarian aid” provided 
in response to a request by the Chad govemment.^^ By a letter to the President of the 
Security Council, Libya also argued that its military presence in Chad was at the 
request of the transitional government of Chad to help put an end to the civil war.^  ^
With regards to its intervention in Chad in 1983, once again France stated that it 
responded to Chad’s request, as provided by the 1976 Cooperation Agreement 
between the two countries.^^ Neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly 
took any decisions regarding the interventions in Chad between 1978-1983. 
Nonetheless, the situation in Chad came before the Security Council in 1983, 
whereby the discussion mostly focused on the Libyan aggression on Chad, and a 
number of countries expressed support for the government of Chad and its request 
for the presence of French troops for its self-defense against the Libyan armed
aggression 38
One of the most dubious cases regarding the legality of invitation is the alleged 
Afghan request for Soviet military intervention in 1979. In the Security Council, the
“Resurgence of Rebel War -  French Support for Chad National Army,” Keesing’s 25 (January 
1979).
^  For the detailed information on the outbreak of hostilities, see “Internal Security and Political 
Developments,” Keesing’s 26 (February 1980).
“Large-scale Libyan Intervention,” Keesing’s 27 (February 1981).
Letter o f 24 November 1981 to the President o f the Security Council by Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
UN. Doc. S/14767 (1981).
UN Yearbook (1983), 185. For the French justifications, see also “French and Zairean Aid to Habré 
Government FAOT Coimter-Offensive,” Keesing’s 29 (December 1983).
Libya’s position was only supported by the USSR, whereas Egypt, France, Guinea, Guyana, the 
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, the Netherlands, the Niger, Pakistan, the United Republic o f Cameroon,
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representative of the Soviet Union claimed that the Soviet decision to send a “limited 
military contingent” to Afghanistan was taken in response to the repeated appeals of 
its government for support in order to repel armed intervention from outside and on 
the basis of provisions of mutual treaty obligations.^^ In a statement published in 
Pravda on 12 January 1980, President Brezhnev reiterated that the Soviet Union had 
responded to the request of Afghanistan in the face of external aggression and crude 
interference from outside in its internal affairs.'*® Nonetheless, the difficulty in 
assessing the legality of the invitation stems from the unclear circumstances in which 
the Afghan government consented to Soviet intervention. The statement of 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan requesting “urgent political, moral and 
economic assistance, including military assistance” from Soviet Union pursuant to 
the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation'** appeared in 
Pravda on 29 December 1979, two days after the overthrow of President Amin’s 
regime.'*  ^ On the other hand, the Soviet Union, in a massive airlift on 25-26 
December 1979, had brought into Kabul an estimated 4000-5000 Soviet combat
the United Kingdom, the United States and Zaire expressed views in favor o f Chad. See, UN 
Yearbook (1983), 184-187.
”  UN Yearbook (1980), 297.
^  “President Brezhnev’s Statement on International Situation,” Keesmg’s 26 (May 1980).
** Article 4 o f the Treaty o f Friendship, Good Neighboxirliness and Cooperation signed between the 
Soviet Union and Afghanistan on 5 December 1978 provided for developing military cooperation in 
the interest o f strengthening their defense capacity. Another article of that treaty provides for mutual 
consultation and appropriate action -presumably whatever the two parties agree to- in the event o f a 
threat to the peace. See “Visit o f President o f Afghanistan to Soviet Union - Signing of Treaty of 
Friendship, Good-neighbourliness and Co-operation -  Agreement on Establishment of Commission 
for Economic Co-operation,” Keesmg’s 25 (February 1979); see also Seth Singleton, ‘The Soviet 
Invasion o f Afghanistan,” http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicals/aureview/1981/mar- 
apr/singleton.htm.
Pravda, 29 December 1979,
htq>://www.cim.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/20/lst.draft/pravda.html. It should be noted that, 
today, it has become known, even from the Soviet sources, that Babrak Karmal was not at the head of 
the government, but was on Soviet territory at the time of the purported request o f assistance. See 
Mullerson, “Intervention by Invitation,” 129.
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troops and their equipment, and had aheady been present in Kabul since then.^ ^ 
Thus, ambiguity remained regarding the regime that issued invitation. However, one 
can presume from the considerable number of Soviet troops in Kabul before the fall 
of President Amin that the Soviets were there with his government’s consent.·^ 
Notwithstanding, most statements at the Security Council and the General Assembly 
mainly questioned the alleged external threat to Afghanistan on which the Soviet 
Union based its justifrcation of collective self-defense.^^ Nevertheless, a majority of 
states also expressed doubts about freedom exercised by Afghanistan in consenting 
the presence of Soviet troops, and regarded the Soviet action as interference in the 
domestic affairs of another country in violation of international law and against the 
principles of Charter. During the General Assembly discussions, for example, 
Singapore challenged the authority of Karmal for such a request, since, in July 1978, 
he had been dismissed from his post as Afghan Deputy Prime Minister. Similarly, 
Kuwait maintained that the request was invalid, for the Government of Afghanistan 
had been installed by the Soviet Union itself. Also Japan expressed parallel views.^ 
Despite the relative concentration on the appeal to self-defense during the 
consideration of the matter at the United Nations, one can judge from the resultant 
Assembly resolution’s call for the “immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own 
form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free
44
“Airlift o f Soviet Troops into Afghanistan -  Overthrow of President Amin,” Keesing’s 26 (May 
1980).
In this respect, one author argues that “an explicit invitation is not a necessary condition in all 
cases,” and that ‘4he mere acceptance or acquiescence may be sufficient in some cases to indicate 
consent” John Lawrence Hargrove, “Intervention by Invitation and the Politics o f the New World 
Order” in Damrosch and Scheffer (eds.). Law and Force, 117.
See Chapter I of Part П for Soviet intervention in Afghanistan within the fi-amework o f “collective 
self-defense.”
““ UN Yearbook (1980), 300.
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from outside interference,”^^  that the Assembly did not consider the Karmal 
government as representative of the will of the Afghan people, and thus implied the 
illegality of its request.
It appears from the above appraisal of the relevant cases that with the exception of 
the Afghanistan case whereby the exact circumstances in which the Afghan 
government was formed and consented to the Soviet intervention were highly 
doubtful, the general response of the UN was either one of inaction, as in the cases of 
Chad interventions, or confined to resolutions reiterating the principle of non­
intervention in the internal affairs, rather than deploring the interventions, as in the 
cases of interventions in Lebanon and Congo. Given that the respective governments 
that issued requests of assistance lacked real power over the totality of their 
territories except Afghanistan, it can fairly be argued that the effectiveness of the 
governments has not been a criterion for questioning the validity of the ‘request’ in 
situations of internal turmoil and civil war. Thus, the absence of strong critical 
assessment of the validity of the consent in the UN organs and the relatively mild 
reaction to these cases may be said to stem from the fact that they were considered as 
‘lawful’ governments of the countries in question. In fact, it was only in the case of 
Angola, where Portugal was formally in charge when the intervention had begun and 
thus the inviting entity was not representing the government, that the UN adopted a 
favorable resolution admitting the right of every state “to request assistance from any 
other state or group of states,” and thus by implication accepting the legitimacy of 
the request. This reaction may be linked to the fact that the inviting entity ultimately 
proclaimed independence and was recognized by the international community. By
GA Res. E S-6 /2 ,14 January 1980. 165
the same token, the UN condemnation of the intervention in Afghanistan can be 
explained by the general belief that the Afghan government was established by an 
outside force, i.e. the Soviet Union, against the will of the people, and thus in 
contravention to the principle of internal self-determination.
2. 3. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS UPON REQUEST TO “RESTORE 
ORDER” OR “DEFEND DEMOCRACY”
The cases belonging to this category are those interventions whereby the requesting 
entity neither wields effective power nor represents any faction in the internal 
conflict, and its legitimacy stems from the fact that it is either democratically elected 
or holding formal power. As a result, in such interventions, one of the main 
purported aims is to “reinstate order” or “restore democracy.” The most illustrative 
case for assessing whether military intervention can be justified on the basis of a 
request from a democratically representative entity without real power is the United 
States and East Caribbean intervention in Grenada (1983). The United States’ 
interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965) and Panama (1989) are also relevant 
albeit to a lesser extent, since ‘invitation’ was not a primary justification in these 
cases.
One of the reasons given by the United States for its intervention in the Dominican
Republic was that it was invited to do so by the Dominican authorities. In the
Security Council, the US representative asserted that the US action was undertaken
due to the collapse of law and order in the Dominican Republic and with a request
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for assistance from the “Dominican law enforcement and military officials” to 
protect the lives Americans and of other citizens of some 30 countries'^. Although 
the group claiming to be the government of the Dominican Republic was a de facto 
government and did not enjoy broad control over the territory of the Dominican 
Republic/’ criticisms in the Security Council mainly focused on the other US 
justifications, most notably on the protection of lives and safety of American citizens 
and other nationals, rather than the legitimacy of the regime and legality of the 
invitation.^’ States condemning the intervention laid emphasis on the principle of 
non-intervention.^^ It was only the British support for the “United States emergency 
action,” that pointed to the aspect of ‘request’ in the US justifications, maintaining 
that the action was undertaken because “the only Dominican forces, which had any 
recognizable claim to be in position to maintain order declared their inability to do 
so” and “requested the United States to take steps to protect nationals whose lives 
were in danger.” In that respect, the French representative, however, was of the 
opinion that the intervention seemed to have been undertaken “against those who 
claimed to have constitutional legality.”^^  The Security Council resolutions adopted
after the debates were nonetheless limited to the calls for cease-fire.53
The alleged legal grounds for the US and Caribbean states’ intervention in Grenada 
paralleled to those presented in the Dominican case: consent of the target state,
^  “Security Council Debates,” Keesing’s 11 (July 1965).
For the political crisis in the Dominican Republic between 1961 and 1965 leading to the formation 
of the military junta government on 28 April 1965 supported by the US, see Max Hilaire, 
International Law and the United States M ilitary Intervention in the Western Hemisphere (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 55-56.
See the part on “protection of nationals” in Chapter I of Part III.
UN Yearbook (1965\ 140-145.
“Security Council Debates,” K eesing’s 11 (July 1965).
SC Res. 203,14 May 1965 and SC Res. 205,22 May 1965.
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protection of nationals and regional peacekeeping action.^ '^  Nevertheless, the 
justification based on consent was more emphasized in the Grenada case, for at the 
time of intervention, as opposed to the Dominican internal situation of full-scale 
conflict, there was only a general internal unrest in Grenada, which did not appear to 
put an imminent danger to the lives of US nationals there.^^ Although the Governor- 
General of Grenada later confirmed his request of assistance but only after the US 
forces were in full control of the situation,^^ both the constitutional authority of the 
Governor-General and the scope of the invitation were subject to strong criticism. To 
begin with, it appeared that the OECS’s decision to intervene was taken in the 
absence of the Governor-General.^’ Secondly, the legal authority of the Governor- 
General to invite foreign troops represented another matter of controversy, since 
under the constitution of Grenada, his office was merely ceremonial and advisory, 
and thus he would not have the constitutional authority to authorize an intervention at 
a time when the existing government was still in control of the country.^* In this 
respect, some statements are indicative of the fact that the authority of Governor- 
General to request assistance was indeed questioned in the United Nations even by 
close US allies. For example, deploring the intervention, France pointed out that *
^ For an extensive treatment of the US and OECS justifications, see Scott Davidson, Grenada: A 
Study in Politics and the Limits o f International Law (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1987), 79-137.
For the situation in Grenada after the coup, see “Removal o f Mr.Bishop -  Establishment of 
Revolutionary Military Council -  Reactions firom other Caribbean States,” Keesing’s 30 (January 
1984).
** Statement by Governor-General, reprinted in Department o f State Bulletin 83 (1983), 75. It is 
noteworthy that Sir Paul Scoon (Govemor-GenCTal) did not sign the formal invitation to the US until 
27 October 1983. In a subsequent intaview on 31 October 1983, he said that he had asked “not for 
invasion but help fit)m outside.” He also maintained that he decided to seek outside assistance on the 
23 October 1983, two days after the OECS decision to intervene. See “Controversy over Nature and 
Timing of Requests by Caribbean Leaders and Governor-General for Intervention,” Keesing’s 30 
(January 1984).
^  The Caribbean states took the decision to take action at an emergency session o f the OECS on 21 
October 1965, without the consent of the Governor. See “Controversy over Nature and Timing of 
Requests by Caribbean Leaders and Govemor-GenCTal for Intervention,” Keesing’s 30 (January 
1984).
Hilaire, International Law and the United States, 88.
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international law and die UN Charter authorized intervention only in response to a 
request from the legitimate authorities of a country, or upon a decision of the 
Security Council.^^ Also, British government stated that it regarded the US action as 
clearly illegal because “the invitation had come from those not entitled to make such 
a request on behalf of Grenada.”®* On the other hand, the fact that a number of states 
also underlined that the armed intervention had denied the people of Grenada the 
right to self-determination, demonstrates that the Governor-General was not accepted 
as representative of the will of the Grenadians.^* As to the US argument of 
restoration of peace and order, the Polish representative, for example, characterizing 
the US action as aggression, expressed his government’s regret that the US had 
presented “violation of basic norms of international law and the Charter of the United 
Nations” as “restoration of peace and order.”®^ However, as mentioned in the 
previous analysis of Grenada case within the context of collective self-defense, the 
overwhelming condenmation could not be translated to a corresponding Council 
resolution, which would have deplored the intervention as violation of international 
law and the independence of Grenada due to the US veto,®  ^Nonetheless, a General 
Assembly resolution of a similar character was adopted.®* As in the Security Council, 
the norms referred to by the majority of states condemning the intervention in the 
Assembly debate were prohibition of the use of force, prohibition of any act of
UN Yearbook (1983), 212.59
® Quoted in Oscar Schächter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), 132.
Among those were Yugoslavia, Guatemala, Venezuela, UN Yearbook (1983), 211-213.
UN Doc. S/PV.2489 (1983), 21.
Draft resolution sponsored by Guyana, Nigaragua and Zimbabwe, S/16077Jtev.l (1983). Failed by 
11 votes in favor, 1 against (United States) with 3 abstentions (Togo, United Kingdom, Zaire).
“  GA Res. 38/7,31 Octob«· 1983.
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aggression, the rule of non-intervention and the rule of non-interference in the
internal affairs of states so as to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination, 65
The case of Panama differs from the above cases with the absence of an internal 
conflict at the time of the intervention, but relevant to the extent that the United 
States also claimed, among others,“  to have been invited to restore democracy by the 
democratic government that had sworn at a US base some thirty minutes before the 
intervention began.^’ Explaining the purpose of the action in the Security Council, 
the US representative stated that there had been consultations with the 
“democratically elected leadership” in Panama before the action, and that these 
leaders had endorsed the ‘steps’ decided by the US.“  The Panama intervention was 
condenmed by the Soviet Union as a “flagrant violation of the fundamental 
principles of the UN Charter and the norms of relations between states.” The 
intervention was also condemned by a large majority of the Latin American states.“  
Among the European Community countries, only Britain publicly lent “full support” 
to the US action.^ ® In the Security Council, France and Canada voted against the 
resolution condemning the US intervention as well.^ * A similar resolution was.
UN Yearbook (1983), 214-216.65
“  Other US justifications included protection o f the US citizens, defending the integrity o f the Panama 
Canal Treaty, stop drug trafficking and bringing Noriega to justice on drug charges. “US Justification 
for Intervention,” Keesing’s 35 (December 1989).
For the details o f the reinstatement o f Guillermo Endara, who was widely held to have won the May 
1989 presidential elections, whose results w ^  annulled by General Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian 
dictator, see “US Invasion and Installation of Endara Government” and “Inauguration o f President 
Endara -  Confirmation of Election Results,” Keesing’s 35 (December 1989).
UN Doc. S/PV.2899 (1989), 31-37. UN Yearbook (1989), 174.
® The Organization of American States on 22 December 1989 “deeply deplored” the military action 
and urged the immediate cessation of hostilities and the commencement of negotiations, in a 
resolution opposed only by the United States, with 20 voting in favor and 6 abstaining (Costa Rica, 
Honduras, Guatemala, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Antigua and Barbuda. See ‘International 
Reactions to Invasion,” Keesing’s 35 (December 1989).
™ ‘International Reactions to Invasion,” Keesing’s 35 (December 1989).
Draft resolution submitted by Algeria, Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal and 
Yugoslavia, failed to be adopted by 10 (joining the sponsoring countries were Brazil, China and
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however, adopted by the General Assembly. Recalling Article 2(4) and the right of a 
state to determine freely its social, economic and political system and to conduct its 
foreign relations without any form of foreign intervention and interference, the 
resolution strongly deplored the intervention in Panama.^^ During the Assembly 
debate, although the US justifications were generally rejected, many speakers, 
particularly from the Western countries conveyed approval of the reinstatement of 
democracy in Panama.^ ^
Common to all these cases of military intervention is the alleged aim of restoring 
order or democracy, among others. In this respect, in all the interventions above, the 
United States seems to have based its claims on a broad interpretation of Article 2(4), 
as reflected by the statement of the US representative. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, 
during the Grenada intervention, who at the time argued that “the prohibitions 
against the use of force in the UN Charter are contextual and not absolute,” and that 
the language “or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations” 
in Article 2(4) provides “ample justification for the use of force in pursuit of other 
values also inscribed in the Charto* -freedom, democracy, peace.” “^^ In this respect, 
one prominent legal scholar argues that Article 2(4) cannot be expansively 
interpreted so as to legalize toppling a repressive regime.’  ^Moreover, neither Article 
51 nor the General Assembly Resolutions on Principles o f International Law (2625),
USSR) to 4 (Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States) with 1 abstention (Rnland), UN Doc. 
S/21048 (1989).
^  GA Res. 44/240, 29 December 1989. The resolution passed with 75 votes in favor and 20 against 
with 40 abstentions. Among the countries voting against were mostly the Western states, but also 
Dominica, El Salvador, Israel, Turkey and Japan. Abstaining countries were mainly the African states. 
”  UNPR G A/7976,29 December 1989,11-15.
”  UN Doc. S/PV.2491 (1983), 31.
”  Oscar Schächter, “The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion,” American Journal o f International 
Law 78:3 (1984), 649.
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provide a legal basis to intervene to maintain or restore democracy. The UN
reactions to the above interventions consistently correspond to the norms laid down
in these documents, and demonstrate that enforcing universal values as such is not
perceived as superseding the right of every people freely to choose their own form of
government without outside interference. Moreover, there is a general agreement
among the legal scholars that there is no legal basis for replacing any regime with
democracy. For example, conunenting on the US invasion of Panama, Farer
maintains that since the central structural principle of the postwar international legal
system is the “equal sovereignty for all nation-states,”
“one state cannot compromise another state’s territorial 
integrity or dictate the character or the occupants of its 
governing institutions. If the law allows any exception to this 
constraint on state behavior, surely it is only where the 
exception is required to preserve the rule, hi other words, 
consistent with the structural principle, one state may 
manipulate the politics of another only where the latter’s 
behavior or internal condition leaves the former with no 
alternative means for defending its own political
the Definition o f Aggression (3314), or the Inadmissibility o f Intervention (2131)
independence and territorial integrity.„77
As a result, it can be said that even when the issue is the enforcement of generally 
accepted virtuous values like peace, order and democracy, the legal capacity of the 
inviting entity is profoundly questioned.
Intervention to assist peoples struggling for self-determination constitutes one other justification for 
military intervention, which will be taken up in Chapter I o f Part n i.
”  Tom J. Farer, ‘Tanama: Beyond The Charter Paradigm,” American Journal o f International Law 
84:2 (1990), 507-508. For a similar view, see for example, Ved P. Nanda, “The Validity o f United 
States Intervention in Panama Under International Law,” American Journal o f International Law 84:2 
(1990), 498. For an opposite view that action against tyranny does not violate Article 2(4), see
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2. 4. OTHER CASES OF MH.ITARY INTERVENTIONS BY INVITATION 
OR PURSUANT TO A PRIOR TREATY
In the cases explored thus far, the question with respect to the invitation was by and 
large related to the legal capacity of the authority concerned in relation to the internal 
situation. However, there are two other cases, whereby the consent of the target state 
was claimed, that do not fall into any of the above categorization. These include the 
Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) and in Czechoslovakia (1968),^ * both of 
which were provoked, as well-known, by the reform programs that the leadership of 
the Communist Party, led by Imre Nagy and Alexander Dubcek respectively, had 
embarked upon.^ ^ The difference from the other cases examined above is that in 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the authority of the respective governments was not 
disputed internally at the time of intervention. Although there was a state of internal 
unrest in Hungary, it was about to settle as a result of the change in the government 
policy along the lines of the people’s demands.*® Moreover, both governments 
clearly expressed that they had not issued any kind of invitation to the Soviets (or 
other Warsaw Pact troops).*^ Thus, in both cases, the entity that asked for invitation
Anthony D ’Amato, ‘The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny,” American 
Journal o f International Law 84:2 (1990), 516-524.
For the Soviet claim of consent o f the government in its intervention in Hungary see UN Yearbook 
(1956), 68; and in Czechoslovakia, see UN Yearbook (1968), 298.
^  For the account o f events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, see Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics 
Since 1945 (New York: Longman, 1996), 294-300.
“  At the beginning of 1956, there was growing discontent with the political leadership in Hungary, 
which led to student demonstrations demanding democratization of the party and the withdrawal of 
Himgary from the Warsaw Pact. On 1 November 1956, Imre Nagy, who was reinstated as Prime 
Minister on 24 October, demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary trader the 
Warsaw Pact o f 1955, informed Hungarian withdrawal o f the Warsaw Pact, declared Hungarian 
neutrality and requested the Secretary-General of the UN to put the latter issue on the agenda of the 
General Assembly. See Cablegram of 1 November 1956 to Secretary G enial from President of 
Council o f Minist№ of Hungary, the UN Doc. A/3251 (1956).
As to the Hungarian case, Ito e Nagy stated on 30 October that he had not signed the appeal to 
Soviet forces requesting aid. See Quincy Wright, “Intervention, 1956,” American Journal o f 
International Law 51:2 (April 1957), 259. Also, on 1 November 1956, the Hungarian President of
173
was not the established government. Instead, the invitation was issued ex post facto 
by the authority installed as a result of the intervention.®^ Therefore, the relevant 
question in these cases was not so much of assessing the legal capacity of the entity 
requesting the intervention, since it was considered unlawful from the outset.®® 
Consequently, the condemnation at the UN centered on the violation of the right of 
self-determination of the Hungarian and Czechoslovak peoples.®  ^ The General 
Assembly resolutions in relation to Hungary reflects such emphasis by considering 
the Soviet intervention as an attempt “to deny to the Hungarian people the right to a
Council o f Ministers of Hungary informed the Secretary-General that fiirther Soviet units were 
entering Hungary. In his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs, he expressed his strongest protest to 
the Soviet Ambassador and demanded the instant withdrawal of Soviet forces. See Cablegram of 1 
November 1956 to Secretary General from President of Council o f Ministers of Hungary, UN Doc. 
A/3251 (1956). With regards to Czechoslovak case, in the statement of Presidium of Czechoslovak 
Communist Party broadcasted by the Prague radio on 21 August 1968, it was declared that the entry of 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries’ troops in Czechoslovakia had happened without the knowledge of 
the President of the Republic, the Chairman o f the National Assembly, the Premier, or the First 
Secretary o f the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The same statement declared the invasion to be an 
act contrary to the principles of international law. Later on the same day, the Czechoslovak National 
Assembly expressed support for the aforementioned declaration. Protesting against the occupation of 
Czechoslovakia, the National Assembly statement also considered it a violation of international law, 
of the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty, and of the principles of equal relations among nations. See 
‘The Soviet Invasion,” Keesing's 14 (September 1968). See also the statement of Czech 
representative at the Security Council on 21 August 1968 reiterating that the Soviet and Warsaw Pact 
troops had entered Czechoslovakia without the knowledge or consent of the leaders of 
Czechoslovakia, and that the occupation was illegal and contrary to international law, UN Yearbook 
(1968), 299, 303.
The invasion of Soviet troops began in Hungary on the morning of 4 November 1956. In the 
evening o f the same day, it was announced that the Nagy government had collapsed and a government 
under Janos Kadar had been established, which issued a request of aid of Soviet troops to restore 
order. Wright, “Intervention, 1956,” 260. In the Czehoslovíúc case, a Toss statement on 21 August 
1968 alleged that the “fraternal assistance” to Czehoslovakia had been requested by a “group of 
members o f the Central Committee o f the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the government, and 
the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.” On the next day. Toss published this 
purported appeal. However, there was no mention of specific names who had asked for this alleged 
‘assistance.’ See “The Soviet Invasion,” Keesing*s 14 (September 1968).
® For example, in the discussions of question of Hungary in the Security Council, the representatives 
of the United Kingdom and France as well as other Council members voiced doubts about the 
existence of any invitation. UN Yearbook (1956), 67-68. And during the Council consideration of the 
Czechoslovak issue, the representatives o f Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France United 
Kingdom, United States maintained that the claim of the Czech request was not convincingly 
documented. UN Yearbook (1968), 300.
^ For the views expressed regarding the intervention in Hungary during the consideration of the 
matter by the Security Council and by the General Assembly at its second emergency special session, 
see UN Yearbook (1956), 67-72. For the views expressed regarding the intervention in 
Czechoslovakia during the consideration o f the matter by the Security Council, see UN Yearbook 
(1968), 298-303.
174
government freely elected and representing their national aspirations,”®^ and by 
condenming the Soviet Union for “depriving Hungary of its liberty and independence 
and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental rights” in the violation 
of the Charter. Similarly, the failed draft resolution, which would have condenmed 
the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, made reference to the right of 
Czechoslovak people to freely “exercise their own self-determination and to arrange 
their own affairs without external intervention.”
In the interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, as mentioned 
before, invoked the right of collective self-defense in accordance with the Warsaw 
Pact Treaty. Among other cases considered above, there are also those whereby the 
intervening power claimed to have responded to a request made in accordance with a 
bilateral treaty that generally provided for mutual assistance in case of an external 
threat.®® Yet, in all these cases, an ad hoc consent of the target state, however 
dubious, was presented as justification, along with or without the treaty obligations. 
Accordingly, the crucial question, as explored above, revolved around the 
competence of the “inviting authority.” As a result, it will not be wrong to argue that 
the legality of the “consent in advance” derived from a prior treaty seems to have 
been subordinated to the legality of the invitation in the UN reactions to cases where 
obligations arising out of a contractual arrangement were raised. However, there is 
one special case of armed intervention, which departs from the above instances due
87
GA Res. 1005 (ES-II), 9 November 1956.
GARes. 1131,12 December 1956.
Draft resolution introduced by Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Paraguay, Senegal, United 
Kingdom, United States. UN Doc. S/8761 and Add. 1 (1968).
“  Such agreements were invoked in the cases of the 1983 French intervention in Chad and the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan. Although 1960 agreements o f France with Chad and Gabon accorded the
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to the nature of the contractual engagement appealed for the intervention as well as 
the absence of the consent of the government, and that is the case of Turkish
intervention in Cyprus in 1974.89
Turkey intervened in Cyprus by virtue of the Treaty of Guarantee (1960), which in 
its Article IV empowers the guaranteeing powers to take necessary measures to 
ensure the observance of the Treaty.^ ® Turkey specifically justified its action as a 
peace operation and as fulfillment of its legal responsibility as a co-guarantor of the 
independence and constitutional order of Cyprus.^ ^ However, it is distinguished from 
all the cases explored so far, with the absence of any kind of express request or 
permission by any party to the conflict, let alone the recognized government of 
Cyprus. Thus, in contrast to the cases examined, the Turkish intervention was not 
undertaken upon a request of the existing government or any other entity for that 
matter. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the intervention on 20 June 1974 and during 
the Geneva peace talks between Turkey and Greece following the intervention, 
Turkey was not condemned by any state as such in the Security Council.^^ In fact, 
some of the countries conveyed their understanding and criticized Greece for having
right of intervention to France in these countries, France did not rely on the terms o f these agreements 
in its interventions, but instead justified them on the express request of the respective governments.
For the events leading to the Turkish intervention and a detailed exploration of the legal status of 
the Republic o f Cyprus as foreseen by the founding treaties, see Sevin Toluner, Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve 
Milletlerarası Huhtk (The Cyprus Conflict and International Law) (Istanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 
1977).
Article IV o f the Treaty o f Guarantee reads as follows: ‘Tn the event of a breach o f the present 
treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the 
representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common 
or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right 
to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.” 
Treaty o f Guarantee, signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960, in Toluner, Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve 
Milletlerarası Hukuk, 523-525.
UN Yearbook (1974), 266.
^  For the views expressed during the Council debate on the matter between 19-20 July 1974, see UN 
Yearbook (1974), 263-266.
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provoked the crisis by involving in the coup staged by Nicos Sampson in violation of 
the founding treaties of C yprusH ow ever, the second Turkish operation, which was 
carried out on 14 August 1974, was generally disapproved. The Security Council 
resolutions adopted after each operation reflect the change in the attitude. While the 
first resolution adopted on the day of the first operation, demanded “an immediate 
end to foreign military intervention” in breach of the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of Cyprus,^^ the resolution passed following the second Turkish 
operation recorded its “formal disapproval of the unilateral military actions 
undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus,” and considered the situation as one 
constituting “a serious threat to peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region.”^^  The General Assembly resolution on the matter was along the same lines 
and revealed a general disapproval of the action by calling upon “all states to respect 
the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity” of the Republic of Cyprus and 
“refrain from all acts of interventions directed against it.”^^  Although by the same 
resolution the Assembly also urged the “withdrawal of all foreign armed forces” and 
“the cessation of all foreign interference” in the affairs of Republic of Cyprus, like 
the Council resolution, it did not condemn the Turkey by name.
One significant question that arises out of the Turkish intervention is whether 
contractual agreements that allow for the use of force are lawful. In classical 
international law, it was recognized that a treaty could confer a state a right of
^  Among those countries were the United States and the Soviet Union. UN Yearbook (1974), 266.
^  SC Res. 353,20 July 1974, adopted by 15 to 0.
SC Res. 360,16 August 1974, adopted by 11 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions (Byelorussian SSR, Iraq 
and the USSR). China did not participate in the voting.
“  GA Res. 3212 (XXIX), 1 November 1974.
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intervention by force on the territory of another state.^ ^ However, since the principle 
of the prohibition of the use of force is admitted to be a jus cogens norm, some 
scholars argue that the treaties providing the use of force in contravention to this 
peremptory norm including the treaties, which guarantee the status of a particular 
state or its form of government, are void.^ ^ Nonetheless, the opposing arguments to 
the Turkish intervention in Cyprus generally focused on the rule of non-intervention 
in the internal affairs and largely disregarded the discussion of whether Turkey could 
appeal to the Treaty of Guarantee as a justification.^^ Insofar as the Turkish 
intervention represents the only example of military intervention that is justified as 
pursuant to a prior treaty but against the will of the entity recognized as the 
legitimate government, and to the extent that it was essentially criticized in the UN 
organs as a violation of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs in 
general rather than on the basis of the invalidity of its claims arising out of the treaty
Hersch Lauterpacht (ed.), L· Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, VoL I -  Peace (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), 307. Among the examples of such treaties are 1863 Treaty of London 
between Great Britain, France and Russia, 1903 Treaty of Havana between the United States and 
Cuba, Treaty o f 1903 between the United States and Panama, 1936 Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation between the United States and Panama and 1954 Treaty between Egypt and the United 
Kingdom regarding the Suez Canal. For the interventions undertaken on the basis of these treaties, see 
Brownlie, International Law, 318-320.
Brownlie, International Law, 320.
^  The view that the Treaty of Guarantee is void by its very nature was put forward by the Greek 
Cypriots and Greece after the warning flights o f the Turkish military jets in the airspace of Cyprus on 
25 December 1963, on 27 December 1963 during the consideration of the matter in the Security 
Council; and has been argued since then. For a detailed legal analysis of the validity of the argument, 
see Toluner, Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Milletlerarası Hukuk, 135-139, It should be noted that the United 
States brought up a similar argument regarding the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness 
and Cooperation between the USSR and Afghanistan by stating that if the treaty in question lent 
support for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, then “it would be void under contemporary 
principles of international law, since it would conflict with what the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
the Treaties describes as a ‘peremptory norm of general international law” (Article 53), namely, that 
contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter.” The 1979 Memorandum of the Legal Adviser o f the US 
Department of State, quoted in Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, 142. However, it is 
also noteworthy that against the Greek Cypriot and the Greek arguments to the same effect in the 
Security Council on 18 February 1964, the US stressed that the Council could not abrogate, nullify or 
modify, either in fact or effect, the Treaty of Guarantee or any international treaty. UN Yearbook 
(1964), 153.
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of guarantee in concern, it is not possible to reach a conclusive assessment regarding 
the UN’s judgment of the validity of such treaties ipso jure.
Certain conclusions regarding the United Nations’ judgment of the element of
‘consent’ as a justification for military interventions can be put forward from the
above analysis of the cases. First, it can be safely argued that the UN admits the right
of states to consent to the use of foreign armed force within their territory. This is
evident both in the discussions of specific cases and in the UN resolutions. During
the Council and Assembly debates, none of the countries, including the opposing
ones to the intervention in question, disputed the right itself. Similarly, none of the
UN resolutions adopted in relation to the interventions considered here challenged
the admissibility of the right of a state to request assistance. On the other hand, a
derivative assessment is that the UN considers ‘consent’ as a valid justification for
the use of force. In this respect, it can be said that the UN response has been
consistent with the rule regarding ‘consent’ in general international law, that is
military assistance rendered by one state to another at the latter’s request is lawful.
Secondly, regarding the question of whether the authority delivering the request is
legally entitled to do so, it appears that the United Nations has not judged the
legitimacy of the government strictly in terms of its exercise of real power over the
totality of the territory in question. Thus, as long as the entity issuing the invitation
was the established government regardless of its nature, its effective power and its
association with any of the parties in the internal conflict, the UN generally did not
question the validity of consent. In contrast, in cases where the constitutional
authority of the inviting entity was disputed, the UN approach was highly critical, as
in the cases of the Dominican Republic and Grenada. Thirdly, the UN response was
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one of strong condenmation with emphasis on the right of self-determination only 
when there existed serious doubts about the character of the consent, i.e. whether it 
was freely and genuinely given, as in the cases of Panama, Hungaty, Czechoslovakia 
and Afghanistan. Finally, the UN response does not lend to a definitive conclusion 
regarding the permissibility of military intervention based on treaty of guarantees and 
against the will of the state, for it has not been raised as an issue of objection in its 
resolutions concerning the only relevant example, i.e. the Turkish intervention in 
Cyprus.
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PART in
OTHER FREQUENTLY RAISED JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION
States have also invoked justifications for military intravention in internal affairs 
other than the exceptions contained in the rule of non-intervention. These are 
generally assistance to peoples in their struggle for self-determination, protection of 
nationals abroad and prevention of violations of human rights. The following 
chapters examine the admissibility and scope of these justifications.
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CHAPTER I:
SELF DETERMINATION AND PROTECTION OF NATIONALS
This chapter will examine the admissibility of the first two of the above-mentioned 
additional state justifications, namely assisting self-determination and protection of 
nationals abroad, by analyzing the cases where they were invoked as legal grounds 
for military intervention and the UN reactions to them. For the purpose of exploring 
the UN’s approach to the permissibility of these justifications, the chapter will first 
attempt to discern their status within the domain of general international law and in 
relation to the UN Charter and other UN documents, such as declaratory General 
Assembly resolutions. In this framework, it will then look at the relevant state 
practice and assess UN responses to individual cases.
1.1. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS TO ASSIST SELF-DETERMINATION
The principle of self-determination may become pertinent to military intervention in 
internal affairs mainly in two ways: when a foreign power provides military 
assistance to a government, which does not represent the will of indigenous people,
or alternatively, when a foreign power provides military assistance to peoples
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entitled to self-determination. The former situation concerns ‘internal’ self- 
determination, and was indirectly examined within the context of the question of 
‘consent’ of the target state in Chapter II of Part n. In this respect, it was observed 
that the UN reaction has been overwhelmingly negative, when there exists a strong 
belief that the government in question was unpopular or imposed by the intervening 
foreign power. ^ The following overview attempts to analyze the other side of the 
coin, namely justification of military intervention on the basis of assistance to 
peoples in their struggle for ‘external’ self-determination.
1. 1. 1. The Rig^t of Self-Determination Under the UN Charter and in the 
General Assembly Resolutions
1 .1 .1 .1 . The Use of Force by the Oppressive State
Several international documents defined self-determination as a right belonging to 
every people and articulated its exercise as the duty of every state vis-a-vis peoples 
and international community to ensure it.^ In practice, this description implies that 
when a people engages in a struggle for self-detennination, the state concerned does
 ^ See for example, UN reactions to the Soviet interventions in Afghanistan, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia in Chapter II of Part II.
 ^ See for example, GA Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting o f Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, 14 December 1960, paras. 4 and 5; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 16 December 1966, Articles 1(2) and 1(3); International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, Article 1; GA Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on 
Principles o f International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, 
principle (e), 24 October 1970; Helsinki Final Act, 1 August 1975. For a concise discussion o f the 
historical background and evolution o f the right o f self-determination, see Richard A. Falk, ‘The 
Right of Self-Detemination Under International Law: The Coherence o f Doctrine Versus the 
Incoherence of Experience” in Wofgang Danspeckgruber and Arthur Watts (eds.), Self-Determination 
and Self-Administration: A Sourcebook (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1997), 50-55; 
James C. Hsiung, Anarchy and Order: The Interplay o f Politics and Law in International Relations 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1997), 130-132.
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not have a right to impede the process, in any way including employing force? hi 
this context, it has to be recalled that the general ban on the use of force by states “in 
their international relations” laid down in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter does not 
extent to the use of force employed by any given state to suppress a riot, for und^ 
general international law, civil wars are in principle internal matters outside the 
confines of international law? However, with the growing recognition of the rule of 
self-determination since the 1950s, it has come to be accepted that, “the relations 
between a colonial power and the colonial people have no longer been regarded as 
internal or municipal, but are seen as coming within the purview of international 
relations proper.”  ^ As a result, some scholars argue that the use of force by an 
oppressive power falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 2(4)? In addition, 
such instances of forcible action can also be characterized as military force used in a 
“manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”,^  namely “self- 
determination of peoples” as laid down in Article 1(2). In this respect, the General 
Assembly Declaration on the Granting o f Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples of 1960 states that;
“All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed
against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them *
 ^Antonio Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1993), 103; Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, tg Çatışmaların Çözümü ve Uhtslararasi Örgütler 
(The Resolution o f Internal Conflicts and the International Organizations) (Istanbul: Boğaziçi 
Üniversitesi, 1981), 155; and Michael Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 257.
* For the details o f international law o f civil war, see the section ‘The Frame of International 
Relations” in Chapter II o f Part I.
* Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination o f  Peoples, A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 196. See also, Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: Grotius 
Ihiblications Limited, 1991), 701; and Karaosmanoğlu, İç Çatışmaların Çözümü ve Uluslararası 
Örgütler. 153.
® See for example, Cassese, Self-Determination o f Peoples, 196.
’ Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
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to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete 
independence.”*
In a similar vein, the Declaration on Principles o f International Law affirms that
states are under a duty not to suppress revolutions for self-determination, freedom
and independence, and the use of force as such is a breach of international law:
“Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action 
which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination and freedom 
and independence.”^
Further, this clause is somewhat strengthened by a provision in tiie Declaration’s 
section on non-intervention:
“The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity 
constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of the 
principle of non-intervention.”'®
Finally, paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility o f Intervention in the 
Domestic Affairs o f States also underlines that “all states shall respect the tight of 
self-determination of peoples to be freely exercised without any foreign pressure.”"
1.1. 1.2. The Use of Force by the Oppressed People
Article 2(4) does not extend to the use of force by the peoples or liberation 
movements for the realization of self-determination, since the prohibition laid down 
in Article 2(4) applies only to the states. During 1950s and 1960s, a number of 
developing countries together with the socialist states put forward the argument that 
resort to armed force by dependent peoples in their liberation movements from *
* GA Res. 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960. The Declaration passed by 89 affumative votes to 0 with 9 
abstentions, which comprised colonial powers such as South Africa, Australia, Belgium, France, 
Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, the United States and the Dominican Republic.
® GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
'“/¿id.
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colonial powers constituted a form of self-defense against armed aggression, and as
such, was authorized by Article 51 of the UN Charter. For example, during the
sessions of the UN Special Committee on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 1964, while
Czechoslovakia proposed to modify the Charter’s prohibition of the threat or use of
force in international relations by incorporating “self-defense of nations against
colonial domination in exercise of the right of self-determination” to the exceptions
of that prohibition,*^ Yugoslavia, India and Ghana proposed the idea that:
“The prohibition of the use of force shall not affect ... the 
right of peoples to self-defense against colonial domination in 
the exercise of their right to self-determination.”*^
However, this political proposition did not find support from the majority of the
member states of the United Nations, particularly from the Western states and a
number of Latin American states.*^ Further proposals to the effect that the exercise
of self-determination be regarded as part of the inherent right of self-defense and
thus entailed a right to seek assistance from other states were submitted to the
Conmhttee during 1966 and 1967.*  ^Opponents argued that “the assertion of a right
of self-defense in the context of a principle of equal rights and self-determination”
could provide a ground “for the intervention of a state in the affairs of another” and
would contravene the duty of non-intervention in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state. In addition, it was asserted that under the Charter
" GARes. 2131 (XX), 21 December 1965.
Stephen M. Schwebel, “Wars o f Liberation as Fought in the UN Organs” in John Norton Moore 
(ed.). Law and Civil War in the M odem World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1974), 446-457.
Report o f the Special Committee on Principles o f International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States, UN. Doc. A/5746 (1964), 20.
Ibid., 23.
Ibid., 42-45.
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provisions, the right of self-defense was only accorded to sovereign states, not to 
peoples, and broad interpretations of the concept would serve to disturb international 
peace. As a result, neither the Declaration on Principles o f International Law nor 
the Definition o f Aggression defined colonialism as ‘aggression’ and placed the right 
to self-determination within the framework of self-defense.^ ®
Despite the fact that the UN Charter neither confirms nor bans the right of rebellion 
by dependent peoples or by liberation movements for the attainment of self- 
determination, the view that grew over the years, has come to allow resort to force 
by such movements on the condition that self-determination is forcibly denied by 
armed forces or coercive measures by the oppressive power .This  standpoint has 
become evident in various General Assembly resolutions adopted particularly in the 
1970s, affirming the legitimacy of the struggles of the liberation movements from 
colonial domination and alien subjugation, “by all available means including armed 
struggle.”^^  Although this should not be taken as a legal right proper granted to
See for example. Reports o f the Special Committee on Principles o f International Law, UN. 
Documents A/6230 (1966) and A/6799 (1967).
Ibid
Article 3 of the Definition o f Aggression, which lists the acts that qualify as ‘aggression,’ do not 
refer to ‘colonialism’ as one constituting ‘aggression.’ However, Article 4 lays down that the acts 
enumerated in Article 3 “are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts 
constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter.” In this sense, the Security Council enjoys 
wide discretion under Article 39 of the Charter in determining any instance o f ‘colonialism’ as an act 
of aggression. However, the Security Council has not taken a decision to this effect thus far. See 
Karaosmanoğlu, İç Çatışmaların Çözümü ve Uluslararası Örgfttier, 152.
Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law, 155.
^ See for example, GA Resols. 3103 (XXVm), Basic Principles o f the Legal Status o f the 
Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, 12 December 
1973; 31/91, Non-Interference in the Internal Affairs o f States, 14 December 1976; 31/92, 
Implementation o f the Declaration on the Strengthening o f International Security, 14 December 1976; 
32/42, Implementation o f the Declaration o f the Granting o f Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, 1 December 1977; 32/154, Implementation o f the Declaration on the Strengthening o f 
International Security, 19 December 1977; 32/14, Implementation o f the Universal Realization o f the 
Right o f Peoples to Self-Determination and o f the Speedy Granting o f Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples fo r the Effective Guarantee and Observance o f Human Rights, 7 November
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liberation movements, it can be said that a license to use force is conferred on them 
by the international community.^^ Both the Declaration on Principles o f 
International Law and the Definition o f Aggression reflect this formulation.^^ For 
instance, Definition o f Aggression reaffirms the right of self-determination of 
peoples forcibly deprived of that right “under colonial and racist regimes or other 
forms of alien domination,” and “the right of these peoples to struggle to that end.”^
In this context, the question arises as to who is entitled to the right of self- 
determination. The Assembly resolutions and declarations confer the right of self- 
determination upon the peoples of non-self-goveming territories, trust territories and 
mandated territories, but remain reluctant to acknowledge the right of self- 
determination in non-colonial situations. For example, while paragraph 2 of 
Declaration on the Granting o f Independence states that “all peoples have the right 
of self-determination,” paragraph 6 deems attempts to “partial or total disruption of 
the national unity or the territorial integrity of a country” as “incompatible with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter.”^  Similarly, the Declaration on Principles o f 
International Law affirms that the principle of self-determination does not authorize 
“any action which would dismember” independent states “conducting themselves 
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... and thus 
possessed of a government representing the whole people ... without distinction as to
1977; 39/50, Question o f Namibia, 12 December 1984; 39/72, Policies o f Apartheid o f the 
Government o f South Africa, 13 December 1984.
Cassese, Self-Determination o f Peoples, 198.
^  GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970; GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), Definition o f Aggression, 14 
December 1974.
“  GA Res. 3314 (XXDQ, Article 7 ,14  December 1974.
^  GARes. 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.
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race, creed or colour.”^  Although this may seem to imply that secessionist action is 
allowed when the government does not represent the whole people, the UN 
resolutions on self-determination do not extend the right of self-determination to 
‘nations’ or ‘minorities’ within an established state, but rather confine the right to the 
peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination.^
1 .1 .1 .3 . The Use of Force by Third States in Support of Self-Determination
A final issue, which is the most relevant to the purposes of the present study, is 
whether third states are entitled to take any action against a state that forcibly denies 
the right of self-determination. More precisely, the question is whether and under 
what circumstances the implementation of the principle of self-determination can be 
invoked to justify a direct military intervention. In this respect, the general view 
seems to accept that while third states are permitted to give military equipment and 
financial or technical assistance to liberation movements, they are not allowed to 
send armed troops in support of such movements.^^ In fact, a number of the General 
Assembly resolutions have called on states to give all forms of moral and material 
assistance to peoples struggling to attain self-determination.^* However, the staunch
“  GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
“  Richard Falk, “Intervention and National Liberation” in Hedley Bull (ed.). Intervention in World 
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 129.
^  Cassese, Self-Determination o f Peoples, 199; Shaw, International Law, 702. It should be noted that 
Judge Schwebel has taken a more restrictive view in his dissenting opinion in Nicaragua case. He 
maintained that “it is lawful for a foreign State or movement to give to a people struggling for self- 
determination moral, political and humanitarian assistance; but it is not lawful for a foreign State or a 
movement to intervene in that struggle with force or to provide arms, supplies or other logistical 
support in the prosecution of armed rebellion.” ICJ Reports (1986), Dissenting Opinion o f Judge 
Schwebel, para. 180.
^ See for example, GA Resols. 2105(XX), Implementation o f the Declaration on the Granting o f 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 20 December 1965; 2734 (XXV), Declaration on 
the Strengthening o f International Security, 16 December 1970; 31/29, Information From Non-Self 
Governing Territories Transmitted Under Article 73E o f the Charter o f the United Nations, 29
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opposition of Western states to “material assistance,which could include weapons
among others, eventually led to the formulation that recognized the right of peoples
struggling against the colonial rule to receive ‘support’ from other states. The
Declaration on Principles o f International Law mirrors this uneasy compromise
regarding the position of the third states vis-a-vis the liberation movements:
“In their action against, and resistance to, such forcible action 
[by a State, seeking to deprive a people of its right to self- 
determination] in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self- 
determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and receive 
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter.” ®^
As such, the language of the Declaration does not specify ‘armed’ support.
Moreover, it underlines that the support permitted is to be “in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter.” On the other hand, the Declaration also
includes a clause, which reflects the priority attached to territorial integrity of states:
“Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial 
or total disruption of the national unity and territorial 
integrity of any other State or country
Hence, it appears that the Declaration distinguishes liberation movements in the 
sense of decolonization from secessionist movements in non-colonial states. While 
the Declaration allows third state support to the former, it rules it out to the latter.
Similarly, the Definition o f Aggression reaffirms the right of peoples, “particularly 
peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination,” to
November 1976; 31/33, Adverse Consequences For the Enjoyment o f Human Rights o f Political, 
Military, Economic and Other Forms of Assistance Given to Colonial and Racist Regimes in Southern 
Africa, 30 November 1976; 32/10, Decade For Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, 
1 November 1977; and 32/154, Implementation o f the Declaration on the Strengthening o f 
International Security, 19 December 1977.
For example, GA Res. 2105 (XX) passed by 74 votes to 6 with 27 abstentions. The Western states 
either voted against or abstained. See UN Yearbook (1965), 554.
^  GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
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self-determination, independence and freedom, and to seek and receive support for
t
these ends. lik e  the Declaration on Principles o f International Law, however, the 
Definition o f Aggression does not spell out the nature of the support. In addition, 
both the Declaration on Principles o f International Law and Article 6 of the 
Definition o f Aggression underscore that none of the rules laid down in these 
documents “shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing” the scope of 
the Charter’s provisions “concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.” 
Hence, while both resolutions recognize a right of revolution, and in effect legitimate 
“support for anti-colonial, anti-racist, anti-hegemonic action” as an exception to the 
rule of non-intervention,^^ the support which revolutionaries may seek and receive is 
limited by the terms of the resolutions as well as purposes of the Charter.^^ In this 
sense, the ‘support’ in question should not extend to include the use of force, which 
could possibly prolong the conflict to a degree that would endanger international
peace and security.34
The reluctance to endorse ‘armed’ support can also be inferred from the debates
before the voting of the Declaration on Principles o f International Law. In voting for
the resolution, the United States representative, for example, indicated his agreement
with the British representative that the text cannot “be regarded as affording legal
sanction for any and every course of action which might be taken in the
circumstances contemplated.” He further stated that:
“We agree, as the United Kingdom said, that States are not 
entitled ‘under the Charter, to intervene by giving military
GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
Falk, “Intervention and National Liberation,” 130.
Schwebel, “Wars of U beation as Fought in the UN Organs,” 456.
^  Kataosmanoğlu, iç  Çatışmaların Çözümü ve Uluslararası Ö r f le r , 156.
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support or armed assistance in Non-Self-Goveming 
Territories or elsewhere. The support which ... States were 
entitled to give peoples deprived of their right to self- 
determination was ... limited to such support as was in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter 
and was therefore controlled by the overriding duty to 
maintain international peace and security.’ hi short, the 
Declaration [on Friendly Relations] does not constitute a 
license for gun-running.”"
On the other hand, apart from the language of the Declaration on Principles o f 
International Law which does not specify the kind of aid a people may receive in its 
struggle for self-determination, one other difficulty related to the military assistance 
to peoples entitled to the right of self-determination arises from the complexity of 
reconciling it with the general rule against providing help to the insurgents in civil 
war. In this respect, one prominent scholar argues that insofar as breaches of other 
rules of international law, for example human rights violations, does not justify aid 
given to insurgents, there is no logical rationale for “treating violations of the right of 
self-determination differently from other breaches of international law.”^^  As a 
result, although the UN documents have granted the right to seek and receive support 
to the peoples entitled to self-determination, to the extent that there exists no explicit 
reference to a right to ask for foreign military aid, it can be said that international law 
does not recognize a general right to use force for the purpose of assisting peoples to
achieve self-determination.37
Statement by the US Alternate Representative in the Legal Committee o f the General Assembly, 24 
September 1970, Press Release USUN-122 (1970), 7.
^  Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law, 258. 
lancdi. Foreign Armed Intervention, 107.
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1 .1 .2 . State Practice and UN Responses to Military Interventions to Assist Self- 
Determination
Three cases of military interventions warrant close examination where the principle 
of self-determination played a significant role: the Indian intervention in Goa, 
Daman and Diu (1961), the Indian intervention in East Pakistan (1971) and the 
Indonesian intervention in East Timor (1975).^ *
When in December 1961 Indian forces attacked the Portuguese forces in what 
Portugal termed Portuguese territories,^^ India argued that Goa, Daman, Diu were by 
nature Indian and that India was responding to colonialism and exercising its right to 
self-defense.^ In the Security Council, the Indian representative described these 
territories as “inalienable part of India unlawfully occupied by Portugal.” *^ The 
Council’s reaction was largely against Indian line of argument, mainly on the basis 
of the illegal use of force.^ ^ The United States representative maintained that the case 
was not about colonialism, but rather about a violation of one of the basic principles 
of the Charter, as embodied in Article 2(4).^^ Other states including the United
The Falklands conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina, which the UK argued to 
involve a right to self-determination, is not a case considered in this study, for it was an ‘‘international 
conflicf’ in conventional terms, whereby two sovereign states fought with regular armies. Similarly, 
in various statements President Reagan justified the US aid to contras in Nicaragua as assistance to 
people who were demanding the right to detam ine their own govertunenL However, insofar as this 
argument was not part of the official legal justification, the US action in Nicaragua is not considered 
within this context
^  For detailed account o f events, see “E*ro-invasion Developments. - Indian and Portuguese 
Allegations and Counter-allegations. - Mr. Nehru’s Statements. - U Thant's Appeal for Indo- 
Portuguese Negotiations -  Replies by Dr. Salazar and Mr. Nehru” and “The Invasion of Goa,” 
Keesing’s Record o f World Events 8 (March 1962), http://www.keesings.com.
UN Yearbook (1961), 130.
“Security Council Meeting on Goa Crisis - Mr. Stevenson’s Criticism of Indian Action. - Soviet 
Veto of Western Resolution,” Keesing*s 8 (March 1962).
For reactions of other states, see “Reactions in Other Countries,” Keesing's 8 (March 1962).
UN Yearbook (1961), 130. See also, “Security Council Meeting on Goa Crisis - Mr. Stevenson’s 
Criticism o f Indian Action. - Soviet Veto o f Western Resolution,” Keesing*s 8 (March 1962).
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Kingdom, Turkey, France, Ecuador, China and Chile held that force was an illegal 
means to resolve territorial disputes.'^ Joining the United States, they called for an 
immediate cease-fire and resumption of negotiations. On the other hand, recalling the 
General Assembly Resolution 1542 (XV) of 1960 on the Non-Self-Governing 
Territories^^ the Soviet Union, Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic 
contended that Portugal possessed no sovereign right over the non-self-goveming- 
territories in Asia, and thus opposed the idea that there was an act of aggression 
committed by India. The Soviet representative further stated that Portuguese refusal 
to fulfill the terms of the General Assembly’s Declaration on the Granting o f 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples^ had generated a threat to 
international peace and security in many parts of the world, including Goa. These 
states agreed that the issue involved a colonial question. More specifically, the issue 
according to them, was the liberation of colonial dependence of peoples and 
territories which constitutes integral part of India.'^  ^ Two draft resolutions, each of 
which was presented by the supporters of the respective arguments, were voted.'*® 
Neither of them was adopted. But the majority of the Security Council voted in favor 
of the resolution introduced by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, calling for a cease-fire, withdrawal of Indian forces from Goa and settlement 
of the dispute by peaceful means.'*’ By this resolution, recalling Article 1 of the 
Charter, which “specifies as one of the purposes of the United Nations the
^  “Security Council Meeting on Goa Crisis - Mr. Stevenson’s Criticism of Indian Action. - Soviet 
Veto of Western Resolution,” Keesing’s 8 (March 1962).
GARes. 1542(XV), 15 December 1960.
GA Res. 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.
UN Yearbook (1961), 131. See also, “Security Council Meeting on Goa Crisis - Mr. Stevenson’s 
Criticism of Indian Action. - Soviet Veto o f Western Resolution,” Keesing’s 8 (March 1962).
^  Draft resolution by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, UN Doc. S/5033 
(1961) and draft resolution by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic, UN Doc. S/5032(1961).
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development of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples,” the Council would have deplored the 
bidian use of force in Goa, Daman and Diu. Nonetheless, during consideration of the 
Portuguese colonialism, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on 19 December 
1961 that condemned “the continuing non-compliance of the Government of 
Portugal with its obligations under Chapter XI of the Chartef ’ and “with the terms of
General Assembly Resolution 1542(XV).»50
hi December 1971, besides justifying its intervention as responding to an earlier 
Pakistani attack and reacting against the massive inflow of the refugees, India 
defended it on the basis of assistance to the people of Bangladesh to achieve 
freedom.^ ^ Speaking at the Security Council, the Indian foreign minister claimed that 
the Indian use of force was justified to prevent the Pakistani violations of human 
rights and promote self-determination. In the Security Council, along with Pakistan 
itself, the countries that openly condemned the dismemberment of Pakistan and the 
foundation of Bangladesh were the United States, China, Somalia, Tunisia and Saudi 
Arabia. The representatives of these countries expressly argued that military 
intervention for promoting self-determination was not permissible. On the other 
hand, whilst not openly supporting the Indian intervention, other countries, especially 
the USSR, Poland, Ceylon, Syria, Argentina, Turkey, held that any solution of the
The resolution received 7 votes in favor (the four sponsors, Chile, Ecuador and Nationalist China) 
and 4 against (Ceylon, Liberia, United Arab Republic and the USSR).
“  GA Res. 1699(XVI), 19 December 1961, adopted by 90 votes in favor to 3 against (Portugal, South 
Africa, Spain), with 2 abstentions (Bolivia, France). Chapter XI o f the Charter concerns Declaration 
Regarding Non-Self-Govraning Territories.
See statements by the Permanent Representative o f India at the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. 
A/PV.2003 (1971) and by the Indian Foreign Minister at the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.1611 
(1971).
“  UN Doc. S/PV.1608 (1971), 141.
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issue must take the will of the Eastem-Pakistani people into consideration. This 
stance was implicitly endorsed by the United Kingdom and France as well.^ ·* 
However, initially having failed to agree on a position regarding the issue, the 
Security Council referred the matter to the General Assembly, which adopted a 
resolution that portrayed the hostilities between India and Pakistan as “an immediate 
threat to international peace and security,” and called for a cease-fire and withdrawal 
of aU armed forces.^^ The socialist countries and India voted against the resolution, 
since the resolution did not recognize Bangladesh.^^ Upon the request of the United 
States, the Security Council held a second round of meetings on the situation in the 
subcontinent, which resulted in the adoption of a resolution that characterized the 
situation, like the General Assembly, as “a threat to international peace and security,” 
and demanded a cease-fire as well as withdrawal of all armed forces.^^
One other example of military intervention allegedly for facilitating self- 
determination is Indonesian intervention in East Timor in December 1975.^ ® The 
Indonesian government justified its intervention as a necessary action to restore the 
order, which was upset by the outbreak of armed conflict between two factions that 
started after the withdrawal of the Portuguese army, in order to enable the people to
”  UN Yearbook, 1971,155-156.
^  UN Yearbook, 1971,152.
“  GA Res. 2793 (XXVI), 7 December 1971.
^  The resolution was adopted by 104 to 11, with 10 abstentions. Negative votes were cast by Bhutan, 
Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, India, Mongolia, Poland, Ukranian 
SSR, USSR. Among those abstained were France and the United Kingdom, 
s c  Res. 307,21 December 1971.
For the internal situation in East Timor before the Indonesian intervention, see “Coup by UDT,” 
Outbreak of Civil War - Proposal for Four-Nation Peace-Keeping Force,” “Consolidation o f Control 
by Fretilin - Indonesian Warnings to Fretilin,” “Further Indonesian Attacks on East Timor - Change in 
Australian Attitude to Indonesia - Rome Talks between Portugal and Indonesia,” “Declaration of 
Independence by Fretilin and of Merger with Indonesia by Pro-Indonesian Parties;” for the details of 
the Indonesian intervention, see “Indonesian Invasion o f East Timor - Severance of Diplomatic
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exercise its right of self-determination.^^ When East Timor was ultimately annexed, 
Indonesia argued that with the re-establishment of the order, the people of East 
Timor had freely chosen to unite with Indonesia in June 1976.^ ® At the UN, the 
annexation of East Timor by Indonesia was openly condemned. Both the General 
Assembly and the Security Council adopted resolutions deploring the Eidonesian 
armed intervention in East Timor and calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian armed 
forces.^' Thus, both organs rejected the Indonesian contention that Indonesian 
intervention was to facilitate the exercise of the right to self-determination in East 
Timor. On the contrary, these resolutions together with the subsequent resolutions 
adopted in the following year^  ^expressly stressed that the withdrawal of Indonesian 
troops was demanded so as to enable the people of East Timor to exercise freely their 
right to self-determination and independence.
The negative reactions of the UN organs to the Indian intervention in East Pakistan 
and the Indonesian intervention in East Timor demonstrate that the third party 
military intervention to promote self-determination is not admitted as a lawful use of 
armed force. The UN reactions may in part be explained by the lack of a general 
agreement as to the people who are entitled to self-determination. Nonetheless, the 
response of the UN to the Indian military action in East Pakistan to “facilitate self- 
determination,” whereby many criticized the repressive Pakistani policies and 
stressed a solution that took into account the will of the Bengali people, suggests that
Relations by Portugal” and ‘Provisional Government Formed by Pro-Indonesian Forces,” Keesing*s 
22 (January 1976).
® UN Yearbook, 1975, 859, 861.
“  ‘Incorporation into Indonesia,” Keesing’s 22 (August 1976).
GA Res. 3485 (XXX), 12 December 1975, adopted by 72 to 10, with 43 abstentions; and SC Res. 
384,22 December 1975, adopted unanimously.
® s c  Res. 389,22 April 1976 and GA Res. 31/53,1 December 1976.
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the UN is reluctant to admit assistance to self-determination as an additional 
justification for military intervention, even in cases where the right of self- 
determination of the people in concern is not disputed generally. The UN reaction to 
these instances of military intervention illustrates that they were considered to be in 
violation of Article 2(4). On the other hand, the fact that the resultant Indian 
annexation of the Portuguese enclave Goa^  ^ was not referred to the General 
Assembly and did not draw reaction from the international society, arguably lends 
weight to the contention that “wars of liberation -viewed, at any rate, as liberation 
from Western colonialism— a^re treated by the international community as an 
exception from Charter prohibitions on the use of force.”^  Thus, while the practice 
of the UN Charter system helped crystallize a legal license for people to take on 
armed struggle against oppressive states forcibly denying self-determination, it did 
not lend support to the formation of a legal right for third states to coercively 
intervene on behalf of those peoples.
1. 2. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
NATIONALS
In many of the cases of military intervention, intervening states put forward the need 
to protect their nationals as a justification for their armed intervention. In the pre- 
Charter period, the right of a state to take military action to protect its nationals
For the developments after the Indian action, see ‘Tost-invasion Developments. -  Goa joins Indian 
Union. - Statements by Air. Nehru and Mr. Krishna Menon. -  Mr. Rajagopalachari’s Criticism o f 
Military Action,” Keesing’s 8 (March 1962).
Schwebel, “Wars of Liberation as Fought in the UN Organs,” 447.
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suffering injuries within the territory of another state was recognized both in the
opinion of jurists and in the practice of states.®  ^ For example, in the arbitration
between Great Britain and Spain in 1925, known as Spanish Moroccan Claims,
Judge Huber, the rapporteur of the commission, stated:
“However, it cannot be denied that at a certain point the 
interest of a State in exercising protection over its nationals 
and their property can take precedence over territorial 
sovereignty, despite the absence of any conventional 
provisions. This right of intervention has been claimed by all 
states; only its limits are disputed.”^
In this respect, Oppenheim makes a similar assertion:
“The right of protection over citizens abroad, which a state 
holds, may cause an intervention by right to which the other 
party is legally bound to submit. And it matters not whether 
protection of the life, security, honor or property of a citizen 
abroad is concemed.”^^
He further states that the right of protection of citizens abroad is a “universally 
recognized customary rule of international law.”
It appears that under customary international law, in cases where diplomatic 
protection has either failed or insufficient to avoid an immediate danger to life or 
property of a state’s nationals in another state, the right to resort to force as a means 
of protection and redress is deemed permissible. However, since the action 
concerned here violates the sovereignty of the state intervened, it is argued that for 
such an action to take place, there must be no other available means of protection.
^ Derek W. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law (New York: Fredraick A. Praeger, 1958), 87; 
Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States (London: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 289-296; Oscar Schächter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht, the 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), 126.
“  Anglo-Spanish Arbitrations (1925), quoted in Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law, 88.
Hersch Lauterpacht (ed.), L  Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I -  Peace (London:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), 309.
68 Ibid., 686.
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Thus, such an action is allowed to the extent that “other means of protection against 
some injury, actual or imminent, to the persons or property” are inadequate and 
insofar as the injury in question stemmed either from “the acts of the territorial state 
and its authorities or from the acts of individuals or groups of individuals which the
territorial state is unable, or unwilling, to prevent.»69
1 .2 .1 . The Question of Legality Under the UN Charter
Notwithstanding its established status within customary international law, protection 
of nationals does not appear in the UN Charter as an exception to the general 
prohibition of the use of force. As a result, although protecting the lives and property 
of citizens abroad has been among the frequently raised justifications for intervention 
in the internal affairs in the post-Charter period, scholars differ on the permissibility 
of intervention on such ground, hi this respect, opinions of the legal scholars change 
mainly in accordance with the different interpretations of the prohibition of force as 
laid down in Article 2(4) and of the exception of self-defense as stipulated in Article 
51.
1 .2 .1 .1 . The Restrictive Approach
The restrictive view of the Charter maintains that although intervention for protection 
of nationals was a pre-Charter customary mle, the UN Charter with its general
® Bowett, Self-Drfense in International Law, 88. For a similar view, see Robert Jennings and Arthur 
Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, Volume I (England: Longman, 1992), 442; and Funda 
Keskin, Uluslararası Hukukta Kuvvet Kullanma: Savaş, Karışma ve Birleşmiş M illetler (The Use o f 
Force in International Law: War, Intervention and the United Nations) (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birli^ 
Vakfi Yayınlan, 1998), 110.
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prohibition of the unilateral use of force, provides no room for the permissibility of 
intervention on the basis of such justification. According to the supporters of this 
view, the UN C harts cannot be taken to permit a right to use force for the protection 
of nationals without a prior Security Council authorization, for the main objective of 
the Charter “was to render unilateral use of force, even in self-defense, subject to 
[UN] control.”™ Thus, the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) is absolute in 
that it entirely prohibits any threat or use of force in state relations. The restrictive 
scholars posit that the only exception to the prohibition of force is self-defense, the 
exercise of which is limited by Article 51 to cases of armed attack to the wronged 
State.^  ^ Moreover, it is contended that such right was often subject to abuse by the 
major states in the pre-Charter period, as it was frequently raised to justify military 
interventions undertaken for Realpolitik purposes,^^ and thus recognizing the 
permissibility of such a right would provide states a legal pretext for abusive
intervention 73
™ Ian Brownlie’s work is exemplary o f the restrictive view. See Brownlie, International Law, 273. 
See also, H. Waldock (ed.), J. L. Brierly, The Law o f Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 413^32.
’’ For interpretation of Article 2(4) in absolute terms and of the exception o f self-defense in Article 51 
strictly confined to cases of armed attack, see generally, Hans Kelsen, Principles o f International la w  
(New York: Rinehart & Company, 1952), 58-62; Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and 
Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 139-145; Thomas Franck and Nigel 
Rodley, “After Bangladesh: The Law o f Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force,” American 
Journal o f International Law 67:2 (1973), 299-302 and Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to 
International Law, 219-224. For more specific arguments on the impermissibility o f intervention to 
protect nationals, see for example, Brownlie, International Law, 298-301; Ian Brownlie, 
‘Humanitarian Intervention” in Moore (ed.). Law and Civil War, 217,219; Anthony Clark Arend and 
Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use o f Force, Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm  (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 110; Michael Akehurst, ‘The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad,” 
International Relations 5:3 (1977).
72 Franck and Rodley, “After Bangladesh,” 284.
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1 .2 .1 .2 . The Coiinter-Restrictiye Approach
The counter-restrictive legal scholars argue that protection of citizens abroad is 
legally permissible and challenge the restrictive view mainly along three lines of 
arguments/'^ In the first place, there are those who consider the violation of rights of 
a state’s nationals as legally tantamount to violation of the rights of that state, which 
in turn may raise the right of self-defense7^ In this respect, it is argued that Article 
51 is not establishing the right of self-defense, but rather recognizing its pre-Charter 
existence.^ ® In scholarly writings, which adhere to this view, there is no exhaustive 
list of cases allowing a right to resort to force for protection of nationals, but rather 
there exists various assessments of the conditions and limitations under which the 
claim to the right of protection by force can be advanced. Adopting from the 
traditional conditions of self-defense, Waldock asserts that the conditions for the 
lawful exercise of the right comprise:
(1) an imminent threat of injury to the nationals;
(2) a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect them;
^ See generally, Tom J. Farer, ‘T^w and War” in Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk (eds.). The 
Future o f the International Legal Order Volume 3 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
In addition to these arguments in support for a legal right to protection of nationals, some scholars 
argue for the legality of such a right within the context of humanitarian intervention. Thomas and 
Thomas, for example, took up the matt«· in connection with an international standard o f justice. Ann 
Van Wyen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, The Law and Its Import in the Americas 
(Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956), 303-309. For a similar view, see also, John 
Norton Moore, ‘Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation o f Intervention,” in Moore (ed.). Law 
and Civil War, 25. In this study however, humanitarian intervention is distinguished from action 
carried out to protect nationals abroad, insofar as it is taken to comprise actions taken to protect non­
nationals.
Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law, 87.
Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro, and Anne Patricia Simons, Charter o f the United Nations: 
Commentary and Documents (New York: Coliunbia University Press, 1969), 344.
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(3) that the measures of protection should be strictly confined to the object of
protecting them against injury. 77
Thus, according to this view, protection of nationals abroad can be viewed as 
protection of the state, provided that the conditions of immediacy, necessity and 
proportionality are satisfied.
Secondly, others point out that since the action undertaken for the protection of 
nationals is limited in purpose and thus cannot be considered as breach of territorial 
integrity or the political independence of the intervened state, it would neither 
constitute a violation of Article 2(4) nor contradict the principles and purposes of the 
United Nations.^* In other words, insofar as such military action does not entail an 
extended military presence of the intervening state in the target state and does not 
result in a territorial loss of the victim state, it represents a limited kind of use of 
force, which lags behind the threshold of the use of force set by Article 2(4).
Finally, there are those scholars who claim that such a customary right has either 
continued to exist or been revived during the Charter period at times when the UN 
failed to respond effectively. One of the most ardent supporters of the former view is 
Bowett, who bases his argument on the intention of the framers of the UN system as 
derived from the travaux préparatoires, to preserve the customary right of self-
^  Sir Hxunphrey Waldock, ‘The Regulation of the Use o f Force by Individual States in International 
Law,” RCADl 81 (1952), 467, quoted in Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-D^ence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226. The same criteria are also reiterated by Bowett. 
See Derek W. Bowett, ‘The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defense” in Moore 
(ed.). Law and Civil War, 40.
™ Richard B. Lillich, “Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and A Plea For 
Constructive Alternatives” in Moore (ed.). Law and Civil War, 236-237.
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defense, and thus to maintain state’s right to protect its nationals.^ ® In addition,
Bowett contends that Article 51 is not intended to restrict the traditional right of
defense “so as to exclude action taken against an imminent danger but before ‘an
armed attack occurs’.”*® Moreover, the language of Article 2(4) according to Bowett,
is not “incompatible with the right to protect nationals” as well. Aside from these
provisions of the UN Charter, Bowett asserts that the practice of states in the post-
Charter period also suggests that the pre-Charter rule has survived.*^ In this
connection, other scholars state that the pre-Charter rule to protect nationals has been
revived in the post-1945 period. For example, Ullich argues that although drafters of
the UN system envisaged collective machinery, in the absence of effective UN
action, customary self-help measures may revive.*^ Consequently, by implication,
states may intervene to protect the lives of nationals. Similarly, Reisman also
maintains that the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) may be considered
absolute to the extent that the UN is able to act. According to him,
“A rational and contemporary interpretation of the Charter 
must conclude that Article 2(4) suppresses self-help insofar 
as the organization can assume the role of enforcer. When it 
cannot, self-help prerogatives revive.”*^
Reisman contends that to adhere to a strict interpretation of Article 2(4) “would be an 
invitation to lawbreakers who would anticipate a paralysis in the Security Council’s
™ Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law, 184-186.
^ Ib id ., 191.
Derek W. Bowett, “The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad” in Antonio Cassese 
(ed.). The Current Legal Regulation o f the Use o f Force (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1986), 40, quoted in 
Arend and Beck, International la w  and the Use o f Force, 107.
Bowett, “The Use o f Force,” in Cassese, The Current Legal Regulation, 41, quoted in Arend and 
Beck, International Law, 107.
“  See generally, Lillich, ‘TIumanitarian Intervention,” 229-251.
W. Michael Reisman, Nullity and Revision: The Review and Enforcement o f International 
Judgments and Awards (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 848-849, quoted in Lillich, 
“Hiunanitarian Intervention,” 239.
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decision dynamics.”*^  Lastly, one other view asserts that although forceful 
intervention on behalf of die injured nationals abroad may constitute neither a 
violation of Article 2(4) nor an act of aggression under Article 39, it may give rise to 
a “threat to peace” under the latter article. As a result, although it may be assumed 
that such a right is legal, acts to that effect may be at times be “deemed
impermissible in any given case.»86
As such, the difference in opinions with regards to the use of force for protection of 
nationals abroad stems from the differences in interpretations of Article 51 as to 
whether the tight of self-defense is limited to armed attack or not, and of Article 2(4) 
as to the character of the ban of the use of force, whether it is qualified or absolute. 
Indeed, the debate on the legality of intervention to protect nationals is an on-going 
one. Notwithstanding, the fact that many states have resorted to force for protection 
of nationals in the post-Charter period have led most of the scholars to conclude that 
the gap between the restrictive views and the state practice seems to “call into 
question the existence of a rule prohibiting state intervention to protect nationals.”®’ *
W. Michael Reisman, “Sanctions and Enforcement” in Black and Falk (eds.). The Future o f the 
International Legal Order, 50.
** Rosalyn Higgins, The Development o f International Law Through The Political Organs o f the 
United Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 220.
^  Arend and Beck, International Law and the Use o f Force, 110. For the view that state practice 
supports such a right, see also, Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations, An Introduction to Public 
International Law (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), 160.
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1. 2. 2. State Practice and UN Réponses to Military Interventions to Protect 
Nationals Abroad
Mdeed states’ view illustrate that the protection of nationals is generally admitted as 
a legal ground for limited use of force. For example, during the Suez intervention in 
1956, the British government underlined that nothing in the UN Charter proscribed
Q Q
the right of states to use force to protect the nationals abroad. In the House of Lords 
debates following the intervention. Lord Chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, asserted that 
the right to protect nationals abroad was a logical corollary of the right to self- 
defense:
“Self-defense undoubtedly includes a situation in which the 
lives of a state’s nationals abroad are threatened and it is
q Q
necessary to intervene on that territory for their protection.” 
hi 1976, when Israeli forces landed at Entebbe airport in Uganda to liberate the 
Israeli passengers who had been taken hostage when the aircraft they were flying had 
been hijacked, Israel argued that the right of a state to protect its nationals was 
recognized by all international legal authorities. During the Council debates, quoting 
legal scholars such as Brierly and Bowett in support for such a right, Israel contended 
that the right of self-defense as enshrined in the Charter extended to protect nationals 
where there was necessity and im m e d iacy h i  support of the Israeli argument, the 
representative of the United States asserted that although Israeli action caused a 
temporary breach of the territorial integrity of Uganda, which would not normally be
Arend and Beck, International Law and the Use o f Force, 96. It has to be noted that UK relied less 
on the protection of nationals than the need to safeguard the Suez Canal and to restore peaceful 
conditions in the Middle East in the UN. See UN Yearbook (1956), 27.
^  (^oted in Tom Hiller, Sourcebook on Public International Law (London: Cavendish Publishing 
Limited, 1998), 609.
UN Doc. S/PV.1939 (1976) and UN Doc. S/PV.1941 (1976), reprinted in D. J. Harris, Cases and 
Materials on International Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), 909-910.
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permissible under the Charter, there existed a “well-established right to use force for 
the protection of one’s own nationals from an imminent threat of injury or death in a 
situation where the State in whose territory were located was either unwilling or 
unable to protect them.”^^  One other example of the use of force for the protection of 
nationals is the US rescue operation in 1980 for the American hostages held in the 
US Embassy in Tehran, during which the US emphasized that it was strictly a 
humanitarian mission.
The significance of these instances of the use of force lies in demonstrating the state 
practice with respect to the claim of protection of nationals. Nonetheless, for the 
purposes of the study, the cases relevant are those where the target states were tom 
by a civil war or characterized by a situation of anarchy i.e. absence of an effective 
official authority or by a degree of internal disturbance. These cases whereby 
protection of nationals was called upon to justify military intervention in internal 
affairs comprise the United States intervention in Lebanon (1958), the Belgian 
interventions in the Congo (1960), the United States and Belgian intervention again 
in the Congo (1964), the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic 
(1965), the French intervention in Chad (1978), the French-Belgian joint intervention 
in the Shaba region in Zaire (1978), the United States intervention in Grenada 
(1983), the United States intervention in Panama (1989) and the United States 
operation in Liberia (1990). It should be noted that in all these instances, except two 
cases (Congo in 1960 and Liberia in 1990), the justification of protection of nationals 
was raised along with other justifications.
UN Doc. S/PV.1941 (1976), 31-32; UN Yearbo^^^l976), 319.
In the case of the United States intervention in Lebanon, apart from the invitation by 
President Chamoun of Lebanon and that of collective self-defense to preserve 
Lebanese sovereignty and integrity, President Eisenhower claimed that the US action 
had also aimed to protect nationals.®^ The US intervention in Lebanon and the 
following UN reaction were examined in detail within the context of the former 
justifications explored in Part n. In fact, the discussions in the Security Council and 
the General Assembly focused mainly on the allegations of subversion and the 
permissibility of such action within the terms of Article 51. In regard to the 
protection of nationals, no direct objection was raised. Thus, to the extent that the US 
justification of self-defense was criticized as unfounded, it can be said that the US 
claim of protection of nationals was not admitted as well. However, it should be 
recalled that the representatives of China, France, the United Kingdom and Canada 
agreed that the US action contravened neither the UN Charter nor the established 
rules of international law. On the other hand, during the Assembly debate, a number 
of countries remarked that the protection of nationals was a pretext for intervention 
and a means through which stronger powers exert pressure against smaller ones.^  ^
The following General Assembly resolution on the matter however, made only a 
general reference to the rule of non-interference in internal affairs.^ '^
^  Statement by President Eisenhower, Department o f State Bulletin (1958), 181. The same 
justifications were also raised during the consideration of the issue at the Security Council. See UN 
Yearbook (1958), 40. On the other hand, som e scholars in the restrictive tradition opposed to the 
extension o f the terms of Article 51 to the protection of nationals in the Lebanon case. For example, 
questioning the US argument o f protection o f nationals, Wright contended that the US had to 
demonstrate that the immediate danger to American citizens in Lebanon constituted “an armed attack” 
upon the United States. Quincy Wright, “United States Intervention in the Lebanon,” American 
Journal o f International Law 53:1 (January 1959), 117.
See for example the statements of Poland and Ethiopia in the General Assembly in General 
Assembly, IUrd Emergency Special Session, 19 August 1958, para. 84; and 20 August 1958, para. 75 
respectively, quoted in Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994), 238.
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It was during the Belgian intervention in the Congo (1960) that the necessity of 
protection of nationals was most expressly invoked and repeatedly stressed as the 
sole aim of the intervention. Upon the outbreak of a mutiny in the ranks of the 
Congolese Force Publique in Leopoldville in the immediate aftermath of 
independence, granted on 30 June 1960, Belgium announced that it would dispatch 
further troops to the two bases, which it already had in the Congo and which it 
expected to retain under an unratified Treaty of Friendship that had been signed at 
the time of independence of the Congo, to ensure the safety of persons in 
Leopoldville.^^ There were conflicting statements from the Congolese government 
officials. While Mr. Bomboko, the Foreign Minister announced that the intervention 
of Belgian troops had taken place at his request, Mr. Lumumba (the Prime Minister 
and the Defense Minister) declared in a broadcast that any intervention by Belgium 
without the approval of the Congolese Government, and specifically of the Defense 
Minister (i.e. himself), would be a violation of the country's sovereignty and of the 
treaty with Belgium, and he protested against the Belgian action in sending 
reinforcements to the Congo.^ ® After the special session of the Belgian Chamber of 
Representatives on 11 July 1960, the Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. Eyskens affirmed 
that Belgian troops had been compelled to intervene in the Congo to save lives. He 
further maintained that Belgium fully recognized and respected Congolese
GA Res. 1237 (ES-m), 21 August 1958.
For the main events regarding the internal disturbance in the Congo leading to the Belgian 
intervention, see “Achievement o f Independence as Republic o f the Congo - Congolese Government 
formed by M. Lumumba. - M. Kasavubu Becomes Head of State,” ‘Troclamation of Congolese 
Independence. - King Baudouin’s Vidit to Leopoldville,” Keesing’s 6 (August 1960); “Incidents 
Before Outbreak of Mutiny,” “Outbreak of Mutiny. - Measures to Meet Mutineers' Demands -  First 
Belgian Military Actions,” “Developments Preceding First Security Council Meeting,” Keesing’s 6 
(September 1960). See also, Evan Luard, ‘The Civil War in Congo” in Evan Luard (ed.). The 
International Regulation o f Civil Wars (New York: New York University Press, 1972), 108-124; and 
Donald W. McNemar, ‘The Postindependence War in the Congo” in Richard A. Falk (ed.). The 
International Law o f Civil War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 244-302.
“Events of July 10,” Keesing’s 6 (September 1960).
209
independence, but had been faced by the duty, recognized by international law, of 
saving the lives of Belgian s u b j e c t s O n  12-13 July 1960, the President (Joseph 
Kasavubu) and the Prime Minister (Patrice Lumumba) of the Republic had 
telegraphed the Secretary-General to ask for the urgent dispatch of UN military 
assistance in view of the Belgian action of sending the troop reinforcements to the 
Congo. The telegram said that the Belgians had acted “in violation of the treaty of 
friendship” which laid down that Belgian troops “can only intervene at the express 
request of the Congolese Government,” no such request had been made, and the 
Belgian action therefore constituted “an act of aggression” against the Congo. It was 
also held that the real cause of most of the disorder lied in “colonialist machinations” 
of the Belgian government, which had led to the declaration of secession by the 
provincial authorities of Katanga (the richest province in the Congo).’® The telegram 
stressed that “the purpose of the aid requested is not to restore the internal situation 
of the Congo, but rather to protect the national territory against acts of aggression 
committed by Belgian metropolitan troops.””  The Security Council first met on 13 
July 1960, at the request of the Secretary-General, Dr. Hammarskjöld, under Article 
99 of the Charter, to discuss the Congo situation.*”  In the Security Council, the 
representative of Belgium maintained intervention had taken place only after the 
Congolese Government had been deprived of all means of maintaining order as a
^  “Events o f July 11,” Keesing’s 6 (September 1960).
Katanga’s independence was announced by Mr. Tshombe in Elisabethville on 11 July 1960. In his 
statement, Mr. Tshombe maintained that the Katanga Government was asking Belgium, “who has just 
given the Government the aid of her own troops to protect human lives,” to give technical, financial, 
and military assistance, and asked Belgium to help in re-establishing order and public security. Mr. 
Tshombe made a similar appeal to the United Kingdom to which the British government replied as 
“.. .in the circumstances of the case, it would not be possible for troops to be sent in at the request of 
an authority other than the lawfully constituted Central Government.” See “Events of July 11,” 
Keesing’s 6 (September 1960).
”  UN Doc. S/4382 (1960).
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result of the mutinies. The Belgian Govenunent, he declared, had decided to 
intervene only to save the lives of Europeans and others; their action had been 
limited in scope; there had been no interference in Congolese domestic affairs; its 
troops would be withdrawn as soon as the maintenance of order and safety of persons 
were restored. He also stressed that in Katanga, the Belgian troops had acted by 
agreement with the Provincial Government. The United States, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, France and Argentina supported the Belgian claim. For example, the 
Italian representative held that the Belgian troops had intervened only to keep order 
and they wished to remain only until UN help arrived. Thus, it should be considered 
as “a temporary security action.”'®^  The UK representative maintained that the 
Belgian troops in the Congo were carrying out a humanitarian task, for which Britain 
was grateful “and for which...the international community should be grateful.”*®^ 
Similarly, the French representative argued that Belgium action aimed only at saving 
the lives of her own nationals and of other countries’ nationals, who were threatened, 
and that “their mission of protecting lives and property” was in accordance “with a 
recognized principle of intematioiial law, namely intervention on humanitarian 
grounds.”*®^ However, the socialist and some of the non-aligned countries, most 
notably the Soviet Union, Poland and Tunisia, condemned the Belgian intervention 
as one of aggression.^ ®  ^ The Tunisian representative declared the arrival of the
Article 99 o f the Charter provides that: “The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the 
Security Council any matter uiiich in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace 
and security.” It has to be noted that this was the first time a Secretary-General invoked this article.
See ‘Tirst Security Cormcil Debate,” Keesing’s 6 (September 1960). The Belgian representative 
repeated the same arguments during the second meeting o f the Security Council on 20 July 1960. See 
UN Yearbook (1960), 54; and “Second Security Council Debate and Resolution,” Keesing’s 6 
(September 1960).
UN Doc. S/PV.873 (1960), 23-24.
UN Doc. S/PV.873 (1960), 25-26.
UN Doc. S/PV.873 (1960), 28. See also “First Security Council Debate,” Keesing’s 6 (September 
1960).
lOS UN Yearbook (I960), 53.
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Belgian troops as “an aggressive act that nothing can justify,” and which could in no 
way be excused by the dangers to the Belgian civilian residents.^°^ Likewise, the 
Soviet representative asserted that Belgium had planned “armed aggression” with the 
support of the US, the UK, France, and Western Germany, and demanded immediate 
UN action to “end the aggression.” Poland insisted that Belgium’s claim to protect 
human life was simply a pretext to further its own commercial interests.^ ®* The 
consequent Security Council Resolution called for withdrawal of Belgian troops 
from the Congo and authorized the Secretary-General “to take the necessary 
measures, in consultation with the Government of the Congo Republic, to provide 
the government with such military assistance as may be necessary.” °^^  However, 
while Western states supported the view that Belgium should withdraw only after the 
UN troops restore order, the Soviet Union and other non-aligned countries argued 
that the Belgian withdrawal should be unconditional.^ ^® The following Security 
Council resolutions repeatedly called upon Belgium to withdraw its forces and 
stressed that states should refrain from any action that would undermine the 
territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of Congo. The 
General Assembly considered the matter in its fourth emergency special session, 
which resulted in a resolution displaying full support of the earlier Security Council
UN Doc. S/PV.878 (1960), 5.
UN Doc. S/PV.873 (1960), 16-21. It has to be noted that a day before the Security Council 
meeting, the Soviet Union issued a statement dismissing the argument that lives and property of 
Europeans in the Congo were in need of protection. The Soviet note claimed that “similar hypocritical 
arguments were used in attempts to justify the armed intervention in the Lebanon.” For Soviet note, 
see “Events o f July 13,” 6 (September 1960).
UN Doc. S/PV.878 (1960), 18-19.
SC Res. 143, 14 July 1960. Adopted by 8 votes in favor to 0, with 3 abstentions (China, France and 
the United Kingdom). On the same day, M. Tshombe stated that in his communication to Dr. 
Hammarskjöld he had reiterated that Belgian forces had taken action at his Government's request, and 
had “protested energetically” against the Security Council’s call to Belgium to withdraw. See ‘'Events 
of July 14,” Keesing's 6 (September 1960).
UN Yearbook (1960), 53.
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resolutions on the m a t t e r / T h e  General Assembly took up a harder stance in its 
following resolutions, deploring the Belgian non-compliance with the Security 
Council resolutions, deeming the presence of Belgian forces as the central factor in 
the grave situation in the Congo which posed a threat to international peace and 
security, and calling upon Belgium to comply “fully and promptly with the will of
the Security Council and of the General Assembly” and withdraw its forces 113
Four years after the Belgian intervention in Congo, when the United States and 
Belgium sent forces upon the outbreak of a civil war again, both maintained that the 
reason for intervention was the humanitarian one of saving civilians, with the 
authorization of the lawful government of the Congo. The two countries notified 
the Council immediately after the operation started. The Democratic Republic of the 
Congo also informed the Council that it had authorized the rescue operation in view 
of the humanitarian objectives of the operation.N otw ithstanding, many countries, 
including most of the African countries condemned the operation. They contended 
that the military operations constituted an intervention to African affairs, a violation 
of the Charter and a threat to peace and security of the African continent. 
Likewise, the Soviet Union characterized the military operations in Stanleyville as a 
blatant act of interference in the internal affairs of the Congo and as a threat to the
See s c  Resols. 145, 22 July 1960 (adopted unanimously); 146 (France and Italy abstained), 9 
August 1960; and 161(France and the USSR abstained), 21 February 1961.
GA Res. 1474 (ES-IV), 20 September 1960. Adopted by 70 votes to 0, with 11 abstentions.
See GA Resols. 1599(XV), 15 April 1961 and 1600 (XV), 15 April 1961.
For the Belgian statement, see UN Doc. S/PV.1173 (1964), 3; for the US statement, see UN Doc. 
S/PV.1174 (1964), 13. For the details o f the American action in Congo, see Richard A. Falk, Legal 
Order in a Violent World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 324-335.
UN Yearbook (1964), 95.
The supports o f this view included Algeria, Burundi, the Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Gtiinea, Kenya, Mali, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania. 
UN Yearbook (1964), 96. See also, “Communist and Afiican Reactions to Stanleyville Operation,” 
Keesing’s 11 (February 1965).
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independence of both the Congo and other African countries.^A lso, in a statement 
handed to the Belgian and British Ambassadors and the US Charge d'Affaires in 
Moscow on 25 November 1964, the Soviet government alleged that the reason for 
this action was “not so much the presence of a certain number of foreigners in 
Stanleyville as the fact that the colonial Powers have realized the inability of their 
stooge Tshombe to cope with the situation in the country and have decided to give 
him open assistance in order to suppress the national liberation movement.” The 
Soviet government demanded “the immediate ending of the military intervention” 
and the “withdrawal of all foreign mercenaries” from the Congo. The supporting 
countries laid emphasis on mainly the humanitarian character of the operation. 
Upon the request of twenty-two countries, the Security Council met in December 
1964 and adopted a resolution, which requested all states to refrain from intervention 
in the domestic affairs of the Congo. Apart from this resolution, the language of 
which was confined to generic terms rather than a specific condemnation of the 
military action, the matter was not considered further. It is notable that the General 
Assembly neither considered the matter nor adopted any resolution.
The United States’ intervention in the Dominican Republic in April 1965 was also 
undertaken under the aegis of protection of nationals and other foreigners. President
UN Yearbook (1964), 95.
“Communist and Afirican Reactions to Stanleyville Operation,” Keesing’s 11 (February 1965).
Among the supporting countries were the United Kingdom, China, France, Brazil, Bolivia and 
Norway. African countries which did not oppose the action included the Ivory Coast, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo and Madagascar. See UN Yearbook (1964), 98; UN Doc. S/PV.1173 
(1964), 38; and “Communist and African Reactions to Stanleyville Operation,” Keesing’s 11 
(February 1965).
The twenty-two countries requesting the Council meeting were Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, 
Kampuchea, ¿ e  Central African Republic, the Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, the United Arab 
Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia. UN Yearbook (1964), 96.
SC Res. 199,30 November 1964. Adopted by 10 to 0, with 1 abstention (France).
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Johnson asserted that the US was informed by the “Dominican law authority 
enforcement and military officials” that they could no longer guarantee the safety of 
Americans and other foreign nationals and that the assistance of the US forces were 
required/^^ In further statements, President Johnson underlined that the United 
States’ objective in the Dominican Republic was “the protection of the United States 
nationals and their safe evacuation.” The US representative reiterated the same 
account during the consideration of the matter in the Security Council.*^ The US 
action was met with condemnation mainly from the Soviet Union, Cuba, Uruguay 
and Jordan. The opponents argued that the action was an act of aggression and 
intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state. The Soviet 
representative quoted from an official US State Department document in support of 
his allegation that the United States had undertaken armed intervention against other 
countries on 85 occasions between 1812 and 1932, and on every occasion, he said, 
the US had acted under cover of such false excuses as “the protection of American 
lives.”^^ Criticizing the US action, the French representative emphasized that, 
according to numerous precedents, an outside government that decided to evacuate 
its citizens from another country had the obligation to limit its operations in terms of 
‘objective,’ ‘duration,’ and ‘scale.’ However, the landing of US troops “on such a 
considerable scale,” he argued, would mean “a genuine armed intervention, the need
Statement by President Johnson reprinted in Department o f State Bulletin 52 (1965), 738. See also. 
Max Hilaire, International Law and the United States Military Intervention in the Western 
Hemisphere (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 64-66; Franck and Rodley, “After 
Bangladesh,” 287. In addition to the protection of nationals, the US extended its justifications to 
include restoring law and order upon invitation from the government of the Dominican Republic and 
prevention of a communist take-over and undertaking a regional peace-keeping on behalf o f the OAS.
Statement by President Johnson reprinted in Department o f State Bulletin 52 (1965), 743.
UN Yearbook (1965), 141.
“Security Council Debates,” Keesing’s 11 (July 1965).
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for which does not appear to exist”*^ Among the supporters were the United 
Kingdom and Bolivia. The British representative expressed his government’s full 
understanding of the US action to protect foreign nationals whose lives were in 
danger.*^  ^On the other hand, the Netherlands supported the action insofar as it was 
within the OAS (Organization of American States) framework, while Malaysia held 
somewhat a neutral position. The following Security Council resolutions did not 
go beyond calling for a cease-fire.^ ^® The General Assembly did not consider the 
matter.
The protection of nationals was also invoked in the 1978 French-Belgian joint 
intervention in Shaba region in Zaire, and in the French intervention in Chad in the 
same year. In the Zairean case, there had been reports from the area alleging that the 
numbers of civilian victims of the fighting, particularly French nationals, were 
increasing. The French statement regarding the action in Zaire declared that troops 
had been sent “at the request of the Zaire government,” with the aim of “protecting 
the French and foreign residents.” It also underlined the temporary nature of the 
mission, which would end as soon as the legal authorities were in a position to ensure 
control of the situation. Similarly, the Belgian Prime Minister stressed that the 
purpose of the Belgian operation was to “bring help to the European and local 
population.”*^ ' A number of countries approved the intervention. For example, after 
the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European Community on 20-21 May *
UN Yearbook (1965), 140-143.
SC Resols. 203,14 May 1965 and 205,22 May 1965.
*** “Invasion of Shaba Province by Rebels - Arrival o f French and Belgian Paratroops,” Keesing's 24 
(August 1978).
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1978, the Danish Foreign Minister declared on behalf of his colleagues that “the 
French initiative in Kolwezi has met with our complete understanding as a purely 
humanitarian, and therefore very natural, rescue operation.”'^  ^ Also most of the 
African countries attending at the fifth Franco-Afirican Conference of heads of state 
or government, which took place in Paris on 22-23 May 1978, endorsed the French 
intervention in Zaire/^^ A Soviet statement, on the other hand, described the rescue 
operation as merely “a fig leaf to cover up an undisguised interference in the internal 
affairs” of Zaire.’^  France also argued that the aim of its 1978 operation in Chad was 
to ensure the safety of French nationals. The French involvement in Chad was 
mostly opposed by Libya, Sudan and the Congo. But the criticism was mainly 
directed to the governments of African states for inviting foreign troops, to which 
Zaire and Mauritania protested by stating that it was states’ right to request help from 
whichever countries they wished.*^® None of the interventions were considered in the 
UN.
One other intervention significant within the context of protection of nationals is the 
US military operation in Grenada in 1983. Among other justifications, the United 
States made the protection of nationals as the central theme of its a c t i o n . T h e  US 
Ambassador to the UN, Ambassador Kirkpatrick argued at the Security Council
For the French and Belgian justifications, see “Invasion o f Shaba Province by Rebels - Arrival of 
French and Belgian Paratroops,” Keesing’s 24 (August 1978).
“Franco-Afiican Conference of Heads of State or Government - Moves towards Formation of 
African Peace-keeping Force,” Keesing’s 24 (August 1978).
The Toss dispatch in “Allegations of Cuban and Soviet Involvement in Invasion -  Cuban and 
Soviet Denials -  Suspension of Zaire’s Relations with Soviet Union, Libya and Algeria,” Keesing’s 
24 (August 1978).
“Allegations of French Military Involvement,” Keesing’s 24 (May 1978).
136 ..jjst Meejijjg o f Council o f Ministers,” Keesing’s 24 (October 1978).
217
meeting on 27 October 1983, that in circumstances where anarchy prevails, “the 
general rule of international law permits military action for protecting endangered 
nationals.”^^® At the subsequent General Assembly meeting, she reiterated that “the 
use of force by the task force was lawful under international law and the UN Charter, 
because it was undertaken to protect American nationals from a clear and present 
danger.”^^  ^ Finally, the Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth Dam, remarked at an 
event that the “US action to secure and evacuate endangered US citizens on the 
island was undertaken in accordance with well-established principles of international 
law regarding the protection of one’s nationals.”*^ However, as mentioned 
elsewhere, a great majority of the states participating in the Council debate strongly 
condemned the intervention,*^^ The opposing arguments emphasized that the action 
was indisputably a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, an act of aggression and a 
flagrant breach of the rule prohibiting intervention. The opponents were also 
dismissive of the alleged ground of protection of nationals as justification of 
intervention. Nicaragua, Cuba and Grenada for example, countered claims that the 
US citizens were in danger. The representative of Grenada read the text of the 
Revolutionary Military Council’s (RMC) telex to the American Embassy in 
Barbados, in which General Hudson Austin, the leader of the RMC, guaranteed the 
safety of US citizens. It is also notable that the US allies opposed the military 
action as well. For example, France was of the opinion that the justifications
The US also defended its action as a regional peace-keeping operation within the firamework o f the 
Organization of the East Caribbean States (OECS) and an attempt to restore law and ordCT to protect 
human rights upon the invitation of the Governor-General o f Grenada.
Statement o f Ambassador Kirkpatrick at Security Council reprinted in Department o f State Bulletin 
83 (1983), 75.
Statement o f Deputy Secretary Dam at Louisville Law Day reprinted in Department o f State 
Bulletin 83 (1983), 81.
For the countries condemning the intervention, see UN Yearbook (1983), 212.
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advanced did not seem admissible insofar as under international law, intervention is 
permitted only in two circumstances, namely in response to a request from the 
legitimate authorities of the a country, or upon a decision of the Security Council. 
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, was more hesitant for an outright 
condemnation. Although it stated its disapproval of the military operation, it also 
asserted that the concerns of the OECS should be taken into account. Upon the 
failure of a draft resolution deploring the intervention, sponsored by Guyana, 
Nicaragua and Z im b ab w e , th e  General Assembly adopted a resolution recalling 
the Declaration on Principles o f International Law and the Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility o f Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs o f States, and 
deploring the armed intervention in Grenada, “which constitutes a flagrant violation 
of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
that State.” The resolution further called for an “immediate cessation of the armed 
intervention and the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Grenada.”'^  ^
Explaining their affirmative votes after the adoption of the resolution, the majority of 
the states characterized the actions of the US and the Eastern Caribbean states as a 
crude violation of the most fundamental norms of international law, namely the 
prohibition of the use of force as laid down in Article 2(4), the prohibition of any act 
of aggression, the principle of non-intervention and the rule of non-interference in 
the internal affairs so as to enable peoples to exercise their right to self­
UN Doc. S/PV.2487 (1983), 42-45.142
UN Yearbook (1983), 212-214. It has to be noted that Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign 
Secretary, in a House of Commons debate contented that states had a right to take military actioil to 
protect nationals abroad where there is a breakdown of law and ord^, and that there was no provision 
in the UN Charter that makes such an action unlawful. Nevertheless, he noted that the UK had taken a 
different view of the circumstances in Grenada. See Scott Davidson, Grenada: A Study in Politics and 
the Limits o f International Law (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1987), 115,134.
Draft resolution sponsored by Guyana, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, UN Doc. S/16077.Rev.l (1983). 
The vote was 11 to 1 (United States), with 3 abstentions (Togo, the United Kingdom and Zaire).
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determination.^^ The only states, which voted against the resolution as a whole, 
aside from the US and its Caribbean allies, were El Salvador and Israel. As such, 
the judgment of the greater part of the international community with regards to the 
US and Caribbean states’ intervention in Grenada was unequivocally one of 
condemnation on the grounds that it had violated the most basic norms of 
international law.
hi its invasion of Panama in December 1989, once again the US espoused the 
protection of American lives as the chief justification for its use of force, along with 
the consent of the legitimate Panamanian government to restore democracy.''^ In 
addition, two other alleged goals of the operation were to defend the integrity of the 
Panama Canal Treaty and to stop drug trafficking.^ '^ ^ President Bush referred to the 
death of an American serviceman, and the assault and detention of another 
serviceman and his wife as evidence that the lives of American citizens were in 
imminent danger. The president also expressed his fear for the lives of thousands of 
Americans living in the Canal Zone area, since the Panamanian Assembly had 
declared a state of war between Panama and the United States.*^® The views 
presented in the Security Council were largely negative. Nicaragua, for example, 
argued that the US had committed an act of aggression under the disguise of 
protecting American citizens.*^* Upon the defeat of a draft resolution which would
GARes. 38/7,2 November 1983.
UN Yearbook (1983), 215-217.
Upon the request o f the US, a recorded vote on each operative paragraph was taken. For details of 
the votes on each paragraph, see UN Yearbook (1983), 214.
UN Yearbook (1989), 174, 175. See also “US Justification for Intervention,” Keesing’s 35 
(December 1989).
Hilaire, International Law and the United States, 118-123.
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Ibid., 115-116.
UN Yearbook (1989), 174.
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have condemned the US intervention and called for an immediate withdrawal of the 
US forces,*^^ the General Assembly resolution strongly deplored the intervention in 
Panama by the US forces, deemed it as “a flagrant violation of international law and
of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Panama, and demanded
1the ‘‘immediate cessation of the intervention.”
When the rebellion in Liberia, which had started in December 1989, turned into a 
civil war,^ "^^  the US sent ships with 2000 marines off the coast of Liberia in early 
June 1990 to evacuate the US diplomatic staff. Although President Doe of Liberia 
requested assistance from the US, the US did not intervene and take sides in the 
Liberian conflict. In fact, at the beginning of the civil strife in Liberia, the US had 
declared it to be as an internal affair to be resolved by Liberians themselves. In the 
following August, upon the deterioration of the situation, the US marines landed in 
the capital, Monrovia, to evacuate remaining US citizens and to protect the US 
embassy. The US emphasized that the need to protect the nationals was the sole
Draft resolution submitted by Algeria, Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal and 
Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/21048 (1989). The resolution received ten votes in favor (Algeria, Brazil, 
China, Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, USSR, Yugoslavia) and 4 against (France, the 
United Kingdom, the US and Canada), with one abstention (Finland).
GA Res. 44/240, 29 December 1989. Most of the Western states voted against the resolution. 
Negative votes were by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Dominica, El Salvador, France, 
Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Portugal, 
Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.
For the details of the rebellion and civil war in Liberia, see Clement E. Adibe, “Strategic Coercion 
in Post-Cold War Afiica” in Lawrence Freedman (ed.). Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 298-299. Also, “Suppression of Rebellion,” Keesing*s 36 
(January 1990); “Increasing Scale of Revolt,” Keesing's 36 (April 1990), “Rebel Successes Advance 
Into Monrovia,” Keesing*s 36 (July 1990).
‘Rebel Successes Advance Into Monrovia,” Keesing*s 36 (July 1990).
David Wippman, “Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War” in Lori Fişler 
Damrosch (ed.). Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 159.
For evaluation of the initial US reaction and inaction, see S. Byron Tarr, “Extra-Africa Interests in 
the Liberian Conflict” in Karl P. Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan (eds.). Peacekeeping in Africa: 
ECOMOG in Liberia (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1998), 155-160.
158 _ Sending of ECOWAS Force - Large-scale Casualties,” Keesing's 36 (August 1990).
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reason of the action and thus their mandate was strictly confined to this goal.'^ ^ The 
US also declared that its action “did not indicate or constitute any intention on the 
part of the US government to intervene militarily in the Liberian conflict.”*^ The US 
intervention did not encounter opposition from the international community and none 
of the UN organs considered the US intervention as such.
Other recent interventions for the protection of nationals include the rescue 
operations of France and Belgium in Zaire in 1991, and the UK in Sierra Leone in 
2000. In 1991, after riots broke out in Zaire,*^  ^ France and Belgium sent troops to 
this country in September 1991. Both countries insisted that their intervention was 
purely humanitarian, seeking to protect and evacuate the 4,000 French and 10,000 
Belgian n a t io n a ls .T h e  French troops were withdrawn by October 30, and the 
Belgian forces by November 4.*®^  Finally, the UK sent a force of paratroopers to 
evacuate British, EU, and Commonwealth nationals in Sierra Leone, when fighting 
broke out once again, after the July 1999 peace agreement between the government 
and rebel forces collapsed in May 2000, and, the rebels attacked UN peacekeepers^^ 
and seized hos tages .The  British Defense Secretary, Geoff Hoon announced that in
159
160
New York Times^  6 August 1990, AL
Washington Posty 6 August 1990, A l.
For the account of political crisis in Zaire, see “Further Setbacks to Political Reform,” Keesing*s 37 
(May 1991); “National Conference,” Keesing*s 37 (July 1991); “National Conference,” Keesing*s 37 
(August 1991); and ‘Toreign Intervention,” Keesing's 37 (September 1991).
162 “poreign Intervention,” Keesing*s 37 (September 1991).
“Dismissal of Prime Minister,” Keesing*s 37 (October 1991); ‘IRival Governments Formation of 
New Cabinet,” Keesing*s 37 (November 1991).
The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), which was established by the Security 
Council Resolution 1181 in 1998 to monitor the security situation, was taken over by the UN Mission 
in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999, with a more robust mandate to “afford protection to civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence.” See SC Res. 1270, 22 October 1999. In 2000, the 
Security Council assigned the mission an expanded mandate under Chapter VII, thereby providing a 
legal framework for coercive action. See SC Res. 1289, 7 February 2000. for the UN action in Sierra 
Leone, see “Expansion of UN Force,” Keesing*s 46 (February 2000); “Action by UN Troops,” 
Keesing's 46 (July 2000); “Security Developments,” Keesing*s 46 (August 2000).
‘breakdown of Peace Agreement,” Keesing*s 46 (May 2000).
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addition to organizing the evacuation of foreign nationals, the paratroopers would 
secure the airport for the UN until it was able to bring UNAMSIL (UN Mission in 
Sierra Leone) up to its authorized strength of 11,000. However, the UK Foreign 
Secretary, Robin Cook underlined that the paratroopers would remain outside UN 
control and would not be used in a combat role.*®  ^None of these interventions drew 
a notable international opposition. They did not become a subject of debate at the UN 
as well.
From the above appraisal of the UN reactions, at the outset, it seems that with respect 
to the protection of nationals as a legal ground for militaiy intervention, the UN 
adheres to the restrictive view of the prohibition of the use of force as enshrined in 
Article 2(4) and the exception of self-defense in Article 51. The consistent reference 
by the UN organs, particularly by the General Assembly, to the principles of non­
intervention in internal affairs and the inviolability of sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity in their resolutions condemning the interventions may be regarded 
as evidence of this conclusion. Nevertheless, this assessment has to be qualified by 
taking into account the specifics of the armed interventions in concern. In cases 
where the intervening countries exceeded the criteria of immediacy, necessity and 
proportionality and where the intervention in question had a political impact on the 
course or the outcome of the internal conflict, such as the 1960 Belgian intervention 
in the Congo, the US interventions in Grenada and Panama; the UN reaction has 
been one of strong condemnation, hi these cases, the action carried out was hardly 
limited to protecting or rescuing nationals. Thus, the initial submission of protection 
of nationals was later accompanied with other legal justifications, such as with the
166 Ibid.
223
consent of the local authority, with self-defense, with “restoration of order” or with a 
combination of more than one of these.^ ^  ^ It follows that even intervening states 
recognize the limits of the use of force within the context of the need to protect 
nationals from an imminent danger, and accept that protection of nationals would not 
justify prolongation of the armed interventions or the presence of the intervening 
power/®* In other cases where the military intervention was limited in scope, scale 
and time, the UN did not respond at all, let alone negatively. The French-Belgian 
intervention in Zaire (1978), the French intervention in Chad (1978), the US 
intervention in Liberia (1990), the French-Belgian intervention in Zaire (1991) and 
the UK intervention in Sierra Leone (2000) are exemplary of the UN inaction in such 
cases. It can be inferred from the lack of attempt of any country to bring the matter 
before the Security Council and the consequent non-consideration of the matter by 
none of the UN organs that these interventions were implicitly endorsed by the 
United Nations. Hence, in the final analysis, one can argue that the UN reactions 
substantially correspond to the limits on military intervention to protect nationals laid 
down by Waldock, namely necessity, proportionality and immediacy. Given that the 
intervening state(s) is invariably a Western state and the intervened is a Third World 
country, this stance may be considered as a manifestation of the “fear of abuse of this 
right” by the powerful states. The validity and viability of the protection of nationals 
in justifying limited and temporary use of force that meets the criteria of necessity, 
immediacy and proportionality is also evident in the statements of the states 
deploring the above interventions. The opposing arguments have been generally 
confined to the rejection of the existence of an exigency, and emphasized that
167 It was only in Belgian intervention in the Congo in 1960 and the US intervention in Liberia in 1990 
that the protection o f nationals was invoked as the sole jusdilcation for the intervention.
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protection of nationals constituted a pretext for stronger states to intervene in the 
affairs of weak«· ones. As such, they have not denied the legality of the right in 
itself. Thus, the permissibility of intervention to protect nationals has been 
challenged as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of principle both by the states 
and the United Nations.
Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention, 121.
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CHAPTER II:
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The final, and by far the most controversial justification for military intervention is 
that on humanitarian grounds. The issue has been immensely debated in the vast 
literature on this subject since the nineteenth century. The classical writers on the law 
of nations have generally stated that a war to punish injustice was a just war.*  By the 
end of the nineteenth century, a majority of legal scholars had come to argue that a 
right of humanitarian intervention existed.^ In its nineteenth century conception, the 
right of humanitarian intervention encompassed the right to protect one’s own 
nationals as well.^ However, since the twentieth century, the definition of 
humanitarian intervention has been confined to the use of force by a state or a group 
of states to protect citizens of the target state from widespread violations of human 
rights there.^ In this respect, Oppenheim maintains that “by virtue of its personal and
‘ For example, Grotius subscribed to the view that if a government, although acting within its rights of 
sovereignty, violates die rights o f humanity, the right o f intervention may be lawfully exercised. See 
the section on the “Intellectual Roots of Non-Intervention” in Chapter I o f Part I.
 ^Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States (London: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 338.
 ^Funda Keskin, Uluslararası Hukukta Kuvvet Kullanma: Savaş, Karışma ve Birleşmiş M illetler (The 
Use o f Force in International Law: War, Intervention and the United Nations) (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler 
BirUği Vakfi Yayınlan, 1998), 125-126.
* For similar definitions of “humanitarian intervention,” see for example, Adam Robots, 
Humanitarian Action in War, Adelphi Paper 305 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 19; 
Tom J. Farer, “An Inquiry into the Legitimacy o f Humanitarian IntCTvention” in Lori Rsler Damrosch 
and David J. Scheffer (eds.). Law and Force in the New International Order (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991), 185; Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, The United Nations in an Evolving
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territorial supremacy, a state can treat its own nationals according to discretion.” 
However, he further notes that:
“But there is a substantial body of opinion and of practice in 
support of the view that there are limits to that discretion and 
that when a state renders itself guilty of cruelties against and 
persecution of its nationals in such a way as to deny their 
fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of 
mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally 
permissible.”^
As such, the key conditions of humanitarian intervention appear to be first, there 
must be immediate and extensive threat to fundamental human rights within the 
target state; and second, the purpose of the intervention must be limited to the 
protection of human rights. In this sense, humanitarian intervention is distinguished 
from intervention to protect nationals insofar as it entails “protection of the nationals 
of another state from inhmnan and cruel treatment within their state.”  ^As mentioned 
elsewhere, the supporters of the right to protect nationals abroad often base its 
validity on the right of self-defense, which is a form of self-help. In contrast, 
humanitarian intervention is not a self-help measure by definition,^ and thus cannot 
be invoked in connection with the right o f self-defense. Humanitarian intervention is 
also distinguished from intervention to promote self-determination. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, intervention to facilitate self-determination occurs on behalf of *
World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 11-12; Anthony Clark Arend 
and R obot J. Beck, International Law and the Use o f Force, Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm  
(London. Routledge, 1993), 113; Ian Brownlie, ‘Humanitarian Intervention” in John Norton Moore 
(ed.). Law and Civil War in the Modem W orld (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1974), 217.
* Hersch Lauterpacht (ed.), L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol I -  Peace (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), 312. A similar assotion is made by Thomas and Thomas. They 
explain that the right of a state to treat its citizens the way it pleases is limited by the “abuse o f right 
doctrine,” namely, “that if a state exercises a right in such a manner as to exceed its equitable limits, it 
becomes legitimate to employ courses that might not otherwise be justified in order to nullify its 
effects.” See Ann Van Wyen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, The Law and Its Import 
in the Americas (Dallas: Southern Methodist UnivCTsity Press, 1956), 384.
* Arend and Beck, International Law, 114. See also, Tom Hiller, Sourcebook on Public International 
Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1998), 611.
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a group of people who is struggling against the established regime by invoking the 
right to self-determination. By contrast, the humanitarian intervention aims not to 
create a new state as such, but only to protect the human rights within an existing 
state. Thus, in this sense, the action is “in the nature of a police measure.”*  In 
addition, while humanitarian intervention involves prior inhuman and cruel treatment 
in the target state, intervention to promote self-determination does not entail such 
precondition.^ Lastly, the distinction between humanitarian intervention and 
intervention to facilitate self-determination is also evident in state practice. States 
advocating the permissibility of the use of force to promote self-determination “have 
been careful not to present this alleged right as an example of a wider right of 
humanitarian intervention. Rather, they have been “often the most vehement in 
condemning any intervention, humanitarian or otherwise, in the affairs of other
states. »10
Another distinguishing aspect of humanitarian intervention is the absence of the 
element of consent, which may exist or be alleged to exist, in cases of military 
interventions to protect nationals and to assist self-determination. Therefore, forcible 
intervention for humanitarian ends is the most controversial justification, for it is a 
conduct of use of force that most visibly violates the principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention. Finally, unlike other justifications, humanitarian intervention 
involves questions of authorization. Since by definition, intervention for 
humanitarian ends concerns all humanity, the contention over its permissibility is
’ Brownlie, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 219.
* Brownlie, International Law, 338.
® Arend and Beck, International Law, 114.
Michael Akehurst, “Humanitarian Intervention” in Hedley Bull (ed.). Intervention in World Politics 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 113.
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significantly reduced where the humanitarian intervention expresses the collective 
will of the society of states through authorization by an international body.
In the light of the above preliminary observations about the concept of the 
humanitarian intervention, this chapter will assess the UN’s approach to the question 
of the permissibility of unilateral military intervention for humanitarian ends. For 
this purpose, it will first explore the contentions regarding the legality of 
humanitarian intervention in general international law and in relation to the UN 
Charter. Secondly, it will scrutinize the military interventions, which are usually 
referred in the literature as examples of humanitarian intervention with respect to 
their outcomes rather than their justifications, in order to evaluate the states’ 
convictions regarding the humanitarian concerns as a justification for unilateral 
military intervention. Finally, the chapter will look at the UN reactions to specific 
cases whereby humanitarian considerations were unequivocally raised. The 
representative cases fall under three categories: humanitarian interventions with 
dubious UN authorization, humanitarian interventions authorized retrospectively, and 
the humanitarian interventions with explicit UN authorizations. The cases will be 
analyzed individually with special emphasis on the state views regarding the validity 
of humanitarian claims as grounds for military intervention.
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2. 1. THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The contention over the legality of humanitarian intervention for the most part 
parallels the restrictive and counter-restrictive arguments in relation to the protection 
of nationals abroad.”
2 .1 .1 . The Restrictive Approach
Under the restrictive approach, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is argued that 
Article 2(4) imposes a total ban on the use of force and Article 51 represents the only 
exception to this general prohibition.^^ In this context, Brownlie notes that the legal 
regime established by the United Nations Charter “rests on a suspicion of unilateral 
action by states.’”  ^Therefore, insofar as humanitarian intervention does not involve 
“individual or collective self-defense,” the restrictive scholars argue, it would 
constitute an illegal use of force “against the territorial integrity and political 
independence of a state,” and thus it is not rendered permissible by the terms of these 
Charter provisions. Moreover, it is maintained that the reference to territorial
“ It must be noted that the issue of legitimizing practice of humanitarian intervention has also been a 
subject of debate among the scholars of world politics and philosophy as well as policy-makers. For a 
succinct examination of pluralist and solidarist theories of hiunanitarian intervention, see for example, 
Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers, Humanitarian Intervention in Interruttional Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 21-52. For an overview of the philosophical debate between 
communitarians and cosmopolitans concerning humanitarian intervention, see Stephen A. Garrett, 
Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination o f Humanitarian Intervention (Westport, USA: Praeger 
Publishers, 1999), 23-39. For ethical views regarding humanitarian intervention, see Pierre Laberge, 
“Humanitarian Intervention: Three Ethical Positions,” Ethics and International Affairs 9 (1995), 15- 
35.
Michael Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1984), 219-221.
Brownlie, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 219.
See for example, Brownlie, International Law, 339-341; and Nigel S. Rodley, “Collective 
Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: The Legal Framework” in Nigel S. 
Rodley (ed.). To Loose the Bands o f Wickedness: International Intervention in Defence o f Human 
Rights (London: Brassey’s, 1992), 21.
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integrity, in Article 2(4) denotes “territorial inviolability.” In this sense, any
humanitarian intervention, however limited, would entail “a temporary violation of
the target state’s political independence and territorial integrity if it is carried out
against that state’s wishes.”^^  In this respect, Henkin maintains that:
“Clearly, it was the original intent of the Charter to forbid the 
use of force even to protect human rights or to install 
authentic democracy. Nothing has happened to justify 
deviations from that commitment...Surely the law cannot 
warrant any state’s intervening by force against the political 
independence and territorial integrity of another on the 
ground that human rights are being violated, as indeed they 
are everywhere.”*^
In support of their arguments, the restrictive scholars usually refer to the principle of 
non-intervention as embraced by the General Assembly resolutions such as the 
Declaration o f Inadmissibility o f Intervention in the Domestic Affairs o f States, 
which condemns the intervention in its widest terms, and the Declaration on 
Principles o f International Law, which reaffirms the inadmissibility of intervention 
in the domestic affairs of states.*® They also cite the judgment of the International 
Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case as applicable to humanitarian intervention, in 
which the Court upheld that:
“While the United States might form its own appraisal of the 
situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use 
of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or 
ensure such respect...The Court concludes that the argument *
Akehitfst, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 105. For the view that unilateral military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes violates the prohibition on use of force undo- Article 2(4), see also Lori Fişler 
Damrosch, “Commentary on Collective Military Intervention to Enforce Human Rights” in Damrosch 
and Scheffer (eds.). Law and Force, 215.
** Louis Henkin, “The Use o f Force: Law and US Policy” in Right vs. Might (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 61.
GA Res. 2131 (XX), 21 December 1965. Paragraph 1 o f the Declaration states that “no State has the 
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the intranal and external affairs o f 
any other State,” and the seventh preambular paragraph declares that “armed intervention is 
synonymous with aggression.”
** GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970. The Declaration repeats paragraph 1 o f the GA Res. 2131 
(XX), and the eight preambular paragraph states that “the practice o f any form o f 
intCTvention.. .violates the spirit and letter of the Charter.”
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derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua 
cannot afford a justification for the conduct of the United
„  . ..IQStates.
The supporters of the restrictive view also reject the examples of state practice in the
pre-Charter period, to which advocates of the right of humanitarian intervention have
appealed to show the existence of such a right in customary international law, as
providing a clear basis on which to base such a right, for in these cases, humanitarian
concerns are almost always mixed with other motives.^ ® Some scholars add that the
pattern of state practice in the post-Charter period also fails to demonstrate a
customary legal right to humanitarian intervention.^* In addition, restrictive scholars
point out that the fundamental objective of the United Nations system is the
maintenance of international peace and secu r i ty In  this respect, Farer for example,
insists that other UN purposes “are permanently subordinated to the dominant
purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” He asserts that:
“No state can claim to be advancing other purposes when it 
breaches the peace to promote interests, for they simply have 
no legitimate independent existence outside the context of
international peace.9^23
ICJ Reports (1986), para. 268. Som e scholars also referred to the judgment of the Court in the 
Corfu Channel case. Although it did not touch directly on the legality of humanitarian intervention, 
the judgment is interpreted by the restrictive scholars “as condemning all intervention, self-protection, 
or self-help involving the use of force—^including...for purposes of hum^tarian intervention.” 
Akehurst, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 110; Francis A. Boyle, “Humanitarian Intervention Under 
International Law,” Review o f International Affairs 1:4 (2002), 49.
^ For a thorough and skeptical survey of the history of “humanitarian intervention,” see Brownlie, 
International Law, 338-342. See also, Brownlie, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 221; Thomas Franck 
and Nigel Rodley, “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force,” 
American Journal o f International Law  67:2 (1973), 281.
Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights, Humanitarian Crisis, and Humanitarian Intervention,” International 
Journal 48:4 (1993), 622.
“  Akehurst, ‘Humanitarian Intervention,” 105.
^ Tom J. Farer, “Law and War” in Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk (eds.). The Future o f 
International Legal Order Volume 3 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 31. Elsewhere, 
Farer notes that given “the Charter’s normative logic, its allocation of coercive jurisdiction, its 
omissions, as well as the preferences manifested by most participants in the drafting process and their 
immediately subsequent behavior,” one should conclude that “the promotion of human rights ranked 
far below the protection of national sovereignty and the maintenance o f peace as organizational 
goals.” See Farer, “An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention,” 190.
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Finally, they point to the potential abuse of such a right.^ In this respect, Henkin 
contends that admitting a legal right of humanitarian intervention may lead to its use 
“as the occasion or pretext of aggression.” He further argues that since the violations 
of human rights are “all too common,” if humanitarian intervention “were to be 
permissible to remedy them by the use of force, there would be no law to forbid the 
use of force by almost any state against almost any other.”^  Similarly, Falk observes 
that authorization of intervention to protect human rights “creates a manipulative 
nexus that can itself be used as a justification for an abusive intrusion upon the 
legitimate autonomy of another state.”^  Consequently, these scholars argue that the 
use of force to rectify a breach of an international obligation may result in “more 
harm than the breach of the international obligation; the cure is often worse than the
disease.»27
hi conclusion, relying on these arguments, the restrictive view adheres to the 
proposition that unilateral action by a state in the territory of another state on the 
ground of protection of human rights is unlawful. However, it has to be noted that 
restrictive scholars also acknowledge permissible forms of humanitarian intervention 
under the existing law. Brownlie for example, maintains that action for protection of 
human rights may be undertaken by the Security Council under Chapter Vn, in 
situations whereby violations of human rights generate a “threat to peace.” 
Alternatively, regional action may be carried out upon authorization from the
^  See generally, Franck and Rodley, “Afta· Bangladesh,” 275-305.
^  Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1979), 145.
“  Falk, Legal Order In a Violent World, 161.
Akehurst, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 111. For a similar view, see Franck and Rodley, “After
Bangladesh,” 275,300.
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Security Council under Chapter VIII of the Charter, when instances of human rights 
deprivations threaten the peace of any given region.^ * In this respect, Falk remarks 
that “the renunciation of intervention” is not substituted by “a policy of 
nonintervention;” rather “it involves the development of some form of collective 
intervention.”^^  From this judgment, Falk notes that the risk of manipulation of a 
right of humanitarian intervention is considerably reduced, if not eliminated, when 
“the decision to intervene is tied to the maintenance of peace and security and 
depends upon collective authorization” by an international organization. As a result, 
Falk holds that such an intervention by collective decision may be allowed “to
protect men against severe abuses from their own state »30
2 .1 .2 . The Counter-Restrictive Approach
The scholars who support the legality of humanitarian intervention submit mainly 
three arguments. First, some scholars argue that the promotion of human rights is as 
equally significant purpose of the Charter as the maintenance of international peace 
and security.^ * These scholars usually make references to the emphasis on the 
prominence of human rights and fundamental freedoms found in a number of places 
in the Charter.^^ For example, according to Reisman and McDougal, the Preamble’s
“  Brownlie, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 226. For a similar view, see also, Akehurst, “Humanitarian 
Intervention,” 106.
Falk, Legal Order In a Violent World, 339.
^ Ibid ., 162.
See for example, Fernando R. Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality 
(New York: Transnational Publications, 1988), 131; Richard B. Lillich, “Humanitarian Intervention: 
A Reply to Ian Brownlie and A Plea For Constructive Alternatives” in Moore (ed.), Law and Civil 
War, 240.
The provisions typically referred to are the Preamble of the Charter and Articles 1 ,55  and 56. The 
Preamble reaffirms “faiúí in fundamental human rights;” Article 1(3) cites “promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental fieedoms” as one o f the purposes o f the United 
Nations; Article 55 underlines the UN objective o f promoting “universal respect for, and obsmvance
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“repeated emphasis upon the common interests that the use of force for the urgent 
protection of such rights is no less authorized than other forms of self-help.”^^  Hence, 
according to the counter-restrictive scholars, attaching protection of human rights 
equal weight with the maintenance of peace “would permit humanitarian intervention 
by states despite Article 2(4), when such intervention were consistent with human 
rights objectives” of the Charter.^^ A second argument in support of the legality of 
the humanitarian intervention relies on a narrow interpretation of Article 2(4). As 
elaborated within the framework of the protection of nationals, some scholars 
contend that as long as the use of force does not breach the territorial integrity and 
political independence of any state and is in consistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations, such uses of force would fall “below the 2(4) threshold,” and thus 
would not contravene the Charter. It would follow from such assertion that military 
intervention limited exclusively to the protection of human rights would be legally 
permissible. For example, lillich  maintains that since humanitarian interventions by 
states are consistent with Charter purposes, and in fact may advance one of the major 
objectives of the UN in many situations, such interventions may be considered to 
inñinge Article 2(4) “only if they are thought to affect the territorial integrity or 
political independence of the state against which they are directed.”^^  In this respect. 
Tesón posits that “a genuine humanitarian intervention” would not lead to “territorial 
conquest or political subjugation.”^^  Similarly, Reisman and McDougal contend that:
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms,” and Article 56 authorizes “joint and separate action [by 
Members] in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement o f the piuposes set out in Article 
55.”
W. Michael Reisman and Myres McDougal, “Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos” in 
Richard B. Lillich (ed.). Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottesville: 
University Press o f Virginia, 1973), 172.
^  Lillich, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 240.
^*№«/.,236-237.
Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention,” 131.
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“Since a humanitarian intervention seeks neither a territorial 
change nor a challenge to the political independence of the 
state involved and is not only not inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations but is rather in conformity 
with the most fundamental peremptory norms of the Charter, 
it is a distortion to argue that it is precluded by Article 
2(4). ■■»37
lillich further notes fliat except those justifications which exclusively rely upon 
Article 51, “any rationale allowing interventions to protect nationals also authorizes 
humanitarian interventions in general.” Moreover, the supporters of the right of 
humanitarian intervention assert that a broad construction of Article 2(4) would lead 
to an international legal system that protects tyгants.^^ hi this respect, one ardent 
supporter of the legality of humanitarian intervention argues that intervention to
displace tyrannical governments “is not only legally justified but morally required »40
Finally, those who support the legality of humanitarian intervention advance the 
argument that there was a customary right of humanitarian intervention in the pre- 
Charter period, which has revived in the post-1945 period. In this regard, the main 
premise is parallel to the one formulated within the context of the protection of 
nationals, in that although the United Nations was founded with a view to centralize 
the protection and enforcement of international rights, the fact that effective working 
of the UN enforcement mechanisms was frequently inhibited by the discord among 
the permanent members of the Security Council gives rise to the application of 
Article 2(4)’s prohibition of the use of force on the condition of effective UN 
response. In cases where the UN fails to do so, the argument goes, the customary law
”  Reisman and McDougal, “Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos,” 177. 
Lillich, ‘‘Humanitarian Intervention,” 241.
See for example. Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention" 167.
Anthony D’Amato, ‘The Invasion o f Panama Was a Lawftd Response to Tyranny” American 
Journal o f International Law 84:2 (1990), 519.
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revives and states are permitted to invoke the right of humanitarian intervention in 
appropriate situations.^^ For example, Reisman and McDougal suggest that human 
rights violations might become a “threat to the peace,” and thus invoke Security 
Council’s Chapter Vn jurisdiction. However, if the Security Council fails to act, 
Reisman and McDougal argue that “the cumulative effect of Articles 1, 55, and 56 
[would be] to establish the legality o f unilateral self-help.”^^  In response to the 
problem of abuse of the right of humanitarian intervention if deemed permissible, the 
counter-restrictive arguments maintain that any claim invoking a right of 
humanitarian intervention “will always require contextual analysis,” and whether it 
is made “in good faith or abusively” will be judged by the appropriate international 
bodies, such as the Security Council or the International Court of Justice. Hence, 
since the validity of these claims can be established by a variety of international 
institutions, it will be wrong not to allow “claims which may in very restricted 
exceptional circumstances be regarded as lawful” just because they may be unjustly
raised occasionally.43
Notwithstanding the counter-restrictive arguments, the fact remains that there exists 
no explicit provision in the UN Charter to support a right of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention by states. Nor does the body of international law appear to specifically 
incorporate such a right in any formal convention, or for that matter, in any 
international legal document so far.'*^  As to customary international law, the right of 
humanitarian intervention seems to be at best ambiguous, given that the state practice
Lillich, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 247.
Reisman and McDougal, “Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos,” 174-175.
Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (New York: 
Oxford UnivCTsity Press, 1994), 247-248.
^  Donnelly, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Crisis, and Humanitarian Intervention,” 622.
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in the pre-Charter period reveals the scope of abusing such a right.'*  ^Moreover, it is 
generally maintained that human rights are essentially matters of domestic 
jurisdiction by virtue of the principle of “sovereign equality” of all the UN members. 
Finally, state practice since 1945 provides for a few cases justified on humanitarian 
grounds. However, the mere fact that the Charter makes references to the subject of 
human rights indicates that such matters may at times become matters of legitimate 
international concern. For that matter, today human rights appear in several legal 
documents as well, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the UN 
Covenants, which give them an international status."*^  Qualifying human rights as 
such would in turn take those issues out of the confines of the terms of Article 2(7), 
namely the “domestic jurisdiction” limitation beyond the reach of the United 
Nations. More importantly, under the Charter, the Security Council may determine 
any situation of human rights violations as constituting a threat to international 
peace. The issue then, can no longer maintain immunity “either under the domestic 
jurisdiction clause or under the concept of sovereign equality, and becomes subject 
then to collective action by the organization.”^^  In this sense, it can be argued that 
Article 2(7) does not constitute an impediment to action by the UN organs with 
regards to human rights. On the other hand, given the broad authority of the Security 
Council to respond to “threats to the peace,” involvement of the Council as such 
might lead to authorization of states to take military action to enforce international 
human rights. As s result, it can be contended that by prohibiting the use of force, 
except for self-defense and collective use of force by the organization on the
See Chapter I of Part I for state practice in the pre-Charter period.
^  For detailed analysis of the global hiunan rights regime, see for example. Jack Donnelly, “The 
Social Construction of International Hirnian Rights” in Tin Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.). 
Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 71-78.
Thomas and Thomas, Jr., Non-intervention, 377.
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occasions determined to constitute a threat to international peace, the UN Charter has 
curtailed unilateral right to intervene for humanitarian purposes.
2.2 . STATE PRACTICE IN THE POST-CHARTER PERIOD
Three cases typically appear on most of the scholars’ list of examples of state 
practice with regard to humanitarian intervention. These are the Indian intervention 
in East Pakistan (1971), the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia (1978) and the 
Tanzanian intervention in Uganda (1978). However, these instances are considered 
as examples of humanitarian intervention more with respect to their outcomes than in 
terms of the justifications presented by the intervening states. Although India and 
Tanzania made a few references to humanitarian concerns, none of them officially 
defended its action on the basis of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
India, for example, in addition to the principal justification of self-defense, in a 
number of Security Council debates, voiced the need to provide support to the 
Bengali people against the Pakistani assault.^ However, at no time did India claim a 
right of humanitarian intervention. Rather, it consistently argued that it had used 
military force in self-defense.'*’ The reactions to the Indian intervention revealed no 
support to the legality of humanitarian intervention. Not a single country claimed that 
India had a right to intervene militarily in order to rescue the people of East Pakistan. 
For example, among the opposing states, Pakistan, China and the United States
48 UN Doc. S/PV.1606 (1971), 17-18; UN Doc. S/PV.1608 (1971), 27-28; UN Doc. S/PV.1611 
(1971), 4-14.
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contended that India had no right to interfere by force with Pakistan’s treatment of 
the inhabitants of East Pakistan. Argentina and Tunisia deemed the Indian action as 
“intervention in the internal affairs of a state.” Most statements in the General 
Assembly was also to the effect that the situation in East Pakistan was an internal 
one, to be settled by the Pakistani government, with no external interference. A 
number of representatives argued that one country’s internal difficulties should not 
be used as a pretext for intervention from outside and voiced support for the 
principles of territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs.^“
Like hidia, when Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in 1978, which resulted in the 
ousting of Pol Pot regime, it did not claim a right of humanitarian intervention, but 
instead invoked the right of self-defense in response to Khmer Rouge aggression 
against Vietnam since 1975.^' Despite the fact that horrendous human rights 
violations in Kampuchea had been well documented, no state pointed to the existence 
of a right of humanitarian intervention. On the contrary, several states contended that 
those violations did not justify Viemam’s intervention. For instance, the Norwegian 
representative stated that:
“The Norwegian Government and public opinion in Norway 
have expressed strong objections to the serious violations of 
human rights committed by the Pol Pot Government.
However, the domestic policies of that Government cannot— 
we repeat, cannot—justify the actions of Viemam over the 
last days and weeks. The Norwegian Government firmly 
rejects the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State.”^^
Similarly, France argued that:
UN Doc. S/PV.1611 (1971), 9; UN Doc. S/PV.1613 (1971), 22. 
UN Yearbook (1971), 146-153.
UN Doc. S/PV.2108 (1979), 12.
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“The notion that because a regime is detestable foreign 
intervention is justified and forcible overthrow is legitimate is 
extremely dangerous. That could ultimately jeopardize the 
very maintenance of international law and order and make the 
continued existence of various regimes dependent on the 
judgment of their neighbours. It is important for the Council 
to affirm, without any ambiguity, that it cannot condone the 
occupation of a sovereign country by a foreign power.”^^
Portugal expressed the same opinion by stating that despite the “appalling record of
violation of the most basic and elementary human rights in Kampuchea,” these
considerations would not “justify the invasion of the territory of a sovereign State by
the forces of another State.”^  Of the other states in the debate opposing to the
Vietnamese action, the UK, the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan made similar
comments on the unacceptability of justifying a military action by the internal
policies of a govemment.^^ All of the five ASEAN countries participating in the
Council debate maintained that Vietnam’s intervention was unjustifiable for any
reason. Singapore directly addressed the issue of human rights violations in
Cambodia, by arguing that “no [other] country has a right to topple the Government
of Democratic Kampuchea, however badly that Government may have treated its
people.”^^  Among the other countries, which contended that a domestic situation
could not justify a foreign intervention, were Bolivia, Jamaica, Nigeria, and
Yugoslavia.57
UN Doc. S/PV.2109 (1979), 2.
^  Ibid.
^  UN Doc. S/PV.2110 (1979), 3.
“  UN Doc. S/PV.2110 (1979), 6 (UK and New Zealand); 7 (US); UN Doc. S/PV.2111 (1979), 2-3 
(Japan), 3 (Australia).
“  UN Doc. S/PV.2110 (1979), 5.
”  UN Doc. Sfl>V.2109 (1979), 7 (Bolivia); UN Doc. S/PV.2111 (1979), 13-14 (Jamaica), 4 (Nigeria), 
13 (Yugoslavia).
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Finally, while Tanzania admitted its role in overthrowing President Amin of Uganda, 
it claimed that it had acted in response to President Amin’s armed aggression.^* The 
intervention did not become a subject of debate in the UN, and was not condemned 
by the OAU. A few African countries reacted against the Tanzanian military action. 
These countries, namely Sudan, Libya and Nigeria did not accept the Tanzanian 
claim of self-defense and accused Tanzania for interfering in Ugandan internal 
affairs.^^ The fact that Tanzanian intervention did not draw much criticism and UN 
reaction however, should not be taken to imply a support for the right of 
humanitarian intervention insofar as Tanzania sought to justify its action on a 
different ground.
Some scholars also refer to the 1979 French intervention in Central African Empire 
as an example of humanitarian intervention, since it resulted in the overthrow of a 
ruler with appalling human rights record.^ ® Although France initially did not admit 
that it took part in the overthrow of the self-proclaimed Emperor Bokassa, and 
pretended that its forces arrived to Central Africa the next day after the coup at the 
request of the new government to help the new regime maintain order, it soon 
became apparent that the new government had in fact been brought to power by the 
French intervention. Notwithstanding well-known human rights violations including 
torture and murder of students, France did not raise a right of humanitarian
“Continued Mediation Efforts,” ‘Recognition of Lule Government by Other Countries,” Keesing's 
Record o f World Events, 25 (June 1979), http://www.keesings.com.
^  See “Recognition of Lule Government by Other Countries,” Keesing's 25 (June 1979).
® See for example, Akehurst, ‘Humanitarian Intevention,” 98; Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention," 
175-178; Arend and Beck, International Law, 125-126; Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 107-108.
242
intervention, but instead relied on die request of the government in justifying its 
action. Neither the UN nor the OAU condemned the intervention.^^
For the purpose of exploring the state conduct with regards to humanitarian
intervention, the US interventions in Grenada and in Panama, both of which resulted
in replacement of governments of the respective countries, are also cases in point. In
both cases, the primary US justifications were fed by humanitarian claims as well.
For example, during the discussion of Grenada in the Security Council, the US
representative. Ambassador Kirkpatrick argued that action was necessary to restore
law and order and to protect human rights.®  ^ In the Panama case, initially, the US
made a distinction between legal justifications and objectives of the US action. In
this respect, the US presented restoring democracy as a significant goal, but not a
legal basis for the military action.®  ^ However, the legal adviser to the US State
Department later appealed to the improvement of human rights as a legitimate
objective of the international system. He declared that:
“The United States does not accept the notion that a State is 
entitled to use force to overthrow the dictator of another 
State, however mad or cruel. The substantial respect accorded 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, however, reflects 
the fact that the advancement of human rights and of 
democratic self-determination are legitimate objectives of our 
international system. Panama presented a strong case for 
humanitarian intervention.”®^ *
For the details o f the French intervention in Central Africa, see “Overthrow of Emperor Bokassa by 
Mr Dacko - Re-establishment of Republic - French Role in Coup,” Keesing ’s 25 (November 1979).
“  UN Doc. S/PV.2491 (1983), 37.
UN Yearbook (1989), 175.
** Abraham D. Sofaer, ‘The Panamanian Revolution: Diplomacy, War and Self-Determination in 
Panama,” Remarks to the 84* Convention of the American Society o f Intmiational Law, quoted in 
Thomas Ehrlich and Mary Ellen O’Connell, International Law and the Use o f Use (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1993), 99,
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The General Assembly deplored both US interventions. The Indian and Vietnamese 
interventions also arouse substantial negative reaction in the UN, expressed in the 
subsequent resolutions. However, since none of these interventions were officially 
and directly justified on humanitarian grounds, for purposes of appraising the legal 
status of humanitarian intervention, authoritative condemnation by the UN can be 
disregarded as not relevant. Rather, these examples are significant in demonstrating 
state behavior and statements, and in shedding light on the opinio juris of states. In 
this respect, the reactions to interventions, which arguably resulted in the 
advancement of human rights in the target states, evince intolerance of interventions 
on the basis of a state’s domestic conduct. Moreover, the reluctance on the part of the 
intervening states to claim a right of humanitarian intervention further illustrates the 
states’ skepticism regarding the permissibility of humanitarian intervention as well 
concerns with the possible erosion of “the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention
by conceding such a right to individual states'»?65
2.3 . RECENT NTERVENTIONS JUSTIFIED IN HUMANITARIAN TERMS
2 .3 .1 . Hiimamtariaii Interventions Without UN Authorization
The most relevant cases for the purposes of this chapter are those unilateral military 
interventions undertaken with express humanitarian purposes. In this context, two 
cases merit close examination: the allied intervention in Iraq in 1991 and the NATO 
intervention in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Kosovo in 1999. The question is
65 Hedley Bull, “Conclusion” in Bull (ed.), In terv^ ^ n  in World Politics, 193.
whether some parameters were set by the UN reactions to these particular instances 
of military interventions that might lead to gradual legitimation of forcible 
humanitarian interventions by a group of states outside any authorization by the 
Security Council.
2 .3 .1 .1 . The Allied Intervention in Iraq (1991)
The debate over the legality of the unilateral humanitarian intervention revived with 
the allied operation in northern Iraq in April 1991, which aimed at creating a safe 
haven for the Kurdish people, who fled across the nearest borders into Turkey and 
Iran, in the face of a brutal military campaign launched by the Iraqi government in 
order to crush the Kurdish uprising in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War in 
1991.^ ® On 8 April 1991, the European Union (EU) endorsed a plan, put forward by 
the UK Prime Minister John Major, for the creation of a UN ‘enclave’ in northern 
Iraq to protect Kurds from further attacks by the Iraqi govemment.^^ Initially staying 
aloof to the idea,® on 11 April, the US President Buish denied that there was 
disagreement between the US and its European allies over the issue of Kurdish 
enclaves. Consequently, on 16 April 1991, allied forces (US, British, French, later
“  For a concise background of Kurdish crisis and allied intervention, see for example, Jane E. 
Stromseth, “Iraq’s Repression of its Civilian Population: Collective Responses and Continuing 
Challenges,” in Lori Fislw Damrosch (ed.). Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal 
Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 77-84; Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution 
o f the Doctrine and Practice o f Humanitarian Intervention (The Hague: lUuwer Law International, 
1999), 145-147; Peter Malanczuk, ‘The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the 
Second Gulf War,” European Journal o f International Law 2:2 (1991), 1-10,
http://www.ejil.0rg/j0umal/Vol^No2/art6-01 .html.
“The Kurdish Crisis,” Keesing’s 37 (April 1991).
On 9 April 1991, a White House spol^m an stated that the US had “no position on the question of 
Kurdish “safe havens,” and a State Department spokesman said that he was unable to give the 
proposal “specific endorsement” Notwitiistanding, on 10 April 1991, the US demanded that Iraq 
cease all military activity north o f 36* parallel, and warned that it would use force in response to any
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joined by Dutch and Canadian) proceeded with establishing safe areas within Iraqi 
territory, without obtaining a formal UN authorization, and agaiiist the opposition of 
the Iraqi govemment.®^ In this respect, it is notable that earlier, the Secretary- 
General, Pérez de Cuéllar objected to the plan to deploy foreign troops in northern
7ПIraq without Iraqi permission and the agreement of the Security Council.
Nonetheless, admitting these legal misgivings with regards to the allied operation, on
16 April, President Bush stated that:
“Some might argue that this is an intervention into the internal 
affairs of Iraq. But I think the humanitarian concern, the 
refugee concern, is so overwhelming that there will be a lot of 
understanding about this.” *^
The Secretary-General’s reservation nevertheless gained ground after the UN and 
Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on 18 April 1991, allowing the 
UN to oversee a civilian “humanitarian presence” throughout Iraq.^^ On 25 May 
1991, Iraq consented to the presence of 500 lightly-armed UN Guard Contingent in 
Iraq by signing an Annex to the MOU on the condition of withdrawal of coalition 
troops.^^ The departure of allied soldiers was completed on 15 July 1991, but a
Iraqi military intaiference in international relief efforts for the Kurds. See ‘The Kurdish Crisis,” 
Keesing’s 37 (April 1991).
® It has to be noted that on 10 April 1991, the US and its allies declared a “no-fly zone” in the north 
of the 36“' parallel, followed by a second one in southern Iraq below the 32"“ parallel on 26 August 
1992. The US justified the second “no-fly zone” by referring to the Security Council Resolution 688, 
which made no specific remark on southern Iraq. See George Bush, Remarks on Hurricane Andrew 
and the Situation in Iraq and an Exchange with Reporters, 26 August 1992, Public Papers o f the 
Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, vol. 2, (Washington DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1993), 1430.
™ ‘The Kurdish Crisis,” Keesing’s 37 (April 1991).
George Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference, 16 April 1991, 
Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, vol.l (Washington DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1992), 379.
”  UN Doc. S/22663 (1991), 2.
^ B id., 6-1.
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multinational rapid-deployment force was set up in Turkey, in order to deter
Saddam’s possible further actions against the Kurds.74
The key element in justification of the allied intervention in Iraq was the 
humanitarian considerations in general, and the Security Council Resolution 688, in 
particular, which was adopted on 5 April 1991, in the Council meeting convened in 
response to the Turkish and French request for the discussion of the massive refugee 
flow comprising almost a million Kurdish in the north and five-thousand Shiites in 
the south.^ ^ For example, in defending the allied action. President Bush stated that 
Operation Provide Comfort was “consistent with the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 688.” ®^ Similarly, John Major claimed that Resolution 688 
provided the legal framework for such an intervention.^^ On the other hand. 
Resolution 688 also marked the beginning of a debate within the Council regarding 
the extent of the Council’s interventionist role regarding internal affairs of states. 
Therefore, an examination of the resolution itself as well as the issues raised in the 
Security Council during its adoption is essential in assessing its precedent-setting 
value with respect to both the right of humanitarian intervention and the 
Organization’s conception of the “domestic jurisdiction” limitation of Article 2(7).
Resolution 688 condemned “the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many 
parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences
Stromseth, ‘Iraq’s Repression of its Civilian Population,” 92.
”  See letter to the President o f the Security Council from the representative of Turkey, UN Doc. 
S/22435 (1991); letter to the President o f the Security Council from the representative o f France, UN 
Doc. S/22442 (1991).
™ Lawrence Freedman and David Boren, ‘“Safe Havens’ for Kurds in Post-War Iraq” in Rodley (ed.). 
To Loose the Bands o f Wickedness, 54.
^  Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 152.
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of which threaten international peace and security.” It further insisted that Iraq 
“allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all these in 
need of assistance.” While Resolution 688 was the least widely supported of all the 
resolutions adopted in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait/® it certainly reflected 
the growing international condemnation of Iraq’s treatment of its Kurdish 
populations.*“ From the statements in the Security Council during the adoption of 
Resolution 688, it can be inferred that the central issue in concern was whether the 
Council action to address Iraqi repression of its civilians would violate Article 2(7) 
that proscribes intervention in matters “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” 
of states in particular. For example, while explaining the Turkish position before the 
vote, the Turkish Ambassador, Mr. Aksin argued that “the scale of human tragedy 
and the its international implications” requires the Security Council “to take urgent 
and forceful action to secure an immediate cessation of the repression of the 
inhabitants of this area.” However, Mr. Aksin also explicitly noted that Turkey’s call 
for a Security Council meeting should by no means considered as interference in 
Iraq’s internal affairs and that Article 2(7) “should be scrupulously observed.” In 
this respect, Mr. Aksin affirmed Turkey’s firm support for the “independence, 
sovereignty and integrity of Iraq.”*^  Similarly, the Iranian Ambassador emphasized 
that massive refugee flows attached an international dimension to the crisis in Iraq,
™ SC Res. 688, 5 April 1991. The draft resolution was submitted by France and Belgium and co­
sponsored by the United Kingdom and the United States. The resolution was adopted by 10 votes in 
favor (Belgium, Austria, the Ivory Coast, Ecuador, France, Romania, Soviet Union, UK, USA, and 
Zaire), 3 against (Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe), with 2 abstentions (China and India).
^  Rodley, “Collective Intervention to Protect Hmnan Rights and Civilian Populations,” 29.
As to international reaction, on 5 April 1991, a NATO statement, accusing the Iraqi government of 
“massive human rights violations,” demanded that “every pressure ... be brought to bear to bring the 
Iraqi authorities to stop the repression without delay.” Germany’s Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, described Iraq’s actions as ‘genocide’ on 5 April 1991, and on 13 April 1991 called for a 
trial of President Saddam Hussein for “crimes against hiunanity.” According to reports, Australian 
Prime Minister, Bob Hawke also urged for international action to help the Kurds. See ‘The Kurdish 
Crisis,” Keesing’s 37 (April 1991).
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“threatening the security of the neighbouring countries and presenting the potential to 
further destabilize inter-State relations” in the region. Thus, he argued, it was the 
magnitude of the problem of refugees that necessitated immediate Security Council
measures.82
Those voted against the resolution, as well as Iraq, invariably argued that human 
rights issues and humanitarian concerns were beyond the competence of the Secmity 
Council, and that their discussion would violate Article 2(7). For example, the Iraqi 
representative maintained that the draft resolution in question was “illegitimate 
intervention in Iraq’s internal affairs and a violation of Article 2 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, which prohibits intervention in the internal affairs of other States.”®^ 
The representative of Yemen denied that the humanitarian situation in Iraq presented 
a threat to international peace and security, and thus claimed that addressing the 
political developments within Iraq was not “within the competence of the Security 
Council” given Article 2 of the Charter.*^ He further stated that the draft resolution 
would set a “dangerous precedent” by opening the way for the Council to address the 
internal affairs of countries. In a similar line of reasoning, the Zimbabwe 
Ambassador asserted that the situation in Iraq represented a “domestic political 
conflict,” therefore lies outside the Council’s competence. Acknowledging the 
problems caused by the humanitarian situation and the flow of refugees to the 
neighboring states, he suggested that these could be “addressed by the appropriate 
organs of the United Nations.”®^ Finally, the Cuban Ambassador was also fervent in
83
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considering the issue as interference to internal matters, and stated that the Security 
Council “simply has no right to violate the principle of non-intervention.”®^
The abstainers, on the other hand, recognized that there was an international aspect 
involved in the issue at hand. However, like the opponents, they underlined that these 
should be settled through appropriate channels. Speaking after the vote on the 
resolution, the Chinese representative, for example, explained the Chinese abstention 
in terms of the complexity of the matter, for it involved not only international aspects 
but also internal affairs of a country. Expressing sympathy “for the difficulties 
confronting Turkey and Iran” as a result of the influx of refugees, the Security 
Council, Chinese Ambassador argued, should not “take action on questions 
concerning the internal affairs of any State.”®^ For its part, India claimed that the 
Security Council would have been competent to address the humanitarian crisis in 
Iraq only if the Iraqi use of force had resulted “in a clear threat to international peace 
and security.”®® Indian Ambassador further asserted that the Council should at all 
times respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, which is a "cardinal 
principle of international relations.”®^
Finally, the supporting statements, by emphasizing the transboundary repercussions 
of Iraq’s oppression of its civilian population for international security, carefully 
balanced the role of the Security Council in the matter with the principle of non­
interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. For instance, the representative of 
Romania maintained that although the repression of Iraqi population was a legitimate
89
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international concern, the Iraqi situation should be considered to be “a special case in 
the aftermath of the Gulf War.” Therefore, Romania argued, the resolution “should 
not create a precedent that could be used ... in the future for political purposes.”’® 
Similarly, the representative of Ecuador stated that the Security Council was 
competent to take an action since the use of force was “extended up to the borders of 
two of those neigbouring countries” and the pressures on their borders caused by the 
displaced people constituted a threat to international peace and security. 
Nevertheless, he made clear that his government would not have supported the 
Council action, were it a “case of violation of human rights by a country within its 
own frontiers.”’* In a similar vein, representatives of Belgium, Zaire, Austria, the 
Ivory Coast, and the Soviet Union stressed that their support for Resolution 688 was 
by no means an attempt to imdermine the principle of non-intervention. In this 
respect, the Soviet Ambassador for example, asserted that the “sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of Iraq must be ensured.”’  ^ The US 
representative took a parallel position by affirming that the phenomenon in question 
was a specific case, which arose “in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis” and underlined 
that it was not “the role or intention of the Security Council to interfere in the 
internal affidrs of any country.”’  ^ He further emphasized that it was the 
“transboundary impact of Iraq’s treatment of its civilian population” that threatened 
regional stability.’  ^In addition to these cautious arguments, one should also note the 
British and the French statements in the Security Council, which stressed primarily 
humanitarian concerns. Britain for example, referring to the example of South
92
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AfTica,^  ^ claimed that human rights were “not essentially domestic,” and thus 
application of Article 2(7) was not relevant^® The French representative, on the other 
hand, argued that “violations of human rights” might become “a matter of 
international interest when they take on such proportions that they assume the 
dimension of a crime against humanity.”^^  Nevertheless, it should be noted that these 
arguments to the effect that internal human rights situation is within the 
Organization’s jurisdiction were raised after the vote, and thus can be assumed not to 
have played a role in the adoption of the resolution.
Overall, the arguments put forward by all states expose the ever-present tension 
between sovereignty and non-intervention on one hand, and the protection of human 
rights on the other. Insofar as the supporting states based the legitimacy of the 
Security Council action with regard to an internal matter on the ‘outcomes’ of the 
Iraqi treatment of its population, and took a rather cautious approach by emphasizing 
the principle of non-intervention and by characterizing the situation as a ‘special’ 
case, their arguments do not appear to be dissimilar to those advanced by the 
opposing states in essence. More precisely, it can be argued that states do not seem to
The treatment of people o f Indian origin in South Africa and later the wider question o f apartheid 
became subjects of discussion in the General Assembly as early as 1946 and 1952. The Security 
Council did not find a general threat to the peace by the apa^eid regime in South Africa, but 
recognized that the situation in South Africa had “led to international friction,” which, “if continued, 
might endanger international peace and security.” SC Res. 134, 1 April 1960. The Council adopted 
many resolutions of a recommendatory nature in relation to the system of apartheid in South Africa, 
including a call for voluntary arms embargo. SC Res. 569, 26 July 1985. It is interesting to note that 
during the consideration o f the situation in South Africa in 1960, Britain and France, as opposed to 
their positions in the case o f Iraq in 1991, argued that the issues in question were within South 
Africa’s domestic jurisdiction, and thus outside the Council’s purview. See UN Yearbook (1960), 143. 
For the Security Council actions regarding the apardieid regime in South Africa, see Sydney D. 
Bailey, The UN Security Council and Human Rights (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 9-13.
UN Doc. S/PV.2982 (1991), 64-65. In response to the apartheid system in South Africa, the 
Security Council, invoking Chaptm* VII, imposed a mandatory embargo on military and nuclear 
collaboration with South Africa in 1977. See SC Res. 418 ,4  November 1977.
”  UN Doc. S/PV.2982 (1991), 53.-
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view violations of human rights in itself as a situation that warrants a Council action. 
This is also evident in the language of Resolution 688. While condenming the 
internal repression of civilian population, the resolution explicitly places the human 
rights crisis in perspective by deeming “its external consequences” as constituting a 
threat to international peace and security.^ ® Thus, Resolution 688 cannot be taken to 
authenticate the internal human rights violations, without international repercussions, 
as threats to international peace and security.^ As a result, it appears that the external 
implications, rather than the human rights violations themselves, constituted the main 
argument in overcoming the limitation of “domestic jurisdiction” in Article 2(7) and 
condemning Iraq with respect to its internal policies. Nevertheless, one can argue 
that the significance of Resolution 688 in connection to Article 2(7) lies in the fact 
that it represents the first time, other than the case of South Africa, that the Security 
Council had demanded betterment in the human rights situation of a member state as
a contribution to the improvement of international security. 100
On the other hand, despite the language of a threat to “international peace and 
security” -the principal terminology that enables enforcement action under Chapter 
VII- Resolution 688 was not explicitly invoked under Chapter Vn and did not 
authorize military enforcement action as such. Thus, although the resolution 
requested Iraq to allow a humanitarian mission on its territory, it remains doubtful 
whether its terms could authorize a third state intervention in hnq without its 
consent. Given the narrow scope of the resolution with no mention of collective
”  See the first operative paragraph of SC Res. 688,5 April 1991.
For a similar view, see for example, Malanczuk, ‘The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the 
Aftermath of the Second Grdf War,” 4.
See the second operative paragraph of SC Res. 688,5 April 1991.
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enforcement measures. Resolution 688 cannot be regarded as evincing the UN’s
endorsement of unilateral military intervention for humanitarian purposes.
Furthermore, with the exception of those of Britain and France, none of the views
expressed in the Council suggests a right of humanitarian intervention or an
international duty to redress human rights violations. The cautious wording of the
statements and the absence of an unequivocal reference to a right of humanitarian
intervention may be interpreted as the states’ uneasiness with the probability of
setting a precedent in this regard -a  point which was in fact underlined explicitly by
some states. Therefore, it remains doubtful whether the allied powers would have
undertaken a military intervention for humanitarian concerns, had the violations of
human rights occurred in any other circumstances than as a result of the Gulf War.
For that matter, it should be recalled that the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against
the Kurds in 1987, which resulted in the death of 180,000 people did not bring about
a similar humanitarian reaction. In this respect, Roberts notes:
“The action [Operation Provide Comfort] happened in the 
immediate aftermath of a war, in circumstances in which the 
coalition powers had considerable reason to feel responsible 
for the plight of the refugees.” “^^
Consequently, it will not be wrong to argue that given its limited legal basis, and the 
special circumstances under which it was undertaken, the allied intervention by no 
means signifies a turning-point in the permissibility of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention.^“^  Rather, one can argue that the significance of the Council action and
Adam Roberts, “Hximanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights,” International 
Affairs 69:3 (1993), 437. Roberts expresses the same view elsewhere. See Roberts, Humanitarian 
Action in War, 25.
In this respect, James Mayall concludes that: “it would be imprudent in practice, and wrong in 
theory, to generalize from the international obligations towards the Kurds in favour o f an intranational 
enforcement mechanism for human rights wherever they are abused.” Similarly, Freedman and Boren 
warn that “it would be unwise to build on the safe havens case,” while Rodley notes Resolution 688 
“is a fragile straw in the wind for future action.” James Mayall, “Non-intervention, Self-determination
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the following allied action essentially lies in altering the tenns of the debate on 
forcible humanitarian intervention, for it led to a shift from Article 2(4) to Article 
2(7) as the main focus of discussion/®^
Finally, it must be pointed out that thus far, no Security Council member, who had 
voted in favor of Resolution 688, publicly questioned whether the Operation Provide 
Comfort was in accord with the resolution/®^ In addition, there was no General 
Assembly resolution issued, condemning the allied intervention in Iraq. However, 
interpreting the absence of a negative UN reaction as a sign of tacit endorsement of 
the allied operation as a permissible humanitarian intervention does not appear 
plausible in this case, considering the eventual UN’s sponsorship of the mission and 
the consent given by the Iraqi government. In this respect, the following observation 
by Shaw remains enlightening:
“It is not inconceivable that in some situations the 
international community might refrain from adopting a 
condemnatory stand where large numbers of lives have been 
saved in circumstances of gross oppression by a state of its 
citizens due to an outside intervention. This does not, of 
course, mean that it constitutes a legitimate principle of
international law; .105
and the ‘New World Order’,” International Affairs 67:3 (1991), 428; Freedman and Boren, ‘“Safe 
Havens’ for Kurds in Post-War Iraq,” 83; Rodley, “Collective Intervention to Protect Hmnan Rights 
and Civilian Populations,” 79. For an opposite view that Resolution 688 and the action that followed 
was a watershed, see for example Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, “Sovereignty is No Longer 
Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention,” Ethics and International Affairs 6 (1992), 96. For 
a more cautious conclusion that “international law no longer forbids military intervention altogether,” 
see Christopher Greenwood, “Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?,” The World Today 49:2 
(1993), 40.
Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Hunumitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: 
A Reconceptualization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 79.
Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 140.
Malcolm N. Shaw, Intematiorud Law (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited, 1991), 725.
255
2 .3 .1 .2 . NATO intervention in F^eral Republic of Yugoslavia/Kosovo (1999)
One other representative case of unilateral humanitarian intervention without 
authorization is NATO’s intervention in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 
response to atrocities carried out by the Milosevic regime in Kosovo. The tension in 
Kosovo reached its peak in February 1998, when the Serbian authorities launched a 
violent onslaught against the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK).*°® The 
continuation of the conflict raised strong international condemnation and started a 
debate in the West whether force should be threatened or used to prevent another 
tragedy in the Balkans.^ ®  ^ The first Security Council resolution regarding Kosovo 
was adopted in March 1998. By this resolution, the Council imposed an arms 
embargo on both parties, and called upon the FRY and the leadership of Kosovar 
Albanians to enter into meaningful dialogue for a peaceful settlement of internal 
strife.^ ®* Although no member voted against the resolution, Russia and China (who 
abstained) expressed their reservations about the resolution, which in their view, 
constituted intervention in the matters within the “domestic jurisdiction.” The 
Russian representative stated that Russia had regarded “recent events in Kosovo as 
the internal affair of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”’®^ China supported this in 
its statement, and added that were the Security Council to intervene in ethnic affairs 
within states “without a request from the country concerned, it may set a bad
On the history o f Kosovo and its rule by Serbia, see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History 
(London: Macmillan, 1998). For the background of the conflict, see Lawrence Freedman, “Victims 
and Victors: Reflections on the Kosovo War,” Review o f International Studies 26:3 (2000), 345-348. 
Also, “Ongoing Conflict in Kosovo,” Keesing’s 44 (January 1998); “Start o f Violence,” “Serious 
Unrest in Kosovo,” “Continued Serb Crackdown,” Keesing’s 44 (March 1998).
For the immediate reaction to Serbian attacks, see “Immediate Reaction to Killings,” Keesing’s 44 
(March 1998).
*®* SC Res. 1160, 31 March 1998. For other sanctions imposed by the Contact Group and the EU, see 
“Imposition o f UN’s Arms Embargo on FRY -  Other Sanctions,” Keesing’s 44 (April 1998).
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precedent and gave wider negative impacts.”“ ® In contrast to this position, majority 
of the states were of the view that the human rights violations in Kosovo had given 
rise to legitimate international concern, and thus no longer could be described as an 
“internal mattor,” which in turn justified the Security Council’s invoking the powers 
granted to it under Chapter V n.“ * However, no state lent support to the secessionist 
claims of the Kosovar Albanians and the resolution reaffirmed the territorial integrity 
of the FRY.
In September 1998, in response to the growing civilian casualties,“  ^ the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1199, which “affirm[ed] that the deterioration of the 
situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region” and, 
under Chapter VII, demanded a ceasefire and action to improve the humanitarian 
situation.“  ^ The Council warned that “should the concrete measures demanded in 
this resolution not be taken, [it would] consider further action and additional 
measures to maintain and restore peace and stability in the region.” Russia 
reluctantly approved the resolution, but speaking before the vote, it underlined that 
this resolution did not authorize military action against the FRY.“ '^  Also speaking 
before the vote, the Chinese representative asserted that China could not support the 
draft resolution, since it did not view “the situation in Kosovo as a threat to 
international peace and security.” He reitCTated that Council’s involvement in a 
dispute without a request by the country in question “would cerate a bad precedent.”
UN Doc. S/PV.3868 (1998), 10.
Ibid., 11-12.
See generally, UN Doc. S/PV.3868 (1998).
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For the details of the developments in Kosoyo after the imposition o f arms embargo, see “Other 
Kosovo Developments” (May 1998); “Continued Violence in Kosovo” (July 1998); “Serbian Military 
Offensive in Kosovo” (July 1998); “Continued Fighting in Kosovo” (August 1998), Keesing’s  44..
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He further argued that the draft resolution had invoked Chapter Vn “all too 
indiscreetly in order to threaten FRY.”“ ^
Attempts at bringing about a negotiated withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo, 
backed by repeated threats of NATO military strikes against the FRY,“  ^ were 
obstructed by Serbian President Milosevic.“  ^ On 13 October 1998, NATO finally 
approved action for air strikes and justified it in terms of Resolution 1199. bi a press 
conference at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the then NATO Secretary-General 
Javier Solana declared:
“The Allies believe that in the particular circumstances with 
respect to the present crisis in Kosovo as described in UNSC 
[UN Security Council] Resolution 1199, there are legitimate 
groimds for the Alliance to threaten, and if necessary, to use
force »118
However, it’s clear from the statements of Russia, China and the United States 
during the adoption of Resolution 1203 in October 1998, that the issue of the use of 
force remained highly troublesome. The resolution reiterated the Council’s earlier 
resolutions on Kosovo, and passed by thirteen votes, with Russia and China 
abstaining. During its adoption, while the US asserted that NATO “had the 
authority, the will and the means to resolve the issue,”^^® Russia emphasized that the 
resolution did not contain any provision that “would directly or indirectly sanction
UN Doc. S/PV.3930 (1998), 3.114
Ibid., 3-4.
The West warned Milosevic as early as June to end the fighting in Kosovo. “Protests Over 
Violence -  Show of Force by NATO” (July 1998); “Show of Force by NATO” (August 1998), 
Keesing’s 44.
See “Preparations for Military Strikes -  Diplomatic Efforts” (October 1998), Keesing’s 44.
Javier Solana, Press Conference at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, 13 October 1998, 
htq>://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981013b.hm.
SC Res. 1203,24 October 1998.
UN Doc. S/PV.3937 (1998), 15.
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the automatic use of force.”^^  ^ Similarly, China maintained that NATO’s activation 
order was a regrettable development, because “the decision was made unilaterally, 
without consulting the Security Council or seeking its authorization,” and this 
“created an extremely dangerous precedent in international relations.” The Chinese 
representative further expressed that the resolution adopted did not “entail any 
authorization to use force or threaten to use force against the FRY.”'^  ^The issue of 
NATO’s authority to take military action against the FRY appeared to be disturbing 
to other Council membera as well, who in supporting the resolution voiced strong 
concerns regarding the legal basis of any NATO military action. For example, Costa 
Rica argued that “any action which implies the use of force -with the very limited 
exception of the right of legitimate defense- requires clear authorization by the 
Security Council for each specific case.” He further asserted that “the Security 
Council alone can determine whether there has been a violation of its resolutions” 
and “can authorize the use of force to ensure compliance with its resolutions.”^^  ^In a 
similar vein, Brazil noted that the authority to decide whether or not its resolutions 
were being complied with laid in the Security Council. In this respect, he underlined 
that the Charter allows the resort to force by “non-universal” organizations “only on 
the basis either of the right to legitimate self-defense, as stipulated in Article 51, or 
through the procedures of Chapter VEI, which imposes on them the obligation of 
seeking Security Council authorization beforehand.”^^·^
11.
14.
Ibid., 6-1. 
‘^ ftid.,10-11.
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Notwithstanding the opposition to NATO’s unilateral use of force without 
authorization from the Security Council, following the failed attempts to reach an 
agreement in Rambouillet in February 1999 and later in Paris in March 1999, NATO 
commenced air strikes against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 24 
March 1999.*^ Javier Solana put forward three reasons for NATO’s action. First, he 
agued, NATO acted to stop the humanitarian tragedy. Second, he noted, the failure of 
all diplomatic initiatives led to Alliance’s military action. Finally, he maintained, 
NATO acted to prevent a further destabilization in the Balkans caused by the 
Milosevic’s brutal campaign against the Kosovar Albanians.^^ In general, NATO 
governments advanced the argument that overwhelming humanitarian necessity 
justified military intervention.*^^ In this respect, the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair 
emphasized the need to protect Kosovar Albanians and contended that the choice 
was to do something or do nothing.*^* An additional argument in support of the 
legitimacy of military action was that Kosovo was indeed a threat to international 
peace and security, as confirmed by the Security Council resolutions. Both President 
Clinton and Tony Blair pointed out that a large flow of refugees from Kosovo could
See “Rombouillet Peace Talks” (February 1999); “Events Prior to Second Round o f Peace Talks” 
(March 1999); “Second Round of Peace Talks” (March 1999); “Deterioration in Security Situation” 
(March 1999); ‘Tinal Holbrooke Mission” (March 1999); “Launch of Operation Allied Force” (March 
1999); “NATO Air-strikes on Yugoslavia” (March 1999), Keesing’s  45.
JaviCT Solana, “NATO is justified and determined,” New Perspectives Quarterly 16:3 (1999), 49- 
50.
See for example the note circulated to NATO allies in October 1998 by the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, which maintains that “Security Council authorization to use force for 
humanitarian purposes is now widely accepted (Bosnian and Somalia provided firm legal 
precedents)...But force can also be justified on the grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity 
without a UN Security Council resolution...There is convincing evidence o f an impending 
humanitarian catastrophe [in Kosovo]...The UK’s view is therefore that, as matters now stand and if  
action through the Security Council is not possible, military intervention by NATO is lawful on the 
grounds of overwhelming hiunanitarian necessity.” One-page note by UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office of 7 October 1998: “FRY/Kosovo: The Way Ahead: UK View on Legal Base 
for Use of Force,” quoted in Adam Roberts, ‘TiATO’s ‘Humanitarian’ War over Kosovo,” Survival 
41:3 (1999), 106. For a discussion of the arguments advanced by individual NATO members, see 
Catherine Guicherd, “International Law and the War in Kosovo,” Survival 41:2 (1999), 25-29.
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destabilize the neighboring countries and lead to a wider war/^^ In the emergency 
session of the Security Council on 24 March 1999, Russia, China, Belarus, and India 
opposed NATO’s action as constituting a violation of the C h a r te r ,w h i le  the 
NATO governments reiterated their arguments in that the action had been undertaken 
in the face of FRY’s violation of legal obligations imposed by the related resolutions, 
and it was a response to a “humanitarian catastrophe.”^^  ^ hi particular, the UK 
representative argued that the action was justiried “as an exceptional measure to 
prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”*^  ^Among the NATO states, the 
Dutch representative explicitly acknowledged that a Security Council “should be 
involved in any decision to resort to the use of force.” However, he asserted, “if due 
to one or two permanent members’ rigid interpretation of the concept of domestic 
jurisdiction, such a resolution is not attainable, we cannot sit back and simply let the 
humanitarian catastrophe occur.”*^  ^ On the other hand, some non-NATO members 
gave a less enthusiastic approval of NATO action. For example, Gambia pointed out 
that the “exigencies” of the situation justified NATO action.*^ Malaysia stated that 
the as a matter of principle the use of force should be “a recourse of last resort, to be 
sanctioned by the Security Council,” and regretted that due to the irreconcilable 
differences within the Security Council, it had “been necessary for measures to be 
taken outside of the Council.”*^® On 26 March 1999, the Security Council rejected 
the draft resolution proposed by Russia, Belarus and India, condemning NATO’s
Tony Blair, text of British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s statement on Kosovo bombing. New York 
Times^  24 March 1999.
William Jefferson Clinton, President Clinton’s address on air strikes against Yugoslavia, 
Washington Posty 24 March 1999, A34; Tony Blair, text of British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 
statement on Kosovo bombing. New York Times^  24 March 1999.
UN Document S/PV.3988 (1999), 2-4 (Russia), 12-13 (China), 15 (Belarus), 15-16 (India).
Ibid., 4-5 (US), 5-6 (Canada), 8 (Nethwlands), 8-9(France); 11-12 (UK).
'“ /hid, 12.
Ibid., 8.
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action as a breach of the UN Charter, by twelve votes to three (Russia, China and 
Namibia).^^^ Along with the sponsoring countries, the position that NATO’s action 
was illegal was also supported by Ukraine and Cuba.^ ^  ^Speaking after the vote, the 
UK once again argued that Resolutions 1199 and 1203 determined that Milosevic’s 
policies had “caused the threat to peace and security in the region,” and that “military 
intervention is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming 
humanitarian catastrophe.”^^ *
As such, NATO did not defend its action “on the basis of a specific rule of law -even 
humanitarian intervention- new or old.” *^^  In general, the legal grounds provided by 
NATO was based on the argument that Resolutions 1199 and 1203, in which the 
Council determined the situation as constituting a threat to international peace and 
security in the context of Chapter VII, warranted military action, hi particular, it was 
held that FRY’s non-compliance with the Security Council resolutions and the failure 
of the Council to act justified exceptional measures to counter the human rights 
violations. In this sense, the central and crucial role of the Security Council in the 
maintenance of international peace and security does not appear to be challenged by 
these countries. On the other hand, nowhere in the statements was there an overt 
reference to a general legal right of humanitarian intervention, or to relevant state 
practice fpr that matter. Rather, the humanitarian aspect was raised in political and
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moral terms by emphasizing the overwhelming need to put an end to the atrocities 
committed by the Serbs in Kosovo. Even then, the exceptional nature of the situation 
was underlined. For example, in October 1998, when the Bundestag gave its 
approval to German participation in the NATO action. Foreign Minister Kinkel 
stressed that it must not set a precedent. In a similar vein, the US Secretary of 
State Albright emphasized in a peace conference after the air campaign that Kosovo 
was “a unique situation sui generis in the region of the Balkans.”*"^  ^Only a few states 
attempted to lay down a legal ground for humanitarian action. The Netherlands for 
example, by stating “the Charter is not the only source of international law,” implied 
that general norms existed outside the Charter. In particular, it argued that “a gradual 
shift” was occurring in international law, whereby “respect for human rights [is] 
more mandatory and respect for sovereignty less absolute.” As a result, the Dutch 
representative concluded that there is now “a generally accepted rule of international
law that no sovereign state has the right to terrorize its citizens.' ,143
Many of the non-NATO states implicitly acknowledged the untenable legal grounds 
for the action. In this respect, it is important to note that while refraining from 
questioning the legality of NATO’s action, they repeatedly underlined the exclusive 
prerogatives of the Security Council in the sphere of peace and security, and stressed
See for example the statements of NATO states in the Security Council during the adoption of 
Resolution 1244, which established an “international civil and security presence” in Kosovo, UN Doc. 
S/PV.4011 (1999), 12 (France and Netherlands), 13 (Canada), 13-14 (US), 17-18 (UK).
Declaration of the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, quoted in Bruno Simma, “NATO, the 
UN and the Use o f Force: Legal Aspects,” European Journal o f International Law 10:1 (1999), 13.
Madeline M. Albright, press confeence with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Singapore, 26 
July 1999, http://secretary.state.gOv//www//statements/1999/990726b.html.
UN Doc. S/PV.4011 (1999), 12. It has to be noted that to some extent, Canada held the same 
position. See UN Doc. S/PV.4011 (1999), 13.
One has to note that opposing Russian draft resolution, Slovenia pointed out that “the Security 
Coimcil has the primary but not exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.” UN Doc. S/PV.3989 (1999), 4.
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that it was crucial to continue to consider the Security Council as the only body 
entitled to sanction resort to force. lik e  the NATO states, however, they invariably 
pointed to the Belgrade’s decline of peaceful settlement, the extreme uigency of the 
humanitarian crisis and the inability of the Council to act, and based their support on 
moral arguments. By way of conclusion then, it can be argued that neither the acting 
states (NATO states) nor the supporting states legitimized the military action by 
referring to a legal necessity or the right of humanitarian intervention provided by the 
current international law. Rather, these states regarded such conduct as prompted by 
the political and moral necessities. Thus, the action was endorsed not on the basis of 
opinio juris, but on opinio necessitatis}'^ In this sense, it can be argued that NATO’s 
military intervention in FRY does not substantiate admissibility of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention without a Council authorization, whenever the Security 
Council proves to be unable to take action because of the veto (or prospect of a veto) 
by one or more permanent members. As to the subsequent UN reaction to military 
action, it can be pointed out that the UN had at least two opportunities to endorse the 
NATO action ex post facto. At the peak of the NATO bombing, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1239, which neither supported nor condemned the military
See for example the statements of Malaysia, Brazil, Argentina, Gabon, Gambia, UN Doc. 
S/PV.4011 (1999), 15-17 (Malaysia), 17-18 (Brazil), 19-20 (Argentina, Gabon and Gambia). 
Nevertheless, one has to note that opposing Russian draft resolution, Slovenia pointed out that “the 
Security Council has the primary but not exclusive responsibility for the maintenance o f international 
peace and security.” UN Doc. S/PV.3989 (1999), 4.
Antonio Cassese, “A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio 
Necessitatis,” European Journal o f  International Law 10:4 (1999), 796.
One prominent scholar holds that the NATO action offers “a badly flawed precedent for evaluating 
future claims to undertake humanitarian int^vention without proper UN authorization.” Richard Falk, 
“Kosovo, World Order, and the Future o f International Law,” American Journal o f International Law 
93:4 (1999), 856. Another scholar notes that “the NATO actions, regardless o f how well-intentioned, 
constitute an unfortunate precedent for states to use force to suppress the commission o f international 
crimes in other states -grounds that easily can be and have been abused to justify intervention for less 
laudable objectives.” Chamey, “Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo,” 835.
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action.*'“  At the end of the NATO campaign, the Council adopted Resolutionl244, 
which decided “on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of 
international civil and security presence.”*'*^  This resolution also did not include any 
remarks on previous NATO action, and was totally prospective in nature.*^® More 
precisely, it “did not retroactively legalize NATO’s actions but only prospectively 
authorized foreign states to intervene in the FRY to maintain the peace.”*^* Given the 
views of the states expressed before, throughout and after the NATO military action, 
assessing lack of an explicit UN condemnation of NATO’s military intervention in 
FRY as evidence of UN’s admission of unilateral humanitarian intervention or 
recognition of the emergence of a new customary rule, does not appear
152convincing.
The appraisal of the two recent cases of unilateral humanitarian interventions without 
an explicit UN authorization demonstrates that neither the states’ views nor the UN 
reactions point to admittance of the use of force for humanitarian concerns as an 
exception of Article 2(4). Rather, they validate that forcible action remains to be
““ SC Res. 1239,14 May 1999. 
SC Res. 1244,10 June 1999.
150 Julie Mertus, ‘The Imprint of Kosovo on the Law of Humanitarian Intervention,” Unpublished 
Paper, http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/student/ organizations/ILSAJoumal/6-2/Mertus%206-2.html. For 
an opposite view that Resolution 1244 effectively endorsed the NATO action and provided it the 
Council’s support, see Louis Henkin, “Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, American 
Journal o f International Law 93:4 (1999), 824-828,
Chamey, “Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo,” 835.
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prominent writer states that: “Because the Charter restrictions on the use of force are themselves jus 
cogens norms, it would take a new norm of that quality to override them. The only clearly effective 
solution would be to amend the United Nations Charter on the basis of a norm of equal status.” 
Chamey, “Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo,” 837. For the view that NATO action 
may be taken as evidence of an emerging doctrine in international law allowing the use o f forcible 
countermeasures to impede a state from committing large-scale atrocities on its own territory, in 
circumstances where the Security Council is incapable of responding adequately to the crisis, see 
Antonio Cassese, “Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?,” European Journal o f 
International Law 10:1 (1999), 23-30.
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viewed within the exclusive domain of the Security Council in line with the terms of 
Article 2(7). However, as much as one should not overrate the precedent-setting 
value of these cases for the admissibility of humanitarian intervention, one should 
not also underestimate their significance in illustrating the Council’s increased 
inclination to consider human rights issues in the Organization’s jurisdiction.
2 .3 .2 . Humanitarian Interventions Authorized Ex Post Facto
Within the state practice of humanitarian interventions, there are also those 
interventions, which were not authorized, but were nevertheless endorsed by the UN 
retrospectively, hi this respect, the relevant cases are ECOWAS interventions in 
Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra Leone in 1997.
2 .3 .2 .1 . ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia (1990)
One prominent example of Security Council’s retroactive endorsement of the use of 
force for humanitarian purposes is the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) action in Liberia in 1990. The civil strife in Liberia started in 1989, and 
by the summer of 1990, the fighting grew increasingly violent and brutal with 
different ethnic groups and tribal clans supporting one or the other of the main 
groups, which led President Doe of Liberia to appeal for assistance to the UN and
For the course of civil war, see “Suppression o f Rebellion” (January 1990); “Increasing Scale of 
Revolt” (April 1990); “Rebel Successes Advance into Monrovia” (July 1990), Keesing’s 36. The main 
groups in the civil war were AFL (Armed Forces o f Liberia) under the leadership of President Doe, 
NPFL (National Patriotic Front o f Liberia) led by Charles Taylor, a former Liberian minister, and a 
third insurgent group, the Independent National Patriotic Front o f Liberia (INPFL), a splinter group o f 
NPFL, led by Prince Johnson. David Wippman, “Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian 
Civil War” in Damrosch (ed.). Enforcing Restraint, 158-165.
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the United States. However, attempts to bring the matter before the UN Security 
Council were thwarted by the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, both of which allegedly 
supported the lebels.^ ^^ Finally, in July 1990, Doe called for a peacekeeping force to 
be set up in Liberia by ECOWAS “to forestall increasing terror and tension.”*^® 
Consequently, a peacekeeping force, known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), was sent to Liberia on 24 August 1990, under the auspices of the 
ECOWAS, comprising troops from Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, and Sierra 
Leone. ECOMOG’s force commander was mandated to conduct military
operations for the objectives of instituting a ceasefire, establishing an interim 
government, and creating the necessary conditions for democratic elections. The 
Standing Mediation Committee of ECOWAS referred to the “massacre of innocent 
civilians,” and the “state of anarchy and total breakdown of law” as a basis for its 
decision to create ECOMOG. All insurgent factions, but INPFL, were opposed to 
the ECOMOG intervention. Although Doe initially asked for assistance, the 
objectives of the intervention, which included his resignation and creation of an
Clement E. Adibe, “Strategic CoCTcion in Post-Cold War Africa” in Lawrence Freedman (ed.). 
Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 298-299.
Ibid., 306.
Lett«· addressed by President Samuel K. Doe to the Chairman and Members of the Ministerial 
Meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, 14 July 1990, reprinted in M. Weller (ed.). 
Regional Peace-Keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1^ 4), 60. It should be noted that, at the time of the request. Doe’s regime had 
already disintegrated and lost de facto control o f the country. See “Rebel Successes Advance into 
Monrovia,” Keesing’s 36 (July 1990).
It has to be noted that not all the ECOWAS countries supported the peace-keeping force. For 
example, Burkina Faso strongly opposed the intervention, arguing that ECOWAS had no competence 
to interfere in member states’ internal conflicts. Togo, Mali, the Ivory Coast and Senegal refused to 
contribute troops to the force. See “Civil War -  Sending of ECOWAS Force -  Large-scale 
Casualties,” Keesing’s 36 (August 1990).
ECOWAS, Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC. 1/8/90, on the Cease-fire and 
Establishment of ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Groups for Liberia, 7 August 1990, reprinted in 
WellCT (ed.). Regional Peace-Keeping, 67. See also, “Civil War -  Sending of ECOWAS Force -  
Large-scale Casualties,” Keesing’s 36 (August 1990).
Final Communiqué of the First Joint Summit Meeting of the ECOWAS, Standing Mediation 
Committee and the Committee of Five, paras. 6-9, reprinted in Wippman, “Enforcing the Peace: 
ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War,” 176.
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interim government, were not acceptable to him. Having occupied most of Liberia, 
Taylor’s forces (NPFL) were also strongly against the in tervent ion .Thus ,  
immediately after its arrival, ECOMOG engaged in fighting with NPFL, which was 
in control of approximately 90 percent of the country. Meanwhile clashes between 
various splinter factions continued.^ ®*
The legal basis for ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia was uncertain at best. In 
addition to the absence of a Security Council authorization. President Doe, the 
internationally recognized head of government, who initially requested a 
peacekeeping force, opposed the ECOMOG intervention, which sought to replace 
him as President. In fact, the decision to intervene made no reference to Doe’s initial 
request. Furthermore, neither the ECOWAS Treaty of 1975 nor the 1978 Protocol on 
Non-Aggression laid down a regional security mechanism to handle internal 
conflicts. The provision that came closest to the management of an internal 
conflict was contained in the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense. The 
related articles of the Protocol indicated that an internal conflict if actively supported 
by and sustained from outside ECOWAS, would be addressed within ECOWAS 
framework contingent on the request of the member state. Thus, intervention of
For detailed review of the responses of rival factions to the ECOMOG intervention, see D. Elwood 
Dunn, “Liberia’s Internal Responses to ECOMOG’s Interventionist Efforts” in Karl P. Magyar and 
Earl Conteh-Morgan (eds.). Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia (London: MacMillan Press 
Ltd., 1998), 92-98.
Karl P. Magyar, “ECOMOG’s Operations: Lessons for Peacekeeping” in Magyar and Morgan 
(eds.). Peacekeeping in Africa, 61.
Hilaire McCoubrey and Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2(K)0), 141.
Articles 4, 16 ,17,18, Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, May 29,1981, reprinted 
in Weller (ed.). Regional Peace-Keeping, 19.
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ECOWAS forces is not envisaged in “purely internal” conflicts and in the absence of
member state’s request. 164
Notwithstanding, in January 1991, five months after ECOMOG forces arrived, a 
Security Council presidential statement commended ECOWAS’s efforts to promote 
peace in Liberia and “called upon all parties to the conflict to respect the ceasefire 
agreement,” which was established in November 1990 among the Liberian 
factions.'®^ And on 19 November 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
788 unanimously, determining that the “deterioration of the situation in Liberia 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security, particularly in West Africa as 
a whole.” It further called for “a complete arms embargo under Chapter VII against 
Liberia,” and recalling Chapter Vm, called upon ECOWAS to “continue its efforts 
to assist the peaceful implementation” of the terms of the Accord signed between the 
parties to the conflict.^^^ By other resolutions adopted in 1993, the Security Council 
consistently made reference to the provisions of Chapter Vm and commended 
ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace. Finally, on 22 September 1993, the 
Security Council established a peacekeeping force, UN Observer Mission in Liberia 
(UNOMIL), in order to supplement the ECOMOG effort to restore order and disarm 
rival groups. Meanwhile, for its part, the General Assembly adopted several
Although during the creation and deployment of ECOMOG units, ECOWAS did not invoke the
provisions o f 1981 Protocol, the Ivory Coast referred to it, while explaining the legal basis of the
ECOMOG forces in the Security Council. See UN Doc. S/PV.3138 (1992), 27.
UN Doc. S/22133 (1991). A similar statement was also issu ^  on 7 May 1992. See UN Doc.
S/23886 (1992).
166
167
SC Res. 866, 22 September 1993. The resolution underlined that “this would be the first peace­
keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peacekeeping mission 
already set up by another organization, in this case ECOWAS.” Until the UN-observed elections in 
1997, various peace accords were brokered, each of which was followed by bloody clashes. 
Subsequent to the formation o f the new government, UNOMIL began to withdraw, a process
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SC Res. 788, 19 November 1992.
SC Res. 813,26 March 1993; SC Res. 856,10 August 1993, both adopted unanimously.
resolutions on the emergency assistance for Liberia, on the assistance for the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of Liberia, and on the financing of UNOMIL.*^^
The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was predominantly defended on humanitarian 
grounds. In a statement justifying the intervention, ECOWAS emphasized the 
humanitarian nature of the action, by stating that it was designed “first and foremost 
to stop the senseless killing of innocent civilian nationals and foreigners, and to help 
the Liberian people to restore their democratic institutions.”*^® Closely related to the 
humanitarian aspect was the ECOWAS express aim of restoring order in Liberia. In 
this respect, the then Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
maintained that the ECOWAS intervention did not violate the OAU’s principle of 
non-interference in domestic affairs, since the state of Liberia was effectively seized 
to exist. Similarly, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe argued that when there was a 
total breakdown of law and order, the principle of domestic jurisdiction did not 
impede intervention, for domestic affairs of a country referred to “affairs within a
peaceful environment.’.171
As to the UN reaction, at the outset, the principle aspect regarding the ECOWAS 
intervention in Liberia appears to be the lack of formal Security Council 
authorization of the use of force. While praising ECOWAS efforts for working to
completed by September 1997. The new government and ECOWAS agreed that ECOMOG should 
remain in the country to provide security, especially during return of refugees. Over the course of the 
conflict, 700.000 Liberians became refugees, and at least 150.000 Liberians were killed between 1989 
and 1995. Martin Ortega, Military Intervention and The European Union, Chaillot Papers 45 (Paris: 
Institute for Security Studies o f WEU, 2001), 34.
See for example GA Resolutions 45/232,21 December 1990; 46/147, 17 December 1991; 47/154, 
18 DecembCT 1992; 48/478,23 December 1993.
Greenwood, “Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?,” 37.
Quoted in Wippman, “Enforcing the Peace; ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War,” 182.
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bring peace to Liberia, the Council statements made no specific reference to the use 
of force. Similarly, during the discussion of the matter, the Council did not address 
the legality of the ECOWAS decision to use force in 1990, or for that matter to the 
ongoing use of force by ECOMOG against one of the warring factions in liberia at 
the time. Nevertheless, almost all delegates speaking at the Council debate applauded 
ECOWAS efforts to restore peace to Liberia. The only criticism came from 
Burkina Faso, which stated that it had “some reservations over certain measures and 
the manner in which they were implemented.”*’  ^As a result, given that the Security 
Council resolutions and presidential statements ‘commended’ ECOWAS for its 
efforts, it can be said that the United Nations did not consider the ECOWAS action 
as a breach of the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs or Article 2(4) of 
the Charter. Thus, although Resolution 788 did not authorize ECOMOG “to use all 
necessary means,” the following emphasis on ECOWAS action as a commendable 
regional effort to restore peace in the subsequent resolutions as well as in the states’ 
statements suggests that Resolution 788 was a retroactive validation of ECOMOG’s 
use of force. In this respect, the UN approach to the ECOWAS involvement in the 
Liberian internal conflict is reflected in a report of the Secretary-General on the 
matter, which states that:
“Liberia continues to represent an example of systematic and 
effective cooperation between the United Nations and 
regional organizations, as envisaged in Chapter VIE of the 
Charter. The role of the United Nations has been a supportive 
one. Closest contact and consultation have been maintained 
with ECOWAS, which will continue to play the central role
in the implementation of the [Cotonou] peace agreement.' »174
172
173
See UN Doc. S/PV.3138 (1992). 
Ibid., 33.
UN Doc. S/26200 (1993).
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2 .3 .2 .2 . ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone (1997)
Following a military coup in Sierra Leone,Nigeria  sent its forces to this country in 
May 1997 to restore law and order. Soon they were subsumed under the Nigerian-led 
ECOWAS intervention force deployed in Freetown to restore peace to the country. 
There was universal condemnation of the coup. During its Council of Ministers’ 
sixty-sixth ordinary session (28-31 May 1997), the OAU, for example, condemned 
the coup and called for the immediate restoration of constitutional order, appealing to 
the leaders of ECOWAS to assist the people of Sierra Leone in that regard.*^ 
Similarly, in a 28 May statement, the EU deplored the attempt to overthrow the 
Government of Sierra Leone and urged the restoration of democratic civilian 
government.*^* The President of the Security Council also issued several statements 
on behalf of the Council, deploring the attempt to overthrow the democratically 
elected government. The statements expressed deep concern about the continuing 
crisis in Sierra Leone and its negative humanitarian consequences on the civilian 
populations including refugees, and internally displaced persons and, in particular, 
the atrocities committed against Sierra Leone’s citizens and foreign nationals.*^^ At 
the annual summit of the ECOWAS on 30 August 1997, the heads of state and 
government of 15 members characterized the new military regime in the country as 
‘illegal,’ and called for the immediate restoration of the “legitimate government” of
For the history of the conflict in Sierra Leone, see David Shearer, “Exploring the Limits of 
Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone,” Journal o f International Studies 26:3 (1997), 845-860. 
For detailed account of the events in 1997, see “Military Coup,” Keesing’s 43 (May 1997); “Chaotic 
Aftermath of Military Coup,” “Installation of Koroma as President,” Keesing’s 43 (June 1997).
“International Reaction to Coup,” Keesing’s  43 (May 1997); “Chaotic Aftomath o f Military 
Coup,” Keesing’s 43 (June 1997).
UN Yearbook (1997), 132.
UN Doc. A/52/165-S/1997/423 (1997).
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President Kabbah and of peace and security, and the “resolution of the issues of
refugees and displaced persons.” ECOWAS authorized an economic blockade
against Sierra Leone, to be enforced by ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). It
also mandated ECOMOG to restore law and order in Sierra Leone.^ *° Although in its
statements the Security Council deemed the situation in Sierra Leone as endangering
“peace, security and stability of the whole region,”'*^  it did not authorize such action
until it adopted Resolution 1132 on 8 October, which determined the situation in
Sierra Leone as constituting threat to international peace and security. Expressing
its strong support for the endeavors of ECOWAS, the Council authorized ECOWAS
under Chapter Vin to enforce the provisions of the resolution, which included arms
and oil embargoes, and a freeze on travel by, and financial assets of, members of the
militaiy junta, in cooperation with the democratically elected government of Sierra
Leone. As noted above, however, ECOWAS had started to operate in advance of its
Council mandate. Thus, Resolution 1132, like the Resolution 788 on Liberia, served
as a post-validation of ECOMOG action. In a following resolution, the Council
further commended ECOMOG for restoring peace in Sierra Leone. Support for
collective action for humanitarian and pro-democratic grounds also came from the
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, who welcomed the ECOWAS efforts in
securing peace in Sierra Leone, and stated:
“Africa can no longer tolerate, and accept as fait accompli, 
coups against elected governments, and the illegal seizure of 
power by military cliques, who sometimes act for sectional
interests, sometimes simply for their own. ,184
™ See UN Doc. S/PRST/1997/29 (1997); UN Doc. S/PRST/1997/36 (1997); UN Doc. S/PRST/1997/ 
42 (1997).
“Annual Summit,” Keesing’s 43 (August 1997).
See UN Doc. S/PRST/1997/36 (1997); UN Doc. S/PRST/1997/ 42 (1997).
SC Res. 1132, 8 October 1997.
SC Res. 1162,17 April 1998.
UN Doc. SG/SM/6481 -  AFR/44 (1998).
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2 .3 .3 . Humanitarian Interrentions with Explicit UN Authorization
The United Nations has recently made increasing use of Security Council resolutions 
to authorize member states to use force in particular cases, whereby an internal 
situation was deemed to present a threat to international peace and security.**^ In this 
regard, the earliest example is the case of Southern Rhodesia. Determining the 
situation in Southern Rhodesia created by the rule of a white racist government as a 
threat to the peace, the Security Council invoked its enforcement powers in 1966, to 
authorize United Kingdom “to prevent by the use of force if necessary” the arrival of 
oil tankers to Southern Rhodesia.^ *® Although no military forces entered Rhodesian 
territory, Rhodesian case remains to be indicative of the Council’s view with regard
to the Organization’s intervention and the limits of “domestic jurisdiction; ,187
The most significant recent cases of such authorizations based on a finding of an 
internal humanitarian crisis posing a threat to peace and security are the US 
intervention in Somalia (1992) and the French intervention in Rwanda (1994).
It has to be noted that whethCT it is within the Security Council’s powers to adopt resolutions, 
which authorize member states to use force has been a subject o f debate among the legal scholars. For 
examination of the questions relating to the Council’s power of delegation, see Niels Blokker, ‘Ts the 
Authorization Authorized? Powcts and Practice o f the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of 
Force by ‘Coalitions of the Able and Willing’,” European Journal o f International Relations 11:3 
(2000), 541-568.
SC Res. 221, 9 April 1966. The resolution was adopted by 10 votes to 0, with 5 abstentions 
(Bulgaria, France, Mali, USSR, Uruguay).
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2 .3 .3 .1 . The US-led Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (1992):
As a result of poverty and corrupt rule, shortly after the end of the Cold War and 
following the ouster of President Mohamed Siad Barre in January 1991, Somalia fell 
into a clan-based civil war, which by the estimates of the UN in December 1992, led 
to the death of more than 300.000 Somalis, and 900.000 refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia,
Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. 188
The first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was deployed with the consent of 
the warring factions in April 1992.^ *  ^ However, when UNOSOM I proved to be 
unable to carry out its basic peacekeeping mandate, Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali reported to the Council that the continuation of the relief operations 
had required resort to enforcement measures under Chapter VII. In his letter dated 29 
November 1992 to the Security Council, he stressed that:
187 For details of the Security Council’s consideration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, see 
Bailey, The UN Security Council and Human Rights, 3-6. See also, UN Yearbook (1966), 94-110.
For the background of the civil war in Somalia, see for example, David D. Laitin, “Somalia: 
Intervention in Internal Conflict,” Unpublished Paper (Stanford University, 2001), 1-2, 
http:/www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/Projects/NIC/Laitin.htm; Hugo Slim and Emma Visman, 
“Evacuation, Intervention and Retaliation: United Nations Humanitarian Operations in Somalia, 1991- 
1993” in John Harris (ed.). The Politics o f Humanitarian Intervention (London: Pinter Publishers, 
1J995), 146-147; Jeffrey Clark, ‘T)ebacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response” in Damrosch 
(ed.). Enforcing Restraint, 207-212; Deon Geldenhuys, Foreign Political Engagement: Remaking 
States in the Post-Cold War World (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 124-131. For information on the 
state of Somalia in early 1992, see the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council on the 
situation in Somalia, UN Doc. S/23829 & Add. 1-2 (1992), UN Doc. S/23693 & Corr. 1 (1992), UN 
Doc. S/24179 (1992), UN Doc. S/24343 (1992), UN Doc. S/24480 (1992), UN Doc. S/24859 (1992), 
UN Doc. S/24868 (1992). See also, “Threat of Deaths Through Mass Starvation,” Keesing's 38 
(August 1992); “Evidence of Worsening Famine,” Keesing's 38 (September 1992).
Before the formation of UNOSOM I, the Security Council adopted several resolutions regarding 
the situation in Somalia, by which it first imposed an arms embargo against Somalia and later declared 
its concern that the “continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security.” See SC Res. 733, 23 January 1992 and SC Res. 746, 17 March 1992 respectively. 
Upon the deterioration of the situation. Security Council established UNOSOM I by Resolution 751 in 
April 1992. In August, by Resolution 775, the Council increased the authorized deployment to 3,500. 
See SC Res. 751,24 April 1992 and SC Res. 775, 28 August 1992. All these resolutions were adopted 
unanimously.
See “Obstacles to UN Efforts,” Keesing*s 38 (October 1992).
275
190 <
“The Security Council now has no alternative but to decide to 
adopt more forceful measures to secure humanitarian 
operations in Somalia.”^^*
This recommendation came four days after the US offered to provide 20,000 troops 
to assist the distribution of the relief supplies in Somalia as part of a multinational 
force authorized by the Consequently, on 3 December 1992, the Security
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 794, which recognized the “unique 
character” and “extraordinary nature” of the situation in Somalia and the need for “an 
immediate and exceptional response,” The resolution declared “the magnitude of the 
human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia” as a threat to international peace 
and security. Invoking Chapter Vn, it authorized “the Secretary-General and 
Member States cooperating to implement the offer [by the United States to organize 
and lead an operation] to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible as 
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”*®^ On 9 
December, 28.000 US troops were deployed in Somalia under Unified Task Force
(UNTTAF, also known as Operation Restore Hope).194
The characterization of Somali crisis in Resolution 794 as a ‘unique’ and 
‘extraordinary’ case, which requires an ‘exceptional’ response, was the common 
emphasized theme in the state views expressed at the time of the adoption of the 
resolution. Almost all representatives stressed the defined and limited objective of 
the operation as being the creation of a secure environment for the delivery and 
effective distribution of humanitarian assistance, and pointed out the unique and
UN Doc. S/24868 (1992), 3.
192 .cyg Offer o f Military Intervention,” Keesing’s 38 (November 1992).
SC Res. 794,3  December 1992.
See “US-led Military IntCTvention” and ‘Progress of US-led Military Operations,” Keesing’s  38
(December 1992).
276
exceptional situation in Somalia, which warranted a unique approach.*^^ hi 
explaining the US vote, the US representative underlined the peaceful and limited 
character of the mission, and expressed that the US had “no other objective,” and the 
US forces would remain in Somalia “no longer than necessary.”^^  ^It is noteworthy 
that the US also hinted a cautious attitude towards authorization of the use of force, 
by stating that cooperation among the international community in response to urgent 
humanitarian needs and to peacekeeping, should have to “occur on a case-by-case 
basis.”*^  ^While Cape Verde maintained that the repercussions of the Somali crisis on 
neighboring states constituted the international dimension of the matter,'®* Britain 
expressed that the international community did not aim to intervene in the internal 
affairs of Somali, but it could not permit “a humanitarian crisis of this magnitude to 
continue.”'®® For its part, India explicitly held that the action “should not set a 
precedent for the future.” ®^® On the other hand, some states revealed uneasiness 
regarding the authorization of the United States for undertaking the operation. For 
example, China expressed its reservations on the authorization of certain countries 
“to take military actions,” for it might “adversely affect the collective role of the 
United Nations.”^ ' Similarly, Belgium stated that it would have preferred the action
‘to be purely United Nations operation.»202
See in particular, the statements of Zimbawe, Ecuador, China, Belgium, United Kingdom, 
Venezuela, Morocco, Hungary, India. UN Doc. S/PV3145 (1992), 7 (Zimbabwe), 12-13 (Ecuador), 17 
(China), 23 (Belgium), 35 (United Kingdom), 39,41 (Venezuela), 46 (Morocco), 47 Hungary), 49 
(India).
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UN Doc. S/PV.3145 (1992), 36. 
Ibid.
Ibid., 19-20.
Ibid., 35.
Ibid., 51.
Ibid., 17.
Ibid., 24.
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Many consider Resolution 794 as a watershed for the right of humanitarian 
intervention, for it established a direct link between an internal tragedy of violence 
and starvation, rather than its repercussions for the neighboring countries, and 
international peace and security.^ ®  ^Li other words, the Council invoked Chapter Vn 
and authorized intervention on the basis of the “domestic situation” a lone.^  In this 
respect, in his Report on the Work o f the Organization in 1993, the Secretary-General 
maintained that the Security Council had “established a precedent in the history of 
the United Nations” by deciding “for the first time to intervene militarily for strictly 
humanitarian purposes.” ®^^ However, despite the novelty of Resolution 794 in 
deeming human sufiering as constituting a threat to international peace and security, 
its precedent-setting value should not be overrated, for, as examined above, states 
displayed a visible uneasiness concerning a potential for precedent-setting. In this 
respect, the use of terms such as ‘unique,’ ‘extraordinary’ and ‘exceptional’ appears 
to aim to distinguish Somalia from other cases of internal disorder,^ ®® and indicates 
the sensitivity and conscious effort of the states not to legitimize a general exception 
to the non-intervention principle. Moreover, although Resolution 794 recognized a 
direct link between the threat to humanitarian presence and international peace, that 
fact alone does not make the subsequent operation a “humanitarian intervention in 
the classical sense,” ®^^ insofar as there was no functioning central government in 
Somalia to request or dissent such an intervention of foreign forces. The lack of
^  In this respect, Adam Roberts notes that the fact that the word “humanitarian” appears no less than 
18 times in Resolution 794 indicates the reasoning and intentions o f the Council to authorize 
intervention. Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War, 24.
^  Greenwood, “Is there a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?,” 37.
UN Yearbook (1993), 51.
^  Nicholas Wheel«· and Justin Morris, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the End of 
the Cold War” in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds.). International Society After the Cold War: 
Anarchy and Order Reconsidered (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 135.
^  Roberts, “Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights,” 440.
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government in Somalia is repeatedly underlined by the states and by the Secretary-
General. For example, in his earlier report to the Council, urging for a Chapter Vn
enforcement action, the Secretary-General stated that:
“At present no government exists in Somalia that could 
request and allow such use of force. It would therefore be 
necessary for the Security Council to make a determination 
under Article 39 of the Charter, that a threat to the peace 
exists, as a result of the repercussions of Somali conflict on 
the entire region, and to decide what measures should be 
taken to maintain international peace and security.” ®^*
Similarly, during the adoption of the resolution, states pointed to the lack of a
government in Somalia. Belgium, for instance, referred Somalia as “a country
without a government, without an administration, with no source of authority.” ®^^
Venezuela maintained that the Secretary-General’s judgment that there was no
national authority in Somalia was indisputable.^’“ Ecuador held that there was no
government in Somalia to agree upon a humanitarian assistance.^”  From these
statements, one can infer states’ wariness regarding the use of force without the
consent of the target state, which would be under normal circumstances (i.e. in cases
where there exists a functioning government) considered as a violation of the
principle of sovereignty in general and Article 2(4) in particular. In this sense, it can
be argued that the humanitarian intervention in Somali was legitimated, since it was
not perceived as contravening the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention.^”
Thus, the compelling human suffering aside, the question remains to be whether such
an intervention would have been carried out, if there were an effective authority in
Somalia. Finally, one should also point to the states’ apprehension to authorize a
UN Doc. S/24868 (1992), 3.208
UN Doc. S/PV.3145 (1992), 23-24.
“^’/¿>/¿.,41.
211‘ Ibid., 13.
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member state to use force for humanitarian ends. As mentioned above, some states 
expressed their preference of a UN operation over the one undertaken by a member 
state. The express reluctance of the states to delegate authority to use force to one 
state leads to the deduction that states do not view unilateral intervention for 
humanitarian ends as ‘proper,’ even if it is authorized by the United Nations, and 
conceive such authorizations only in exceptional cases.
2 .3 .3 .2 . The French-led Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda (1994)
Another case in point is the 1994 UN authorized French intervention in Rwanda. On 
4 August 1993, the opposing sides in Rwanda’s civil war -the Hutu dominated 
government and the Tutsi-led rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)- signed the 
Arusha Accord, formally ending the fight, which had started in October 1990.^ *  ^ A 
United Nations peacekeeping force (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, 
UNAMIR) was deployed in Rwanda in October 1993, to monitor the ceasefire and 
the process of demilitarization.^^'^  However, the death of Rwandan President Juvdnal 
Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 unleashed violence once again on a horrific scale, 
which resulted in militant Hutus seizing control of the govemment.^*^ Subsequently, 
the militant Hutus assaulted both ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus, which was
For elaboration of this point, see Roberts, “Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human 
Rights,” 439-442.
For the background of civil war, see for example Bruce D. Jones, ‘“Intervention Without Borders’: 
Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990-94,” Journal o f International Studies 24:2 (1995), 226- 
229; Martin Plant, “Rwanda -Looking Beyond the Slaughter,” The World Today 50:8-9 (1994), 149- 
151.
The Security Council established UNAMIR by Resolution 872 under Chapter VI authority, with 
the consent o f the established government of Rwanda, and of both sides to the conflict SC Res. 872,5  
October 1993.
“Death o f President -  Renewed Violence,” “Carnage After President’s Death,” Keesing’s 40 (April 
1994).
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responded by Tutsis in kind.^ *  ^By the end of April, it was maintained by observers 
that around 200,000 people died from ethnic massacres and some 500,000 had fled 
the country.^’’ As fears of an unprecedented catastrophe increased, on 29 April 1994 
Boutros-Ghali m^ed the Security Council “to consider what action, including a 
forceful action, it could take, or could authorize Member States to take, in order to 
restore law and order.”^^ * By late May 1994, Boutros-Ghali determined that the 
killings in Rwanda constituted ‘genocide.’ *^^  Upon the reluctance of the Western 
states to provide logistical and financial resources necessary for the 
implementation of UNAMIR's expanded mandate,^ ^  ^ France expressed its 
willingness to intervene in Rwanda to put an end to the massacres, and requested 
Chapter Vn authorization ‘‘in the spirit of Resolution 794” (which had authorized the 
US-led UNTTAF operation in Somalia) for itself and Senegal “to send a force in
“International Reaction,” Keesing's 40 (April, 1994), Reuters, “UN Accuses Tutsi Rebels of 
Atrocities,” Washington Post, 18 May 1994, A16; D. Lorch, “In a Bleak Camp, Rwanda Refugees Say 
Each Tribe Is Joining in the Kill,” New York Times, 18 May 1994, A6.
J. Preston, “250.000 Flee Rwanda For Tanzania,” Washington Post, 30 April 1994, A l; K. 
Richburg, “Bodies Clog Rwandan River: Officials Count Hundreds o f Corpses Per Day Floating into 
Tanzania,” Washington Post, 2 May 1994, A12; ‘International Reaction,” Keesing*s 40 (April 1994).
Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1994/518 
(1994).
UN Doc. S/1994/640 (1994). By Resolution 925, the Security Council also established that “acts of 
genocide have occurred in Rwanda.” SC Res. 925, 8 June 1994. For the details of humanitarian 
situation in Rwanda in May and June 1994, see “Humanitarian Crisis,” (May 1994); “FPR Advances 
Ceasefire Attempts - Report by UN Special Rapporteur,” (June 1994), Keesing*s 40.
^  For its part, tile Clinton Administration at the time introduced guidelines for the deployment o f US 
forces for UN peacekeeping with the Presidential Decision Directive 25, signed on 3 May 1994, 
which maintained that US forces would be stationed abroad in cases where US national interests were 
at stake. See “US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” reprinted in Richard N. Haass, 
Intervention: The Use o f American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 233-245. With respect to Rwanda, the US consistently 
downgraded the crisis diplomatically and hampered effective intervention by UN forces. For the US 
policy regarding the Rwandan crisis, see Holly J. Burkhalter, ‘The Question of Genocide: The Clinton 
Administration and Rwanda,” World Policy Journal 11:4 (1994/1995), 44-54. See also E. Sciolino, 
“New US Peace-keeping Policy De-emphasizes Role of the UN,” New York Times, 6 May 1994, A l, 
A7; and D. Jehl, “US is Showing a New Caution on UN Peacekeeping Missions,” New York Times, 18 
May 1994, A l. For the European position, see S. Kinzer, “European Leaders Reluctant to Send 
Troops to Rwanda,” New York Times, 25 May 1994, A l.
The Security Council authorized an increase in the UN force in Rwanda to 5500, and expanded 
UNAMIR’s mandate by Resolution 918, adopted on 17 May 1994.
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without delay, so as to maintain a presence pending the arrival of the expanded
UNAMIR. »222
On 22 June 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 929, which recognized 
the situation in Rwanda as “a unique case which demands an urgent response by the 
international community,” and determined that “the magnitude of the humanitarian 
crisis in Rwanda” constituted “a threat to peace and security in the region.” Without 
mentioning France by name, the resolution sanctioned the “establishment of a 
temporary operation under national command and control aimed at contributing, in 
an impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and 
civilians at risk in Rwanda.” Acting under Chapter VII, it authorized “Member 
States...to conduct the operation...using all necessary means to achieve the 
humanitarian objectives.”^^  ^Consequently, France launched Operation Turquoise on 
23 June 1994 and quickly established a “safe humanitarian zone” in Rwanda.^^ All
French forces left Rwanda by 22 August 1994.225
^  Letter from the French representative to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/1994/734 (1994). 
French intervention had first been raised as an option by Alain Juppé, the Minister o f Foreign Affairs, 
on 15 Jxme 1994. Three days later President François hfftterrand and Prime Minister Edouard Balladur 
issued a joint statement giving notice of their intention to seek a UN mandate for a French 
humanitarian initiative. See “Failure to Deploy UNAMIR II -  French Intervention,” Keesing’s  40 
(June 1994); Reuters, “France May Move In to End Rwanda Killing,” New York Times, 16 June 1994, 
A12.
^  SC Res. 929,22 June 1994.
^  “Continuing Massacres and Civil War - Deployment of French ‘Humanitarian’ Force,” “Launch of 
‘Operation Turquoise’,” Keesing’s 40 (June 1994); M. Simons, “French Troops Ent«· Rwanda in Aid 
Mission,” New York Times, 24 June 1994, A l; “French Security Area,” Keesing’s 40 (July 1994).
^  K. Richburg, “French Troops Withdraw From Rwanda Safe Zone,” Washington Post, 22 August 
1994, A14.
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Unlike the unanimous support for the US-led intervention in Somalia, Resolution 
929 passed with 10 votes in favor and 5 abstentions.^ ^^ This contrast between the two 
authorized unilateral interventions, indicates that the authorized action in Rwanda 
was not without reservation. Speaking after the vote, the French representative 
underlined “exclusively humanitarian” character of the French initiative, which was 
“motivated by the plight of the people.” He affirmed that France had no intention “to 
influence in any way the military and political situation,” and stated the French 
action would end as soon as the expanded UNAMIR was deployed.^ ^^ Almost all the 
abstainers, however, agreed that UNAMIR was the most appropriate framework for 
pursing an end to genocide in Rwanda, and thus any action -unilateral or multilateral- 
should be placed within it.^ ^* While Brazil and China underscored the fact that one of 
the parties to the conflict had opposed to the proposed mission,^^^ New Zealand and 
Nigeria stressed their support for the “Council action” under Chapter VII. The 
supporting states on the other hand, emphasized the purely humanitarian character of 
the proposed action with a formulated mandate for a limited time-frame. They further 
pointed out that the grave humanitarian crisis in Rwanda had demanded an 
immediate action.^ ^° For example, Oman and Argentina specifically referred to the 
Rwandan situation as a unique case.^ ^  ^ Nonetheless, the supporting statements also 
evince an uneasy approval of the French initiative. To begin with, implicit in most of
States voted affirmatively comprised Oman, Argentina, Czech Republic, Djibouti, France, Russian 
Federation, Rwanda, Spain, United Kingdom and United States. States abstained were Brazil, China, 
New Zealand, Nigeria and Pakistan.
^  UN Doc. S/PV.3392 (1994), 5-6.
^  Ibid., 3 (Brazil), 4 (China), 7 (New Zealand), 10 (Nigeria). Pakistan did not make a statement in the 
Security Council.
From the outset the RPF made known its complete opposition to the French plan, warning that such 
intervention would be viewed as a provocation. See “ETR Opposition to French Involvement,” 
Keesing’s AQ (June 1994).
^  See UN Doc. S/PV.3392 (1994).
UN Doc. S/PV.3392 (1994), 10 (Argentina), 11 (Oman).
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the supporting statements is doubts about the true motives of France.^^ In this 
respect, the vitality of the impartiality and neutrality of the operation was repeatedly 
underlined.^^ On the other hand, the US admitted that the solution agreed was not 
ideal.^^ Also, some of the supporting states stressed their preference for securing 
consent of the two waning parties in Rwanda?^^ As a result, in the light of these 
observations, it can be argued that the case of Rwanda reveals the shaky support to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, even when there is an agreement on the merits 
of the crisis in question and there is an explicit authorization of the Security Council.
In concluding this chapter, one can argue that the UN response to unilateral military 
interventions for humanitarian purposes largely conforms to the restrictive view of 
the Charter. In other words, the view that there is no legal exception to the use of 
force for unilateral interventions on the ground of protection of human rights appears 
to be the prevailing position. More specifically, the UN practice provides a very 
weak support for any claim that the restraints of the Charter for the unilateral use of 
force “have been superseded by a new consensus concerning the use of force to 
protect human rights.”^^ In this respect, the cases of Iraq and Kosovo validate that 
UN does not give a carte blanche to unilateral humanitarian interventions, even in 
cases where it determines a threat to peace and security. At best, it admits such a
Many commentators observed that France was pursuing national self-interest in Rwanda under the 
guise of humanitarianism. See for example, Jones, ‘“Intervention Without Borders’: Humanitarian 
Intervention in Rwanda, 1990-94,” 231; Plant, ‘Rwanda -Looking Beyond the Slaughter,” 152; 
Wheeler and Morris, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the End of the Cold War,” 158- 
159.
See for example statements of the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, 
Argentina. UN Doc. S/PV.3392 (1994), 6 (US), 8 (Spain), 9 (UK and Czech Republic), 10 
(Argentina).
^ . UN Doc. S/PV.3392 (1994), 7.
See statements of Russia, Czech Republic and Oman. UN Doc. S/PV.3392 (1994), 2 (Russia), 9 
(Czech Republic), 11 (Oman).
Farer, “An Inquiry into the Legitimacy o f Humanitarian Intervention,” 195.
284
cases of Somalia and Rwanda demonstrate. This makes a profound difference in
terms of the debate, for it shifts attention from Article 2(4) of the Charter to Article
2(7), which in turn clearly distinguishes legitimate collective action from illegitimate
self-help, thus overcoming the traditional objection that a general right of
humanitarian intervention could be abused, hi this sense, it can be said that the UN
has proved to be the key mechanism for providing a legal framework for
humanitarian interventions. At the outset, it appears that the UN has extended the
interpretation of the notion of threat to international peace and security, to include
the wider purposes of the Charter. By widening the scope of “threat to peace,” the
UN has transcended the Article 2(7) restraint against intervention in the internal
affairs of sovereign states. However, insofar as it emphasized the ‘exceptional’
nature in cases it did so, it can be said that the UN has deliberately avoided “one for
all” criteria for humanitarian interventions. As a result, given the subjective nature of
the Council’s determination of threat to peace, it will be safe to say that the UN
practice in the cases examined above does not establish a general right of
humanitarian intervention. In addition, one has to recall that the UN established a
direct link between international peace and security and human plight, and
authorized military actions on humanitarian grounds in cases where there was
complete anarchy (Somalia and Rwanda), while refrained from doing so where there
was an effective government (Iraq and FRY). The fact that the UN authorized or
retrospectively endorsed military interventions in “failed” or “collapsed” states,
where consent of the host state was irrelevant (Somalia) or had little practical
meaning (Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone) demonstrates that the principle of
sovereignty and non-intervention constitute priority in its decisions to invoke
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right within its own framework depending on the merits of the case at hand, as the
enforcement actions. Thus, one can conclude that the UN is inclined to authorize 
unilateral humanitarian interventions in circumstances where the authorized 
intervention is believed to promote, rather than to undermine, the affected country’s 
sovereignty by restoring the capacity of the affected people to reestablish order.
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CONCLUSION
The principles of sovereignty -equality, independence, mutual respect and 
reciprocity- together find expression in the norm of non-intervention as the main 
governing rule of in tu ía te  relations. However, the phenomenon of intervention has 
been a prevalent factor of modem world politics. Scholars have defined intervention 
with respect to the type of activity, by reference to the type of actor or in relation to 
the target. There have been also attempts to classify the types of intervention. From 
the analysis of various definitions of interventions, this study has established four 
distinguishing aspects of intervention: First, the target of intervention is a recognized 
sovereign state; second, intervention is a temporary incident, which aims to infiuence 
the internal affairs of a state; third, intervention presumes the absence of consent of 
the target state; and fourth, intervention is distinguished from other types of influence 
with its anticipated and direct effect on the target state as opposed to involuntary and 
minor impact. In the light of these characteristics, this study adopted a definition of 
intervention that encompasses unsolicited acts of military interference in another 
sovereign state’s conduct of its internal affairs.
Despite the pervasiveness of intervention in international politics, the rule of non­
intervention remains firmly established in international law. Its intellectual origins as
a principle go back to the writings of classical legal scholars and political thinkers.
287
Among these scholars were Grotius, Wolff, Vattel, Kant and Mill, all of whom 
articulated a principle of non-intervention in internal affairs as derived from the right 
to independence and sovereignty. Nonetheless, they also established exceptions to 
the mle of non-intervention on the basis of the arguments of international order and 
stability (Grotius, Wolff, Vattel, Mill), and republican homogeneity (Kant).
Notwithstanding the eminence ascribed to the non-intervention principle in classical 
legal and political writings, the phenomenon of intervention in internal affairs has 
coexisted with the principle of non-intervention since the foundation of the state 
system. During the era of Concert of Europe, intervention in internal affairs was 
considered as a legitimate right of European conservative powers to curb 
revolutionary movements. It functioned as an instrument of great powers to promote 
dynastic legitimacy, hi this sense, the exercise of sovereign rights was contingent on 
the adherence to a certain arrangement of internal affairs. Outside Europe, European 
powers often raised a right of intervention on the grounds of treaties signed with non- 
European and non-Westem powers. Alternatively, intervention outside the Concert 
system was also defended with a liberal emphasis on the notion of assisting the 
oppressed. During this period, European powers undertook interventions in the 
Americas as well. Although the Monroe Doctrine set forth an authoritative warning
to European powers to refrain from intervening in the American affairs, the European
/
interventions did not encounter serious American objections up until late nineteenth
century. Underlining American neutrality with respect to the European affairs and a
reciprocal expectation, the Monroe Doctrine remained mute regarding the principles
governing US relations with Latin America, in that it did not forbid the US
interference in the internal affairs of Latin American states. Nonetheless, it was not
288
until the rise of its power towards the end of the nineteenth century that the US 
embarked on enforcing the principles set forth in the Doctrine regarding European 
interventions in the Americas, and undertook several interventions in the Central and 
Latin American states itself. Although subsequent corollaries of the Monroe Doctrine 
elaborated humanitarian concerns as a justification for intervention, the US 
apprehension with self-preservation was evident in the US interventions in the 
region. Despite the prevalence of interventions, the doctrine of non-intervention 
nevertheless functioned as a legal restraint and guided state behavior by providing a 
standard for acceptable and unacceptable conduct in international relations as well as 
for situations where resort to intervention was regarded permissible.
Presently and at the universal level, it is the United Nations framework that governs 
the non-intervention rule. Despite the emphasis in the United Nations Charter and the 
General Assembly resolutions on the principle, contentions exist regarding the scope 
of behavior that is prohibited. The most relevant articles of the Charter with respect 
to the non-intervention are Article 2(4) and Article 2(7). While the former sets forth 
the general prohibition of the use of force, the latter lays down the United Nations’ 
jurisdiction in relation to domestic jurisdiction of the member states.
Article 2(4) requires that states refrain from the threat or use of force in their
international relations. In this sense, it represents the most explicit Charter provision
against intervention with the use of armed force. Controversies regarding Article 2(4)
arise in relation to the interpretations of the notions of “force,” “threat of force,” and
“the frame of international relations” “territorial integrity and political
independence.” Examining the authoritative General Assembly resolutions -
289
Declaration on Principles o f International Law and Definition o f Aggression-, this 
study has concluded that Article 2(4) prohibits all unilateral use of force -employed 
directly or indirectly- not authorized by the UN. Moreover, it has established that 
Article 2(4) has a jus cogens status, and thus has universal and imperative 
applicability.
The principle of non-intervention as set in Article 2(7) differs from the duty of non­
intervention established by general international law, since non-intervention clause 
of Article 2(7) applies to the relations between UN organs and member states, and 
stipulates that the United Nations is not permitted “to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” The fact that Article 2(7) 
does not provide a specific criteria for what amounts to the Organization’s 
intervention or what is to be considered as “essentially domestic” has enabled the UN 
organs to bypass Article 2(7) “domestic jurisdiction” restraint through application of 
certain principles. The UN bodies have considered a matter, made recommendations, 
adopted resolutions and instituted missions of inquiry outside the territory of the state 
in concern insofar as an “international concern” on the matter has been raised. Thus, 
the aspect of “international concern” has removed the matter from the operation of 
Article 2(7), more specifically, brought it under the Organization’s jurisdiction. In 
this respect, the highly vague criterion of “international concern” together with the 
broader goal of maintaining international peace and security provide the UN 
considerable latitude to address the issues of domestic jurisdiction. For on-spot 
inquiries and peacekeeping operations, however, the UN has relied on ‘consent’ of 
the state in question for claiming competence. As a result, the scope of domestic
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jurisdiction has remained to be a relative concept, which is to be determined on the 
basis of the facts of each case.
Both Article 2(4) and Article 2(7), however, provide for exceptions to the rules they
stipulate. With respect to the rule of Organization’s non-intervention in domestic
affairs, the enforcement measures under Chapter Vn are the only exception. Chapter
Vn represents the heart of the collective security mechanism of the United Nations.
Under Article 39, the Security Council is designated as the exclusive body to
determine a threat to, or breach of international peace and security. Once the Security
Council determines that a threat to peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression
exist, it is allowed to embark on implementing non-military measures pursuant to
Article 41, and in the event of their failure, undertake military measures in
accordance with Article 42. As such, the Security Council is provided with a wide
discretion for determination of the existence of a threat to, or breach of the peace, or
an act of aggression. On the other hand, under Chapter Vin, the Charter assigns a
role to “regional arrangements or agencies.” By the related articles (Articles 52, 53
and 54), regional organizations are permitted to assume peacekeeping actions, but
prohibited from exercising Chapter VH powers, unless they have acquired prior
Security Council authorization. The Charter confines the role of the General
Assembly to consider and make recommendations in matters of peace and security.
In this respect, the 1950 Uniting fo r Peace resolution substantially broadened the
Assembly’s area of jurisdiction by empowering it to make recommendations on
enforcement measures, when the Security Council is unable to act. Nevertheless, the
General Assembly has effectively utilized the rights granted by the Resolution only
once in the Korean case (1951). Thus, for the most part, the practice of the General
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Assembly with respect to matters of peace and security has been confined to 
examination, discussion, and occasionally condemnation.
Under the Charter, the only exception to the general proscription of the use of force 
as laid down in Article 2(4) is Article 51, which contains the right of individual and 
collective self-defense. The most contentious issue regarding Article 51 concerns 
whether the use of right of self-defense is limited to the circumstances whereby an 
armed attack has already occurred or whether this right can be invoked in 
anticipation of such an attack. While some have read Article 51 as confining the right 
of self-defense to cases where an actual armed attack has occurred, others have 
contented that Article 51 should be interpreted as including the right to anticipatory 
self-defense in the case of an imminent danger of attack.
In short, the UN Charter strongly affirms the mle of non-intervention in internal 
affairs, and allows for only one condition as an exception to the prohibition of the 
use of force by states as opposed to fairly open-ended powers in relation to the 
Organization’s intervention in domestic affairs. Along with the Charter, the rule of 
non-intervention is also enshrined as the main governing rule in interstate relations 
by a number of G enial Assembly resolutions.
By examining the Charter framework, the study thus specified that intervention in 
internal affairs is illegal, but there may be circumstances, which may justify such 
interventions. As one distinguished British statesman of the nineteenth century 
observed:
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“Intervention is a high and summary procedure which may 
sometimes snatch a remedy beyond the reach of law. 
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that, in the case of 
intervention as in that of revolution, its essence is illegality 
and its justification is its success.”^
Within this context, the main purpose of the study has been to discover the normative 
trends in legitimization of specific justifications of military interventions by the 
United Nations. Before making a general conclusive assessment on the UN’s 
application of the principle of non-intervention as set forth in the Charter and its 
implications for the normative framework of military intervention, it is useful to 
summarize the main findings of the research.
Although self-defense constitutes the main exception to the proscription of the use of 
force, states have at times invoked this right in highly dubious circumstances. As to 
cases of military interventions justified as individual self-defense in situations where 
an internal matter of a state is claimed to constitute an external threat to the security 
of another state, the UN response was found to conform to the restrictive 
interpretation of Article 51 and the customary requirements of the exercise of the 
right of self-defense, i.e. necessity and proportionality. In all cases examined in this 
respect, the UN did not endorse the military interventions defended on the basis of 
self-defense. Although there were prior acts of aggression involved in these cases, 
the absence of an actual armed attack together with the disproportionate magnitude 
of the military responses are found to be determinant in the UN’s decline to consider 
those military interventions as acts of self-defense. *
* Sir William Vernon Harcourt, “Historicus,” Letters on Some Questions o f International Law 41 
(London, 1863), quoted in Quincy Wright, “Intervention, 1956,” American Journal o f International
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As to the military interventions carried out in collective self-defense in situations 
where the target state is claimed to be in need of assistance against an alleged threat 
or aggression, the UN is found to have given a legal status to the use of force by a 
third state, which is not itself attacked or threatened. In this sense, the UN appears to 
interpret the collective self-defense in Article 51 beyond common, coordinated 
exercise of the right of individual self-defense by a number of states that were 
individually attacked, and admits the right of states to request military assistance of 
other states when faced with foreign aggression. The contending arguments in the 
cases examined mainly called into question whether or not the internal entity 
invoking the right to collective self-defense was the legitimate government, rather 
than the validity of such a right. Thus, the United Nations appears to consider third 
states’ assistance to a state that was subject to foreign intervention in support of 
insurgents in that state as permissible. But the admissibility of such a right is 
qualified with the perception of the degree of threat posed by those prior acts of 
aggression to the target state’s security. In other words, to the extent that the danger 
to the security of the state is considered as imminent and grave, the UN admitted 
intervention in collective self-defense as a valid legal ground. The UN has also 
applied a broader interpretation of armed attack and admitted a legal basis for 
collective self-defense in response to foreign aggression by irregular forces and to 
subversion by a foreign power insofar as the military actions in pursuance of 
collective self-defense were perceived to be in line with the customary criteria of 
self-defense -necessity, immediacy and lack of no other means. In this respect, the 
UN reactions are in conformity with the ICJ’s interpretation of armed attack as 
encompassing military actions by irregular forces, as well as with the duty of every
law  51:2 (1957), 274.
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state to refrain from such acts as referred by the Declaration on Principles o f 
International Law and acts listed as prohibited forms of use of force in the Definition 
o f Aggression. With respect to collective self-defense in response to subversion and 
instigation of civil war, the United Nations is found to consider subversive activities 
as permissible grounds for invoking a right of collective self-defense, regardless of 
the difficulty in characterizing such acts as tantamount to “armed attack.” Thus, the 
UN approach to such acts diverges from the I d ’s judgment that “assistance to rebels 
in the form of provision of weapons or logistical or other support” does not amount 
to armed attack. Contrary to the broader application of armed attack under the 
aforementioned circumstances, the UN has not admitted a right of collective self- 
defense in cases of claims of collective self-defense in response to an alleged 
external threat. Thus, in this sense, the UN’s application of the right of collective 
self-defense does not permit a preventive intervention in anticipation of a threat, 
where there is no significant evidence provided to substantiate allegations of such 
threat. Combined with the element of the consent, the UN’s broader interpretation of 
collective self-defense as opposed to more rigid application of armed attack in 
individual self-defense can be said to reflect the concern with the vulnerability of the 
weaker states to militarily stronger states.
Notwithstanding the approval of the right of collective self-defense as a permissible
ground for military intervention along the lines of the customary criteria, the UN has
nevertheless raised concerns with respect to the validity of ‘consent’ of the target
state requesting assistance for collective self-defense. In conformity with the general
international law and the I d ’s judgment, the UN admits the right of states to consent
to the use of foreign aimed force within their territory. By the same token, the UN is
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found to consider ‘consent’ of the target state as an element circumventing the
general prohibition of the use of force and regard military assistance rendered by one
state to another at the latter’s request is lawful. Thus, the UN views consent of the
target state as a valid legal ground for military intervention in internal affairs. With
respect to the ad hoc invitation, the UN has rather been concerned with the question
of whether the authority delivering the request is legally entitled to do so. In this
regard, the United Nations has not judged the legitimacy of the government strictly
in terms of its exercise of real power over the totality of the territory in question.
Insofar as the inviting entity was the established government, the UN generally has
not questioned the validity of consent regardless of the government’s position in
relation to the internal conflict. More specifically, the government’s effective power
or its association with any of the parties in the internal conflict has not been a
criterion for questioning the validity of the ‘request’ in situations of internal turmoil
and civil war. M contrast, however, in cases where the constitutional authority of the
inviting entity was uncertain, the UN has questioned the validity of the consent, and
has not admitted consent as a valid legal ground for military intervention.
Additionally, the UN has also declined ‘consent’ as a permissible justification for
military intervention, when the inviting authority is perceived as not representing the
actual will of the people i.e. as one not corresponding to “internal self-
determination,” or believed to have been established by an outside force. In a similar
vein, the UN reactions to the military interventions on grounds of restoring order or
defending democracy upon the consent of the alleged “democratically elected”
government do not purport to UN’s admittance of military intervention on such
grounds. As to the consent given in advance by a treaty, in cases where the
intervening power claimed to have responded to a request made in accordance with a
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bilateral treaty (which generally provided for mutual assistance in case of an external 
threat), the UN reaction was concerned with the existence of a valid consent of the 
target state at the time of intervention. In this sense, the UN is found to give priority 
to the legality of the invitation at the time of intervention rather than the legality of 
the military intervention as arising out of the obligations of the contractual 
arrangement in question. Finally, the UN practice has not provided a definitive 
conclusion regarding the permissibility of military intervention based on a priori 
consent and against the will of the state at the time of intervention, for it has not been 
raised as an issue of objection in its resolutions concerning the only relevant 
example, i.e. the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Thus, the UN has admitted the 
element of consent as a permissible ground for military intervention, but questioned 
it as a matter of fact.
Along with the exceptions contained in the rule of non-intervention in the internal
affairs, states have raised other justifications. As to the question whether the
implementation of the principle of self-determination can be invoked to justify
military intervention, the examined cases have pointed to the conclusion that the UN
does not admit assistance to self-determination as an additional justification for
military intervention in internal affairs. Even in cases where the right of self-
determination of the people in concern is not contested, the UN has considered the
military interventions for promoting self-determination in contravention to Article
2(4). In this respect, the UN response corresponds to the general international law as
well as the principles referred regarding this matter in the Declaration on Principles
o f International Law and the Definition o f Aggression that while third states are
permitted to give military equipment and financial or technical assistance to
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liberation movements, they are not allowed to send armed troops in support of such 
movements. Thus, while the UN appears to admit “support for anti-colonial, anti­
racist, anti-hegemonic action” as an exception to the rule of non-intervention, it 
denies a general right to use force for the purpose of assisting peoples to achieve 
self-determination.
With regards to the protection of nationals abroad as a legal ground for military 
intervention in internal affairs, UN has regarded it as a permissible justification for 
intervention to the extent that the use of force complies with the criteria of necessity, 
immediacy and proportionality. The UN nevertheless has not admitted the 
permissibility of military intervention in internal affairs defended on the basis of 
protection of nationals, when such interventions have resulted in prolonged 
involvement in the target state’s internal affairs and had a political impact on the 
course or the outcome of the internal conflict. In other cases where the military 
intervention was limited in scope, scale and time, the UN did not respond at all, let 
alone negatively. Thus, the UN is found to implicitly permit the use of force to 
protect nationals abroad on the conditions of necessity, immediacy and 
proportionality, but not as a justification for extended military intervention in internal 
affairs.
Finally, with regards to the military intervention on the basis of humanitarian
concerns, neither the states nor the UN are found to view humanitarian justifications
as an admissible derogation from Article 2(4). Contrary to the prevailing general
perception, the UN practice does not lend support to the permissibility of military
intervention in internal affairs for promoting human rights. However, the human
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lights violations and human plight have at times become matters of legitimate 
international concern and given way to authorizations of military interventions for 
humanitarian ends. In this sense, it appears that the UN has extended the 
interpretation of the notion of threat to international peace and security, to include 
the wider purposes of the Charter. By determining an “international concern” and 
widening the scope of “threat to peace,” the UN has transcended the Article 2(7) 
restraint against intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In this 
connection, it is found that forcible action with regards to humanitarian ends remains 
to be viewed within the exclusive domain of the Security Council. Nevertheless, 
insofar as the UN has emphasized the ‘exceptional’ nature in cases it had authorized 
military interventions for humanitarian concerns, the UN has avoided setting 
precedents for interventions on such grounds and rather chosen to link humanitarian 
concerns and “threat to peace” on the basis of specifics of the cases at hand. As a 
result, the UN practice has not established a general right of humanitarian 
intervention. The fact that the UN has linked international peace and security and 
human plight, and authorized or retrospectively endorsed military actions on 
humanitarian grounds in ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ states, while refrained from doing so 
where there was an effective government lend to a further inference that the principle 
of sovereignty and non-intervention constitute a priority in UN’s application of the 
principles and purposes of the Charter.
By way of induction, the study finds that the UN regards self-defense and consent of
the target state as the only permissible grounds for military intervention in internal
affairs, while denies admissibility to other justifications, which cannot find express
legal ground in the Charter. In this respect, the United Nations has not interpreted
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Article 2(4) broadly so as to provide room for justifications for the use of force in 
pursuit of such values like freedom and democracy, and Article 51 as permitting 
preventive interventions in anticipation of a threat. Even in the context of admitted 
exceptions, the UN has been very meticulous to validate the facts of the matter at 
hand. The UN’s application of die principle of non-intervention is therefore 
substantially in accordance with the restrictive interpretation of the provisions of the 
Charter, pertaining to the use of force and self-defense -Article 2(4) and Article 51. 
In this sense, the UN explicates Article 2(4) as entirely prohibiting any threat or use 
of force in state relations. Regarding Article 2(7) and Chapter VII, the UN has been 
cautious not to set precedents when the matter is intervention by the use of force, 
despite the fact that it enjoys a wide latitude in determining threats to peace and 
invoking enforcement measures under Chapter Vn. By implication, the UN appears 
to interpret “maintenance of international peace and security” as the dominant 
purpose of the Charter.
In conclusion, among the three hypotheses formulated in the introduction of this 
study, the third one -by consistently declining the permissibility of unilateral 
military interventions in circumstances other than those stipulated by the Charter, the 
United Nations reactions to individual cases of unilateral military intervention have 
abided by the exceptions explicitly laid down in the UN Charter, therefore, the UN 
practice indicates substantial adherence to the Charter scheme regarding the 
prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs 
- is verified by the research. The first two hypotheses, namely:
- By consistently endorsing the justifications other than those provided in the
Charter, the United Nations reactions to individual cases of unilateral military
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intervention have made the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of 
non-intervention in internal affairs laid down in the UN Charter futile. Thus, 
the UN practice represents a complete break with the Charter framework 
regarding these rules, and,
- By consistently approving certain justifications other than those provided in 
the Charter, the United Nations reactions to individual cases of unilateral 
military intervention have introduced exceptions to the ban on the use of 
force and principle of non-intervention in internal affairs other than those 
provided in the UN Charter. As a result, the UN practice suggests the 
adaptation of the Charter framework regarding these rules, 
are not confirmed by the findings of the research. Since the UN responses have not 
lent support to justifications other than the exceptions -self-defense and consent- as 
legal grounds for military intervention in internal affairs, the UN practice does not 
purport neither to complete break with, nor to the adaptation of the Charter 
framework. The Charter system thus remains considerably unchanged with regards to 
the principles governing military intervention in internal affairs in the UN’s 
application.
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APPENDED I
MAIN PRINCIPLES IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECLARATIONS
AND
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS INVOKING THESE PRINCIPLES
PRINCIPLES DECLARATIONS RESOLUTIONS
Duty to refrain from 
intervention/ 
Obl^ation not to 
intervene in the 
internal and external 
affairs of the any 
other state/Duty not 
to intervene in 
matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction 
of any State
• Draft Declaration on the 
Rights and Duties of States 
(1949)
• Declaration on Principles of 
Intemational Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter 
of the UN (1970)
• Declaration on the 
Strengthening of ftitemational 
Security (1970)
• Declaration on the 
Inadniissibility of 
Intervention and Interference 
in the hitemal Affairs of the 
States (1981)
• Manila Declaration on the 
Peaceful Settlement of 
Intemational Disputes (1982)
• USSR -  Hungary 
(1956)
• U K - Jordan (1958)
• US-Lebanon (1958)
• Belgium -  Congo 
(1960)
• Turkey -  Cypms 
(1974)
• Vietnam -  Cambodia 
(1978-1979)
• USSR -  Afghanistan 
(1979)
• U S-G renada (1983)
• US -  Nicaragua 
(1981-1986)
• U S-Panam a (1989)
Force of arms not be 
resorted to and used 
against the 
territorial integrity 
or political 
independence of any 
state
• Duties of States in the 
Event of the Outbreak of 
Hostilities (1950)
• USSR -  Hungary 
(1956)
• Vietnam -  Cambodia 
(1978-1979)
• USSR -  Afghanistan 
(1979)
• U S-G renada (1983)
• US -  Panama (1989)
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Condemning 
intervention of a 
State in the internal 
affairs of another 
State for tile purpose 
of overthrowing its 
l^ally  established 
government by the 
threat or use of 
force/Condenming 
armed intervention 
and all other forms 
of interference 
ga in st political, 
economic and 
cultural elements of 
a State
• Peace Through Deeds 
(1950)
• Declaration on the 
biadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the 
Protection of Their 
hidependence and 
Sovereignty (1965)
• Declaration on Principles of 
hitemational Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter 
of the UN (1970)
• Inadmissibility of the policy 
of Hegemonism in 
International Relations (1979)
• Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference 
in the hitemal Affairs of the 
States (1981)
• USSR -  Hungary 
(1956)
• Indonesia -  East 
Timor (1975)
• Vietnam -  Cambodia 
(1978-1979)
• USSR -  Afghanistan 
(1979)
• U S-G renada (1983)
• US -  Panama (1989)
Respect for 
sovereignty, equality 
and territorial 
int^rity and non­
intervention in one 
another’s internal 
affairs
• Peaceful and Neighbourly 
Relations Among States 
(1957)
• Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference 
in the Intonal Affairs of the 
States (1981)
• U K -Jordan (1958)
• US -  Lebanon (1958)
• Belgium -  Congo 
(1960)
• Turkey -  Cyprus 
(1974)
• Indonesia-East 
Timor (1975)
• Vietnam -  Cambodia 
(1978-1979)
• USSR -  Afghanistan 
(1979)
• Israel -  Lebanon 
(1982)
• U S-G renada (1983)
• US -  Panama (1989)
336
APPENDIX n
UN REACTION TO MILITARY INTERVENTIONS
REACTION SECURITY COUNCIL GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
Condemnation
• Indonesia -  East Timor 
(1975)
• Cuba/South Africa -  
Angola (1976)
• Israel -  Lebanon (1982)
• USSR-Hungary 
(1956)
• Belgium -  Congo 
(1960)
• Indonesia -  East 
Timor (1975)
• Viemam- 
Kampuchea (1978-1979)
• USSR -  Afghanistan 
(1979)
• Israel -  Lebanon 
(1982)
• U S-G renada (1983)
• U S-Panam a (1989)
Define as Aggression
• Cuba/South Africa -  
Angola (1976)
Define as Grave/Ciitical 
Situation
• UK/France -  Egypt 
(1956)
• USSR-Hungary (1956)
• UK/France-Egypt 
(1956)
• USSR-Hungary 
(1956)
• Belgium -  Congo 
(1960)
• Indonesia -  East 
Timor (1975)
Impose Sanctions 
(Chapter VII)
• Liberia (1990)
• Demanded Chp. Vn 
action in Kosovo (NATO -  
FRY, 1999)
• ECOWAS -  Sierra Leone 
(1997)
Appeal to Regional 
Organizations 
(Chapter V ni)
• ECOW AS-Liberia 
(1990)
• ECOWAS -  Sierra Leone 
(1997)
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Commend the 
intervention
ECOW AS-Uberia 
(1990)
ECOWAS -  Sierra Leone 
(1997)
Refer as Foreign 
Intervention
• USSR-Hungary 
(1956)
• Belgium -  Congo 
(1960)
• USSR -  Afghanistan 
(1979)
• U S-G renada (1983)
• U S-Panam a (1989)
Define as threat to 
international peace and 
security
Belgium -  Congo (1960) 
India -  Eastern Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) (1971)
Turkey -  Cyprus (1974) 
Situation in liberia 
(ECOWAS -  liberia, 1990) 
Repression of civilian 
population in Iraq and its 
consequences (US/Allied 
Pow ers-Iraq, 1991)
• Situation in Kosovo 
(NATO-FRY, 1999)
• Situation in Sierra Leone 
(ECOWAS -  Sierra Leone, 
1997)
• Belgium -  Congo 
(1960)
• India-Eastern 
Pakistan (Bangladesh) 
(1971)
• Turkey -  Cyprus 
(1974)
• Vietnam-  
Kampuchea (1978-1979)
Define as likely to 
threaten international 
peace and
security/Concemed with 
tile implications for 
international peace and 
security
• Israel -  Lebanon (1982) • USSR -  Afghanistan 
(1979)
US/Belgium -  Congo 
(1964)
DesistiRefrain from any 
form of
intervention in the 
internal affairs
• USSR-Hungary 
(1956)
• Turkey -  Cyprus 
(1974)
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General reference to 
non-interference in 
internal affairs
Cuba/South Africa -  
Angola (1976)
US -  Nicaragua (1981- 
1986)
U K -Jordan (1958) 
U S-Lebanon (1958) 
Vietnam -  
Kampuchea (1978-1979) 
USSR -  Afghanistan 
(1979)
U S-G renada (1983) 
US -  Nicaragua 
1981-1986)
U S-Panam a (1989)
Demand to end 
intervention/Cessation 
of intervention
Turkey -  Cyprus (1974) 
Israel -  Lebanon (1982)
U S-G renada (1983) 
U S-Panam a (1989)
Demand withdrawal of 
all foreign forces
Belgium — Congo (1960)
• India -  Eastern Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) (1971)
• Indonesia -  East Timor 
(1975)
Israel -  Lebanon (1982)
• Withdrawal of FRY 
forces from Kosovo (NATO 
-FR Y , 1999)
UK/France -  Egypt 
(1956)
USSR-Hungary 
(1956)
U K -Jordan (1958) 
US-Lebanon (1958) 
Belgium -  Congo 
(1960)
Turkey -  Cyprus 
1974)
Indonesia -  East 
Timor (1975)
Vietnam -  
Kampuchea (1978-1979) 
USSR -  Afghanistan 
1979)
Israel -  Lebanon 
1982)
U S-G renada (1983)
Demand ceasefire
• US -  Dominican Republic 
(1965)
• India -  Eastern Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) (1971)
Israel -  Lebanon (1982)
UK/France -  Egypt 
1956)
India -  Eastern 
Pakistan (Bangladesh) 
(1971)
• Israel -  Lebanon 
(1982)
Demand an end to the 
internal situation
• Iraq (US/Allied Powers 
hag, 1991)_____________
• Iraq (US/Allied 
Powers -  Iraq, 1991)
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Naming the m ponsible 
party
• USSR/Hungary(1956)
• Belgium -  Congo (1960)
• Indonesia -  East Timor 
(1975)
• Cuba/South Africa -  
Angola (1976)
• Israel -  Lebanon (1982)
• US-Nicaragua (1981- 
1986)?
• UK/France -  Egypt 
(1956)
• USSR-Hungary 
(1956)
• Belgium -  Congo 
(1960)
• India-Eastern 
Pakistan (Bangladesh) 
(1971)
• Indonesia -  East 
Timor (1975)
• Israel -  Lebanon 
(1982)
•  U S-N icaragua 
(1981-1986)
• US -  Panama (1989)
• UK/France -  Egypt • U K -Jordan (1958)
(1956) • US-Lebanon (1958)
• US/Belgium -  Congo • Turkey -  Cyprus
(1964) (1974)
Not naming the • US -  Dominican Republic • Vietnam-
responsible party (1965) Kampuchea (1978-1979)
• India -  Eastern Pakistan • USSR -  Afghanistan
(Bangladesh) (1971) (1979)
• Turkey -  Cyprus (1974) • U S-G renada (1983)
• UK -  Sultanate Of • UK -  Sultanate of
Muscat and Oman (1957) Muscat and Oman
• U K -Jordan (1958) (1957)
• US-Lebanon (1958) • India-G oa (1961)
• • India-G oa (1961) • France-Gabon
• France -  Gabon (1964) (1964)
• USSR/Warsaw Pact - • US/Belgium -  Congo
Czechoslovakia (1968) (1964)
Non-Reaction • France -  Chad (1968) • US-Dom inican
• Israel -  Uganda (1976) Republic (1965)
• France/Morocco -  Zaire • USSR/Warsaw Pact-
(1977) Czechoslovakia (1968)
• France/Belgium -  Zaire • France -  Chad (1968)
(1978) • Cuba/South Africa-
• France -  Chad (1978) Angola (1976)
• Vietnam -  Kampuchea • Israel -  Uganda
(1978-1979) (1976)
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• Tanzania -  Uganda • France/Morocco-
(1978-1979) Zaire (1977)
• France -  Central Africa • France/Belgium-
(1979) Zaire (1978)
• Libya -  Chad (1979- • France -  Chad (1978)
1980) • Tanzania -  Uganda
• USSR -  Afghanistan (1978-1979)
(1979) • France -  Central
• U S-G renada (1983) Africa (1979)
• France/Zaire -  Chad • U bya-C had (1979-
(1983) 1980)
• US -  Panama (1989) • France/Zaire -  Chad
• U S-L iberia (1990) (1983)
• France/Belgium -  Zaire • U S-L iberia (1990)
(1991) • ECOWAS -  Liberia
• UK -  Sierra Leone (2000) (1990)
• US/Allied Powers-  
Iraq (1991)
• France/Belgium-  
Zaire (1991)
• ECOWAS -  Sierra 
Leone(1997)
• NATO-FRY (1999)
• UK -  Sierra Leone 
(2000)
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APPENDIX m
UN AUTHORIZED INTERVENTIONS
REACTION SECURITY COUNCIL GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
Define as threat to 
international peace and 
security
• Situation in Southern 
Rhodesia (1965)
• Situation in Somalia (1992)
• Humanitarian Crisis in 
Rwanda (1994)
Impose
SanctionsAlilitary 
Measures 
(Chapter VII)
• Southern Rhodesia (1965)
• Authorizing the UK 
(Southern Rhodesia, 1965)
• Somalia (1992)
• Authorizing Member States 
(UNTTAF -  Somalia, 1993)
• Authorizing France (France 
-  Rwanda, 1994)
• Calls upon UK to take 
all possible measures 
(Southern Rhodesia, 
1965)
Appeal to Regional 
Organizations 
(Chapter VIH)
• Calls upon Organization of 
African Unity to assist the 
implementation (Southern 
Rhodesia, 1965)
• ECOW AS-Liberia (1990)
• ECOWAS -  Sierra Leone 
(1997)
Non-reaction
• UNTTAF -  Somalia 
(1992)
• France -  Rwanda 
(1994)
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